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In late 2003 after two financial crises and many years of deliberation, the Russian 
Government introduced a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) aimed primarily at protecting 
the savings of the population. The DIS's stated objectives were to protect the right and 
legal interests of depositors, to strengthen public confidence in the banking system, and to 
encourage household savings. Recent official assessments of the scheme have been, at 
best, partial, have tended to use government statistics and have failed to establish a link 
between the banking sector outputs and the impact of the DIS. 
This thesis undertakes a detailed evaluation of the Russian DIS based on a 
comprehensive analysis of vast literature on deposit insurance schemes globally covering 
rationales for its establishment and its main features, as well as of the relevant Russian 
legislation and past attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS which were somewhat 
patchy. Adopting a cross-sectional, mixed methods approach, the study reports on the 
findings that emerged from a combination of surveys, interviews and observations 
conducted at six participating Russian banks in spring 2009. These were supplemented 
by documentary evidence from the banks and the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency. To 
facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the data, a theoretical framework was devised, 
and included a set of success criteria and impact indicators.  
The results of the analysis indicate that the Russian DIS does not appear to have fully 
achieved its stated objectives. Irrefutably, the Russian Government failed to establish an 
effective institutional and regulatory environment which could have enforced uniform 
provision of information about the DIS to retail depositors. This is evidenced by visible 
differences among bank practices in relation to the implementation of the DIS. 
Consequently, as a result of these variations in implementation, the retail depositors’ 
understanding of the DIS and its perceived impact differs depending on which bank they 
patronise. 
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“A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single 
step.” 
–Lao Tsu (600-531 BC) 
 
This thesis examines in detail a Russian deposit protection law reform, its implementation 
in the Russian banking sector and the outcome it has had on retail depositors in Russia. 
This chapter gives the background to the research, sets out the research purpose and the 
research question, defines certain terms used within the thesis, and explains the way this 
thesis is structured. 
Russian deposit protection law reform was carried out to fulfil three objectives, namely 
(i) to protect the rights and legal interests of depositors, (ii) to strengthen public 
confidence in the banking system, and (iii) to encourage household savings in the banking 
system. 
This research is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the Russian deposit insurance 
scheme, i.e. to match the outcomes to the stated objectives. It is not the main concern of 
this investigation to judge whether or not the Russian Federation has chosen the best 
way to regulate deposit protection, or to consider alternative forms of regulation of 
deposit protection that might have been used by the Russian legislator. Moreover, this 
study does not judge whether the chosen parameters of the Russian deposit insurance 
scheme are good or bad. The main purpose of the present investigation is to examine 
whether the scheme that has already been implemented has achieved its stated objectives.  
The scope of this investigation does not include an attempt to demonstrate the benefits 
and negatives of deposit protection arrangements in general. This research, however, 
does examine what deposit protection is, when a government may decide to introduce it 
and who may benefit from it (the stakeholders). Whilst a comparative legal analysis is 
2 
not the objective of this study there is, nevertheless, an account of deposit protection 
arrangements in other countries (USA, Europe, former USSR countries) in order to 
provide a broader international perspective only. This study neither identifies the 
shortcomings of the present Russian deposit insurance scheme (DIS) nor does it propose 
possible remedies and changes that would be suitable for Russia to adopt. 
The findings of this research highlight the importance of public awareness campaigns 
when implementing deposit insurance schemes. Consumer awareness of deposit protection 
is a topical issue, especially in the aftermath of the last global financial crisis and is 
currently on the agenda of the International Association of Deposit Insurers. 
1.1 Definitions 
The following key terms are used in this thesis. 
1.1.1 Deposit Insurance 
Briscoe and Fuller include only two relevant terms in Harriman’s Financial Dictionary, 
namely ‘deposit insurance’ and ‘Deposit Protection Scheme’ (Briscoe and Fuller, 2007: 
96-97). They define ‘deposit insurance’ with reference to the US federal insurance 
schemes for banks and credit unions, whilst their definition of ‘Deposit Protection 
Scheme’ refers to a UK scheme. 
Flannery uses the term ‘deposit insurance’ and states that “deposit insurance (DI) 
transfers the risk of default losses from bank depositors to the government or a 
consortium of private financial firms” (Flannery, 1992: 630). 
Bernet and Walter (2009) use the terms “deposit insurance” and “deposit protection” 
interchangeably. They define a DIS as a scheme that “<...> contains the explicit 
guarantee of an institution (deposit insurance), usually limited as far as the sum is 
concerned, in respect of a precisely-defined category of depositors of specific financial 
institutions (mostly banks or other financial intermediaries with depositors from public) 
in case of a shortfall in precisely-defined deposit classes” (Bernet and Walter, 2009: 15). 
Kyei (1995)uses the terms ‘deposit protection’, ‘deposit guarantee’ and ‘deposit 
insurance’ interchangeably throughout his working paper: 
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[t]his paper is a survey of depositor protection schemes and it is the first part of a broader 
project on deposit guarantee arrangements. <...> The paper is partly based on responses 
to a 1992 Questionnaire on Bank Supervision and Deposit Insurance <...>, which posed in 
the area of deposit insurance the following questions <...>. (Kyei, 1995: 1)1 
For the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘deposit protection’, ‘deposit insurance’ and 
‘deposit guarantee’ have the same meaning and are used interchangeably. The 
abbreviation DI refers to all of these terms. The abbreviation DIS means either ‘deposit 
insurance scheme’ or ‘deposit insurance system’, and represents a set of features and 
arrangements related to DI in any given country. 
1.1.2 Deposit 
Laurinavičius (2006: 291) argues that a ‘deposit’ is a “personal claim against the bank”, 
which means that a deposit is a bank account with a positive balance. 
Russian Federal Law uses terms “vklad”2 and “schot” to describe current and savings 
bank accounts respectively. 
For the purposes of this thesis a current account means a bank account for every day 
transactions, whilst a savings account means an account where money is deposited for a 
short or long term and certain interest can be accumulated. Moreover, the term ‘deposit’ 
means any type of bank account with money in it. 
1.1.3 Retail Depositor 
Cartwright (2001) notes that there is no universally agreed definition of ‘consumer’. 
It has always been recognised in civil law that a person who is “dealing as a consumer” 
buys goods or services “ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption” (Borrie, 
1984: 10), or “for private purposes” (Howells, Ramsay, and Wilhelmsson, 2010: 3). 
For the purposes of this thesis, a depositor is a consumer who uses banking products and 
services. There are two types of depositor, namely retail depositors who use banking 
products and services for personal use, and business depositors. Since the Russian DIS 
                                               
1 Emphasis added. 
2 Transliteration throughout this thesis follows the rules of the European Commission (2011: 85-
86). 
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only covers retail depositors, the terms ‘depositor’, ‘retail depositor’, and ‘consumer’ 
mean the same and are used interchangeably. 
1.2 International Context of Deposit Insurance 
DIS is a public policy which, when implemented, provides compensation to depositors 
should their bank find itself unable to return their deposits (Cranston, 2002; Ellinger, 
Lomnicka, and Hooley, 2005). The principal public policy objectives of a DIS are 
financial stability and depositor protection (Carisano, 1992; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Hoelscher, 2011; Kyei, 1995; Lee and Kwok, 2000; MacDonald, 1996). 
DIS is seen as part of a wider financial safety net, alongside other components like the 
lender of last resort, regulation and supervision, bank insolvency and resolution laws and 
cooperation and resolution processes (see, for example, Bernet and Walter, 2009; 
Carisano, 1992; Hoelscher, 2011). 
There are numerous features of a DIS and different regulatory and institutional 
environments, which result in each DIS being unique and country-specific. Despite this, 
international organisations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) managed to develop core principles which benefit those 
countries that consider the adoption or the reform of a DIS. 
1.3 Russian Context of Deposit Insurance 
Russia experienced dramatic and sustained economic problems in 1992-1998 (Bacon, 
2006) and, after a major financial crisis in 1998, it became clear that deposit protection 
mechanisms in Russia were illusory. Important changes in financial regulation have taken 
place since then and Butler (2003) indicates that the banking climate in Russia improved 
by the year 2000 with only 7.8% of all banks experiencing serious difficulties, paving the 
way for further reforms in the banking sector. 
Nevertheless, it was not until several years after the 1998 financial default that the 
Russian government and the banking community could agree on the features of the DIS. 
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The introduction of the DIS in late 2003 is one of the major banking system reforms of 
the past decade, and is aimed at protecting retail depositors, increasing public confidence 
in the banking system, and encouraging household savings. However, until recently it 
was not clear whether the newly introduced DIS was achieving its stated objective and 
was capable of sustaining a trusting depositor-bank relationship. This research 
commenced after the Russian DIS was implemented and followed the main changes to the 
current scheme. 
1.4 Research Purpose and Research Question 
The research purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the Russian DIS against its 
stated objectives and to identify possible problems with implementation of the 2003 
reform. 
The aim of this thesis is to address the following research question 
‘Has the Russian DIS achieved its stated objectives?’ 
The following overall objectives guided this investigation: 
• To examine the establishment of the Russian DIS and the context within which it 
was introduced; 
• To identify the stated objectives in devising and implementing the Russian DIS; 
• To analyse how the Russian deposit protection scheme has been implemented 
within the Russian banking system; 
• To evaluate the success of the scheme in achieving its stated objectives. 
To help answer the research question, the present investigation will gather data in 
relation to each of the three stated objectives and determine how far the DIS has 
achieved them. 
1.4 Interdisciplinary Research: Law and Public Policy 
According to Arthurs (1983), there are four types of legal research, depending on 
whether the research is of a disciplinary or doctrinal nature, or whether it is applied or 
pure (see Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 
Types of legal research 
 
Pierre (2006) argues that real life problems can rarely be understood by one academic 
discipline and require a certain degree of inter-disciplinary work. 
The present research fits into the “law reform research” quadrant, represented by the 
interdisciplinary and applied natures. This thesis looks at the DIS as a governmental 
programme and, thus, calls for borrowing an appropriate methodology from public policy 
studies. 
Usual legal research methods, although used in the present investigation to a certain 
extent, were deemed insufficient to answer the research question and, thus, were 
discarded at the outset. Methodologies in neighbouring academic disciplines were 
consulted and it was decided to employ an impact evaluation research methodology 
derived from public policy research. It should be stressed that even though the study uses 
a research methodology from public policy, it is a legal study and the conclusions, 
including any policy implications, have a legal focus. 
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1.5 Original Contribution of this Thesis 
A number of studies have been carried out in the area of DI which includes discussion of 
the rationale of DI, comparisons of different DI arrangements, variations in DIS design 
and the main features of a DIS (see, for example, Bernet and Walter, 2009; Campbell 
and Cartwright, 1999; Cariboni, Vanden Branden, Campolongo, and De Cesare, 2008; 
Carisano, 1992; Cartwright, 1999; Cartwright and Campbell, 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1999, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2001, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Kane, and Laeven, 2008b; Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001; Garcia, 1996, 1999, 2000; 
Hoelscher, Taylor, and Klueh, 2006; Kyei, 1995; Lee and Kwok, 2000; MacDonald, 
1996; Nenovsky and Dimitrova, 2003, 2008). 
Of particular interest are studies of the Russian banking sector (Karas, Pyle, and 
Schoors, 2010; Karas, Schoors, and Weill, 2010; Tompson, 2004). Some attempts have 
been made at evaluating the existing DIS in Russia, however, these have been 
commissioned by the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA, 2010b) and are based on 
statistics provided by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR). A few 
independent evaluations of the Russian DIS were either of a doctrinal nature or used 
CBR statistics and failed to systematically evaluate the Russian DIS (Camara and 
Montes-Negret, 2006, 2008; FSAP, 2003, 2010; FSVC, 2007; Khomenko, 2006).  
The original contribution of this research is that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
Russian DIS is based on outcomes, rather than outputs. The bespoke theoretical 
framework devised for this investigation attempts to systematically assess the success of 
the DIS in achieving its stated objectives and provides an account of different 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the DIS. 
In design and execution, the present investigation makes a number of important 
theoretical, empirical, analytical and methodological contributions. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis follows the structure set out below. There are nine chapters in total, and the 
eight remaining chapters will focus on the following aspects of the present investigation. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review  
The present work adopts a view of deposit insurance as a governmental programme, 
established to provide for consumer protection within the financial sector. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the literature on DI, consumer protection in the banking services 
market and on usual approaches to public policy implementation and evaluation. The 
chapter offers an introduction to DI as a governmental programme, including an 
overview of the history of DI and main features of DISs, worldwide. The chapter also 
looks at DI as an instrument of consumer protection, identifies possible challenges in 
implementing a governmental programme, and reviews the main approaches to public 
policy evaluation. 
Chapter 3 Overview of the Russian Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the DIS development in Russia, its current features 
and any evaluations carried out since 2004. It provides an historic account of the banking 
reforms, including the reform of DI in Russia so that the current DIS can be understood 
in a context. The chapter also outlines the main features of the current DIS in Russia, 
including its legal form, public policy objectives and mandate, its administration, funding 
and membership, and its coverage and payout mechanisms. A separate account is given to 
public awareness instruments currently used by both the DIA and by banks participating 
in the scheme. Finally, the chapter presents past evaluations of the Russian DIS and 
identifies a gap for an independent evaluation assessing the effectiveness of the scheme. 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology adopted to answer the research question. Firstly, 
the rationale for the research and research questions is introduced, and the research 
design, philosophical and methodological assumptions, and research approach are 
discussed, including the choice of a cross-sectional, mixed method impact evaluation. The 
six participating banks and the locations of the data collection, are identified and the data 
collection and data analysis techniques are presented. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the limitations and the ethical implications of the chosen methodology. 
As the present investigation involves four different data collection techniques, including a 
retail depositor survey, interviews with bank staff and the representatives of the 
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judiciary, in-branch observations, and documents, the next three chapters present the 
analysis of these multiple data sources.  
Chapter 5 Quantitative Data Analysis 
Chapter 5 focuses on the analysis of quantitative data gathered during the retail depositor 
survey (n = 942) in six participating banks. The quantitative data is analysed in relation 
to each of the three stated objective of the DIS. This analysis provides an insight into the 
respondents’ knowledge of the DIS, the extent of information provision by the six 
participating banks, and the level of the respondents’ confidence in the banking system, 
and their saving behaviour. 
Several statistical tests are used to analyse the data. Firstly, the data are analysed in 
aggregate form. Then, to add value to the large amount of data collected, they are 
examined in disaggregate form with the ‘bank’ as an independent variable. This helps to 
throw further light on any differences between the responses of respondents from 
different banks. 
Chapter 6 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Chapter 6 focuses on the analysis of qualitative data gathered during the 32 interviews 
with bank staff at six participating banks and the representatives of the judiciary. As 
with Chapter 5, the qualitative data are analysed in relation to each of the three stated 
objectives of the DIS. This analysis provides an insight into the perceptions of bank staff 
of the retail depositors’ knowledge of the DIS. The analysis also provides evidence of 
levels of depositor confidence in the banking system and saving behaviour, evidence of 
bank staff appreciation of how the DIS operates and evidence of how information 
concerning the DIS is communicated by the six participating banks to their depositors. A 
content analysis technique is used to analyse the transcribed interviews. 
Chapter 7 Document and Observational Data Analysis 
Chapter 7 focuses on the analysis of documents and data gathered during 17 in-branch 
observations at the six participating banks. As in the case of Chapters 5 and 6, the 
document and observational data are analysed in relation to each of the three stated 
objectives of the DIS. This analysis provides an insight into how information regarding 
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the DIS is disseminated by the six participating banks. A document analysis technique is 
used to examine the marketing materials and bank account contracts from each of the six 
participating banks. Similar documents from other banks in Russia are also analysed for 
comparative purposes. Data from in-branch observations are presented and analysed, 
separately. 
Chapter 8 Discussion 
Chapter 8 provides an overview and discussion of the main findings from the 
quantitative, qualitative, and document and observational data analysis. This chapter also 
discusses the data analysis against the literature on the subject. It relates the findings to 
the research purpose and the research question, and provides a discussion of the main 
findings against each of the stated objectives of the Russian DIS reform. Finally, it places 
the main findings of this research into a broader context of previous studies of the 
Russian DIS, presented in Chapter 3, and the academic literature, reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
Chapter 9 provides an overall summary of the thesis and highlights the key findings and 
original contributions to the wider academic literature and practices of impact 
evaluations. It presents and discusses the limitations of this investigation and provides 
suggestions for further research. 
Following Chapter 9, there is a list of references to the literature used to inform this 






“After all, there is an element in the readjustment of our 
financial system more important than currency, more 
important than gold, and that is the confidence of the 
people.” 
–Franklin D. Roosevelt (1889-1945) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on DI, consumer protection in 
banking services, and selected theories of public policy implementation and the different 
approaches to programme evaluation. 
Section 2.1 provides an introduction to DI as a governmental programme, including an 
overview of the history of DI and the main features of DISs, worldwide. Section 2.2 
looks at DI as an instrument of consumer protection, whilst Section 2.3 identifies possible 
challenges with the implementing a governmental programme and reviews the main 
approaches to public policy evaluation. 
2.1 Deposit Insurance as a Governmental Programme 
This section looks at the rationale for DI and its public policy objectives, provides an 
historic account of the development of DI, and reviews the academic literature on key 
elements of DISs. 
Over the past century, banks have transformed from specialised entities into complex and 
universal institutions. As financial systems have globalised, it has become more difficult 
to estimate and monitor the risks involved. 
Lastra (2006: 110) argues that “since the banking industry is inherently unstable, the 
authorities always need to be prepared to confront the possibility of crises or problems”.  
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Recent decades have seen a number of financial crises in emerging markets,3 which in 
turn, have led to the reassessment of many national financial safety nets and have 
prompted action to restore financial system stability, particularly through the widespread 
introduction of DISs.4 
Banking and financial crises normally involve problems with the liquidity of financial 
institutions which lead to retail and business depositors losing access to their bank 
balances. Subsequent decrease in confidence in the banking system and individual 
financial institutions may generate panic amongst depositors and investors, leading to the 
possibility of bank runs, ultimately resulting in the closure of financial institutions.5 
Closing down a financial institution requires a special insolvency procedure. Campbell 
(2006: 133) submits that there are several reasons for treating bank insolvencies any 
differently from the insolvencies of other types of business, perhaps the most important of 
which is the existence of retail depositors: 
The failure of a large bank will have effects which reach far wider than the shareholders 
and customers of that bank. For example, other banks may be adversely affected and a 
systemic crisis may emerge. The payments systems of the country may be disrupted to 
some extent and this can have far-reaching economic effects. <...> Joined to these issues is 
the possibility that the loss of savings by a large number of voters will have political 
consequences <...>. 
To minimise such disruption, governments set up financial safety nets, which “[seek] 
simultaneously to make crises less likely and to limit the harm suffered when insolvencies 
occur” (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven, 2008a: 8). 
A financial safety net is a set of regulations established to ensure the stability and proper 
functioning of the financial system. The components6 of a financial safety net include: 
regulation and supervision, DIS, lender of last resort, bank insolvency and resolution 
                                               
3 The series of crises started in Thailand in mid-1997, spreading to other South-East Asian 
countries and Korea in late 1997, to Russia in 1998, to Brazil in 1999, and to Turkey and 
Argentina in 2001 (Desai, 2003). 
4 During the last quarter of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
the number of countries featuring some form of explicit DI has almost tripled (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Kane, 2001).  
5 For an overview of literature on the ‘anatomy of crisis’, see Lastra (2006: 111-113). For a 
discussion about the bank runs, see Temzelides (1997). For a more detailed discussion of 
insolvency regimes (including cross-border insolvencies), see Omar (2008). 
6 Hoelscher (2011) refers to them as ‘functions’ of the financial safety. 
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laws, and cooperation and resolution processes (Bernet and Walter, 2009: 13).7 Whilst 
many authors use the terms ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision’ interchangeably, these two 
terms are different. Lastra (2006: 84-90) argues that regulation means rule-making, 
whilst supervision means oversight of the behaviour of financial institutions, including 
monitoring and control of risk-taking. 
Kyei (1995: 1) states that most countries adopt a financial safety net, consisting of four 
elements, namely “lender of last resort facilities by the central bank, deposit guarantees 
of various forms, regulation, and supervision”. Hoelscher (2011) argues that there are 
three functions of a financial safety net, namely supervision, DI, and problem bank 
resolution, and that they are in a period of transition. He further suggests that the three 
functions of the financial safety net will become more integrated in the future as the 
mandate of the DISs will expand, thus, making it fully embedded in the safety net. 
DIS is a public policy which, when implemented, compensates depositors should their 
bank be unable to return their deposits (Cranston, 2002; Ellinger et al., 2005).8 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008a) argue that the likely costs of DIS are not fully visible at 
the outset and a DIS can provide for immediate protection of depositors. Ellinger et al. 
(2005) claim that DISs can be justified on the basis that they enhance public confidence 
in the banking system and, thus, help to discourage runs on troubled banks. 
On the other hand, it is believed that DISs give rise to a moral hazard, whereby, there is 
no longer an incentive for depositors to monitor risk-taking by the banks they patronise. 
Also, there is a body of literature which suggests that the ‘moral hazard’ argument can be 
accommodated by limiting the amount of the compensation payable to depositors 
(Cartwright and Campbell, 1999; Cartwright and Campbell, 2003; Cranston, 2002; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Ellinger et al., 2005).9 
                                               
7 For more information on the relationship between DI and the lender of last resort, see Sleet and 
Smith (2000). For a more detailed overview of financial safety net and the role of DI in it, see 
Carisano (1992), Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2001), Kane (2001), Ketcha (1999), Kroszner and 
Melick (2008), and Schich (2008). 
8 Another approach to depositor protection is provision of depositor preference in bank’s 
insolvency proceedings (Cranston, 2002; FDIC, 1998).  
9 For more information on co-insurance, see Section 2.1.2.2 below. 
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The principal public policy objectives of a DIS are financial stability and depositor 
protection (Clarotti, 1997; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Hoelscher, 2011; Kyei, 1995; 
Lee and Kwok, 2000; MacDonald, 1996). 
Other objectives which can be found in the academic literature include the enhancement 
of public confidence in the banking system, the encouragement of savings, and the 
generation of competition by improving the opportunity for small banks to compete in the 
market (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008a; Garcia, 1996, 
1999, 2000; Keeton, 1990). 
Some authors argue that DI distorts competition as it creates a situation whereby bigger 
banks pay for smaller banks in the case of failure (Ellinger et al., 2005). But, there is an 
alternative view that DI provides for better competition in the retail deposits market as it 
allows smaller (and newer) banks to compete alongside bigger (and better known) banks, 
including state-owned banks. 
Whilst the financial crises of the 1990s led to the reassessment of financial safety net 
arrangements and to the introduction of DISs in many countries, the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis called for changes in DISs to restore public confidence in the financial 
markets. As Bernet and Walter (2009: 14) state 
[t]he explicit guarantees of numerous states that became necessary to protect eligible bank 
deposits [during the global financial crisis] show clearly that the present deposit insurance 
schemes were not able to meet the demands put upon them adequately. 
Such changes in the DISs shifted the focus of DI from financial stability to depositor 
protection and public awareness. 
2.1.1 History of Deposit Insurance 
In order to understand current practices in DI arrangements, it is important to review the 
history of this public policy. This section provides a short overview of the historic 
development of DI, starting from the first DISs established in different US states in the 
nineteenth century followed by a federal DI enacted in 1933, to similar developments in 
the European Union in the 1990s, to the introduction of DISs as a means of facilitating 
the move towards market economy conditions in the former Soviet bloc countries in the 
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last decade. As this thesis is focused on the Russian DIS, this section does not cover the 
development of such arrangements in other parts of the world. 
2.1.1.1 USA 
Whilst the USA was not the first country to introduce a nationwide DIS,10 it has the 
oldest functioning DIS in the world. 
The first DISs were introduced in several US states in the nineteenth century (FDIC, 
1998; Todd, 1994), but a US federal deposit insurance was not established until 1933.11 
It was created following the closure of thousands of banks “not so much to compensate 
individual depositors after a failure, but to prevent instability through the mass 
withdrawal of funds from the banking system in the first place” (Cranston, 2002: 78). It 
was believed that if depositors were protected, there would be no reason for them to 
panic, thus systemic risk could be avoided. Whilst deposit insurance originally had little 
appeal among the states, the collapse of banks focused the attention of the general public 
on banking reform and allowed Henry B. Steagall, a United States Representative from 
Alabama and the Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency, at the time, to 
promote deposit insurance, with a view to restoring the confidence of the people in the 
financial system (Calomiris and White, 1994). 
Whilst White (1998) believes that without the Great Depression, the USA would not 
have adopted a federal DI,12 the US DIS was just a part of tighter banking regulation 
provisions. As Thomson explains: 
[t]he Great Depression opened an era of increased federal government intervention into 
private markets. It brought striking changes to the financial sector, where legislation like 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 [the Banking Act of 1933] sought to compartmentalize 
financial firms and markets into distinct sets of activities (commercial banking, housing 
finance, investment banking, and insurance). This fragmentation was mirrored in 
government agencies, where a separate regulatory infrastructure was established for each 
                                               
10 Czechoslovakia was the first country to introduce a nationwide deposit insurance system in 
1924 (Garcia, 1999; Hall and Kaufman, 2003; McCarthy, 1980). 
11 FDIC (1998) states that there were a total of 150 proposals for deposit protection 
arrangements made in Congress between 1886 and 1993. 
12 White (1995; 1997) also argues that DI was a creation of the US banking system and that, 
unless there are additional regulations and close supervision in place, it is unsuitable for 
developing and transition economies. 
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segment of the financial system. The change also meant setting up two different insurance 
funds for depository institutions: one for those engaged primarily in housing finance 
(savings and loans) and another for commercial banks (Thomson, 2000: 1).13 
The DIS became effective on 01 January 1934 and provided depositors with USD 2,500 
in coverage until 01 July 1934 when the FDIC started functioning and greater coverage 
of USD 5,000 was introduced.14 
Under the present arrangements, the federal DIS covers all deposit accounts in insured 
banks and savings associations, including current and savings accounts, and certificates 
of deposit, up to the sum of USD 250,000 per depositor, per insured bank.15 For more 
information on FDIC’s mandate, please see Garten (1989).  
2.1.1.2 European Union 
Whilst there were explicit DI arrangements in several European countries in place in the 
1960s (Finland, Germany, and Norway)16 and 1970s (Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Spain), it was not until 1994 that the EU introduced compulsory 
deposit protection arrangements across its Member States. 
Since the 1986 Recommendation on deposit guarantee schemes17 was not followed in 
some EU Members States, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive 
on deposit guarantee schemes on 04 June 1992 (Clarotti, 1997; Gerster, Klein, 
Schoppmann, Schwander, and Wengler, 2004). 
                                               
13 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), created by the National 
Housing Act of 1934, was set up to insure deposits in thrifts. For more information, see Litan 
(1987: 25-26) and Thomson (2000: 1). 
14 For a more detailed account of the pre-1933 and post-1933 development of the US federal 
deposit insurance, please see US House (1990), FDIC (1998), and Kroszner and Melick (2008). 
15 The FDIC insures deposits in most, but not all, banks and savings associations. For more details 
on the FDIC coverage, visit www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits. From 31 December 2010 until 31 
December 2012, deposits held in noninterest-bearing transaction accounts are fully insured, 
regardless of the amount in the account. 
16 Norway and Finland introduced their DISs already in 1961 and in 1969 respectively, but the 
former is still outside of the EU, and the latter became an EU Member State only in 1995. 
17 Commission Recommendation 87/63/EEC of 22 December 1986 concerning the introduction of 
deposit-guarantee schemes in the Community. OJ L 33 of 4.2.1987, p. 16. 
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The EU Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes18 (the “1994 Directive”) required 
Member States to set up legally enforceable deposit guarantee schemes by 01 July 1995, 
thus laying the foundations for general harmonisation of DI across the EU. 
The main provisions of the 1994 Directive included, amongst others: (i) a requirement 
for the DI arrangements to be compulsory for all deposit-taking financial institutions in 
Members States with a few exceptions (Article 3), (ii) prevalence of home country 
arrangements (Article 4),19 (iii) a coverage limit of at least EUR 20,000 (Article 7), (iv) 
information disclosure requirements (Article 9), and (v) time for compensation set at 
three months with a possibility to extend for another six months (Article 10).20 
The 1994 Directive required that existing and prospective depositors must be provided 
with information sufficient to allow them to identify the scheme to which a particular 
credit institution and its branches belong. Furthermore, information relating to the 
amount and scope of cover had to be made available. Such information must have been 
provided “in a readily comprehensible manner” (Article 9(1) of the 1994 Directive) and 
in the official languages of the Member States. The information on the compensation 
procedure was to be given upon request. Furthermore, Member States were obliged to 
establish rules restricting the possibility of misusing information on DI in advertising.21 
The 1994 Directive left certain matters to be decided on by Member States, including the 
legal form of the DIS, the definition of an eligible deposit, the precise extent of cover, the 
type of funding mechanism to be used, the definition of an insured event and the 
calculation of members’ contributions. Whilst Huizinga (2008: 275) argues that the 
1994 Directive was “unique in imposing minimum standards of deposit insurance policies 
on several countries”, Cariboni et al. (2008) demonstrate that this autonomy has resulted 
in a divergent evolution of DISs across the EU. 
                                               
18 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-
guarantee schemes. OJ L 135 of 31.5.1994, p. 5. 
19 For more information on home country and topping-up arrangements, see Horn (1999) and 
Gerster et al. (2004). 
20 For a more detailed discussion of the main provisions of the 1994 Directive, see Landsmeer and 
van Empel (1998), Garcia and Prast (2003), Kudimova (2003), and Misita (2003).  
21 For a more detailed analysis of the information provision and advertising requirements under 
the 1994 Directive, see Misita (2003). 
 18 
The exposure of these differences in the implementation of DI between Member States 
during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis led to a re-examination of the 1994 
Directive by the European Commission. The review process commenced with a public 
consultation in 2005 and continued through the global financial crisis. As a result of this 
review process, the 1994 Directive was amended in 2009.22 
The key amendments included: (i) a two-step increase in the extent of cover (minimum 
compensation amount) to EUR 50,000 by 30 June 2009 and then to EUR 100,000 by 
31 December 2010; (ii) a requirement that depositors be informed if a deposit is not 
covered by the DIS; (iii) the elimination of co-insurance (where it was introduced); and 
(iv) the introduction of a shorter pay-out period of 20 working days from the 
determination of default with a possible extension of 10 working days in exceptional 
circumstances.23 Other amendments included a requirement that DISs should cooperate 
with each other and that more information disclosure takes place between deposit-taking 
institutions which are part of the scheme and the DIS itself.24 
Despite the attempts to increase the extent of cover and reduce delays in making 
payments, Singh and Walker (2009) argue that the 2009 Directive does not deal with 
some of the underlying issues, such as how DISs are to be funded, which means that 
Member States may still need to intervene in future crises. 
2.1.1.3 CEE and Former USSR Countries 
Following the collapse of communist regime in central and eastern Europe (CEE), the 
countries of the region have uniformly embarked upon a path towards the creation of “a 
new political and economic system which provides for economic liberalisation in order to 
                                               
22 Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 
amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and 
the pay-out delay. OJ L 68 of 13.3.2009, p. 3. 
23 According to the 2009 Directive, the competent authorities must determine that a credit 
institution is in default no later than five working days after becoming satisfied that the institution 
has failed to repay deposits that are due and payable. 
24 For a more detailed overview of the development of deposit insurance arrangements in the 
European Union area, please see Cariboni et al. (2008), Singh and Walker (2009). 
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establish a market economy” (Mörner, 1997: 5).25 Del Duca (1993) pointed to the 
“phenomenon” of eastern European countries and the USSR moving from controlled to 
free economies. 
Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2003, 2008) argue that the accession of countries from CEE 
has created huge challenges, in a variety of areas, for the EU as well as for the new 
Member States themselves. This is especially so in the development of the banking sector. 
It is, generally, accepted that an effective financial system is fundamental to the 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Thus, the creation of a solid 
banking system was of paramount importance to governments in the region in the early 
years of transition with a primary task of splitting the mono-bank system into a two-level 
banking system. 
Mörner (1997) argues that the position of eastern European countries differed from that 
of other emerging market economies like Russia, and other former USSR countries in 
central Asia, since all eastern European countries applied for membership of the EU and, 
thus, received a large-scale dissemination of knowledge. Russia did not receive such help 
and tried to create the banking system itself.26 
There are two groups of countries in the region: the former USSR countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), and eastern 
European countries from the former communist bloc (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic). It should be noted that, since 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the EU, they will be discussed as part of the new 
EU Member States. 
The accession of the new Member States from CEE took place in two waves, the first 
group consisting of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia27 
                                               
25 See also Lannoo (2000) for a detailed evaluation of the progress that the CEE countries have 
made toward the market-based financial sectors and in introducing appropriate regulatory 
frameworks. 
26 For the historic account of the Russian banking system and the deposit insurance arrangements, 
see Chapter 3. 
27 Slovenia will not be included in further discussion since this country was a part of former 
Yugoslavia during the communist regime and is considered as part of south-eastern Europe. 
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acceded in 2004, and the second group – Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak 
Republic, and Romania – in 2007.  
Whilst some of the new EU Member States introduced DI arrangements shortly after the 
wave of financial crises in the 1990s (see Figure 2.2), a further reason for the 
introduction of new DISs was, of course, integration into the EU and the requirement of 
harmonisation under the 1994 Directive (Nenovsky and Dimitrova, 2003, 2008). All of 
the above-mentioned countries introduced explicit DISs, instead of the implicit schemes 
inherited from the previous planned economy. The first countries to introduce a DIS were 
Hungary and the Czech Republic (1993 and 1994, respectively) with most of the other 
countries following in 1995 and 1996. Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia introduced their 
DISs in 1998. 
With the exception of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the former USSR counties took 
longer to develop a DIS. Kazakhstan28 was the first to introduce a functioning DIS in 
1999. 
By October 2006, five of the former USSR countries had still failed to put a DIS into 
place. According to the summary of all DISs worldwide, published by the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (Walker, 2006), there was one pending DIS (in 
Kyrgyzstan), one planned DIS (in Georgia), and two DISs under study (in Azerbaijan 
and Belarus), with no mention of any DIS (either pending, planned or under study) in 
Turkmenistan. 
Since then, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan have introduced explicit DISs, leaving 
Georgia and Turkmenistan as the only countries in post-Soviet territory without explicit 
DI arrangements. The timeline of introduction of DISs across the former USSR countries 
is presented in Figure 2.2 
. 
 
                                               
28 Belarus and Ukraine declared an introduction of the DIS with Presidential Decrees in 1998, 
however, the necessary legislation required to make these DIS function was enacted several years 




The chronology of introduction of DISs in CEE and former USSR countries 
 
Source: Garcia (1999: 30-31), IMF (2006: 1-2), relevant country legislation. 
2.1.2 Key Elements of a Deposit Insurance Scheme 
Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to discuss the benefits of different elements of a 
DIS, it is necessary to present an overview of the alternatives, so that the Russian DIS, 
presented in Chapter 3, can be placed within acceptable international standards of DI. 
The following sections outline the most common features of DISs found in the academic 
literature, and summarise particular studies which have identified international best 
practices to be used for the optimal design of a DIS. 
MacDonald (1996: 7) argues that the design of a DIS is of principal importance for its 
future effectiveness, and “while deposit insurance is a fairly straightforward concept, 
deposit insurance schemes in practice are relatively complex”. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2008b: 24) state that DI is a “strong medicine” and “[w]hether it benefits or harms a 
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2.1.2.2 Academic Literature on the Most Common Elements of a 
Deposit Insurance Scheme 
DIS may be structured in a variety of ways. There is a vast amount of literature on the 
key elements of DISs.29 Two main groups of literature concerning the main features of 
DISs can be identified. 
The first group of authors approach the key elements from a theoretical angle and discuss 
them based on secondary data (see, for example, Bartholomew and Vanderhoff, 1991; 
Bernet and Walter, 2009; Carisano, 1992; Cartwright and Campbell, 2003; Feyen and 
Vittas, 2009; Helfer, 1999; Ketcha, 1999; Kroszner and Melick, 2008; Laeven, 2002; 
Lee and Kwok, 2000; Lindgren and Garcia, 1996; MacDonald, 1996; Morrison and 
White, 2006; Radecki, 1990; Redburn, 1988; Schich, 2008; Short and Robinson, 1998). 
The second group of authors base their discussions of the main features of deposit 
insurance systems on large surveys or other data sets, usually as part of long-term 
research projects. However, whilst there is a vast body of literature on DI, including 
economic theories,30 “empirical evidence on the actual operation and design of deposit 
insurance systems is relatively scarce and limited in geographic coverage” (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2008a: 13). 
The first long-term project was conducted by the staff at the IMF. McCarthy (1980) 
discussed technical problems involved in designing an optimal DIS, drawing on a survey 
of DI arrangements in 12 countries. Mas and Talley (1990) further updated and 
considerably expanded the McCarthy’s survey; moreover, they discussed the implications 
of establishing DISs in developing countries, contrasting explicit and implicit DI 
arrangements, including a discussion of the major features of such schemes. 
Kyei (1995) provided an overview of deposit protection arrangements in various 
countries and discussed the main features of explicit DISs. Lindgren and Garcia (1996) 
                                               
29 These ‘key elements’ (Kyei, 1995), or ‘elements’ (Kane, 2001), are also known as ‘major 
features’ (Mas and Talley, 1990), ‘building blocks’ (Bernet and Walter, 2009), ‘characteristics’ 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001), and ‘components’ (Lee and Kwok, 2000) of a DIS.  
30 For the purposes of this thesis, literature on economic theories applicable to DI was not 
considered as part of the literature review. 
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built on this research and further developed the data set by looking at DISs in times of 
crisis. 
Based on a survey of DI arrangements in 72 countries (including explicit DISs in 68 
countries), Garcia (1999)compared all of existing arrangements with the set of “best 
practices” adopted by staff at the IMF and subsequently updated by Garcia (2000).31 
Hoelscher, Taylor, and Klueh (2006) further updated the previous IMF studies and 
described newly established DISs. 
Around the same time as the IMF project, the staff at The World Bank began to collect a 
cross-country data set (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (1998) as quoted in Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Sobaci (2001)). Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999, 2002)were first in using 
the cross-country database to study the link between DI and financial crises. By using 
data from 61 countries between 1980 and 1997, they found that poorly designed explicit 
DISs tend to increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
The data set was further developed to contain information on DI arrangements (both 
explicit and implicit) in 178 countries worldwide (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2001; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001).  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001: 481) explain the need to create such a cross-country 
data set by the fact that “until recently, bank staff were unable to give sound policy 
advice because of the <…> lack of empirical evidence on how different DI designs affect 
banking outcomes”. 
2.1.2.2 Variations in Deposit Insurance Scheme Design 
Different authors describe the main characteristics of a DIS in various ways. Based on 
the above-mentioned literature, it is believed that the main elements of a DIS can be 
grouped as follows: (i) legal form and public policy objectives, (ii) coverage and 
                                               
31 For more details on the best practices, please see Section 2.1.3 below. 
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compensation mechanisms32, (iii) membership, and (iv) management33 and funding (see 
Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3 
Key elements of a DIS 
 
Each of the groups will be reviewed and possible alternatives presented and discussed in 
the following sub-sections. 
Legal Form, Public Policy Objectives, and Mandate 
There are two types of DI – implicit and explicit. Kyei (1995: iii) defines explicit DI as 
“formal deposit guarantee arrangements” and implicit DI as a guarantee which is “taken 
for granted or based on past experience that government is bound to take steps to protect 
the banking system”. 
Implicit DI can be in the form of a political declaration from the government. During the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis, several countries in Europe, Asia and the Pacific 
introduced temporary blanket guarantees whereby retail depositors were provided with 
                                               
32 Also known as a “payout mechanism” (Bernet and Walter, 2009). These two terms are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
33 Also known as “administration” (MacDonald, 1996; Tompson, 2004). 
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unlimited cover in respect of their deposits (Feyen and Vittas, 2009; Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008).34 
Alternatively, DI can be implied when a banking system as a whole or financial 
institutions are state-owned, such as it was in the time of the USSR, when all deposits 
were guaranteed, because the banks which promised to return the money deposited in 
bank accounts were owned by the government. 
In the case of explicit DISs, the exact arrangements are, usually, stipulated by law 
(whether a separate law or as part of banking laws).35 BCBS and IADI (2009: 1)state 
that “[e]xplicit DI has become the preferred choice compared to other alternatives such as 
reliance on implicit protection”. Garcia (1999) also confirms a tendency to move from 
implicit to explicit DISs (20 implicit DISs became explicit by 1999). 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the principal objectives of a DIS, usually quoted in the 
literature, are the stability of the financial system and depositor protection. Other public 
policy objectives may include the protection of smaller banks and the creation of a level 
playing field in the market. 
BCBS and IADI (2009) advise that the chosen public policy objective should be stated in 
the legal acts, so that it is clear what objectives the DIS intends to achieve. 
The wider regulatory and institutional environment is also important, as a weak 
environment may jeopardise even an optimally-designed DIS (Bernet and Walter, 2009; 
Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999, 2002; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2008b; Garcia, 1997, 1999, 2000; Hoelscher et al., 2006). 
In terms of its mandate, the role of a DI agency (or other organisation or governmental 
body which runs the DIS) may be either narrowly or broadly construed. Under a narrow 
mandate, or a so-called paybox system, the DI agency only collects funds and pays out 
when an insured event occurs. Garcia (1999: 22) suggests that such a “limited role is 
                                               
34 Even New Zealand, which does not have a DIS in normal times, introduced a temporary two-
year blanket guarantee in 2008 capped at NZD 1 million per depositor per bank (Mayes, 2011).  
35 Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008b) submit that every country has a de facto implicit DIS as 
governments need to intervene if a banking crisis occurs. Thus, adoption of an explicit DIS does 
not completely eliminate the implicit DIS, but rather formalises the governmental obligation to 
pay. 
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more likely for privately run DIS that lack governmental authority for more proactive 
responsibilities”. A broader mandate allows DI agency to be involved in bank liquidation, 
restructuring and supervision. 
Hoelscher et al. (2006) argue that there is a trend to give more powers to DI agencies, 
especially in light of the many bank failures during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis 
and the need to quickly resolve failed financial institutions. 
Coverage and Compensation Mechanism 
In terms of the compensation amount, a DIS can provide a full or blanket guarantee, 
whereby, all deposits are protected without a limit. Whilst this measure may prevent 
bank runs and thus stabilise the financial system in the short term, it is not generally 
recommended since the public, banks and investors may expect the same response should 
a crisis reoccur(Feyen and Vittas, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Schich, 2008). 
The norm is to have a limited coverage. Some countries have introduced a co-insurance 
element into their system, whereby, only a certain percentage of the maximum 
compensation amount is guaranteed fully, whilst loss of the remainder is shared with the 
depositor. For example, a depositor may be guaranteed 100% of the first amount and 
80% of the next amount, up to a certain limit. 
Kyei (1995) suggests that a co-insurance element is usually introduced where the 
introduction of the DIS seeks to reduce moral hazard on the part of depositors, so that 
they become responsible for some part of loss.36 However, co-insurance is not always 
beneficial as illustrated by the EU Member States which were recently obliged to 
eradicate co-insurance element from their DISs, because co-insurance “has been 
demonstrated to undermine depositor confidence” (Recital 14 of the 2009 Directive). 
Kyei argues that the coverage limit is related to the objective of the DIS. For example, 
“where the objective is to protect small depositors <...>, coverage is limited to 
individuals”, whilst, “if the objective is wider than the mere protection of small 
depositors”, then other groups of depositors will be covered, too (Kyei, 1995: 20). 
                                               
36 For more details on the moral hazard and co-insurance, see Section 2.1 above. 
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Furthermore, Laeven (2004) submits that there is a link between the level of financial 
literacy of the population and the country’s level of deposit insurance coverage. 
The coverage limit is usually determined for each person (per depositor) or for each bank 
account (per deposit). The former allows for compensation of a maximum amount per 
single depositor in a failed bank, whilst the latter allows for compensation of a maximum 
amount per single deposit in a failed bank. The tendency is to cover a single depositor 
rather than each individual account (Garcia, 1999). There may also be different 
arrangements for joint accounts. 
A clearly defined coverage limit makes it clear that the amount above the maximum 
compensation amount cannot be guaranteed. For example, Fjordbank Mors, the ninth 
Danish bank to collapse following the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, was unable to 
raise capital sufficient to meet the newly increased national solvency requirements. 
Despite the fact that its assets and some liabilities were transferred to FinansielStabilitet, 
a company created in October 2008 to ensure financial stability in Denmark, “[c]reditors, 
including depositors with deposits exceeding EUR 100,000 in Fjordbank Mors must 
<...> anticipate losses of approximately 26% as the bank closes” (FinansielStabilitet, 
2011; RTÉ, 2011). 
A DIS may cover different types of depositor, whether these are retail depositors only, 
both retail depositors and individual entrepreneurs, or retail depositors, individual 
entrepreneurs and business depositors. The usual development goes from covering the 
retail depositors only to covering all depositors, both retail and business. 
Some countries exclude certain types of retail depositor from coverage. These may 
include senior management staff in financial institutions, auditors of financial institutions, 
etc. Another possible problem is the treatment of depositors who hold deposits in excess 
of the coverage limit and are tipped off by the bank before its license is revoked, so that 
these depositors can split their account and open several smaller accounts within the 
coverage limit (usually involves participation of family members).37 
                                               
37 The same may happen when a business depositor is tipped off before the license is revoked and 
transfers some or all of the funds into retail bank accounts, opened usually by the family members 
of the management or employees of the business depositor. 
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There is no standard rule relating to the types of deposit eligible for cover as this is a 
matter for each country to decide upon.  
Most countries will provide cover in respect of both deposits in the national currency and 
those in foreign currencies, although some may choose not to provide cover in respect of 
the latter. According to Kyei (1995), deposits in foreign currency may be excluded 
because of difficulty in specifying the limits due to changing exchange rates. 
Three issues need to be addressed prior to determining the compensation mechanism to 
be employed. First, what constitutes an insured or triggering event must be defined. 
Secondly it must be determined who is to decide when an insured event has occurred and 
thirdly, it must be determined what time limits are to be placed upon the ability of a 
depositor to gain access to their funds. 
There is no single definition of an insured event, as the concept is differently defined in 
national DI regulation. Some countries commence the payout process as soon as a 
banking license has been revoked by the national bank or other licensing authority, whilst 
others may have to wait for a court decision on the bankruptcy of the financial institution 
before depositors are informed when and how they can receive their funds. It is important 
to note that the time required to announce an insured event should also be taken into 
account when assessing the speed of a payout mechanism. 
Once the occurrence of insured event has been announced, the DI agency (or other 
organisation or governmental body which runs the DIS) will usually initiate the 
compensation process. Payout timings vary from country to country, but many countries 
have reduced the time required for compensation in light of experiences during the global 
financial crisis. For example, EU Member States had to implement a 20-day payout 
mechanism by the end of 2010 (see Section 2.1.1.2 above).38 
The actual compensation payment may be arranged by the DI agency (or other 
organisation or governmental body which runs the DIS) or by bank-agents chosen and 
                                               
38 Llewellyn (2009: 21) calls co-insurance “the central fault line in the [UK] system” and states 
that the government could not prevent bank runs because of it. Mayes and Wood (2009: 37) agree 
by saying that “[t]he Northern Rock experience is thus likely to end co-insurance in other 
countries as well”. 
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nominated by the agency. Some countries also use the postal service to provide 
compensation on behalf of the DIS. 
Whilst many countries cover deposits in both national and foreign currencies, the 
compensation payment is usually made in national currency, in order to protect the DIS 
from exposure to foreign exchange risk Garcia (1999). If the deposit was in a foreign 
currency, then its equivalent value will be calculated by reference to the exchange rate of 
the national bank. Some DISs determine the exchange rate for deposits in foreign 
currency on the date the insured event was announced, whilst others select the date on 
which the DI agency (or other organisation or governmental body which runs the DIS) 
commences the compensation process. 
Where a deposit exceeds the maximum compensation amount, the procedure for recovery 
is provided for in national insolvency or other special legislation. 
However, whatever the coverage and the payout mechanism, it may count for nothing if 
depositors are unaware of them. An effective public awareness programme is essential so 
that present and future depositors can be made aware of the extent of cover and the 
means by which they can access their funds in the event of bank failure. 
Membership 
There is no standard rule as to what institutions should be covered by a DIS. Each 
country regulates this issue differently, based on the financial market environment. 
However, it is a norm to include deposit-taking institutions (whether commercial banks, 
savings banks or co-operative banks).  
Another issue is whether or not to cover the branches of member institutions abroad and 
whether or not to cover the branches of foreign institutions in the country. These 
arrangements depend on the national regulation. In the EU, for example, there is a home 
country rule, whereby, all foreign branches belong to their home DIS and may join the 
host country scheme if their coverage is lower than that of the host country. 
Membership of a DIS may be either compulsory or voluntary. Kyei (1995: 21) argues 
that “the level of development of the financial system does not seem to have any bearing 
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on whether the membership was compulsory or voluntary”. Garcia (1999) confirms a 
shift away from voluntary DISs to compulsory membership. 
Compulsory membership is usually connected to a licensing process. For example, a 
financial institution becomes a member of a DIS upon receiving a banking license. 
Equally, in some countries when a banking license is revoked, a financial institution 
ceases to be a member of a DIS, and this constitutes an insured event for the purposes of 
a payout process. 
Voluntary DISs allow financial institutions to decide whether to join or not. An example 
of voluntary DIS is as an add-on to the existing nationwide compulsory DI. For example, 
in Germany there are four voluntary DISs providing additional guarantee arrangements. 
These include one for private banks, one for public banks, one for savings banks and one 
for co-operative banks, each operated by a relevant banking association (Beck, 2001). 
By its nature, compulsory DIS helps to promote competition in the market in the interests 
of depositors. When all deposit-taking financial institutions are covered by a compulsory 
scheme, their membership is no longer a competitive advantage, thus, allowing the banks 
to compete for depositors by offering good customer service or improved bank account 
terms and conditions. 
Kyei argues that the type of institution covered will depend on the objectives of the 
relevant DISs: 
Where it is to promote the developments of some particular group of institutions such as 
savings banks, only those institutions are covered <...>, where the purpose is to maintain 
the existing structure <...>, all groups of depository institutions are covered but 
sometimes by separate agencies. <...> On the other hand, where the purpose is to protect 
the entire banking system, the legislation requires that all banks be covered. (Kyei, 1995: 
19) 
Kyei further suggests that the extent of government involvement in the management and 
funding of a DI agency (or any other managing body) may determine the institutions 
covered. For example, “where there is no government involvement, only the private 
commercial banks are involved” (Kyei, 1995: 19). 
Management and Funding 
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The management of a DIS can be public39, private or joint. A DIS can have a legally 
separate managing organisation, such as a DI agency of some sort, or it can be managed 
by a government body. 
The composition of the management body of the DI agency (or other managing body) will 
depend on whether the DIS is public, private or joint.  
Based on a survey, Kyei (1995) distinguishes four main types of management and 
funding arrangements: 
(i) those administered and funded by the government; 
(ii) those administered by a public corporation and funded by both government 
and banks; 
(iii) those jointly administered by banks and the government and funded by 
banks; and 
(iv) those administered and funded by banks. 
Kyei (1995) suggests that the first option provides for the highest level of moral hazard 
since the banks participating in the DIS do not contribute to the cost of resolving failed 
banks at all. The fourth option, at the opposite extreme, is described by Kyei as a “mutual 
insurance scheme” (1995: 21), whereby, the banks participating in the DIS take on 
burden of other banks’ failure and are thus forced to regulate, supervise, and examine 
themselves. However, government involvement may be needed if the cost of resolving 
failed banks is high and affects the entire banking system. 
When it comes to funding, a DIS can be ex ante or ex post. Ex ante schemes are based on 
a fund which is accumulated through the obligatory contributions of member institutions 
in the form of joining, annual and emergency premiums.40 As a start-up contribution, 
governments may also provide funds. Helfer (1999) argues that if adequately funded, a 
                                               
39 Also known as “official” (Kyei, 1995: 19). 
40 Laeven (2002) provides results of a calculation of ‘fair’ deposit insurance premiums in 42 
countries based on credit ratings and option prices. Garcia(1999) argues that there is a trend 
towards instituting risk-adjusted premiums, whereby, each member institution contributes 
depending on their risk rating. Whilst the use of risk-adjusted premiums are desirable in theory as 
they reduce the moral hazard; it is proving difficult in practice to correctly identify and measure 
the risks and establish the levels of such premiums (Carisano, 1992; Lee and Kwok, 2000; 
McCarthy, 1980; Schich, 2008; Short and Robinson, 1998). 
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DI can contribute to the financial stability of a country, however, if not – it is certain to 
fail.  
Ex post DISs are based on a promise by member institutions to cover the compensation 
amount when an insured event occurs. This funding mechanism is less common as it is 
difficult to estimate what amount may be needed, especially in the case of several banks 
failing at about the same time. For example, the collapse of Northern Rock in the United 
Kingdom showed how difficult it can be to maintain public confidence in the financial 
system when there is no fund immediately available for compensation (Eisenbeis and 
Kaufman, 2009; Kuczynski, 2011). Hoelscher (2011) advocates the importance of ex 
ante funding as a prerequisite for maintaining public confidence. 
2.1.3 Internationally Accepted Standards of Deposit Insurance 
All of the comparative studies discussed in Section 2.1.1 aided in the development of best 
practices in this area. Garcia (1999) surveyed the features of explicit DISs in 68 
countries and presented a set of 20 good practices that has been adopted by the IMF (see 
Table 2.1).41 
Table 2.1 
International Monetary Fund’s Good Practices for Deposit Insurance 
Issue Best Practice Departures from Best Practice 
Infrastructure 1. Have realistic objectives Expect deposit insurance system to 
avoid/resolve crises. 
2. Choose carefully between a public 
or private deposit insurance 
system. 
A publicly funded system that is 
privately run. 
3. Define the deposit insurance 
agency’s mandate accordingly. 
Pretending the system is private 
when it has public backing. 
4. Have a good legal, judicial, 
accounting, financial, and political 
infrastructure. 
Weak valuation, poor laws on 
collateral, bankruptcy, private 
property, a weak court system. 
Moral Hazard 5. Define the system explicitly in 
law and regulation. Conduct a 
public awareness campaign. 
The system is implicit and 
ambiguous. 
6. Give the supervisor a system of 
prompt remedial actions. 
The supervisor takes no, or late 
remedial action. 
                                               
41 A 1999 version of this table contained only 15 practices and called them “best” practices, whilst 
the 2000 version added 5 new good practices and divided them into groups, which are presented 
in Table 2.1 above. 
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Issue Best Practice Departures from Best Practice 
7. Resolve failed depository 
institutions promptly. 
Ill-conceived capital forbearance: 
banks that should be resolved 
continue to operate. 
8. Provide low coverage. There is high, even full coverage, 
which can impose an excessive 
fiscal burden and fosters moral 
hazard. 
9. Net (offset) loans in default 
against depositors. 
Cover the deposits of borrowers in 
default. 
Adverse Selection 10. Make membership compulsory. The scheme is voluntary. 
11. Risk-adjust premiums, once the 
deposit insurance system has 
sufficient experience. 
Flat rate premiums. 
Agency Problems 12. Create an independent, but 
accountable deposit insurance 
system agency. 
Political interference, lack of 
accountability. 
13. Have bankers on an advisory 
board, not the main board of a 
publicly run deposit insurance 
system with access to financial 
support from the government. 
Bankers are in control, regulatory 
capture. 
14. Ensure close relations with the 
lender of last resort and the 
supervisor. 




15. Start when banks are sound. Start before resolving failed banks. 
16. Ensure adequate sources of 
funding (ex ante or ex post) to 
avoid insolvency. 
The deposit insurance system is 
underfunded or insolvent, and 
makes demands on the budget. 
17. Invest fund resources wisely. Invest in risky assets, such as 
deposit in problems banks. 
18. Pay or transfer deposits 
quickly.  
There are delays in payment. 
19. Organise good information on 
the condition of individual 
institutions and the distribution of 
deposits by size. 
Have bad information based on 
poor accounting, valuation, loan 
classification and provisioning 
standards, and no data on the 
distribution of deposits by size. 
20. Make appropriate disclosure to 
maintain confidence while enabling 
depositors to protect their interest. 
Make little, or misleading 
disclosure, and a discredited press. 
Source: Adapted from Garcia (1999: 9, 2000: 3-4).  
Since 2000, there have not been many comparative studies undertaken in this area. The 
International Deposit Insurance Survey conducted by Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in 2003 and in 2008 (“IDIS”) aimed at gathering more up-to-date 
information about DISs around the world with the hope of developing an on-line database 
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which could be used by researchers and policymakers when evaluating or reforming 
existing arrangements or establishing new DISs. 
The 2003 IDIS contained over 163 questions covering 14 areas of DI and received 
responses from 48 DISs. The 2008 IDIS received 62 responses (CDIC, 2008). Whilst 
the results of both IDISs have not been officially published, these surveys contributed to 
the understanding of the development of DISs worldwide.  
The International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), established in 2003, has been 
working on the collection of best practices for DI for many years drawing on the 
experience of its members. 
The results of two IDISs conducted by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation in 
2003 and 2008 aided IADI in development of the IADI Core Principles, which were 
developed for the benefit of countries considering the adoption or the reform of a DIS. 
The IADI Core Principles were taken as the basis of the internationally agreed set of 
Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (‘Core Principles’) presented by 
the joint working group of representatives from the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and the International Association of Deposit Insurers in June 2009. 
These Core Principles are categorized into ten groups and contain 18 principles (see 
Table 2.2). 
As stated in the Core Principles, “a high degree of compliance with the Core Principles 
should contribute to financial system stability and enhance depositor protection” (BCBS 
and IADI, 2009: 7). 
This thesis is not aimed at evaluating the Russian DIS against the Core Principles, as 
they were introduced after the present investigation had been designed and the data had 
been collected. It will, however, address some of the relevant issues. 
There are several principles, which, if followed, will provide for a higher level of 
protection of depositors. These are Principles 1, 8, 9, 12, 17 and 18. 
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Principle 1 requires a formally specified set of DIS objectives. According to the Core 
Principles, “The principal objectives for deposit insurance systems are to contribute to 
the stability of the financial system and protect depositors” (BCBS and IADI, 2009: 9). 
Principles 8 and 9 specify that the membership of a DIS should be compulsory for all 
financial institutions accepting deposits and that the level of coverage should be clearly 
defined in law and should cover the greater majority of depositors to meet the public 
policy objectives of the system. 
Principle 12 emphasises the importance of public awareness of the DIS. According to the 
Core Principles, in order for a DIS to be effective, “it is essential that the public be 
informed on an ongoing basis about the benefits and limitations of the deposit insurance 
system” (BCBS and IADI, 2009: 15). It is suggested that the deposit insurer (e.g., DI 
agency) should be the party primarily responsible for promoting public awareness. The 
deposit insurer and the member financial institutions (including their staff) should work 
together to ensure consistency in the information provided. 
Principle 17 provides for the prompt reimbursement of insured funds. According to the 
Core Principles, “[d]epositors should have a legal right to reimbursement up to the 
coverage limit and should know when and under what conditions the deposit insurer will 
start the payment process <…>” (BCBS and IADI, 2009: 18). Principle 18, in its 
explanations and supporting guidance, provides for the right of depositors to recover 
funds (beyond the coverage limit) from the estate of a failed bank within the bounds of 
insolvency law. 
Table 2.2 
Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems 
Group Principles 
Setting objectives 1. Public policy objectives: The first step in adopting a deposit 
insurance system or reforming an existing system is to specify 
appropriate public policy objectives that it is expected to 
achieve. These objectives should be formally specified and well 
integrated into the design of the deposit insurance system. The 
principal objectives for deposit insurance systems are to 
contribute to the stability of the financial system and protect 
depositors. 
2. Mitigating moral hazard: Moral hazard should be mitigated 
by ensuring that the deposit insurance system contains 
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Group Principles 
appropriate design features and through other elements of the 
financial system safety net. 
Mandates and powers 3. Mandate: It is critical that the mandate selected for a deposit 
insurer be clear and formally specified and that there be 
consistency between the stated public policy objectives and the 
powers and responsibilities given to the deposit insurer. 
4. Powers: A deposit insurer should have all powers necessary 
to fulfil its mandate and these powers should be formally 
specified. All deposit insurers require the power to finance 
reimbursements, enter into contracts, set internal operating 
budgets and procedures, and access timely and accurate 
information to ensure that they can meet their obligations to 
depositors promptly. 
Governance 5. Governance: The deposit insurer should be operationally 
independent, transparent, accountable and insulated from undue 
political and industry influence. 
Relationships with other 
safety-net participants and 
cross-border issues 
6. Relationships with other safety-net participants: A 
framework should be in place for the close coordination and 
information sharing, on a routine basis as well as in relation to 
particular banks, among the deposit insurer and other financial 
system safety-net participants. Such information should be 
accurate and timely (subject to confidentiality when required). 
Information-sharing and coordination arrangements should be 
formalised. 
 7. Cross-border issues: Provided confidentiality is ensured, all 
relevant information should be exchanged between deposit 
insurers in different jurisdictions and possibly between deposit 
insurers and other foreign safety-net participants when 
appropriate. In circumstances where more than one deposit 
insurer will be responsible for coverage, it is important to 
determine which deposit insurer or insurers will be responsible 
for the reimbursement process. The deposit insurance already 
provided by the home country system should be recognised in 
the determination of levies and premiums. 
Membership and coverage 8. Compulsory membership: Membership in the deposit 
insurance system should be compulsory for all financial 
institutions accepting deposits from those deemed most in need 
of protection (for example, retail and small business depositors) 
to avoid adverse selection. 
9. Coverage: Policymakers should define clearly in law, 
prudential regulations or by-laws what an insurable deposit is. 
The level of coverage should be limited but credible and be 
capable of being quickly determined. It should cover adequately 
the large majority of depositors to meet the public policy 
objectives of the system and be internally consistent with other 
deposit insurance system design features. 
10. Transitioning from a blanket guarantee to a limited 
coverage deposit insurance system: When a country decides to 
transition from a blanket guarantee to a limited coverage deposit 
insurance system, or to change a given blanket guarantee, the 
transition should be as rapid as a country’s circumstances 
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Group Principles 
permit. Blanket guarantees can have a number of adverse 
effects if retained too long, notably moral hazard. Policymakers 
should pay particular attention to public attitudes and 
expectations during the transition period. 
Funding 11. Funding: A deposit insurance system should have available 
all funding mechanisms necessary to ensure the prompt 
reimbursement of depositors’ claims including a means of 
obtaining supplementary back-up funding for liquidity purposes 
when required. Primary responsibility for paying the cost of 
deposit insurance should be borne by banks since they and their 
clients directly benefit from having an effective deposit 
insurance system. 
For deposit insurance systems (whether ex-ante, ex-post or 
hybrid) utilising risk-adjusted differential premium systems, the 
criteria used in the risk-adjusted differential premium system 
should be transparent to all participants. As well, all necessary 
resources should be in place to administer the risk-adjusted 
differential premium system appropriately. 
Public awareness 12. Public awareness: In order for a deposit insurance system 
to be effective it is essential that the public be informed on an 
ongoing basis about the benefits and limitations of the deposit 
insurance system. 
Selected legal issues 13. Legal protection: The deposit insurer and individuals 
working for the deposit insurer should be protected against 
lawsuits for their decisions and actions taken in “good faith” 
while discharging their mandates. However, individuals must be 
required to follow appropriate conflict-of-interest rules and 
codes of conduct to ensure they remain accountable. Legal 
protection should be defined in legislation and administrative 
procedures, and under appropriate circumstances, cover legal 
costs for those indemnified. 
14. Dealing with parties at fault in a bank failure: A deposit 
insurer, or other relevant authority, should be provided with the 
power to seek legal redress against those parties at fault in a 
bank failure. 
Failure resolution 15. Early detection and timely intervention and resolution: 
The deposit insurer should be part of a framework within the 
financial system safety net that provides for the early detection 
and timely intervention and resolution of troubled banks. The 
determination and recognition of when a bank is or is expected 
to be in serious financial difficulty should be made early and on 
the basis of well defined criteria by safety-net participants with 
the operational independence and power to act. 
16. Effective resolution processes: Effective failure-resolution 
processes should: facilitate the ability of the deposit insurer to 
meet its obligations including reimbursement of depositors 
promptly and accurately and on an equitable basis; minimise 
resolution costs and disruption of markets; maximise recoveries 
on assets; and, reinforce discipline through legal actions in cases 
of negligence or other wrongdoings. In addition, the deposit 
insurer or other relevant financial system safety-net participant 
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should have the authority to establish a flexible mechanism to 
help preserve critical banking functions by facilitating the 
acquisition by an appropriate body of the assets and the 
assumption of the liabilities of a failed bank (for example, 
providing depositors with continuous access to their funds and 
maintaining clearing and settlement activities). 
Reimbursing depositors and 
recoveries 
17. Reimbursing depositors: The deposit insurance system 
should give depositors prompt access to their insured funds. 
Therefore, the deposit insurer should be notified or informed 
sufficiently in advance of the conditions under which a 
reimbursement may be required and be provided with access to 
depositor information in advance. Depositors should have a legal 
right to reimbursement up to the coverage limit and should 
know when and under what conditions the deposit insurer will 
start the payment process, the time frame over which payments 
will take place, whether any advance or interim payments will 
be made as well as the applicable coverage limits. 
18. Recoveries: The deposit insurer should share in the 
proceeds of recoveries from the estate of the failed bank. The 
management of the assets of the failed bank and the recovery 
process (by the deposit insurer or other party carrying out this 
role) should be guided by commercial considerations and their 
economic merits. 
Source: Adapted from BCBS and IADI (2009). 
In July 2011, the Financial Stability Board launched a review of DISs in its member 
jurisdictions.42 This review will use the Core Principles as a benchmark with the peer 
review report to be published in 2012 (Financial Stability Board, 2011). 
2.2 Deposit Insurance as Part of Consumer Protection 
Having shown the importance of depositor protection as one of the main rationales for 
establishing a DIS, in Section 2.1 of this Chapter, this section discusses the importance 
of depositor protection from a consumer protection perspective. 
2.2.1 Rationales for Consumer Protection 
Cartwright (2001) suggests that in order for a consumer protection policy to be effective, 
it should address both economic and social perspectives. 
                                               
42 As of July 2011, the membership of the Financial Stability Board comprises 26 member 
jurisdictions (including the European Commission and the European Central Bank), 4 
international financial institutions and 6 other international bodies. 
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Howells, Ramsay, and Wilhelmsson (2010: 1) provide an historical account of the 
development of consumer law and related areas and submit that consumer law 
<...> is linked to the development of the consumer society and the rise of the regulatory 
state. One of the intriguing aspects of consumer law is that whilst consumers are often 
situated in a vulnerable position in the market structure and face similar problems in most 
market economies, nevertheless, consumer law has in its national manifestation to take 
account of local legal, social and cultural traditions. However, whilst the particular policy 
responses to the problems consumers face may differ depending on local context, many of 
the actual problems facing consumers replicate themselves throughout the global 
economy. 
While the present thesis is not aimed at describing and discussing different theories of 
consumption and different approaches to market theory, it is important to understand the 
role of the consumer and the need for consumer protection. 
Scott and Black (2000: 1) look at the need for consumer protection from the point of 
view of consumers as 
<...> sovereign economic actors, with stable preferences that have been formulated 
rationally and autonomously, and who have the potential to exercise power <...> by their 
purchasing choices, so ensuring that producers and suppliers respond to meet those 
preferences. 
From this perspective, the role of consumer law is to assist consumers in making choices 
more efficiently. On the other hand, there is a belief that it is the producers and suppliers 
of goods and services that actually control consumer demand through the use of 
advertising, marketing, packaging, market research and other measures which shift 
consumption decisions from the consumer to the suppliers. 
From a market theory perspective, there are, primarily, two approaches to consumer 
protection, in general. On the one hand, proponents of the Chicago school of economics43 
advocate the existence of perfect market in which individuals are rational decision-makers 
and, by making choices, determine how the market operates. Krugman (2009: 36) 
describes this as an “idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact 
in perfect markets”. Such a perfect market has perfect information that allows consumers 
to make well-informed decisions. 
                                               
43 Also known as ‘freshwater school of economics’ with their opponents referred to as ‘saltwater 
school of economics’. 
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On the other hand, some authors contend that markets are not always efficient or perfect. 
Thus, governmental intervention is necessary and justified to correct market failures44 
and to protect consumers.45 
Howells et al. (2010: 10-13) single out four possible rationales for consumer law. These 
include: (i) market failure (in neo-classical economic understanding) and the need for 
consumer protection to ensure that markets are efficient and function properly; (ii) 
information asymmetry and the role of consumer protection, in the form of certain 
information requirements, in ensuring “the consumer is able to perform his role as a 
contract party successfully”, as well as the inequality of bargaining power (which is seen 
as a broader term than information asymmetry) and the role of consumer protection in 
countervailing “such inequality, in order to achieve fair and equal contract practices”; (iii) 
consumer behaviour, which, usually, differs from the rational consumer behaviour 
assumed in theory, and the role of consumer protection in creating “a system that 
corresponds to how consumers actually behave”; and (v) other values which may include 
human rights issues, environmental and gender equality concerns. 
2.2.2 Consumer Protection in Financial Services Market 
An example of an imperfect market can be found in the financial sector, which is 
characterised by a high level of information failure. 
It is widely recognised that financial markets and instruments involve “highly complex, 
fast-moving, and high-stakes decision making” (Collins and Khan, 2004: 27). Market 
theory is based on the assumption that there is full or complete information amongst 
buyers and sellers about products and services being exchanged. However, this is not an 
accurate description of the real operation of financial markets. 
According to Scott and Black (2000), consumer policy focuses on redressing consumer 
detriment. Detriment can be defined as “the difference in purchasing decisions that 
                                               
44 Austrian school argue that there is no such phenomenon as “market failure”, and that 
inefficiency is caused by consumers making choices inconsistent with their goals (see Kirzner 
(1963)). 
45 For a discussion of rationales for intervention in the consumer markets, see Cartwright (2001), 
Krugman (2009), Ramsay (1984), and Scott and Black (2000). 
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consumers make on the basis of information that is available, and decisions they would 
have made with further information that they could usefully obtain or assimilate” (Scott 
and Black, 2000: 3). 
Trebilcock (1997: 103-126) lists several categories of information failure in the market, 
including material non-disclosure (and the issue of information asymmetry), information 
processing disability and standard form contracts among others.46 
2.2.2.1 Information Asymmetry 
Any buyer-seller relationship in any market situation is affected by information 
asymmetry. This problem is even more prominent in the depositor-bank relationship. 
This is caused by the complexity of the financial services market as well as by the, 
generally, low level of financial literacy amongst depositors. 
Mishra, Heide, and Cort (1998) argue that the relationship between buyers (i.e. 
depositors) and sellers (i.e. banks) often is characterised by information asymmetry, in 
the sense that the seller possesses more information about the object of an exchange than 
the buyer. Buyers or borrowers, generally, do not have full or complete information about 
transactions and, thus, market failures are likely to result from information asymmetries. 
A typical decision-making situation will arise when depositors decides to put their money 
in a bank account, but need to be sure of the financial soundness of the bank under 
consideration. To make this judgement, the depositors will require the bank to provide 
information relating to its financial stability and until that information is provided, the 
depositors cannot make a rational decision. 
Balling (2011: 217) uses Figure 2.4 as an illustration of “how disclosure rules affect the 
information sets available to different bank stakeholders”. 
 
 
                                               
46 For a full list of categories of information failure, see Trebilcock (1997: 103-126). 
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Figure 2.4 
Asymmetries in access to bank performance relevant information (BPRI) 
 
Source: Adapted from Balling (2011: 217). 
Whilst the outer layer represents existing information about bank performance available 
at any given time, it is evident that, despite varied information disclosure regulations in 
the banking sector, the amount of information which is read and understood by depositors 
is only a small fraction of the available information, thus creating a consumer information 
gap. 
Retail depositors will have a different perspective on a bank’s performance compared to 
other stakeholders of that bank, and will have to base their decisions about entering into 
a contract with a specific bank on the information available to them at the time and on 
their understanding of such information. 
2.2.2.2 Deficiencies in Information Processing 
The problems that consumers face in the market are not the same for all. Burden (1998) 
identifies seven categories of vulnerable consumer, namely elderly people, young people, 
the unemployed, those with a limiting, longstanding illness, those in low income 
households, members of ethnic minorities and those with no formal educational 
qualifications. He further suggests that  
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[c]onsumers may be vulnerable for two reasons. First, some may have greater difficulty 
than others in obtaining or assimilating the information needed to make decisions about 
which goods and services, if any, to buy. Second, they may be exposed to a greater loss of 
welfare than other consumers as a result of buying inappropriate goods or services, or of 
failing to buy something when it would be in their interests to do so. (Burden, 1998: 5) 
Scott and Black (2000) argue that further difficulties which vulnerable consumers face 
are exclusion from certain services (e.g. financial exclusion), disproportionate effect of 
dubious marketing techniques, and lesser likelihood of using their legal rights as 
consumers than those with higher income. “Knowledge and understanding of the legal 
positions and of where to seek assistance decline as one progresses down the socio-
economic groups” (Scott and Black, 2000: 8). 
The above-mentioned constraints, when working with vulnerable consumers, have been 
widely confirmed by empirical research. 
Fox, Bartholomae and Lee (2005) argue that poor financial management in the family 
and low levels of financial literacy may lead to high levels of consumer debt, low levels of 
savings, and highs levels of individual bankruptcy. Cunha, Lambrecht and Pawlina 
(2011) provide further evidence that vulnerable households rely too frequently on 
overdrafts. 
Based on a survey of young adults with regard to their financial literacy, Lusardi, 
Mitchell and Curto (2010) provide evidence that there is a relationship between levels of 
financial literacy and social and demographic characteristics, such as degree level, gender 
and family wealth. 
Erasmus and Mathunjwa (2011) indicate that age and gender influence consumer 
decision-making, with younger females appearing better informed than others. 
From an overview of literature on information processing deficiencies in elderly 
consumers conducted by John and Cole (1986: 297), it appears that 
[e]lderly adults have been pictured as more easily persuaded and deceived <...>, less 
aware of unfair business practices <...>, using fewer information aids <...>, processing 
information at a slower rate <...>, and remembering less product-related information 
than younger adults <...>. 
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John and Cole (1986: 302) identified and examined factors that affect information 
processing abilities of elderly consumers. They found that four factors that need to be 
considered when assessing the abilities of elderly adults are (i) information quantity 
(“[l]arge amounts of information present greater difficulties for elderly individuals”); (ii) 
information format (“[e]lderly adults remember information better with visual aids but do 
not appear to benefit from televised presentation”47); (iii) instruction sets (“[s]pecific 
instructions regarding the use of memory strategies are beneficial for the elderly”); and 
(iv) response format (“[e]lderly adults generally perform better in recognition than recall 
tasks”). 
Despite the evident difficulties with processing information, Cunha, Lambrecht and 
Pawlina (2011) indicate that elderly households still tend to accumulate more liquidity 
than other age groups. 
2.2.2.3 Standard Form Contracts 
Retail depositors are consumers of financial services and, in particular, of banking 
services.48 All of these services have two common features, namely the complexity of the 
information provided and the difficulty the consumer has in understanding that 
information. 
Depositors enter a variety of contracts with banks on a daily basis. These may include a 
wide range of current and savings contracts, credit card contracts and others. By nature 
of retail banking, these contracts are standard form contracts,49 whereby, depositors 
                                               
47 There was no evidence of information processing deficits caused by the lack of thematically 
organisation of the materials and by the order in which information is presented. 
48 Other financial services include insurance, pensions, individual investments, consumer credit, 
etc., all of which have their own peculiarities in terms of consumer protection. For more 
information on consumer protection in insurance, see Birds (1999), Willett and Hird (1999), in 
pensions, see Harris and Jones (1999), in individual investments, see Chin (1999), in consumer 
credit, see Howells (1999), Ison (1979), Lowe and Woodroffe (2004). 
49 Also called ‘contracts of adhesion’ (Blum, 2007; Kessler, 1943; Korobkin, 2003). Law and 
Martin (2009: 524) define standard-form contract as “[a] commercial contract <...> that is 
concluded on terms issued by the offeror in standard form and allows for no effective negotiation.” 
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accept those standard terms if they wish to open a bank account and have no power to 
change the terms and conditions.50 
Trebilcock (1997) argues that standard form contracts are an expression of a 
monopolistic position and are characterised by the existence of imperfect information on 
the side of one of the parties to the contract. 
Whilst submitting that not all standard form contracts necessarily have a negative 
impact, Blum (2007) argues that the drafting party (the seller in most consumer 
contracts) may in a sufficiently dominant position to draft the terms and impose them on 
the consumer. Gillette (2011: 121-122) concludes that based on empirical evidence, 
standard form contracts consistently contain one-sided language in favour of the drafting 
party. 
Wilhelmsson and Willett (2010: 161) claim that there is a lack of transparency when it 
comes to standard form contracts: 
Terms may be expressed in unclear, possibly legalistic, language and in small, and 
otherwise difficult to read, text. There may be a considerable degree of complexity, poor 
structuring and poor cross-referencing. This may also be compounded by the fact that 
consumers have little time to read the terms before making the contract; and may have 
little understanding of the legal context or how the term might affect them in practice. 
This, in turn, may lead to consumers being left unaware of the need to negotiate better 
contract terms. Moreover, consumer may also be unaware that there may be terms that 
operate in their favour and so fail to take advantage of those terms should the need arise. 
Recent empirical research on post-recession household credit facilities (Erasmus and 
Mathunjwa, 2011) confirms consumer ignorance with respect to contractual terms and 
their obligations as a consumer. 
Gillette (2006) submits that though there is a vast amount of literature on the 
advantages and disadvantages of standard form contracts, there is consensus on some of 
the issues, including the following. 
                                               
50 For a review of broader issues of fairness and freedom in consumer contracts, see Willett 
(2007). 
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Firstly, Gillette (2006: 241) submits that there is an agreement that standard form 
contracts are socially useful, as they “facilitate mass marketing of goods and services by 
creating one-size-fits-all contracts”.51 Moreover, standard form contracts allow for higher 
volumes of sales by avoiding variations in contract terms and thus reducing transaction 
costs (see also Gillette (2011: 115), Kessler (1943: 631-632), Treitel (2003: 215-216), 
and Twigg-Flesner (2003: 40)). 
Secondly, it appears that there is an agreement in the literature, that “buyers, or the vast 
majority of them, do not read the terms presented to them by sellers” (Gillette, 2006: 
242). Gillette argues that, given the inability to negotiate the terms of standard form 
contracts, the failure to read them may be rational. Examples of situations in which such 
a ‘rational’ buyer may decide against reading the terms of a standard form contract may 
include the situations when (i) a buyer predicts that the cost of reviewing the contract 
exceeds its benefits, (ii) a buyer predicts that the situations when unfavourable terms will 
apply are unlikely to occur, and (iii) a buyer is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it situation.52 
2.2.3 Regulating Information Provision in Financial Services 
Market 
To counteract the information gap created by various market failures and imperfect 
distribution of information in the market, governments use different methods of 
information provision, including obligatory pre-contractual information disclosure and the 
regulation of advertising, amongst others.53 
Twigg-Flesner and Schulze (2010) submit that there are four different types of consumer 
information. These include information about goods and services, information on the seller 
                                               
51 For more information on ‘massification’ of the consumer market, see Howells et al. (2010: 4-6). 
52 For other examples of situations when a buyer may decide against reading the terms of a 
standard for contract, see Gillette (2006: 242). 
53 Twigg-Flesner and Schulze (2010) argue that there are four approaches to improving 
information provision: (i) direct information duties (duty to disclose and duty to provide 
information), (ii) indirect information duties, (iii) licensing, and (iv) use of quality labels, 
trustmarks, and third party information. Ogus (2004) argues that information regulation is 
formed of two categories: (i) mandatory disclosure and (ii) control of false and misleading 
information. Sefton-Green (2005: 34) elucidates that “the concept of a duty to inform is less 
highly developed in the common law than in the civil law systems”. For more details on the theory 
of information provision in consumer markets and on country-specific examples, see Howells, 
Janssen, and Schulze (2005). 
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or supplier, information on terms and conditions of the contract and, finally, information 
on additional rights beyond the substance of the contract. They further suggest that 
[a]ny obligation to provide information should result in a remedy for the intended 
recipient if that information is not given – otherwise, any such requirement would be 
ineffective if it could be flouted by suppliers without incurring any sort of penalty. 
(Twigg-Flesner and Schulze, 2010: 141) 
Based on exploratory research, Patton (1981) provides evidence that consumers prefer 
large quantities of information about a product or a service as this helps them to make a 
better decision. Hoek, Gendall, Rapson, and Louviere (2011) use empirical evidence to 
show that the increased visual accessibility of information enhances consumers’ 
knowledge and attitudes and, thus, influences the decision-making process. 
However, the question about the timing of such information provision remains. Twigg-
Flesner and Schulze (2010: 144) argue that 
[i]t may be tempting to think that it is best that a consumer has as much information as 
possible before concluding a contract <...>, but that may not necessarily be the most 
appropriate moment. <...> Often, regulation aimed at providing information requires that 
this is done at a time when the consumer does not (yet) need the information.54 
Another way of informing consumers is by advertising. Ramsay (1996, 2007) discusses 
the rationales of advertising regulation, including the provision an adequate level of 
information in the market, and suggests that regulating the practice of advertising so that 
it provides consumers with adequate information “is regarded as a method of market 
intervention to ensure an adequate flow of information to consumers” (Ramsay, 1996: 
4).55 
By using economic analysis, Ramsay (2007: 398) looks at advertising as information and 
states that such an approach focuses “not on deception per se but on the extent to which 
it had led to consumers’ making costly mistakes in a particular market. <...> [Such 
r]egulation might be concerned not merely with prohibiting deception, but also with 
making it informative, for example, through required disclosures <...>.” 
                                               
54 Emphasis added. 
55 Other purposes of advertising regulation, according to Ramsay (1996, 2007), include achieving 
truth in advertising, and social and cultural role of advertising in changing consumer preferences. 
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Similarly, Yeshin (2006) states that advertising has three functions, namely, (i) to 
inform, (ii) to persuade, and (iii) to sell. With regard to the informational functions of 
advertising, he suggests that 
<...> advertising simply seeks to provide the public with specific pieces of information. In 
many cases, this has a neutral content, such as public announcements or some forms of 
governmental advertising. (Yeshin, 2006: 8) 
Nehf (2010: 108) argues that advertising is “not always completely truthful” and, due to 
time and financial constraints, suppliers of goods and services “will always convey 
selective information”. As a result, 
<...> one of the difficult aspects of regulating advertising is determining what standard 
should be used to separate the allowable practices from the forbidden. In other words, how 
does one decide whether something is a sharp marketing tactic that embellishes the truth 
within permissible bounds <...> or an unlawful trade practice that harms consumers and 
justifies some sort of sanction? (Nehf, 2010: 108) 
Despite agreement in the literature on the need to inform consumers about the terms and 
conditions of a contract, even if such information is provided before the time of 
contracting, there are several limitations which may prevent consumers from processing 
such information and using it in their favour.56 
2.2.4 Provision of Deposit Insurance Information 
When it comes to DI, governments choose different ways to convey the necessary 
information to depositors. 
Some governments require the mandatory provision of information and provide 
enforcement measures in the event of default. 
At the European level, the 1994 and 2009 Directives require credit institutions to make 
available to existing and prospective depositors information on the DIS they belong to, 
and the amount and scope of cover offered by that DIS. Moreover, the credit institutions 
are obliged to inform depositors if certain deposits are not covered by the DIS. EU 
                                               
56 For a detailed discussion on these limitations, see Twigg-Flesner and Schulze (2010: 143-144). 
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Member States are also obliged to restrict the possibility of misusing DI information in 
advertising.57 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 195058 (as amended) governing the functioning of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the USA prescribes the usage of the 
insurance logo and the inclusion of a specific statement that “insured deposits are backed 
by the full faith and credit of the United States Government” (Section 18(a)(1)). 
Furthermore, Section 18(a)(3) establishes a penalty for violation of the above-mentioned 
provisions. 
Moreover, insured depository institutions are required to display the official FDIC sign (§ 
328.2(a)(1))59 within 21 days of becoming a DIS member (§ 328.2(a)(3)) and to comply 
with requirements as to the form of official advertising statements. § 328.3 also requires 
insured depository institutions to declare that they are a “Member of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation” in all advertisements promoting either deposit products and 
services, or non-specific banking products and services.60 
In addition to information remedies in favour of retail depositors, DI agencies may run 
special promotion campaigns to raise awareness of DI among the public. Such campaigns, 
usually, advertise the DIS, without reference to any specific bank. For example, Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) has a TV advertisement which clearly states that 
Canadian depositors are protected by up to a maximum compensation amount of CAD 
100,000 and invites the viewers to find out more about the DIS by visiting the website of 
the CDIC, calling their hotline or by making enquiries in a bank. The most recent TV 
advertisements end with the following phrase “Be informed. Protect your savings”.61 
                                               
57 For more details on information disclosure provisions and advertising requirements under the 
1994 and 2009 Directives, see Section 2.2.2. 
58 P.L. 81-797, 64 STAT. 873. 
59 12 C.F.R. Part 328 “Advertisement of Membership”. For the full text, see 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-5200.html (last accessed on 09 October 
2011). 
60 § 328.3(d) provides a list of ten types of advertisements which do not require the usage of 
official advertising statement, including advertisements by radio or television which do not exceed 
thirty seconds in time. 
61 The script of the 2010 TV advertisement by CDIC can be found in Appendix 2. For all 
advertisements since 2009, visit http://www.cdic.ca/e/video.html. 
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2.3 Public Policy Implementation and Evaluation 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis undertakes an evaluation of the Russian DIS with 
the research question rooted in the stated objectives of the DIS. The following sections 
provide an overview of how an evaluation can be conducted and the models employed for 
such purpose. 
Parsons (1995) presents a thorough overview of the development of literature on public 
policy evaluation over the last century. He clearly identifies two time periods in which the 
concept of public policy evaluation has changed dramatically. Until the 1970s, policy 
analysis was mostly concerned with the ‘front end’ of the policy process (e.g. decision-
making, etc.). However, in the 1970s it became apparent that many policies had not 
performed as well as intended and policy analysts began to direct their attention to what 
had gone wrong, why and how. In subsequent years (1980s and 1990s) the attention 
started to shift from inputs and processes (policy analysis) towards outputs and outcomes 
(policy evaluation) with the emphasis on the ‘delivery’ end of the policy process.62 
According to Dye (1978: 351), policy evaluation is a process of learning about the 
consequences of public policy: 
[p]olicy evaluation research is the objective, systematic, empirical examination of the 
effects ongoing policies and public programmes have on their targets in terms of the goals 
they are meant to achieve. 
However, in order to understand how a public policy, or a governmental programme, can 
be evaluated, it is important to understand how it is developed and at what stages an 
evaluation can take place. 
2.3.1 Public Policy Process 
There are different views on the number of stages, or phases, of a public policy process, 
but the consensus is that the design stage is followed by the implementation stage (where 
first evaluations can take place); the implementation stage is followed by the evaluation 
stage (where the majority of evaluations take place). Many authors write about ‘policy 
                                               
62 For more detailed information on the debate, see Parsons (1995: 457-461). 
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analysis’ at the design stage, but this is only a cost-benefit analysis of the possible design 
features and has little to do with evaluation as it is meant in this thesis.63 
The following sections of this chapter discuss the implementation and evaluation stages 
of the public policy process. 
2.3.1.1 Implementation of Public Policy 
It has been argued in literature on public policy that the first evaluation, or so-called 
‘formative evaluation’, can take place during the implementation stage of the public policy 
process (Palumbo, 1987; Rossi and Freeman, 1993). 
Rossi and Freeman (1993: 163) describe this type of evaluation as being directed at 
three questions: 
(1) the extent to which a program is reaching the appropriate target population, (2) 
whether or not its delivery of services is consistent with program design specifications, and 
(3) what resources are being or have been expended in the conduct of the program. 
Nonetheless, for the better understanding of the results of an evaluation, it is essential to 
identify some of the conditions that may promote or hinder the successful implementation 
of a public policy, or a governmental programme.64 Two such conditions which can be 
said to relate to the present investigation and require consideration are (i) probability of 
failure, introduced by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and (ii) street-level bureaucracy, 
introduced by Lipsky (1971, 1980). 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue that the more stages of decision-making that are 
involved in implementing a public policy, or a governmental programme, the more likely 
such policy or programme may fail to meet the stated objectives. 
Lipsky (1980) states that, in order to understand how and why public policies or 
governmental programmes may not achieve their objectives, it is necessary to be aware of 
                                               
63 For a detailed discussion of the different stages, or phases, see, Colebatch (2002), Fischer, 
Miller, and Sidney (2007), John (1998), Hill (1997, 2009), Hupe and Hill (2006), Kraft and 
Furlong (2007), Palumbo (1987), Parsons (1995), Rist (1995), Rossi and Freeman (1993), and 
Wu, Ramesh, Howlett, and Fritzen (2010). 
64 For a detailed discussion on typical implementation barriers, see Wu et al. (2010: 74-77). 
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the experiences of low-level staff implementing these policies or programmes. He argues 
that 
<...> the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish <...> effectively 
become the public policies they carry out. <...> [P]ublic policy is not best understood as 
made in legislatures <...>, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded 
offices and daily encounters of street-level workers. (Lipsky, 1980: xii) 
As a result, the low level staff have a direct impact on the likelihood of the successful 
implementation of a public policy, or a governmental programme. 
Wu et al. (2010: 3) agree by stating that “policies implemented by street-level 
bureaucrats deviate considerably from what was envisaged at the policy formulation 
stage”, and that this may lead to “a confusing patchwork of rules and regulations, 
undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of many policies”. 
2.3.1.2 Evaluation of Public Policy 
The evaluations which take place at the evaluation stage of the public policy process are 
of a summative nature and assess policies or programmes which are “in a mature or 
settled stage and have had sufficient time to have an effect” (Owen, 2007: 251). 
Wu et al. (2010: 9) define policy evaluation as a “critical policy activity in that it 
involves the assessment of the extent to which a public policy is achieving its stated 
objectives and, if not, what can be done to improve it”. 
The existing literature on forms and approaches to evaluation is fragmented and does not 
provide a uniform classification. Different authors provide their own typologies based on 
different criteria.65 The following two sub-sections look at the types of evaluation based 
on the scope of an evaluation, and based on timing and methods. 
 
 
                                               
65 See, for example, House (1978), Hutton and McNeill (1981), Nachmias (1979), Owen (2007), 
Owen and Rogers (1999) , Palfrey, Phillips, Thomas, and Edwards (1992), Stufflebeam and 
Webster (1980), Vedung (2006), and Wu et al. (2010). 
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Typology of Evaluation Approaches: Scope 
Summative evaluations tend to look at the process, the output or the impact (or the 
outcome) of a policy or a programme.66 
In process evaluations, the process is evaluated to generate knowledge about the 
efficiency of the process in devising public policy (Pierre, 2006). According to Wu et al. 
(2010: 85), the main aim of output evaluations (or performance evaluations) is to 
“determine what the policy is producing, often regardless of the stated objectives”. 
The traditional performance evaluation model – inputs, process, output model – measures 
the intervention from input (amount of resources) to output (expected measurable result), 
on the basis of the aggregated output. However, such a model fails to produce an 
assessment of the impact of a policy or a programme.67 
Impact evaluations (or effectiveness evaluations) look beyond efficiency and compare the 
outcomes of a policy or a programme to its intended goals and determine whether a policy 
or a programme is meeting them and how it impacts on end-users (Markless and 
Streatfield, 2006; Parsons, 1995; Wu et al., 2010). Wu et al. (2010: 85) argue that 
impact evaluations are the most difficult to carry out and that “[t]he information needs 
are immense and the level of sophistication required to carry out the process is higher 
than is generally available in government”. 
                                               
66 Nachmias (1979) and Pierre (2006) distinguish only two types of evaluation, namely process 
evaluation and outcome evaluation. Wu et al. (2010) differentiate political and administrative 
evaluations, from which the latter has five types, namely efforts evaluation (input), performance 
evaluation (output), process evaluation, efficiency evaluation, and effectiveness evaluation 
(impact). 
67 The following example shows why such a model cannot measure the outcome, or the impact of a 
programme. If, for example, the government tries to improve the knowledge of consumers about 
DI, they might do it by creating educational material explaining how the DIS works and noting 
how many brochures or flyers they have produced and at what cost (inputs measures). They 
would then dispatch the brochures or flyers to all banks within the DIS and ensure these materials 
are placed in the bank branches where they are likely to be accessible to consumers (the speed and 
precision with which this is done can be the process measures). Most of these brochures and flyers 
will then be taken by depositors and there may be different ways of measuring how frequently the 
stands get empty (output measures). But, how can the government find out whether or not 
consumers know more about the DIS as a result of this intervention? No amount of monitoring 
how frequently stands have to be re-filled can tell whether brochures were actually read or 
whether readers were in any way influenced by what they had read or whether they have learnt 
anything. For a detailed discussion of differences between outputs and impacts (or outcomes), see 
Nachmias (1979: 2-3). 
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When measuring the impact of a policy, the outcomes can be those intended or can be 
different from what was envisaged (unintended outcomes). A distinction is sometimes 
also made between direct outcomes and longer-term outcomes. Markless and Streatfield 
(2006) argue that outcomes of both kinds are not always clearly identifiable and they are 
often confused with outputs, even in the specialist literature.  
Rossi and Freeman (1993: 215) submit that whilst “[i]mpact assessments are 
undertaken to estimate whether or not interventions produce their intended effects[, 
s]uch estimates cannot be made with certainty but only with varying degrees of 
plausibility <…>”. OECD (1984: 32) further argues that “impacts are very difficult to 
assess in the absence of clearly stated objectives and of adequate evaluation means”. 
Typology of Evaluation Approaches: Timing and Methods 
Over time, the focus of evaluations and the respective approaches changed from 
retrospective evaluations using survey methods in the 1970s, to prospective evaluations 
using laboratory experiments in the 1980s, to theory-driven evaluations using a 
multitude of methods in the 1990s. 
Houston and Rothschild (1980) advocated experimental research and the prospective 
impact evaluation as an input to public policy decision-making. They argued that “[t]hese 
two features of public policy making [would] grow together in the 1980s just as the use 
of survey research and retrospective impact evaluation grew together in the 1970s” 
(Houston and Rothschild, 1980: 446). They further argued that in marketing literature 
there were two types of policy-related research: 
(1) research that examines post hoc the effects of implemented public policy using 
secondary data <...> or survey methods <...> and (2) research not conducted specifically 
for the purpose of providing input to policy formulation but whose context and findings are 
relevant to persons contemplating policy <...>. (Houston and Rothschild, 1980: 432) 
Werlin and Schauffler (1978) advocated prospective evaluation studies, because 
retrospective evaluations have data collection and control group difficulties. Moreover, 
they emphasised the importance of establishing standardised measures and criteria for 
programme success. 
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According to Stame (2004), realistic evaluation, introduced by Pawson and Tilley 
(1997), represents one of the new waves of theory-oriented approaches to evaluation.68 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) assume that realistic evaluations test a theory about what 
might cause change even if the programme’s theory is not explicit. They argue that it is 
the task of a realistic evaluation to identify the programme’s theories through clear 
hypotheses about how, and for whom, a programme might work and test these 
hypotheses.69 
They argue that what creates programme impact (or outcome) is an interaction between 
the programme’s mechanism and the context in which it exists. 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) believe that programmes aim to address an existing problem 
by creating a certain level of social change. Programmes enable participants to make 
choices. Making and sustaining different choices requires a change in the participants’ 
reasoning (e.g. beliefs, values and attitudes) and resources (e.g. information, skills or 
material resources) available to them. Such a combination of ‘reasoning and resources’ is 
the programme’s ‘mechanism’ in this model, and this is what enables a programme to 
work. 
The contexts of a programme influence the outcomes such a programme may achieve. 
Such contexts may include a variety of factors, for example, social, economic and political 
environments, geographical, historic and organisational contexts, as well as the 
programme participants. Some factors may trigger a particular programme’s mechanism, 
whilst other factors may prevent this process. 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) submit that whilst a programme, which is replicated from one 
context to another, will not achieve the same impact as in the original context, it is 
possible to transplant an understanding about ‘what works for whom, in what context, 
and how’. Therefore, it is the purpose of evaluation to learn more about ‘what works for 
                                               
68 Stame (2004) also mentions ‘theory-driven evaluation’, introduced by Chen and Rossi in 1989, 
and ‘theory-based evaluation’, introduced by Weiss in 1987. 
69 Tilley (2006: 105) argues that realistic evaluation “emphasises the presence of various layers of 
social reality that need to be understood <...> to make sense of outcome patterns produced”. 
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whom’ and determine ‘in which contexts particular programs do and don’t work’, and 
‘what mechanisms are triggered by what programs in what contexts’. 
2.3.2 Evaluation of Consumer Programmes 
A number of evaluation studies have been carried out in the field of consumer information 
and consumer education reforms, policies and programmes. Considering that the DIS is 
not only an institutional reform, but also a consumer information reform, ideas from the 
studies discussed below will influence the direction of the evaluation of the Russian DIS. 
Houston and Rothschild (1980) state that discussions related to the design of consumer 
information studies are scattered and, being case-specific, do not identify a complete set 
of relevant issues. However, there are several authors who offer an insight into what 
evidence should be collected to suggest whether a consumer information reform has 
achieved its stated objectives. 
Drawing from 31 impact evaluation studies of consumer health education programmes, 
Werlin and Schauffler (1978) conclude that the major variables measured across all 
studies were participant knowledge (11 studies), participant attitudes (9 studies), health-
related behaviour (24 studies), and health status of the participants (13 studies). They 
further advocate the establishment of standardised measures and criteria for programme 
success. 
Bettman (1975), drawing on research into information processing by consumers, submits 
that any public policy or governmental programme within the consumer information 
domain creates an information environment. Depending on the intent of a policy or a 
programme, such environment may have two functions, namely a processing function and 
a policy function. 
An information environment has a processing function when “it is intended only that 
consumers should be aided in perceiving and processing the appropriate information, but 
there is no commitment to how or even if consumers use such information” (Bettman, 
1975: 175). An information environment has a policy function when the intent is that 
consumers use the information in a particular way. The measurable effects of both 
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functions are awareness, recall and knowledge – for processing function, and attitude and 
behaviour – for policy function.70 
This understanding of the impact of consumer information programmes, being social 
programmes, is shared by Weiss (1972). She further suggests that  
[b]ecause it is studying a program that intervenes in people’s lives with intention of causing 
change, evaluation can often make direct inferences about the causal links that lead from 
program to effect. Evaluators use the whole gamut of research methods to collect 
information – interviews, questionnaires, tests of knowledge and skill, attitude inventories, 
observation, content analysis of documents, records, examination of physical evidence. 
<...> The kind of data-collection scheme to be used depends on the type of information 
needed to answer the specific questions that the evaluation poses. (Weiss, 1972: 8-9)71 
2.4 Summary 
As discussed in this chapter, there are different rationales for DI, however, the two 
principal public policy objectives usually cited in literature are those of financial stability 
and depositor protection. A DIS may be structured in different ways, but the design of a 
DIS will always reflect the country-specific parameters of the legal, regulatory and 
institutional environment, thus making each of the existing DISs, worldwide, unique. 
The review of literature on consumer protection in financial markets shows that the most 
common examples of information failure found in the depositor-bank relationship are 
information asymmetry, deficiencies in information processing by consumers, and issues 
related to standard form contracts. 
The literature on public policy implementation suggests that there may be several 
barriers to implementing a policy or a programme, which may affect its outcome. 
Furthermore, examples of previous evaluations in the field of consumer information 
remedies recommend using the awareness, knowledge, attitude and behaviour of 
participants (or end-users) as the measurable effects of a public policy or a governmental 
programme. 
 
                                               
70 For more information on attitude and behaviour as measures in evaluation research, see 
Nachmias and Ridgeway (1986). 
71 The choice of data collection methods is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
Overview of the Russian Deposit Insurance Scheme 
 
“If there is a way to delay an important decision, the good 
bureaucracy, public or private, will find it.” 
–C. Northcote Parkinson (1909-1993) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the DIS development in Russia, its current features 
and any evaluations carried out since 2004. 
Nystén-Haarala (2001: v) submits that 
Russian law cannot be understood without studying it in its economic, social, political and 
historical context. It is not the details that are interesting in Russian law, but the transitory 
development itself. 
Therefore, a historic account of the banking reforms in Russia, including the reform of 
DI, is provided in section 3.1 so that the current DIS can be understood in context. 
Section 3.2 outlines the main features of the current DIS in Russia, including its legal 
form, public policy objectives and mandate, its administration, funding and membership, 
and its coverage and payout mechanisms. Public awareness instruments currently used 
by both the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) and by banks participating in the 
scheme are examined separately. Section 3.3 presents the past evaluations of the Russian 
DIS, and identifies a gap for an independent evaluation assessing the effectiveness of the 
scheme. 
3.1 History of the Russian Banking System 
The Russian banking system has a long and diverse history. This section provides a 
chronological account of the main developments within the banking system since the 
1860s, including information on the main reforms, on households’ savings’ behaviour and 
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on many attempts to set up a deposit protection system since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
3.1.1 Imperial Financial Reforms and the Socialist Banking System 
(1860s-1970s) 
The origin of the modern banking system in Russia goes back to the financial reform of 
1859. The State Bank of Russia was founded in 1860, followed by several private credit 
institutions. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian banking system was comprised of 
the State Bank, the State Savings Bank and some other governmental banks, as well as 
various social and private credit institutions. These included about fifty commercial banks 
which were formed as joint-stock companies and, in addition, three hundred city credit 
societies and banks (Oda, 2002). 
After the October Revolution which took place in 1917, these banking institutions were 
nationalised, and banking business was declared to be under state monopoly. Activities of 
foreign banks in Russia were prohibited by 1918. 
At the beginning of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, the State Bank of the 
RSFSR was founded, and was later transformed into the State Bank of the USSR (‘State 
Bank’). Some specialised state banks such as the Foreign Trade Bank and the 
Agricultural Bank were set up around this time. During the period of NEP, the state 
monopoly of banking was forgotten temporarily, and some private credit organisations in 
the form of mutual credit societies were allowed to be set up. However, these institutions 
were phased out by the end of 1930s. 
The socialist system of banking could be described as a mono-bank system in contrast to 
a two-tier banking system of state bank and commercial banks. The State Bank, being 
the issuer of money, together with a selected number of specialised banks, were the sole 
credit institutions. All state enterprises and organisations had a current bank account 
with a local branch of the State Bank and were obliged to pay all their money into this 
account and effect payments through the bank. This system was designed for the 
government to closely monitor state enterprises for the ultimate goal of fulfilling the state 
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economic plan. On the other hand, individuals could only hold savings bank accounts, and 
all payments were made in cash. 
Feldbrugge (1973) argued that savings bank accounts enjoyed a specially protected 
status as compared with other private property. The protection of savings was 
specifically declared in Article 10 of the 1936 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the 
USSR72, as amended, and later, in Article 13 of the 1977 Constitution (Fundamental 
Law) of the USSR73. The safety of deposits was guaranteed by the Government of the 
USSR (Feldbrugge, van den Berg, and Simons, 1985). 
3.1.2 Last Socialist Reforms and the Development of Modern 
Banking System (1980s-1996) 
The system started to change in 1987, when the last economic reform under socialism 
was attempted. In the proposed new system, the State Bank was transformed into a 
genuine central bank, leaving other functions to the newly created specialised state banks. 
In addition, the Foreign Trade Bank (‘Vneshtorgbank’) and the Savings Bank 
(‘Sberbank’) were reorganised, and were given more independence from the State Bank. 
In 1988, the special legislation was enacted, allowing association (unions) of co-
operatives to set up co-operative banks. According to Oda (2002), this new legislation 
was a watershed for private enterprise which had previously been banned by law. In 
reality, the banks which “mushroomed” after 1988 were mainly “wildcat” banks formed 
by state enterprises and local governments (Oda, 2002: 357). Furthermore, non-
governmental banks rapidly developed, with up to one hundred and fifty new commercial 
banks and co-operative banks being opened in 1988-1989. By the end of 1990, the 
number of commercial banks exceeded one thousand. In the first half of the 1990s, 
commercial banks in Russia continued to prosper: 
[t]he early 1990’s saw a boom in commercial banking in Russia. The number of registered 
credit institutions grew from 1 360 at the end of 1991 to 2 019 at the end of 1993 and 2 
605 in June 1996. (Schleifer and Treisman, 1998: 40) 
                                               
72 Adopted on 05 December 1936. 
73 Adopted on 07 October 1977. 
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Oda (2002: 278) claims that, in the period of high inflation, these credit organisations 
became accustomed to a ‘fast-and-loose’ style “closer to loan-sharking, currency 
speculation, and arbitrage than conventional banking”. 
To conclude, a two-tier system of banking, i.e. a system with a Central Bank and 
independent commercial banks, emerged in Russia in late 1980s. 
The Russian banking system at the time could be classified as heterogeneous. Apart from 
Sberbank, which held the vast majority of retail depositors’ savings at the time, there 
were two main groups of banks. The first group consisted of mostly large Moscow and 
regional banks which worked with, and serviced funds of, governmental bodies of various 
levels, and natural resources monopolies. The second group consisted of banks which 
were orientated towards commercial enterprises with no access to the funds from local 
and regional administrations.74 
There were, and still are, different forms of entry for foreign companies, including banks, 
in Russia: (i) through a representative office, (ii) through a branch (filial), (iii) through a 
separate subsidiary bank, (iv) through participation in an established bank with other 
foreign investors, or (v) through the merger or acquisition of another foreign bank which 
has a presence in the Russian market. Historically, the foreign banks chose first to create 
a representative office in Russia and then organically grow, and subsequently to 
transform the representative office into a fully functioning subsidiary with 100% 
ownership by the parent company (Vernikov, 2002: 374). Schleifer and Treisman 
(1998) note that in 1993, the Russian Government took protectionist measures and 
restricted entry of foreign banks to the Russian market. Furthermore, there was a 
legislative restriction on the share of foreign capital in the aggregate capital of the 
Russian banking system.75 
                                               
74 The current banking system resembles the system of 1990s in so far as it still is heterogeneous, 
though the number of banks has been decreasing in the past two decades through normal exits of 
weak banks from the market or through mergers and acquisitions. The DIA attempted to classify 
all Russian banks in four groups and now uses this classification for reporting purposes. The 
classification will be presented and discussed in Section 3.3.2.3 below. 
75 These restrictions continued through the present time and the opening of branches of foreign 
banks is prohibited in Russia (Filina, 2011). However, according to Mekhryakov (2002), this will 
have to change if and when Russia joins the World Trade Organization. 
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In early 1994, the Russian Government tried to stabilise the economy and, as a result, 
the monthly inflation rate fell to 4%in August 1994. However, stabilisation was 
discarded when the Central Bank and ministers caved in to pressures for agricultural 
credits and subsidies to northern territories in the summer and autumn of the same year. 
The result of a less vigorous policy, which was foreseen in financial markets, was the 
27% depreciation of the Russian Rouble on 11 October 1994, so-called ‘Black Tuesday’, 
and the loss of confidence in the Government. By December 1994, inflation was back to a 
monthly rate of 17% (Boone and Fedorov, 1997). 
Many Russians lost trust in banks, and invested in hard currency or in goods. By 1994, 
only about 8% of individuals kept savings in a bank (Molchanov, 1996). 
Whilst Khomenko (2006) states that the first mention of deposit protection was in the 
CBR’s Instruction dated 30 April 1991,76 which included reference to the establishment 
of a deposit insurance fund. By the mid-1990s, Russia still had not developed a 
functioning DIS. 
Johnson (2000: 113) argues that the main reason for that was the fact that the Central 
Bank wanted commercial banks to design and fund the system, but the bankers felt that it 
was the responsibility of the Central Bank – “both wanted the security, but neither 
wanted to pay for it”. Moreover, the total number and the diversity of banks, combined 
with the uncertainty of the economy, made it difficult to estimate the funding required to 
operate the system and the regularity with which payouts might take place. Tosunyan 
(1995) backed the idea by proposing that the funds for creating such a system and 
financing its start-up activities could be granted by the state in the form of subsidised 
credit, with a lengthy term of repayment. The Central Bank, on the other hand, preferred 
that the commercial banks set up and control their own voluntary fund. As a result of this 
fundamental difference in opinions, two Presidential Decrees on the matter (from 1993 
and 1994) were ignored.77 
                                               
76 For more details on this CBR’s Instruction, please see Khomenko (2006: 36). 
77 For more information on 1993 and 1994 Presidential Decrees, see Guznov (1999) and 
Khomenko (2006). 
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On 13 July 1995, a group of MPs submitted a bill “On Obligatory Insurance of Bank 
Deposits of Citizens”78 to Parliament. Parliament passed this law in November 1995, but 
the President vetoed it (Medvedev, 1996; Rutland, 1996). 
Another attempt to pass the law which would have provided depositor protection took 
place in June 1996, when a group of MPs submitted a bill “On Guaranteeing of Deposits 
of Citizens in Banks”.79 However, this bill had a similar fate to the previous one and was 
withdrawn following the President’s veto.80 
3.1.3 Deposit Guarantee Fund in Saint-Petersburg (1996-1998) 
In this period of unrest among the Russian population with respect to the safety of bank 
deposits, and in light of a very slim possibility of the relevant legislation being passed at 
federal level, regional authorities were looking at the ways of protecting people’s savings. 
Vishnyakova and Petrova (2005: 73) argue that “[e]ven in the 1980s. <...> when 
reforms had not yet been initiated, St Petersburg was a leader in developing banking in 
Russia”.81 It is not surprising then that Saint-Petersburg became the first region in 
Russia to set up a deposit guarantee fund (Guznov, 1999). 
Krotov (2009) states that the impetus to the establishment of the deposit guarantee fund 
in Saint-Petersburg was a seminar organised by the FDIC, where banks learnt about the 
history and structure of DIs in the USA.82 As a result, and knowing that US states had 
regional DISs before the federal system was enacted, the Chief Territorial District 
Division of the CBR in Saint-Petersburg, several banks, Association of Banks of North-
                                               
78 “Ob obyazatelnom strakhovanii bankovskikh vkladov grazhdan”. 
79 “O garantirovanii vkladov grazhdan v bankakh”. 
80 It should be noted that this bill was dormant for several years and was withdrawn only in 2003 
at the time when a new bill, which would then create the current DIS, was submitted for 
consideration. 
81 For an overview of the economic development of Saint-Petersburg in 1990s, see Kihlgren 
(2003). 
82 For a different opinion see Ivanov (1996), who argues that the decision to set up the deposit 
guarantee fund was political and took place right before the mayoral elections. 
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West, and the Saint-Petersburg City Administration initiated the first deposit guarantee 
fund in Russia on a regional level in 1996.83 
The fund started its operations in 1997, just before the 1998 financial default. The 
membership consisted of seven banks: Baltoneksim Bank, Bank Saint-Petersburg, 
Commercial Export-Import Bank, Energomashbank, MDM-Bank Saint-Petersburg, 
Petrovsky Narodny Bank, Promstroybank, and Tekhnokhimbank. During the 1998 
financial crisis the structure of the fund changed substantially. The fund was now 
focusing on the protection of the most socially vulnerable group of depositors – retired 
people who were aged 60 years and above and had savings accounts in the participating 
banks. At the outset, the compensation amount was RUB 500. 
It is believed that this fund played an important role in restoring public confidence in the 
banking system in the region, as none of the participating banks lost their banking 
licences during 1998, whilst many local branches of Moscow banks suffered during the 
crisis.84 
3.1.4 Financial Default and Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance 
(1998-2003) 
In 1998, Russia fell into a serious financial crisis: 
The long, protracted ruble crisis took a sudden turn on August 17: the government threw in 
the towel, stopped propping up the ruble with the central bank’s depleted foreign exchange 
reserves, and let the exchange rate sink until it was de facto devalued by 35 percent. (The 
World Bank, 1998: 7) 
                                               
83 Established by the Order of the Mayor of Saint-Petersburg № 465-р from 12 May 1996 “On 
Establishment of the Saint-Petersburg Fund Guaranteeing Protection of Deposits and Savings 
Accounts of the Population in Commercial Banks” (“O sozdanii sankt-peterburgskogo fonda 
obespecheniya sokhrannosti depozitov i vkladov naseleniya v kommercheskikh bankakh”). 
84 In 2002, Inkasbank was accepted into the deposit guarantee fund in Saint-Petersburg and the 
compensation amount was increased to RUB 3,000 (Shaklanova, 2002). The territory of the 
fund’s activities was expanded to include the whole North-West region of Russia (now – North-
Western Federal District; other six federal districts include: Central Federal District, Southern 
Federal District, Far Eastern Federal District, Siberian Federal District, Urals Federal District, 
and Volga Federal District). Upon the establishment of the Russian DIS in late 2003, the fund 
was transformed into Saint-Petersburg fund for assistance of deposit insurance system’s 
development, and it has since represented the interests of the DIA in the region. 
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Apart from devaluing the national currency, the Russian Government had to default on 
foreign debt and freeze bank accounts (Intriligator, 1999), which resulted in a bank run 
among the population.  
The Central Bank injected liquidity into the 12 biggest banks, leaving many small banks 
to close down because of the considerably widened gap between their rouble assets and 
US Dollar liabilities (The World Bank, 1998). 
Buckley (1999: 7) states that: 
[d]ozens of banks suspended operations and quickly siphoned assets into new entities, 
leaving customers high and dry. Though some banks had their licences withdrawn, the lack 
of a state-backed deposit insurance scheme to protect the savings of bank depositors and the 
absence of proper laws to protect creditors in the event of insolvency make it doubly hard 
for the Russian banks to restore their credibility. 
According to Article 39 of the Federal Law on “Banks and Banking Activity”,85 there 
was supposed to be a federal obligatory deposit insurance fund. However, no such fund 
was actually set up because the special legislation, required to set such a fund up, was 
never passed (Guznov, 1999; Khomenko, 2006; Rozhdestvenskaya, 2003).86 
Moreover, commercial banks had a right to establish a voluntary deposit insurance fund 
(Article 39 of the Federal Law on “Banks and Banking Activity”). However, these 
voluntary funds did not become widespread. As for banks with more than 50% of the 
statutory capital controlled by the state, deposits were insured with the subsidiary 
(secondary) liability of the state.  
As a result, due to the lack of the necessary legal mechanisms, the banks’ obligations 
towards depositor protection could not have been fulfilled. Hence, all the measures 
stipulated by law were not enough to prevent the outcome of the financial crisis of 1998, 
when all deposits appeared not to be protected at all (Sergeev and Tolstoi, 2000). 
                                               
85 Federal Law № 395-1 “On Banks and Banking Activity” dated 02 December 1990. 
86 It appears that Rozhdestvenskaya (2003) copied the first part of her article from Guznov 
(1999: 76-80), except for one sentence. 
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The 1998 financial default re-ignited the attempts to establish a federal DIS in Russia, 
and there were a few proposals submitted to the Russian Parliament before all 
stakeholders could agree on the main features of the scheme.87 
On 15 September 1998, only one month after the default, a group of MPs submitted a bill 
“On State Emergency Measures for Protection of Deposits of the Population in Banks of 
Russians Federation”88 to the Parliament, but it was withdrawn from consideration in 
June 2000.  
However, the discussions about the reform continued: 
<...> the bank reform strategy spells out the formation of a general deposit insurance 
scheme (with a deposit ceiling). The scheme is initially voluntary, but will become 
compulsory, and deposit-taking rights will be available only to sound banks. Sberbank 
[which enjoys governmental deposit protection] is unwilling to switch to the scheme until it 
becomes compulsory. (Korhonen, 2001: 55) 
As a result of long discussions and several legislative proposals, the deposit protection 
system was introduced in Russia by the Federal Law “On Insurance of the Deposits of 
Psychical Persons in Banks of Russian Federation” dated 23 December 2003,89 and came 
into force on the date of its publication, 27 December 2003. 
3.1.5 Federal Law No 177-FZ and First Amendments (2003-2008) 
The Russian DIS was originally set up as an ex ante financed paybox system 
administered by a state corporation. Membership was (and still is) compulsory for all 
deposit-taking institutions and the process of joining the DIS was combined with the 
process of obtaining the banking licence. Participating banks paid (and still pay) quarterly 
premiums to the mandatory deposit insurance fund established to cover compensation 
payout in case of an insured event. The maximum compensation amounted to 100% of 
                                               
87 In the meantime, the Agency for restructuring of credit organisation (ARCO) was set up to 
become an administrator in five banks which suffered during the 1998 financial default, and to 
provide protection to their depositors. ARCO was liquidated in 2004. For more information, see 
Kmomenko (2006). 
88 “O gosudarstvennykhchrezvychaynykhmerakhpozashchitevkladovnaseleniya v bankakh 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii”. 
89 “O strakhovanii vkladov fizicheskikh lits v bankakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii”. 
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any amount up to RUB 100,000.90 Depositors retained the right to claim in the amount 
not covered by the deposit insurance. 
Table 3.1 presents a timeline of amendments to provisions on depositor protection in the 
Federal Law and introduction of relevant additional legislation. 
Table 3.1 
Timeline of amendments to the Federal Law and other legislation in relation to depositor 
protection91 
23 December 2003 Federal Law № 177-FZ is signed; came into force on 27 December 
2008 
29 July 2004 Federal Law № 96-FZ introduces deposit compensation by the CBR to 
retail depositors whose bank has not been included in the DIS at the 
time of withdrawal of the banking licence; came into force on 11 
September 2004 
20 August 2004 Federal Law № 106-FZ amended the Federal Law to stop subsidiary 
liability of the state in relation to bank accounts opened before 01 
October. 2004 in banks with participation of the CBR on 01 January 
2007;came into force on 25 August 2004 
27 July 2006 Federal Law № 150-FZ introduces co-insurance and a maximum 
compensation amount of RUB 190,000 (100% of RUB 100,000 + 
90% up to the total of RUB 190,000) 
13 March 2007 Federal Law № 34-FZ increases the maximum compensation amount to 
RUB 400,000 (100% of RUB 100,000 + 90% up to the total of RUB 
400,000); came into force on 26 March 2007 
13 October 2008 Federal Law № 174-FZ increases the maximum compensation amount 
to RUB 700,000 and abolishes the co-insurance, and came into force on 
14 October 2008 
27 October 2008 Federal Law № 175-FZ widens the mandate of the DIA to include 
prevention of bank bankruptcies (together with the CBR); came into 
force on 28 October 2008 
22 December 2008 Federal Law № 270-FZclarified that the bank accounts of sole trades 
(including lawyers and notaries) opened for execution of their 
professional activity are not covered by the DIS 
27 September 2009 Federal Law № 227-FZ suspended the enforcement of Article 48(3)(2) 
and Article 48(3.1)(1) and (3) on the consequences of nonconformity of 
banks-members of the DIS to the DIS participation requirements until 
31 December 2010;came into force on 29 September 2009 
23 December 2010 Federal Law № 375-FZ extends the validity of suspension introduced 
by Federal Law № 227-FZ from 31 December 2010 to 01 July 2011; 
came into force on 07 January 2011 
                                               
90 Rozhdestvenskaya (2003) states that the original proposal included the maximum compensation 
amount of RUB 95,000 with a co-insurance element (100% of RUB 20,000 followed by 75% of 
the remaining amount). 
91 Amendments related to other parts of the Federal Law (not to provisions on depositor 
protection) are not covered in this thesis. 
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In July 2006, the amendment to the Federal Law introduced a co-insurance element to 
the DIS. The compensation increased to a maximum of RUB 190,000 (100% of the 
amount up to RUB 100,000 followed by 90% of further RUB 100,000). Furthermore, 
Federal Law № 96-FZ “On the Payments by the Bank of Russia for Household Deposits 
with Bankrupt Banks Uncovered by the Deposit Insurance System” dated 29 July 
2004,92 allowed the depositors of banks which failed to join the DIS to be eligible for 
compensation from the CBR, should their bank fail. 
From 01 January 2007, the retail depositors of Sberbank could no longer rely on the 
subsidiary liability of the state and were given the same status as the retail depositors of 
any other bank in Russia, which was seen as a logical continuation of the Federal Law 
(Vladimirov, 2004). 
In March 2007, another increase in the maximum compensation amount took place. 
Retail depositors were now guaranteed compensation in the amount of up to RUB 
400,000 whereby the first RUB 100,000 were guaranteed in full, with the remaining 
amount guaranteed by 90% up to the total amount of RUB 400,000. 
3.1.6 Global Financial Crisis Aftermath (2008-2011) 
The global financial crisis became apparent in September 2008 after failures of large 
financial institutions in the United States. It rapidly evolved into a global crisis, resulting 
in a number of European bank failures and declines in various stock indexes, and 
significant reductions in the market value of stocks and commodities worldwide. The 
crisis has led to a liquidity problem and the de-leveraging of financial institutions, 
especially in the United States and Europe, which further accelerated the liquidity crisis. 
Following events elsewhere in the world, the Russian stock market has fallen by almost 
58% from its peak on 19 May 2008 to its lowest point on 17 September 2008 making 
this the largest decline since the 1998 financial default (Illarionov, 2008). Members of 
the Government fully attributed the decline in the Russian stock market to the impact of 
the liquidity crisis in the United States, and contended that the crisis in Russia had little, 
                                               
92 “O vyplatakh Banka Rossii po vkladam fizicheskikh lits v priznannykh bankrotami bankakh, ne 
uchastvuyushchikh v sisteme strakhovaniya vkladov fizicheskikh lits Rossiyskoy Federatsii”. 
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if anything, to do with internal problems in its economy and the governmental policies. 
However, many analysts, including Illarionov (2008), claimed that the crisis in the stock 
market in Russia was deepened dramatically by internal factors, including concerns over 
state interference in the economy, lack of transparency in banking and political risks 
associated with escalating geopolitical tensions following the war in South Ossetia in 
August 2008.  
The first sign of problems in Russian’s banking sector came on 17 September 2008 when 
KIT Finans investment bank put itself up for sale on 16 September 2008 after failing to 
pay off its debt (Khutornykh and Rozhkov, 2008).93 
This was followed by the Government lending the country’s three biggest (and state-
owned) banks – Sberbank, VTB Bank and Gazprombank – as much as RUB 1.13 trillion 
(USD 44 billion) for at least three months to boost liquidity. 
On 22 September 2008, a group of pro-Government MPs introduced a bill to increase the 
maximum deposit insurance compensation amount from RUB 400,000 to RUB 700,000, 
with the increase of the 100% guaranteed amount from RUB 100,000 to RUB 200,000. 
The MPs hoped to pass the bill in all three readings at once as all the parties concerned 
had reached a consensus. 
On 23 September 2008,a regular meeting of the DIA’s Board of Directors took place 
(DIA, 2008c). The meeting held detailed discussions of issues related to changing a 
number of key parameters of the Russian DIS aimed at expanding guarantees provided to 
banks’ depositors in the present crisis. Based on submitted calculations, it was considered 
feasible to raise maximum insured deposit coverage as proposed by the MPs (see above). 
It is interesting to note that the Minister of Finance held a consultation with 
representatives of 50 banks and 2 bank associations initiated by the bankers themselves 
before the bill was introduced in Parliament. Bankers proposed the introduction of a 
temporary blanket guarantee on all deposits, irrespective of their amount since, in the 
opinion of the bankers, the public did not quite understand the reasons behind the lending 
                                               
93 Deposits of all clients decreased, according to KIT Finans, from RUB 71.7 billion on 01 
September to RUB 57 billion on 01 October. On 01 August, the bank held RUB 83 billion in 
deposits. 
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of money to the 3 biggest, banks and this led to the nervousness of the depositors. The 
bankers insisted that although there is no economic necessity for a blanket guarantee, this 
change was necessary to let the public know that there was nothing to fear (Kudinov and 
Khutornykh, 2008). 
Though some countries of the European Union did announce a blanket guarantee at the 
time (see Chapter 2 for more details), the Russian Parliament did not go that far. 
According to the re-drafted amendments to the Federal Law (which were passed on 13 
October 2008 and came into force on 14 October 2008) deposit insurance coverage was 
increased from RUB 400,000 to RUB 700,000. This change also abolished previously 
existing co-insurance arrangements and established 100%coverage of up to RUB 
700,000. 
The new parameters of the DIS became applicable to banks which failed after 01 October 
2008, which means these amendments to the Federal Law had a retrospective force 
(Zykov, 2008). There were two banks which lost their licence in October 2008 – 
Yevraziya-Tsentr (on 09 October) and Yunitbank (on 15 October) and these were the 
first two banks whose depositors received a higher compensation amount. 
On 28 October 2008, the Federal Law “On Additional Measures to Strengthen the 
Stability of the Banking System through 31 December 2011”94 came into force. This new 
Federal Law substantially widened the mandate of the DIA by granting additional 
authority in preventing bank failures by providing financial support to the mergers or 
acquisitions of troubled banks. In case no investor was found, the DIA was given a right 
to write off the equity capital and inject new capital directly. All such actions of the DIA 
were to be pre-approved by the CBR.95 
There have been no major changes to the DIS since 2008.96 However, the DIS in Russia 
may see the disappearance of over 100 banks from the market in early 2012 because they 
will not be able to comply with new capital requirement of minimum RUB 180 million 
                                               
94 “O dopolnitelnykh merakh dlya ukrepleniya stabilnosti bankovskoy sistemy v period do 31 
dekabrya 2011 goda”. 
95 For a more detailed overview, please see Bloomberg (2008) and EFDI (2008); Zarshchikov 
(2009) provides an analysis of the DIA activities in late 2008 and early 2009 in this regard. 
96 For a more general account of banking reforms in Russia in recent years, see Balling (2009). 
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(Zykova, 2011). A similar fate may await further banks when additional capital increase 
to a minimum of RUB 300 million will be introduced in January 2015 (Zborovskaya, 
2011). How will this affect the DIS, and whether mass payouts will be necessary, 
remains to be seen. 
3.2 Main Features of the Current Russian DIS 
Based on the main features of a DIS discussed in Chapter 2, the Russian DIS can be 
described as follows. 
3.2.1 Legal Form, Public Policy Objectives, Mandate 
The Russian DIS is explicit, and was established in December 2003 when the Federal 
Law was passed. There are three stated objectives of the DIS (Article 1(1) of the 
Federal Law), namely (i) to protect the rights and legal interests of household depositors, 
(ii) to strengthen public confidence in the banking system, and (iii) to encourage 
household savings in the banking system.97 
In terms of a mandate, the Russian DIS is a paybox scheme with additional authorities 
over the resolution of problem banks (see Section 3.1.6 above). 
3.2.2 Coverage and Compensation Mechanism 
The Russian DIS provides limited coverage per depositor per bank. The maximum 
compensation amount is a RUB 700,000 (introduced in October 2008). 
The coverage is extended to retail depositors and sole traders, and, in terms of the type of 
bank accounts, includes all bank accounts, except four types specified in Article 2 of the 
Federal Law. Bank accounts in both national and foreign currencies are covered. Foreign 
currency bank accounts are compensated in the national currency, based on the exchange 
rate of the CBR on the date of an insured event. 
                                               
97 Tompson (2004: 26) argues that there were four public policy objectives of the DI reform in 
Russia which are “to strengthen banking sector stability, to protect retail savers, to enhance 
competition and to foster financial deepening by mobilising the large volume of unbanked savings 
held by Russian households”. 
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With regard to the compensation period, Russia has one of the shortest payout times. 
According to the Federal Law, the payout shall commence within 14 calendar days of the 
announcement of the insured event. 
According to Article 8(1) of the Federal Law, there are two possible insured events: (i) 
revocation (annulment) of bank’s banking licence, and (ii) imposition of a moratorium by 
the CBR on settling the claims of bank’s creditors. The depositors’ right for compensation 
emerges as of the date of the insured event. 
The DIA is responsible for the payout process, and may involve a bank-agent if the failed 
bank had a widespread branch network. Bank-agents are not prohibited from enlisting 
the depositors of a failed bank as their new depositors and thus keeping the funds. 
According to the Federal Law, the DIA appoints a bank-agent for paying out the 
compensation in the case of an insured event. Any bank, meeting certain requirements 
specified in the Law, can apply to be appointed as a bank-agent. 
The DIA may also offer an option to receive the compensation directly from the Agency. 
In Russia, compensation can be received in cash or through a bank transfer. 
Russia experienced a problem with business depositors who were tipped off before the 
banking licence of the bank they patronise was revoked only to transfer some or all of the 
funds into retail bank accounts, opened usually by the family members of the management 
or employees of the business depositor. DIA (2011a: 9) described the situation as 
follows:  
In 2010 the work on preventing payouts to depositors whose claims resulted from 
insurance fraud was continued. Typically, such illegal claims are connected with account 
balances artificially formed in a de facto insolvent bank shortly before its license revocation. 
They are documented by technical records of intra-bank transactions in the form of transfer 
of funds from accounts of legal entities, individual entrepreneurs as well as natural persons 
whose account (deposit) balance exceeds the established deposit insurance limit. Also to 
create artificial records on accounts of household depositors some bank customers and its 
employees arrange simultaneous cash withdrawals and cash depositing on insured accounts 
via the bank cashier office. 
Even though, under the Federal Law, all retail deposits have to be included in the payout 
in the case of an insured event, the DIA chose not to compensate such ‘suspicious’ retail 
depositors, and filed relevant claims in court. The DIA classified such cases as insurance 
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fraud because, in the opinion of DIA, such movements of funds were intended “to evade 
priority of creditor claims established by legislation for liquidation proceedings and 
receive baseless payment at the expense of the mandatory deposit insurance fund” (DIA, 
2011a: 9).98 There were reports of situations when innocent retail depositors suffered an 
unnecessary delay in receiving their compensation because of this (Gurkina, 2009). 
Amendments to the Federal Law aimed to prevent such situations are currently under 
discussion (Dementyeva, Nantay, and Dementyeva, 2010; Kukol, 2011). 
For the compensation of the amount above the maximum compensation amount, retail 
depositors have preference over other creditors in the process of bank’s liquidation. 
In terms of public awareness, there are several instruments which are used to raise the 
level of the retail depositors’ knowledge about the DIS in Russia. These are described in 
detail in Section 3.2.5 below. 
3.2.3 Membership 
The DIS is compulsory for all deposit-taking financial institutions. The process of joining 
the DIS is connected to the licensing process, whereby the membership in the DIS is 
granted upon receipt of the retail banking licence, and conversely, the membership ceases 
to exist once such a licence has been revoked. 
Foreign branches of banks with headquarters in Russia are not included in the DIS 
(Article 5(2)(4) of the Federal Law). As for branches of foreign banks in Russia, Russian 
legislation does not allow foreign companies to open direct branches, and all foreign 
companies operating in Russia have to create a new legal entity in accordance with 
Russian law (see Section 3.1.2 above). 
3.2.4 Management and Funding 
The DIS is administered by a state corporation, and is funded ex ante with additional ex 
post financial support from the state, if necessary. 
                                               
98 Lazareva (2006: 58) reviews the provisions on insurance fraud and the right of an insurer not 
to pay insurance compensation in such cases. She confirms that these provisions do not apply to 
the deposit insurance and that the DIA does not have an authority to withheld compensation. 
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The DIA is separate from the government legal entity in the form of a state corporation. 
The Government provided the initial finance when the deposit insurance fund was set up 
and then, in 2008, allocated additional funds for resolution purposes as a response to the 
global financial crisis.99 
Banks contribute quarterly premiums, which are based on the remainder of the retail deposits 
at the end of the previous quarter. The premiums are not risk-adjusted. 
3.2.5 Public Awareness Instruments 
The Federal Law stipulates that, whilst the depositors have the right to receive 
information from a bank they patronise as well as from the DIA about their bank’s 
membership in the DIS (Article 7(1)(3)), the banks have an obligation to inform 
depositors about their membership in the DIS and about the procedures they follow and 
the amount of deposit insurance coverage (Article 6(3)(2)). Furthermore, banks are 
obliged to display information about the DIS in branches, and in places where depositors 
will have free access to such information (Article 6(3)(3)). In turn, the DIA’s activities 
and authority includes the Agency’s right to request banks to display information on the 
DIS and bank’s membership in it in premises where bank provides services to depositors 
(Article 15(2)(6)). 
To aid banks in this task of informing depositors, the DIA issued a set of 
Recommendations on how to inform depositors about the DIS100 on 30 June 2005. 
Considering the DIA is a state corporation which manages the DIS, its recommendations 
have no enforceable power and thus can merely make recommendations. 
                                               
99 For more information on the current details of the deposit insurance fund, please see DIA 
(2011a: 12-13). 
100 “Rekomendatsii o poryadke informirovaniya bankami vkladchikov po voprosam strakhovaniya 
vkladov” can be found at http://asv.org.ru/for_banks/docs/recomen/. 
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3.2.5.1 Website 
The DIA set up a website which features different information about the DIS.101 The 
website contains information about the scheme, including the process of liquidation and 
financial rehabilitation of insolvent banks and so on. 
3.2.5.2 Hotline 
The DIA has also set up a free hotline, whereby anyone can call and find out more about 
the DIS in general, or about any of the insured events in particular. For those depositors 
who have not received their compensation in full beyond the maximum compensation 
amount, it is possible to find out more about the process of liquidation through this 
hotline. 
3.2.5.3 Brochure 
The DIA published a special brochure giving details of the DIS. The first edition of the 
brochure, entitled “Depositor’s Manual” (“Spravochnik vkladchika”), was published in 
August 2006, and contained basic information on the key elements of the DIS, an 
explanation of the co-insurance arrangements, and provided an overview of how the 
compensation would be calculated, depending on the amount of the deposit. It further 
included information about the compensation process, as well as full details of the DIA 
funds (see Appendix 4). 
Since then, there have been two further editions of the brochure. The edition issued in 
August 2007 introduced a higher compensation amount, but made no other changes. 
The current edition was issued in October 2008, at the time of the changes to the main 
elements of the DIS. It was also the first time the front page contained a statement “How 
to get RUB 700,000 back in 14 days” (see Appendix 5). From the outset, the brochure 
advocated the division of money between different banks in order to ensure that all of the 
depositor’s fund would be compensated in case of an insured event. 
                                               
101 The website can be access at http://www.asv.org.ru. 
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It is not clear how banks receive such brochures, and whether there is a systematic way 
to replenish banks’ stock of such brochures. 
3.2.5.4 Sticker 
The stickers with DIS’s logo and words “Deposits are insured. Deposit Insurance 
System” (“Vklady zastrakhovany. Sistema Strakhovaniya Vkladov”) have been produced 
and distributed to the banks. According to paragraph 9 of the Recommendations, the DIA 
recommends that stickers are displayed at different points across the banks’ branches, 
including at cashiers’ windows, near the entrance doors and the ATMs. 
3.2.5.5 Advertising by the DIS Member Banks 
According to the Federal Law, banks are obliged to inform retail depositors about the 
DIS and their membership in it. The Recommendations of the DIA further clarify that 
banks are allowed to use the DIS sign for the purposes of advertising (paragraph 11), 
which is defined as information about the bank, its financial and investment services and 
securities, about its ideas and initiatives, which is distributed in any form, with the help 
of any means and is designated to the undefined group of people and is called upon the 
formation or maintaining interest towards the bank and its activities. 
When using the DIS sign in advertising or for other purposes, according to paragraph 8 
of the Recommendations of the DIA, banks are not allowed to alter the DIS sign in any 
way, except for a change in size (whilst keeping the same proportions). 
3.3 Past Evaluations of the Russian DIS 
There is a paucity of evaluative research on the DIS in Russia. The main sources of any 
evaluative information are: opinion polls (conducted by opinion poll companies) and 
annual reports and other analytical documents by the DIA. Independent102 evaluations of 
the DIS are very scarce (see below). 
                                               
102 ‘Independent’ here means independent from the DIA and/or the CBR. 
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3.3.1 Opinion Polls 
Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)103 conducted several opinion polls on 
issues concerning the use of banking products and services, levels of confidence in the 
banking system, public saving behaviour, and public awareness of the DIS (VCIOM, 
2004, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011). 
3.3.1.1 Opinion Polls on Usage of Banking Products and Services, Levels 
of Confidence in the Banking System and Public Saving 
Behaviour 
The results of the opinion poll conducted by VCIOM (2004) in October 2004 showed 
that, almost one year after the introduction of the DIS, only 32% of the population 
reported having any savings. The remaining 63% did not have savings s at the time. It 
was claimed that the existence or nonexistence of bank savings depended, to a 
considerable degree, on the income of respondents, their educational qualifications and on 
the town or city where they lived. 
Moreover, the results of this opinion poll confirmed that 68% of respondents did not have 
a bank account. Whilst 48% of them did not consider it to be necessary at all, the 
remaining 20% were considering opening a bank account (18% in Sberbank and 2% in a 
commercial bank). 25% of respondents had a bank account, from which 19% – in 
Sberbank (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 
Retail depositors’ attitudes to bank accounts since the adoption of the DIS, in percentage 
Do you have a bank account in any bank? Percentage 
No, I do not need one 48% 
No, but I would like to open a bank account at Sberbank 18% 
No, but I would like to open a bank account in a commercial bank (not 
Sberbank) 
2% 
Yes, I have a bank account only in Sberbank 19% 
Yes, I have bank accounts in Sberbank and in another bank (or in more 
than one bank) 
3% 
Yes, I have a bank account in a commercial bank (not Sberbank) 3% 
Difficult to say 7% 
Source: Adapted from VCIOM (2004). 
                                               
103 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) is the oldest and the leading marketing and 
opinion research company in Russia. For more information, please see http://wciom.com/. 
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The results of opinion polls conducted in May 2005 and November 2006 (VCIOM, 2007) 
showed that 14% of Russians were making planned savings (in 2006 this number 
increased by 5% from the 2005 figure). 
Only 62% of the population used banking products and services, with the top three being: 
(i) payment of utility bills (27%), (ii) consumer credit (19%), and (iii) current account 
associated with a debit card linked to the ‘salary project’ (16%). The remaining 37% of 
respondents did not use any of the banking products or services. 
The results of the opinion poll conducted in July 2011 (VCIOM, 2011) showed that one 
in three Russians ha savings (31%, an increase of 6% from the 2010 figures). It was also 
confirmed that 37% of those who had savings were retired, and 50%% of those who had 
savings were wealthy. 
The data presented in Table 3.3 shows that, ten months into the operation of the DIS, 
30% of respondents preferred to keep their money in Sberbank. Only4% of respondents 
considered other commercial banks as possible alternatives to Sberbank (VCIOM, 2004). 
The next most popular forms of savings were real estate (26%) and cash (19%). 
Table 3.3 
Preferences about savings among the Russian population after the establishment of the 
DIS 
Which forms of savings do you prefer now, after the 
establishment of the DIS? 
Percentage 
Savings account in Sberbank 30% 
Savings account in a commercial bank 4% 
Savings accounts in both Sberbank and a commercial bank 6% 
Cash 19% 
Securities 3% 
Real estate 26% 
Other 2% 
Difficult to say 11% 
Source: Adapted from VCIOM (2004). 
Further similar opinion polls investigating the saving behaviour of the Russian 
population, was conducted in October 2008 (VCIOM, 2008a, 2008b), in October 2009 
(VCIOM, 2009) and in July 2011 (VCIOM, 2011). The results on what the Russian 
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population identified as the most secure ways of saving money were compared to the 
results of similar opinion polls conducted since 1998 (see Table 3.4). 
Whilst keeping money in real estate stayed on top of the list of ways to save money (51% 
in 2008, compared to 45% in 1998), opening an account in Sberbank came third (17% in 
2008, compared to 9% in 1998), and keeping money in a commercial bank was chosen 
only by 2% of respondents (no change compared to 1998). 
59.4% of respondents did not fear losing their savings, whilst the remaining 40.6% 
feared their savings would be lost. Moreover, three per cent of respondents claimed to be 
privately insuring their savings bank accounts. 
In November 2008, VCIOM (2008c) conducted a repeat opinion poll with the same 
questions as in October 2008 (see above). Compared to the results of the October poll, in 
November, only one in four Russians had a savings bank account (25%, compared to 
32% in October 2008). Most of the respondents with a savings bank account lived in big 
cities (31%), were in the 25-44 years age group (27-28%104) and had a higher degree 
qualification or were in higher education at the time (30%). 
In terms of the forms of savings, confidence in the commercial banks fell from 2% in 
October 2008 to 1% in November 2008. Confidence in Sberbank also fell from 17% in 
October 2008 to 11% in November 2008. 
With regard to confidence in the banking system, the results of the opinion poll conducted 
in March 2006 (VCIOM, 2006) showed that the level of confidence appeared to be low 
(only 36.5% of respondents agreed that big Russian banks were reliable enough and 
trustworthy). 
The result of this opinion poll also helped identify a ‘vulnerable’ consumer. It was evident 
that confidence in the banking system is not equally distributed among the Russian 
population. People who are poorer on average have a lower opinion of the banks and the 
banking system. Moreover, those people, who do not have savings (mostly due to low 
income), also have little confidence in the banking system. It was claimed that such a 
                                               
104 This percentage is taken from VCIOM (2004). 
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result is fairly logical, as vulnerable population stratum can easily lose confidence in 
social institutions in times of instability. 
Additionally, a direct relationship between how people perceive their awareness of banks 
and confidence in the banking system was identified. Hence, 77.2% of respondents who 
did not understand banking products and services showed distrust of large Russian 
banks; whilst 64.8% of the respondents who did understand banking products and 
services, expressed confidence in the banking system. 
3.3.1.2 Opinion Polls on Awareness of the DIS 
VCIOM (2004) showed that in October 2004, ten months after the Federal Law came 
into force, almost half of the population (45%) still had not heard about the DIS. 
Furthermore, 34% respondents who were aware of the DIS did not know full details of 




Preferences about savings among the Russian population between 1998 and 2010, in percentage. 
Which forms 
of savings do 
you see as 
being the 
safest at the 
moment? 
Percentage 
10/98 10/08 11/08 12/08 01/09 03/09 04/09 05/09 06/09 07/09 07/10 12/10 04/11 07/11 




9% 17% 11% 16% 14% 12% 17% 17% 17% 16% 19% 24% 26% 26% 
Gold, jewellery 26% 19% 21% 17% 19% 21% 19% 18% 19% 19% 17% 24% 20% 15% 




39% 7% 7% 6% 12% 11% 8% 7% 10% 11% 6% 8% 9% 7% 
Savings 
account in a 
commercial 
bank 
2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
Securities 3% 8% 5% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 6% 6% 6% 4% 4% 




1% 4% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
Other 4% 4% 4% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 
Difficult to say 17% 19% 21% 23% 21% 21% 22% 24% 21% 22% 20% 12% 13% 18% 
Source: Adapted from VCIOM (2008a, 2009, 2011).
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In October 2008 (VCIOM, 2008a), 60% of the Russian population did not know the 
correct deposit insurance compensation amount, and 22% could not give an answer to 
this question at all. Only 18% of the respondents stated the amount correctly. 
Table 3.5 
Respondents’ knowledge about the DIS, in percentage. 
Do you know that there is 












I know enough about the 
DIS 
4% 3% 12% 19% 3% 
I know roughly how the 
DIS works 
15% 12% 21% 26% 16% 
I have heard something, 
but cannot say anything 
concrete about it 
26% 23% 32% 33% 30% 
This is the first time I 
have heard about it 
49% 60% 31% 20% 47% 
Difficult to say 6% 2% 4% 3% 4% 
Source: Adapted from VCIOM (2008c, 2010b). 
Throughout October 2008, Russians received more information about the DIS (VCIOM, 
2008c). Whilst in October 2008, 31% of respondents heard about it for the first time, in 
November of the same year, this figure decreased to 20% (see Table 3.5 for comparison 
with the results of other opinion polls). 
Table 3.6 
Respondents’ knowledge about the maximum compensation amount, in percentage. 
In your opinion, what amount is covered by the 
DIS? 
Percentage 
October 2008 November 2008 
Under RUB 50,000 5% 3% 
RUB 50,001-100,000 9% 3% 
RUB 100,001-200,000 6% 1% 
RUB 200,001-300,000 2% 0% 
RUB 300,001-400,000 5% 3% 
RUB 400,001-699,999 1% 2% 
RUB 700,000 or more 1% 38% 
I know nothing about this 50% 26% 
Difficult to say 22% 23% 
Source: Adapted from VCIOM (2008c). 
As for the deposit insurance compensation amount, in October 2008, very few 
respondents could state the amount correctly, whilst in November 2008, 38% stated it 
 83 
correctly. However, this result is questionable as, not only is the scale disproportionate, 
but also the option chosen by 38% of respondents was worded as “RUB 700,000 and 
more” whilst the actual amount was, and still is, exactly RUB 700,000 (see Table 3.6). 
Apart from public opinion polls, there are also several documents published by the DIA 
which contain statistical data on the DIS. 
3.3.2 Annual Reports and Other Analytical Documents of the DIA 
According to Article 24 of the Federal Law, the DIA publishes annual reports. Moreover, 
it also prepares quarterly, bi-annual and annual overviews of the household savings 
market whereby it analyses the trends. 
3.3.2.1 Annual Reports 
The annual reports provide information on the development of the DIS, as well the 
execution of other functions of the DIA, including the management of receivership and 
liquidation proceedings, and the operations aimed at preventing bank insolvencies in 
Russia (DIA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a). 
In terms of structural indicators of the DIS, the following details are presented in the 
annual reports. 
As of01 January 2011, there were 909 banks included in the DIS, and there were 16 
insured events during 2010. Figures for years 2004-2010 are presented in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 
Changes in the structural indicators of the DIS in Russia, by years 
Year Included in the 
register of DIS 
member banks 
Excluded from the 
register of DIS 
member banks 
Number of DIS 
member banks at 
the end of the year 
Number of 
insured event 
during the year 
2004 381 0 381 0 
2005 562 12 931 1 
2006 10 7 934 9 
2007 7 7 934 15 
2008 13 10 937 27 
2009 7 19 925 31 
2010 7 23 909 16 
Source: DIA (2011a: 7). 
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The DIA (2011a) reported that 99.7% of deposits were fully covered in 2010. This 
figure has been consistently over 99% since 2008 (DIA, 2009a, 2010a). 
The DIA uses the statistics on the increase of household deposits as evidence to the 
DIS’s contribution to the increase or maintenance of public confidence in the banking 
system. For example, the Annual Report for 2010 states the following: 
In2010DIS contributed to maintaining public confidence in the banking system. During the 
reporting year household deposits were rapidly growing even taking into account the 
decrease of the interest rates to the levels that were lower than the rate of inflation. This 
shows that primarily citizens consider bank deposits as a safe harbor for their savings. 
(DIA, 2011a: 15) 
However, such a causal link is questionable, as it has not been tested. 
3.3.2.2 Special Studies on the Impact of the DIS in Russia 
Apart from opinion polls, described in Section 3.3.1, VCIOM conducted two surveys on 
the impact of the DIS on public saving behaviour in response to a request by the DIA. 
The first survey was conducted in December 2007 and the second in February-March 
2010. Both surveys included quantitative and qualitative components. The quantitative 
components of each survey consisted of an individual questionnaire filled in by 1,600 
respondents in 153 settlements across Russia, whilst the qualitative component consisted 
of 20 in-depth interviews in six cities with representatives of a so-called ‘high income 
group’ with a monthly income in excess of RUB 50,000 per person.105 
The main findings of the 2007 and 2010 surveys can be summarised against the three 
stated objectives of the DIS as follows. 
With regard to the protection of depositors’ rights and legal interests, there have been 
three main findings. First, the results confirmed that 38% of respondents in 2007, and 
49% of respondents in 2010 were more or less aware of the DIS, including those who did 
not know full details (see Figure 3.5). This means that almost half of the respondents 
still did not know anything about the DIS. 
 
                                               
105 For a more detailed overview of the results of 2007 survey, please see Appendix 6. 
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Figure 3.5 
Respondents’ knowledge about the DIS, in percentage 
 
Source: Adapted from DIA (2010b: 54). 
The results of the 2007 survey state that high income interviewees had a general 
knowledge about the DIS, but it is not clear what ‘general’ means in this context. In 
2010, all interviewees knew about the DIS, most of them could state the maximum 
compensation amount and some even showed knowledge of the payout process. 
Second, 37% of respondents were aware of the increase in the maximum compensation 
amount which took place in 2007. This number exceeded the number of respondents who 
had some type of bank account (33%).  
Third, in 2010, 27% of respondents reported to have recognised a DIS sign in banks’ 
branches, in banks’ advertising on the streets, and in the printed media or on TV. 64% 
did not notice the DIS sign at all (see Figure 3.6). 
With regard to the increase in public confidence in the banking system, there was one 
main finding. The results of the 2007 survey showed that 16% of respondents felt more 
confident about banks, 8% reported less confidence, whilst 46% stated that their attitude 
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respondents reported no change in their confidence level and, whilst it is not clear at what 
level their confidence was at the time, the conclusion that “[t]hus, positive dynamics in 
the change of public attitude to banks can be testified” (see Appendix 3) is 
questionable.106 
Figure 3.6 
Familiarity of respondents with the DIS sign, in percentage 
 
Source: Adapted from DIA (2010b: 57). 
In comparison, in 2010, 54% of respondents reported no change in their attitude to banks 
(more than double of the results of the 2007 survey), whilst 6% of respondents 
(compared to 16% in 2007) reported an increase in their confidence in banks because of 
the governmental protection of deposits and 7%of respondents (compared to 22% in 
2007) attributed the increase in their confidence level to evidence of safety of the banks. 
The high income interviewees confirmed that, on the whole, their confidence in the 
banking system had increased in recent years. Some interviewees mentioned the 
establishment of the DIS as the reason for their increased confidence. However, their 
opinion about the DIS as such differed, with some interviewees believing that the 
                                               
106 However, the summary of the results of 2007 survey presented in Appendix 3 does not 
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introduction of the DIS was a very important step in bringing the Russian banking 
system closer to international standards, whilst others did not trust the DIS because of 
its governmental nature. 
With regard to the encouragement of household savings, there have been four main 
findings. First, the surveys helped to define a ‘systemic saver’, a retail depositor who 
lives in Central or North-West Federal Districts of Russia, has free resources available 
after covering all basic needs, and is in a position to save these resources. 15% of 
respondents fell into this group in 2007, and 9% in 2010. The second most common 
category of typical savers was pensioners. 
It is interesting to note, that whilst a typical ‘systemic saver’ earned a monthly income of 
RUB 5,000 per person, as defined in the results of 2007 survey, VCIOM chose to 
conduct in-depth interviews with a group of respondents who had much higher income 
and thus may not have represented an average ‘systemic saver’ at the time. This poses 
the question as to why this group of depositors was chosen for interview, and whether it 
was done to provide a more favourable response. 
In 2010, 40% of respondents could be classified as ‘depositors’ according to the meaning 
of the Federal Law (in 2007 this figure was 33%). This 40% consisted of two groups: 
24% of respondents who knew that they had a current or savings bank account, and 16% 
of respondents who stated that the do not have a bank account, but then in a different 
question indicated that they have a debit or credit card through the ‘salary project’ with 
their employer. 
In terms of use of banking services, 46% of respondents did not use any banking services 
in 2007; in 2010 this figure went down to 35% (see Figure 3.7). DIA (2010b) explains 
this with the increase of those respondents who used debit or credit card through the 
‘salary project’ (their share went up from 17% in 2007 to 26% in 2010).  
Second, the surveys identified a differentiation in depositors’ saving behaviour depending 
on whether they lived in the two biggest cities – Moscow and Saint-Petersburg – or in 
other cities and towns. It appears that those living in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg do 
not see the need to make regular savings or investments, and prefer to spend their 
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monthly income in full to meet their increasing demands. However, the share of regular 
savers in these cities is higher (23%) compared to those living in smaller cities and towns 
(14-16%). In 2010, the situation changed, balancing the results across the groups, 
because of a decrease in the income of respondents in the two biggest cities. 
Figure 3.7 
Respondents’ usage of banking services at the time of surveys, in percentage 
 
Source: Adapted from DIA (2010b: 26). 
Third, there was no consensus among the respondents on what amount constitutes a 
‘savings’ amount. In 2007, only 9% of respondents considered amounts exceeding RUB 
100,000 to be a ‘savings’ amount, whilst the maximum compensation amount under the 
DIS at the time was RUB 400,000 (with co-insurance element). It has been concluded 
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behaviour within the framework of existing insurance coverage is far from being 
exhausted” (see Appendix 3). From the perspectives of high income group interviewees, 
in 2007, the ‘savings’ amount was an amount between RUB 100,000 and RUB 500,000. 
Fourth, in 2007, 15% of respondents reported that the DIS had an impact on their 
saving behaviour. Among other findings, 12% of respondents stated that they paid more 
attention to interest rates in smaller and lesser known banks, 14% of respondents opened 
bank accounts for the first time, whilst 7% increased amounts in their bank accounts or 
the term of their savings accounts, and a further 3% of respondents started spreading 
their savings across different bank accounts. In 2010, the number of respondents who 
reported an impact of the DIS on their saving behaviour decreased to 8%. DIA (2010b) 
explained this by the fact that depositors’ knowledge about the DIS had gone to a 
subconscious level and they could not adequately report the change in their behaviour due 
to the DIS. 
The impact of the DIS on the saving behaviour of high income interviewees was three-
fold: almost all of them (i) reported to mirror the amount in their savings accounts with 
the maximum compensation amount, (ii) chose long term savings accounts without fear of 
losing money, and (iii) expressed greater trust in non-state banks. 
15% of respondents, who knew about the increase in the maximum compensation amount 
which took place in 2007, reported a change in their saving behaviour following this 
event. Of these, 7% increased the amount in their bank accounts (or were planning to 
increase), 4% opened a bank account for the first time (or were planning to do so in the 
near future), and the remaining 4% extended the term of their savings account. 
Other findings included the distribution of respondents with resources to save by age, and 
the list of criteria respondents used when choosing a bank. 
3.3.2.3 DIA’s Overviews of Household Deposits Market Developments 
The DIA publishes quarterly, bi-annual and annual overviews of the household deposits 
market in Russia. Each of these overviews consists of nine sections, which cover the 
following information. 
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The first section looks at the general economy trends which may affect the development 
of the household deposits market, for example, industry growth, currency exchange rates, 
consumer prices, average monthly salaries and the share of organised savingswithin the 
spending structureof the population in the particular reporting period. 
The second section looks at the institutional aspects of the household deposit market 
development and the participation of banks in the DIS (see Figure 3.8). The difference 
between the higher number of banks participating in the DIS and the lower number of 
banks with a deposit-taking banking licence is due to the on-going payouts for banks 
whose banking licence has been revoked. 
Figure 3.8 
Number of banks with deposit-taking banking licence and those participating in the DIS 
 
Source: DIA (2008b, 2009b, 2010c, 2011b). 
It further looks at the total volume of deposits in banks participating in the DIS. The 
share of the total volume of retail deposits in the GDP has been steadily growing in the 
past seven years (reaching 22.1% in 2010 (DIA, 2011b)), with the exception of 2008, 
when the figure dropped to 14.2% (from 15.5% in 2007 (DIA, 2008b)) as a consequence 




















The second section also provides information on the number of insured events in the 
reporting period, details of the distribution of the DIA’s liabilities across different banks 
and across different amounts of banks accounts. Furthermore, it provides an overview of 
the shares of different banks and groups of banks on the household market. DIA (2008b, 
2009b, 2010c, 2011b) suggests that, not only there is an emerging trend for the 
decrease of the share of the 30 biggest banks, but there is also a visible trend in the 
decrease of the share of Sberbank in the deposit market, with an exception in both trends 
in the second half of 2008, when the volume of deposits in the 30 biggest banks 
(including Sberbank) increased. 
The third section of these overviews describes the dynamics of attracted household 
deposits. DIA (2008b) and DIA (2009b) confirm that the increase in the maximum 
compensation amount was followed by the increase in the total volume of deposits, 
especially in the amount category which was affected by the increase. 
The fourth section provides details on the structure of attracted deposits, in terms of the 
time of such deposits, the amount deposited and the currency used. Within the last four 
years, it is evident that there was a tendency for the population to consolidate their 
savings into single savings account of higher amounts (DIA, 2008b, 2009b, 2010c, 
2011b). 
The fifth section of household market development overviews describes the dynamics of 
interest rates on the market, whilst the sixth, seventh and eights sections of each 
overview look at the household deposits market in the regions (across regional and 
Moscow banks), across the large network banks and across the banks with 100% foreign 
capital. 
For reporting purposes, the DIA classifies banks into four categories: 
(i)
 
Multi-branch network banks (banks with branches in more than 10regions 
of Russia and with the total amount of retail deposits over a certain 
amount);107 
                                               
107 At the moment, this amount is RUB 3 trillion. As of 01 January, 2011 there were 42 network 




Regional banks (banks which are not multi-branch network banks; with 
headquarters outside Moscow); 
(iii)
 
Moscow banks (banks which are not multi-branch network banks; with 
headquarters in Moscow); 
(iv)
 
Banks with 100% foreign capital108 (multi-branch network banks with 
100% foreign capital are included in this category).109 
Banks of all categories suffered from the 2008 global financial crisis. However, whilst 
the growth rate of network banks and banks with 100% foreign capital fell by about half 
from the 2007 figures, the fall in the growth rate of regional and Moscow banks was 
approximately eightfold. The growth rate of Moscow banks soared from 5.5% in 2008 
(DIA, 2009b) to 60% in 2010 (DIA, 2011b). DIA (2010c: 24, 2011b: 23) explains this 
by the much higher income growth of Moscow residents compared to the residents of 
other regions of Russia, by the quicker restoration of the economy in the Moscow region 
and the availability of free financial means to deposit in Moscow banks. 
From the data presented in the overviews, it is evident that any withdrawals at regional 
banks, Moscow banks and banks with 100% foreign capital during 2008 were absorbed 
by network banks, which increased their share of the total volume of deposits in 2009 by 
5% (DIA, 2009b, 2010c). The share of network banks in the total volume of deposits in 
2010 stayed at the same level as in 2009 (DIA, 2011b). 
Over the past four years, regional banks saw a decrease in the volume of retail deposits 
within the under RUB 100,000 category, and a steady increase in the volume of retail 
deposits within the RUB 400,000-700,000 category (DIA, 2008b, 2009b, 2010c, 
2011b). The volume of retail deposits in the over RUB 700,000 category decreased 
                                               
108 Vernikov (2002) notes that the target audience for foreign banks in the Russian market have 
always been foreign and large national companies, mainly involved in foreign trade. Several banks 
with 100% foreign capital showed interest in working with retail depositors and took real steps 
toward increasing their retail banking offerings, and not limiting themselves to only servicing 
‘salary project’ of their corporate clients (including opening the current bank accounts and debit 
cards for their employees). 
109 As of 01 January 2011 there were 55 banks with 100% foreign capital (DIA, 2010c: 27). 
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between 2007 (DIA, 2008b)and 2009 (DIA, 2010c), but showed a substantial growth 
from 36.5% to 44.2% in 2010 (DIA, 2011b). 
Both network banks and banks with 100% foreign capital had consistently higher volume 
of retail deposits within the over RUB 700,000 category (DIA, 2008b, 2009b, 2010c, 
2011b). However, whilst network banks did not experience major changes in this 
category after 2007, banks with 100% foreign capital experienced an outflow of retail 
deposits in this category in 2008 (58.7% compared to 63.6% in 2007). 
It should be noted that both regional and network banks saw an increase in the volume of 
retail deposits in the RUB 400,000-700,000 category following the changes in the 
maximum compensation amount in October 2008 (an increase from 12.6% to 16.7% for 
regional banks, and from 9.8% to 13% for network banks). 
The final, ninth section of each overview provides the summary of main trends for the 
reporting period. 
3.3.3 Independent Evaluations 
There are very few independent studies on the Russian DIS. These studies can be divided 
in two broad groups: the first group contains studies published in foreign literature, and 
the second group consists of studies published in Russian academic journals and other 
sources. 
3.3.3.1 Studies Published in Foreign Literature 
FSAP (FSAP, 2003: 5)reviewed the proposed reform and stressed that, because the 
previously used liquidation process proved to be highly costly and ineffective110, “<...> 
the authorities [should] proceed with the proposed scheme only if they are fully 
committed to take the necessary difficult decisions” when it comes to revoking licences 
from the unsound banks. They further suggested that, for the DIS to be successful, 
several additional reforms should be implemented, including the introduction of 
supporting legislation for banking supervision and the re-assessment of Sberbank’s roles 
                                               
110 Until 2002, for the CBR to revoke a banking license, an arbitration court had to find the bank 
to be bankrupt before the liquidation procedure can commence (FSAP, 2003). 
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within the development of the banking sector. FSAP (2003: 4) argued that 
“[d]efficiencies in the bank failure resolution system have resulted in a large number of 
phantom banks and has undermined depositors’ confidence in the banking system”, and, 
therefore, changes have to be made to make the process more effective. In their opinion, 
by moving the resolution process “into an administrative rather than judicial context” 
(2003: 5), the CBR would have more power to resolve problem banks, thus contributing 
to the cusses of the DIS. 
Based on the further analysis carried out in July 2008, FSAP (2010: 6) stressed the 
importance of a bank resolution framework: 
[t]he CBR would benefit from having the authority to intervene in weak banks at an early 
stage, thereby containing resolution costs in larger, more complex cases and limiting 
disruption to creditors, including depositors. Such corrective action and a broader range of 
options to sell the franchise of a failed bank to interested investors could be important 
resolution tools. 
FSAP (2010: 28) also emphasised that, despite the DIA’s success in improving the level 
of confidence in the DIS among the retail depositors, further efforts should directed at 
improving public awareness of the main features of the DIS in Russia and that the DIA 
has “to ensure that the extent of coverage and solvency of the system is fully recognised 
by depositors”. Furthermore, they encouraged a review of the DIS, particularly with 
respect to co-insurance. 
As part of review of several banking reforms, Tompson (2004) provides an analysis of 
the Federal Law and an assessment of its likely impact. Tompson (2004: 2) names the 
introduction of the DI in Russia as one of the most important banking reforms at the 
time, and argues that “[t]he real test of Russian banking reform efforts, however, will be 
in implementation” as the success of the Russian banking sector development, and the DI 
reform in particular, will depend on the changes that occur in the wider contracting 
environment. 
Tompson (2004: 16) submits that the common assertion that “the absence of DI is a 
major reason for households’ reluctance to bank their savings” may not be true in the 
case of Russia since despite state guarantees enjoyed by state-owned banks, the 
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population still prefers to keep cash at home, so-called ‘mattress money’.111 It is further 
suggested that, considering the limited coverage, “the direct impact of the introduction of 
DI on households’ propensity to place unbanked savings into the financial system will be 
limited”, however, “[t]his need not matter a great deal, given that ordinary Russians’ 
inclination to bank their savings appears to be growing anyway” (Tompson, 2004: 28). 
Unfortunately, no empirical evidence is presented to support any of the above assertions. 
Moreover, it is evident that Tompson (2004)has high expectations for the fostering of 
competition in the banking sector with the help of the DI, and for the creation of equal 
opportunities for state-owned (including Sberbank) and privately-owned banks. 
Camara and Montes-Negret (2006: 4) set out to assess “how effective the new system 
has been so far” and its impact on the stability and development of the banking system in 
Russia, as well as to draw lessons from the implementation process. 
In terms of implementation of the deposit insurance reform in Russia, Camara and 
Montes-Negret (2006) submit that Russia should have strengthened the monitoring and 
enforcement capabilities of the CBR before introducing the DIS, as the strong powers of 
the CBR in this area and a straightforward resolution process are critical to the 
effectiveness of the DIS. In their view, conflicting interests of different stakeholders and 
a fear of another banking crisis led to “sub-optimal outcomes from a public policy 
perspective” (Camara and Montes-Negret, 2006: 13). As a result, the fact that over 80% 
of all banks in Russia were admitted to the DIS received generally negative reviews. 
In terms of encouragement of household savings and increase in confidence in the 
banking system among the Russian population, Camara and Montes-Negret (2006: 10) 
argue that Russia has an underdeveloped financial sector, and , in such an environment, 
“deposit insurance can not, by itself, <...> stimulate savings in the domestic banking 
system.” Moreover, they question whether the proposed graduated increase in the 
maximum compensation amount, advocated by the DIA, as a tool to encourage more 
savings, will result in an increase in the public trust in private banks. 
                                               
111 Tompson (2004) names tax avoidance and uncertainty in the national currency as the possible 
reasons for such reluctance rather than the fear of banks failure. 
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Camara and Montes-Negret (2006) admit that the decrease in the market share of 
Sberbank and the 30 biggest banks indicates an increase in competition in the banking 
sector, however they also argue that, despite Sberbank not being part of the DIS until 
early 2007, “the perception of an implicit 100 percent insurance by the state would most 
likely remain with Sberbank’s depositors” (2006: 11). 
Finally, they stress that the structural framework of the DIS as provided by the law 
“reflects in many respects good practices from international experience” (Camara and 
Montes-Negret, 2006: 4). However, whilst “some immediate and possibly temporary 
benefits can be attributed to the new DIS” (2006: 15), they recommend eight policy 
changes which will strengthen the legal and institutional framework of the banking 
system in Russia. 
FSVC (2007: 5) argued that the increase in household deposits of150% since the 
introduction of the DIS in late 2003 “reflect[s] proper functioning of the DIS as designed 
under the law”. They further praise the transfer of the liquidation process from the CBR 
to the DIA, and the use of purchase and assumption agreements instead of the full scale 
liquidations, which, in their opinion, will help maintain confidence in the banking system 
whilst also minimising payouts. In terms of the implementation process, FSVC (2007) 
argued that there was an effective screening process put in place both during the 
acceptance of banks into the DIS and afterwards. However, this is challenged by a 
number of authors, including Camara and Montes-Negret (2006), who believe that 
Russia missed an opportunity to use the introduction of the DIS to restructure its 
banking system by disposing of unsound banks. 
A later version of the same evaluation (Camara and Montes-Negret, 2008) appeared in 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2008), however did not contain any new information 
and was a mere reprint of their earlier version. 
3.3.3.2 Studies Published in Russian Literature 
The Russian academic literature on the DIS can be characterised not only by its focus on 
doctrinal research, but also by the scarcity of references to the vastly available resources 
on the topic in foreign languages. These can be explained by the continued low level of 
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knowledge of foreign languages among academics in Russia. Some of those who refer to 
foreign literature are clearly unaware that they re-print foreign publications.112 
The topics covered by Russian academic literature in relation to the DI are varied. The 
majority of authors provide a description of the main provisions of the Federal Law 
(Akhmayev, 2006; Gubayuk, 2004; Guznov, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Khomenko, 2006; 
Kornilova, 2006; Krichevsky, 2005; Lyalin, 2005b; Makarova, 2004; Makhmutova, 
2005; Timofeyev, 2006b). Some authors discuss the place of DI within the traditional 
insurance types in Russia (Amerkhanova, 2005; Lazareva, 2006; Makhmutova, 2005; 
Rudov, 2007; Vasnov, 2004) with conflicting conclusions, whilst others provide review 
the history of DI in Russia (Amerkhanova, 2005; Guznov, 2004a; Khomenko, 2006; 
Kornilova, 2006; Timofeyev, 2006b). 
Other authors discuss the objectives of the DIS in Russia (Khomenko, 2006; Lazareva, 
2006; Rudov, 2007; Timofeyev, 2006a; Timofeyev, 2006b; Turbanov, 2004), the 
obligatory nature of the DIS (Krichevsky, 2005; Lazareva, 2006), and the regulation of 
retail depositor protection in banks which did not join the DIS (Guznov, 2004b; 
Makarova, 2004; Timofeyev, 2006a). 
There are also those authors who discuss the development of the competition in the 
banking sector (Kornilova, 2006; Makarova, 2004; Timofeyev, 2006a) and the changes 
in the bankruptcy procedures (Golubkov and Kudryashova, 2007; Lyalin, 2005b; 
Markov, 2006) following the introduction of the DIS.  
Other issues discussed in Russian academic literature include the right of subrogation and 
its applicability to the DIA’s claims (Lyalin, 2005a), the positioning of the DI norms 
within the norms of financial, civil and administrative laws (Komissarova, 2007), the 
definition of ‘deposit’ for the purposes of the Federal Law and related to it 
misunderstandings by the banks participating in the DIS (Zavoda, 2007), a comparison 
of Russian DI arrangements with those abroad (Timofeyev, 2006b), and an idea of 
introducing a voluntary DI in addition to the existing DIS (Krichevsky, 2005). 
                                               
112 For example, Timofeyev (2006b: 40) presents six choices in relation to the DIS described by 
Garcia (1999: 4, 2000: 1) without proper reference to the original, and with reference to a 
website http://www.bankir.ru instead. 
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Khomenko (2006) provides a review of the impact the DIS had on the household deposits 
market one year after the DIS was introduced. Based on the statistics from the DIA and 
the CBR, it is concluded that two out of three objectives of the DIS (protection of rights 
and legal interests of depositors, and encouragement of savings in the banking system) 
have been achieved. 
Whilst the record of the successful payouts may evidence the existence of the depositor 
protection mechanism and thus the achievement of the first objective of the DIS, the 
presented findings in relation of the third objective of the DIS (“to encourage household 
savings in the banking system”) do not correspond to the conclusion that this objective 
has been achieved. On the one hand, Khomenko (2006) refers to 62.3% of the population 
who believed their saving behaviour has not changed since the introduction of the DIS. 
On the other hand, it is argued that the increase in household deposits in the banking 
system was due to the fact that the Russian population deposited savings which they kept 
at home previously, however, it fails to establish a link between the increase in household 
savings and the DIS.  
3.4 Summary 
Whilst the DIS was first mentioned in Russian legislation in 1991, all attempts to 
establish such a scheme at federal level failed until 2003, when the current scheme was 
introduced. 
The Russian DIS aims (i) to protect the rights and legal interests of household 
depositors, (ii) to strengthen public confidence in the banking system, and (iii) to 
encourage household savings in the banking system. The membership in the DIS is 
obligatory for all banks working with retail depositors and the scheme provides 
compensation in the amount of up to RUB 700,000 per depositor per bank. 
Most of the Russian literature on the DIS is doctrinal in nature, and uses little reference 
to empirical data. All authors who have attempted to assess the effectiveness of the DIS 
have invariably used statistics from the DIA and CBR, rather than gathering primary 
data. 
 99 
Consequently, there has been no systematic evaluation of the Russian DIS, nor any 







“For the rational study of law black letter man may be the 
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of 
statistics and the master of economics.” 
–Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935) 
 
Having reviewed the literature on the main features of the DIS and its role in depositor 
protection, as well as the approaches to evaluating the DIS as a public policy, this chapter 
discusses the methodology adopted to answer the research questions.  
Firstly, the research purpose and the research question are introduced in Sections 4.1 
and 4.2 respectively. Secondly, the research design, philosophical and methodological 
assumptions, and research approach are discussed in Section 4.3, and the choice of a 
cross-sectional, mixed method, non-experimental evaluation is justified. The methods of 
data collection and techniques used for data analysis are presented in Sections 4.4 and 
4.5 respectively. Finally, limitations and ethical implications of the chosen methodology 
are identified in Sections 4.6 and 4.7. 
This chapter draws on the literature on business and social research methodology as well 
as on specialist literature on the methodology of public policy evaluation.   
4.1 Research Purpose 
As explained in Chapter 1, the main aim of this thesis is to evaluate the Russian DIS 
against its stated objectives, and to shed light on possible problems with the 
implementation of the 2003 reform. 
Evaluation of such reform can only be undertaken when the context in which the DIS 
ought to operate is understood. There are multiple stakeholders influenced and affected 
by the introduction of the DIS in Russia. Apart from the government which manages the 
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DIS through the DIA, the banks participating in the scheme are obliged to provide 
information about it to retail depositors. However, there are no known enforcement 
mechanisms to date which would ensure the uniform provision of such information. 
Hence, the level of knowledge about the DIS and general awareness amongst retail 
depositors of the scheme may differ from bank to bank.  
Previous attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS failed to provide a clear overview of the 
multiple viewpoints across the spectrum of stakeholders. This research represents an 
attempt at a comprehensive, methodologically rigorous evaluation of the DIS by 
capturing the perceived success of the DIS in achieving its objectives among the 
stakeholders. 
4.2 Research Question 
The research question of this thesis is ‘Has the Russian DIS achieved its stated 
objectives?’ As introduced in Chapter 3, the Russian DIS has three stated objectives, 
namely (i) to protect the rights and legal interests of depositors, (ii) to strengthen public 
confidence in the banking system, and (iii) to encourage household savings in the banking 
system. 
This reflects the research purpose being “[t]o evaluate [which] is to monitor social 
intervention programmes, to assess whether they have achieved their desired outcomes, 
and to assist with problem-solving and policy-making” (Blaikie, 2009: 70).113 
To help answer the research question, the present investigation will look at the three 
stated objectives in turn, and determine how far the DIS is perceived by key stakeholders 
to have achieved these objectives. 
4.3 Research Design 
According to de Vaus (2001: 9), the function of a research design is “to ensure that the 
evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as 
                                               
113 Emphasis added. For other types of research purposes, see Blaikie (2009: 69-70). 
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possible”. Therefore, it is important to consider all aspects of the research design in order 
to achieve the best results from the data collection and analysis. 
It is difficult to present the research methods in a coherent way, as different authors use 
different terms to express the same components or stages of the research design. Whilst 
this thesis does not aim to offer a comprehensive overview of all different approaches 
found in the academic literature, it will provide reference to different terms used in the 
literature. It will consider those terms which were selected as appropriate for meeting the 
research objectives. 
For instance, Cameron and Price (2009: 58) present ‘research strata’ with ‘philosophical 
preferences concerning ontology and epistemology’ at the bottom of the strata and 
research methods at the top as a final decision-making point. However, whilst they 
explain most of the levels of their research strata, it is not clear what they mean by a 
‘research design’, as they also refer to it as one of the last levels of the strata. Bryman 
and Bell (2007) also position the research design decision at the end of the decision-
making process. Alternatively, the ‘overall framework’ described by Creswell (2009: 
15)114 starts with the decision on the design, followed by decision on the procedures of 
inquiry, and concludes with the choice of specific methods of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation. Hallebone and Priest (2009: 8) introduce a so-called ‘research zip’, a 
metaphor which represents a convergence of paradigm-driven (abstract) and design-
driven (concrete) streams of research activity. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007) 
depict the complexity of decisions involved in research design through a ‘research onion’, 
used as a metaphor to indicate the layers of decision-making. 
Blaikie (2009) provides a comprehensive overview of different research designs similar 
to those described above, and concludes that the categories usually presented in the 
academic literature are not mutually exclusive. He further argues that 
[a] research design contains many elements and each element involves a choice from among 
alternatives. While some combinations of choices may be more common, and others may not 
be legitimate, potentially, there is a wide variety of possibilities. The resulting combinations 
of decisions produce a wide variety of actual designs that cannot easily be described by 
simple labels. (Blaikie, 2009: 41) 
                                               
114 Also referred to as ‘approach’ (Creswell, 2009: 6). 
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Due to the complexity of the context in which the DIS in Russia operates, the evaluation 
of such a public policy requires a bespoke research design. For that reason, this thesis 
does not follow the conventional research design process, but introduces its own 
adaptation of commonly used categories of research design. 
The following section defines key terms which are used in the subsequent sections of this 
chapter, and is based on terminology used by Blaikie (2009) as the most recent and most 
inclusive combination of research design choices. 
4.3.1 Definitions of Components of Research Design 
The next four sub-sections provide a glossary, and culminate in a roadmap of research 
design presented in Figure 4.9. 
4.3.1.1 Research Purpose and Research Question 
The starting point in research design is the research purpose and the research question, 
as the research question “provides the focus and direction for the study” and it is “what 
the study will attempt to answer” (Blaikie, 2009: 42).115 
Yin (2003) argues that the purpose of a research study can be to explain, describe and 
explore. Descriptive research answers the question “what is going on”, whereas 
explanatory research answers the question “why is it going on” (de Vaus, 2001). 
Exploratory research develops propositions for the future in a particular subject area. 
Blaikie (2009: 69) points out that the research purpose depends on the type of knowledge 
a researcher wants to produce, and is usually divided into basic and applied purposes: 
“[r]esearch can set out to explore, describe, explain, understand, predict [which are basic 
purposes], change, evaluate and assess impacts [which are applied purposes]”.116 
                                               
115 Also known as ‘research topic’, which “clearly defines the topic, its context and purpose”, 
which is “substantially informed by extant work in the literature and the community of practice 
(Hallebone and Priest, 2009: 7). 
116 For more information on basic and applied research, see Saunders et al. (2007: 8). 
 104 
4.3.1.2 Research Paradigm 
A research paradigm, including ontology, epistemology, axiology,117 logic of enquiry, and 
methodology, is defined as “the basic belief system or world view that guides the 
investigation, not only in choices of methods but in ontologically and epistemologically 
fundamental ways” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 105).118 
Cameron and Price (2009: 73) suggest that it is logical to start the research design 
process with the philosophical preferences since these are “the foundation upon which 
everything <...> will rest”. 
4.3.1.3 Research Strategy 
Different authors use the term ‘research strategy’ at different stages of the research 
design process. Some understand it as a logic of inquiry (Blaikie, 2009), whilst others, 
like Creswell (2009), refer to case study, action research and grounded theory as types of 
research strategy.119 For the purposes of this thesis, research strategy has the same 
meaning as a logic of inquiry. 
4.3.1.4 Research Methodology 
For this thesis, research methodology is defined generically, and includes quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed-method methodologies.120 
                                               
117 Axiological assumptions relate to the role of values in science and research, and are closely 
related to epistemology. This thesis does not include axiological assumptions in the research 
paradigm. For more information on axiology, see Bahm (1993),Campbell (1935), Edwards 
(1995), Hart (1971), and Weinberg (1970). 
118 Creswell (2009) calls these philosophical ideas ‘worldview assumptions’ unlike previously 
(Creswell, 2007) when they were referred to as ‘paradigms’. 
119 Interestingly, the same types are referred to as ‘research approaches’ by Cameron and Price 
(2009: 248). 
120 Creswell (2009) consider research design to be either qualitative, quantitative or mixed 
methods. 
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4.3.1.5 Research Approach 
The research approach depends on the research purpose and research question. It can be 
classified according to difference lenses through which a researcher views the research. 
The example in Figure 4.9 is only one such lens, and represents the type of evaluation 
(experimental, quasi-experimental, non-experimental). 
Figure 4.9 
Roadmap for research design 
 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie (2009), Bryman and Bell (2007), Hallebone and Priest (2009), and 
Saunders et al. (2007). 
4.3.2 Research Paradigm 
There are several theories in the literature on the philosophy of research which are used 
to justify the research process. Any research design is dependent on different 
philosophical assumptions, whether it is regarding the nature of reality (i.e. ontology) or 
regarding the extent to which reality can be known (i.e. epistemology).121 Slife and 
Williams (1995) argue that though philosophical ideas are usually hidden in the research, 
they do influence the research process and therefore need to be explicitly identified. 
                                               
121 For descriptions of different ontologies and epistemologies, see Blaikie (2007, 2009), Bryman 
and Bell (2007), Cameron and Price (2009), Creswell (2009), Saunders et al. (2007). 
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Academics tend to place different weight on epistemological and ontological assumptions, 
and even suggest using them to inform the different stages of the research design 
process. 
Some authors (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Cameron and Price, 2009; Saunders et al., 2007) 
believe that both epistemological and ontological considerations inform the research 
design. Cameron and Price (Cameron and Price, 2009: 73) claim that the philosophical 
preferences inform guarantors of the enquiry system, where the guarantors are “the 
foundation upon which everything <...> will rest”. However, Creswell (2009) argues 
that the first, and most important, decision a researcher takes is about the research 
design, and that epistemology and ontology only aid in this decision-making process. 
Creswell (2007) argues that ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions 
can be grouped together into research paradigms, so-called “set[s] of basic beliefs that 
guide action”. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994: 107), paradigms represent “a 
worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the “world”, the individual’s place in 
it, and the range of possible relationships <...>. The beliefs are basic in the sense that 
they must be accepted simply on faith <...>”. They describe four paradigms, namely 
positivism, postpositivism, critical theory and constructivism.122 
Positivism is a paradigm associated with scientific research, entailing a belief in an 
objective reality, an ideal of a detached, impartial researcher, and a methodology of 
rigorously testing prior hypotheses, typically using quantitative methods. At the other 
extreme is constructivism, which is a common paradigm in social research. It favours 
qualitative methods, emphasises the subjective nature of reality and sees the construction 
of meaning as being situation- and context-specific.123 
For the purposes of this investigation, it is important to define the paradigm, which will 
determine other elements of the research design. The DIS is part of the institutional and 
                                               
122 For other paradigms discussed in the academic literature, including pragmatism, see Bryman 
and Bell (2007), Creswell (2007), and Saunders et al. (2007).Pragmatism, as a paradigm, does 
not fit easily within the spectrum ranging from positivism to constructivism. It breaks the 
traditional association between worldview and methodology, taking the stance that methodology 
should be selected first and foremost based upon the research questions and the specific situation 
at hand (Cherryholmes, 1992; Diggins, 1994; Goodman, 2005; Morgan, 2007; Murphy and with 
Rorty, 1990; Rescher, 1977, 2000). 
123 McEvoy and Richards (2006) view interpretivst paradigm at the extreme opposite of 
positivism. 
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regulatory environment, consisting of the Federal Law establishing the DIS, the DIA and 
the banks which implement the DIS, and thousands of retail depositors as the end-users. 
Accordingly, there are several different contexts (see Figure 4.10), and none of the 
paradigms so far discussed is well suited to fully embrace such a structure of reality. 
Figure 4.10 
The multiple contexts of the structure of reality involving the DIS 
 
Several academic contributions in criminology, education, nursing, social work, and 
strategic management recently emerged using critical realism as the research paradigm to 
accommodate the complex structure of reality.124 Kazi (2003) and Pawson and Tilley 
(1997), in particular, advocate a critical realist perspective to evaluative research. 
Critical realism, introduced by Bhaskar (1975, 1978, 1989) and further developed by 
others (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, and Norrie, 1998; Lopez and Potter, 2001), is 
a “radical paradigm” (McEvoy and Richards, 2006: 69).125 This new paradigm accepts 
that “there is a reality out there independent of our thoughts and impressions” (Houston, 
2001: 850), which can be differentiated into a stratified three-level reality and allows for 
a study of both the regularities occurring in reality and the contexts and mechanisms 
which influence these. 
McEvoy and Richards (2006) argue that critical realists see two problems with the 
positivist approach, namely that positivists focus exclusively on observable reality, and 
look at relationships between variables in isolation. Similarly, critical realists critique the 
interpretivists who fail to see the embeddedness of phenomena within social structures, 
                                               
124 See, for instance, Bergin, Wells, and Owen (2008), Houston (2001), Kazi (2003), Matthews 
(2009), Miller and Tsang (2010), Scott (2005), and Wilson and McCormack (2006). 
125 Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to critical realism as an ontology within postpositivist paradigm. 
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which may have an impact on the actions of individuals. This criticism is shared by 
Granovetter (1985). 
Kazi (2003: 803) states that the critical realist paradigm 
<...> has the potential for a ‘white box’ [rather than ‘black box’] evaluation that not only 
systematically tracks outcomes, but also the mechanisms that produce the outcomes, the 
contexts in which these mechanisms are triggered, and the content of the interventions. 
It is this thorough investigation of the three-level stratified reality that allows offsetting 
the criticisms of positivism and interpretivism mentioned above. 
4.3.2.1 Ontological Assumptions 
The three levels, or domains, of reality are real,126 actual and empirical (Bhaskar, 1975; 
Collier, 1994; Sayer, 1992). The relationship between these three levels of reality is 
presented in Figure 4.11. 
Beside this unique ontological assumption, critical realist paradigm has its own 
epistemological and methodological assumptions. 
Figure 4.11 
The stratified reality according to the critical realist paradigm 
 
                                               
126 Also referred to as ‘deep structures and mechanisms’ (McEvoy and Richards, 2006: 69) and 
‘causal level’ (Houston, 2001: 850). 
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Source: Adapted from Bhaskar (1975, 1978), Collier (1994), Sayer (1992), Houston (2001), 
McEvoy and Richards (2006). 
4.3.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions 
Epistemology is traditionally sub-divided into empiricism and rationalism, which look at 
where valid knowledge is derived from (Jupp, 2006), and positivism and interpretivism, 
which explore what constitutes valid knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Empiricists assume that knowledge comes from the external world, as opposed to the idea 
that knowledge comes through logical deduction from a priori principle which is 
proclaimed by relativists. These two theories correspond to the dichotomy between 
inductive and deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning involves making a number of 
observations and then proceeding to the formulation of a principle which will be of 
general application, whereas deductive reasoning proceeds by stating one or more 
propositions and then reasoning to a conclusion by applying established principles of logic 
(McLeod, 2005).127 
Positivists claim that knowledge is valid only when positivistically derived, thereby 
producing objective and value-free knowledge with the researcher detached from the 
process. In contract interpretivists see valid knowledge as soft knowledge being based on 
subjective interpretation of personal experience and insights (Piper, 2006). 
Neither of the epistemological stances referred to can inform as to the stratified nature of 
reality unless there is a combination and co-construction of both objective and subjective 
approaches. 
4.3.2.3 Research Strategy 
Blaikie (2007, 2009) argues that a research strategy (or logic of inquiry) is a starting 
point, a series of steps, and an end point for answering research questions, and is directly 
connected to a particular research paradigm. It represents a major logic of social enquiry 
and not types of research design or research methods. 
                                               
127 For more details on logics of inquiry see Section 4.3.2.3 below. 
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The most commonly accepted dichotomy of research strategies is deduction and induction 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Denscombe, 2007; Saunders et al., 2007). Deduction is 
concerned with testing a hypothesis by “testing general ideas against specific instances or 
cases”, whilst induction aims to develop a theory by “generalizing from specific instances 
or cases” (Blaikie, 2007: 3). 
Since objective and subjective epistemological approaches are combined and co-
constructed in a critical realist paradigm, neither deduction nor induction, alone, are able 
to guide through the research process. 
There are two other, less familiar, logics of inquiry which have been identified in 
academic literature as, namely, abduction and retroduction. 
The process of abductive reasoning differs from deduction and induction. By allocating a 
central and very demanding role to the researcher, abductive reasoning is a creative and 
“dynamic process that unfolds over time” (Shum, 2001: 1671). Blaikie (2007: 3) argues 
that 
[b]oth concepts were used by Charles Peirce <...>, although the basic ideas can be traced 
back to Aristotle. <...> Roy Bhaskar’s <...> [uses] ‘retroduction’ to refer to the use of 
reason and imagination to create a picture or model of the structures or mechanisms that 
are responsible for producing observed phenomena. The task is then to try to establish their 
existence. The logic involves moving back from observations to the creation of a possible 
explanation. 
It has been argued that retroduction must be used when conducting research from a 
critical realist perspective (Blaikie, 2007, 2009; Creswell, 2007, 2009; Hallebone and 
Priest, 2009). 
An overview of the four research strategies is presented in Table 4.1. Blaikie (2007: 3) 
explains the main differences between the four logics of inquiry as follows: 
[o]ne way of distinguishing these logics of enquiry is to see induction and deduction as 
involving linear processes, the former being bottom up and the latter top down, and 
retrodutction and abduction as involving much more complex processes that can be thought 




Four existing research strategies (logics of inquiry). 
 Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive 
Aim: To establish descriptions 
of characteristics and 
patterns 
To test theories, to 
eliminate false ones and 
corroborate the survivor 
To discover underlying 
mechanisms to explain 
observed regularities 
To describe and 
understand social life in 
terms of social actors’ 
meanings and motives 




• Produce descriptions 
• Identify a regularity 
that needs to be 
explained 
 
• Construct a theory and 
deduce hypothesis 
• Document and model a 
regularity and motives 
 
 
• Describe the context 
and possible 
mechanisms 




• Produce a technical 
account from lay 
accounts 
Finish: Relate these to the 
research questions and 
explain further 
observations 
Test the hypotheses by 
matching them with data  
Establish which 
mechanism(s) provide(s) 
the best explanation in that 
context 
Develop a theory and 
elaborate it iteratively 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie (2007: 7, 2009: 84). 
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4.3.2.4 Methodological Assumptions 
The terms ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ are traditionally used in categorising research 
methodology as part of a research design. Blaikie (2009: 199) argues that the key 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative is closely associated with the degree of 
involvement the researcher has with research participants, as well as the format of the 
research technique used and its administration. 
Quantitative investigations use standardised measures, look for distinguishing 
characteristics and tend to measure ‘how much’ and ‘how often’. Qualitative 
investigations are associated with interpretative approaches, and allow for the issues to 
be explored in greater depth and detail. 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) claim that apart from the two dominant research 
methodologies, there is a third called mixed method research. Whilst qualitative research 
recognises rich, observational data and quantitative research recognises hard, 
generalisable data, mixed method research draws from the strengths and minimises the 
weaknesses of both, and improves the breadth and depth of information collected during 
the investigation. 
The combination of the quantitative and qualitative components of mixed method 
research can vary. There are four main types of mixed method research approaches, 
namely triangulation, embededness, explanatory and exploratory. Triangulation means a 
combination when methods from both quantitative and qualitative methodologies are used 
at the same time. Embeddedness means a combination when one method, usually from 
qualitative methodology, supplements the other. Explanatory means a combination when 
the methods from quantitative methodology precede the qualitative, and exploratory– 
when they are used in a reverse order (Blaikie, 2009; Bryman, 2006; Castro, Kellison, 
Boyd, and Kopak, 2010; Patton, 2002). 
A critical realist perspective, owing to the complex nature of reality, enables a variety of 
research methods to be employed and, as a result, is commonly associated with a mixed 
method research. Mixed method research combines both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies (Creswell, 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Blaikie (2009: 200) 
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argues that, “after years of neglect and controversy, the use of mixed method is gaining 
popularity”. 
Table 4.2 shows how the critical realist paradigm and its underlying assumptions are 
applied to the present investigation of the DIS in Russia. 
Table 4.2 
Application of a critical realism paradigm to the present investigation. 
Ontology Stratified three-level reality as 
viewed by critical realism: 
• Real – mechanisms, events 
and experiences (mechanisms 
and structures which generate 
actual events) 
• Actual – events and 
experiences (those aspects of 
reality that occur but may not 
necessarily be experienced) 
• Empirical – experiences 
(directly observable actions 
that have occurred) 
The reality of the DIS is viewed 
as follows: 
• Real – Federal Law, and the 
institutional and regulatory 
environment as a result of its 
implementation 
• Actual – insured events and 
the compensation payouts, 
actual implementation of the 
reform 
• Empirical – events which are 
experienced by stakeholders, 
directly or indirectly (e.g. 
perceptions of the DIS) 
Epistemology Co-construction and combination 
of researcher’s and participants’ 
views to create knowledge 
Inclusion of perceptions of the 
key stakeholders (retail 
depositors and bank staff), as well 
as the researcher’s own view (e.g. 
through observations and 
document analysis) 
Strategy Retroduction Retroduction  
Methodology Mixed method, where quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies are 
blended to create plausible 
explanation reflecting the three-
level reality 
Combination of quantitative and 
qualitative techniques: 
• Survey of retail depositors 
(quantitative); 
• Interviews with bank staff 
(qualitative); 
• Documents (both quantitative 
and qualitative); 
• Observations (both 
quantitative and qualitative) 
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4.3.3 Research Approach 
There are many different approaches to research design, which depend on the purpose of 
the investigation and the research questions. For the overview of main approaches, see 
Blaikie (2007, 2009), Bryman and Bell (2007), Denscombe (2007), Saunders et al. 
(2007). 
Given that the present investigation aims to evaluate the Russian DIS, which is a public 
policy programme, and to assess whether the stated objectives have been achieved, the 
following section considers a set of approaches relevant to the evaluation of public 
policies.  
4.3.3.1 Approaches to Evaluation Research 
Weiss (1972) demonstrates that ‘evaluation research’: 
[i]n its research guise, <...> establishes clear and specific criteria for success. It collects 
evidence systematically from a representative sample of the units of concern. It usually 
translates the evidence into quantitative terms <...>, and compares it with the criteria that 
were set. It then draws conclusions about the effectiveness, the merit, the success, of the 
phenomenon under study. (Weiss, 1972: 1-2) 
Rossi and Freeman (1993: 5) refer to evaluation research as “the systematic application 
of social research procedures for assessing the conceptualisation, design implementation, 
and utility of social intervention programs”. 
Weiss (1972: 4) indicates that “[t]he purpose of evaluation research is to measure the 
effects of a program against the goals it set out to accomplish as a means of contributing 
to subsequent decision making about the program and improving future programming”,128 
where ‘to measure the effects’ refers to the research methodology, and ‘the effects’ 
emphasises the outcomes of the programme. This definition also stresses the use of 
explicit criteria for judging how well the programme is doing through a comparison of 
effects with goals. It is believed that “[t]he most important purpose of evaluation is not to 
prove but to improve” (Stufflebeam and Shinkfield, 2007: 331).129 
                                               
128 Emphasis added. 
129 For an overview of history of the evaluation research and the main theories, see Shadish, Cook, 
and Leviton (1991). 
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The most widely discussed, and most agreed upon, taxonomy of research approaches 
which can be used to evaluate a public policy or a governmental programme includes 
experimental, quasi-experimental, and non-experimental approaches (Langbein, 2006; 
Posavac and Carey, 2007; Weiss, 1972).130 
Experimental Approach 
Experiment131 uses experimental and control groups where the former has been exposed 
to the programme and the latter has not. The units (people, organisations, cities) in each 
group are randomly chosen from the target population. The measurement of relevant 
variables usually takes place before the programme starts and after it ends. The 
programme is deemed a success if the experimental group has improved more than the 
control group.132 
Quasi-experimental Approach 
Unlike experiments, which protect almost all possible threats to internal validity, quasi-
experiments generally leave one or several of them uncontrolled, and are believed to have 
the advantage of being practical when conditions prevent true experimentation (Campbell 
and Stanley, 1966; Weiss, 1972).133 
Non-experimental Approach 
Callahan et al. (1995: 13-14) state that, whilst experiments are “desirable when dealing 
with causal questions, looking at a narrow range of program variables, examining an 
                                               
130 Weiss (1972) calls them ‘designs’. Campbell and Stanley (1966) describe preexperimental, 
experimental and quasi-experimental designs; and Callahan, Tomlinson, Hunsaker, Bland, and 
Moon (1995) provide an overview of literature on experimental and non-experimental approaches. 
For other approaches to evaluation research, see Yin (2003) who singles out quasi-experiment, 
grounded theory, historic research, and case study; Rafter (1984) who discusses the scientific, 
interactive and hybrid approaches to evaluation; and Bennett (2003)who reviews the approaches 
to educational evaluation. 
131 Also known as ‘true experimental design’ or ‘randomised control trial (RCT)’ (Contento, 2007: 
372). 
132 For more information on experimental approaches, see Fischer (1995) Royse, Thyer, and 
Padgett (2010), and Weiss (1972). 
133 For more information on types of quasi-experiment see Langbein and Felbinger (2006) and 
Weiss (1972). 
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established program, and when contextual factors are unimportant”, a non-experimental 
approach is “preferred when conducting an exploratory set, dealing with a broad range of 
questions, or evaluating an emergent program”. It is further argued that “[t]hus it 
becomes important to select an evaluation design according to the context to be evaluated 
<...>”.134 
Since the DIS in Russia is compulsory in nature, all banks and all retail depositors would 
be part of the experimental group and no control group could be created. Moreover, since 
this research commenced after the introduction of the DIS, the required before-
measurement could not have taken place. Considering the limitations of the experimental 
and quasi-experimental approaches, it is submitted that the most appropriate approach 
for the present investigation is a non-experimental approach. 
4.3.3.2 Non-experimental Approach to Impact Evaluation of the DIS in 
Russia 
Before proceeding to a description of the methods of data collection and analysis used in 
the present investigation, this section presents a bespoke theoretical framework for the 
evaluation of the DIS in Russia.135 
The impact evaluation model developed by Markless and Streatfield (2006) was 
originally designed to assess the impact of library services. This model permits an 
evaluation of the impact of a library service on its users, by tracing the development of 
the service from the date of setting objectives, success criteria and impact indicators 
through to the final point of delivery. 
Although this model cannot be fully applied to the present research, it was adapted to fit 
the present investigation. The adapted model informed the process of building the 
theoretical framework for the evaluation of the DIS in Russia. 
Markless and Streatfield (2006) claim that, if one starts at the top of the model (overall 
purpose) and goes through it step by step then, when reaching the point of data 
                                               
134 Emphasis added. 
135 This theoretical framework can be adapted to a number of countries to evaluate the success of 
their DISs. 
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collection, the focus will still be on the aims and directions of the programme rather than 
on the programme itself. 
The following three sections explore the application of Markless and Streatfield’s model 
of impact evaluation to the present research. 
Objectives 
Markless and Streatfield (2006: 62) emphasise that “the objectives drive the whole 
process of impact evaluation”.  
According to Article 1(1) of the Federal Law (see Appendix A), there are three 
objectives of the DIS: 
1. To protect the rights and legal interests of depositors; 
2. To strengthen public confidence in the banking system; and 
3. To encourage household savings in the banking system. 
Owen (2007: 256) suggests that, in an objectives-based impact evaluation 
<...> the goals of a program are taken as a given, and decisions about the success of the 
program are based on the extent to which goals are achieved, according to some standard or 
level of achievement. 
Therefore, since the aim of this investigation is to evaluate whether the DIS has met its 
stated objectives, the objectives presented above will be used as the starting point of the 
theoretical framework and will guide the development of success criteria and impact 
indicators. 
Success Criteria 
Markless and Streatfield (2006: xvii) suggest focusing on the ‘success criteria’ of the 
programme before deciding on the impact indicators: 
Success criteria should answer the questions: ‘How can we tell if we are making a 
difference?’ or ‘How can we know that we are getting to where we want to be?’ If you start 
off by identifying a series of criteria by which the service might be judged, you will end up 
with the list of specific qualitative statements <...>. These then form the basis for creating 
indicators, which are accessible and may be quantifiable. 
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The main questions guiding through the definition of the success criteria are “What do I 
want to be judged on in relation to each of my objectives?” and “What sort of changes am 
I looking for in the people that I want to reach with this objective?” (Markless and 
Streatfield, 2006). 
The answers to these questions will be success criteria, which then can be turned into 
impact indicators. Impact is usually about having an effect on people (end-users or 
management), which create change. 
The changes may be: 
(i) Affection-based (attitudes, perceptions, levels of confidence, satisfaction with 
the service); 
(ii) Behaviour-based (people do things differently, ask different types of questions, 
or become more critical or independent); 
(iii) Knowledge-based (knowing about key sources of relevant information, knowing 
what questions different databases can answer); 
(iv) Competence-based (people do things more effectively, improve search 
techniques, are able to find appropriate information). 
According to Markless and Streatfield (2006), success criteria identify the sorts of 
changes that a governmental programme is trying to achieve by addressing the stated 
objectives. Impact indicators translate these broad areas into specific pieces of 
information, which will be used at a later stage to assess whether the objectives have 
been met. 
Since the success criteria for this programme were not set or publicly announced by the 
Russian government, it was necessary to make certain assumptions as to what these 
criteria can mean for each of the stated objectives. In order to minimise possible 
misinterpretation of the objectives of the DIS in Russia, the defined success criteria, and 





Markless and Streatfield (2006: 65) state that 
[i]ndicators can only give you clues about the difference you are making. It is extremely 
difficult to evaluate the actual impact of any service. Human beings are complex and are 
affected in many subtle ways by each experience. Impact indicators are usually surrogates 
for impact: pieces of information that provide good clues, telling part of the story. <...> 
[The] challenge is to design the strongest surrogates possible. For example, assume that 
your service is trying to encourage enthusiasm for books and reading. You may decide to 
monitor loan levels, but this is a weak surrogate for the impact that you are trying to 
record. Loans might increase for a number of reasons. A much stronger surrogate, and 
therefore a better indicator, is users’ attitudes towards books – are they more positive as a 
result of your work?136 
According to the model of Markless and Streatfield (2006), there are three types of 
indicator: 
• Output performance indicators (e.g. volume of deposits in different banks, average 
amount per deposit etc.); 
• Process performance indicators (changes in delivery indicators, e.g. whether the 
share of deposits in different banks changed and how, whether there were any 
special events organised); 
• Impact indicators (evidence that shows that the stated objectives have been met, 
e.g. there is a transparent system in place to compensate depositors, who are 
aware of the DIS). 
Delivery and process indicators are used by the DIA to evaluate the implementation of 
the DIS, and can be found in the overviews of the market and annual reports (see 
Chapter 3). This research evaluates the impact of the reform so the impact indicators 
will be used. 
The impact indicators can be worded in three formats: 
• as questions (e.g. “Do depositors know about their rights and how to protect 
them?”); 
• as statements (e.g. “Depositors know about their rights and how to protect 
them”); 
• as quantities (e.g. “50% of depositors know about their rights and how to protect 
them”). 
Markless and Streatfield (2006) argue that, although there is a place for some numbers 
in an impact evaluation, numbers can only tell a limited amount, and it may be more 
                                               
136 Emphasis added. 
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important to find out about the nature and magnitude of the changes that have occurred 
rather than just how many people were affected. 
As noted by Markless and Streatfield (2006), impact indicators should inform about the 
specific pieces of information which will make it possible to judge whether the 
programme under evaluation is making a difference. Each impact indicator shows what 
information will be gathered in order to demonstrate whether the success criteria have 
been fulfilled. 
Based on the information above, the following success criteria and impact indicators have 
been developed for the present investigation. 
OBJECTIVE 1 “TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL INTERESTS OF 
DEPOSITORS” 
Success criterion 1.1 There is a transparent system in place to compensate depositors in 
case of bank insolvency (competence-based). 
Impact indicators: 
1.1.1 Depositors get compensation within the time stated in the Federal Law. 
1.1.2 Depositors are aware of the procedures to follow in order to claim deposits in 
excess of the coverage provided by the DIS. 
Success criterion 1.2 Depositors know what is available in terms of deposit insurance 
(knowledge-based). 
Impact indicators: 
1.2.1 Depositors know about the parameters of, and the process of compensation under, 
the DIS. 
1.2.2 Depositors consult the printed/online materials about the DIS. 
1.2.3 Depositors’ questions about the DIS are less basic and more specific (focused). 
1.2.4 Depositors have been made aware of the protection of their rights and legal 
interests. 
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Success criterion 1.3 There is an increased awareness of the DIS among the public 
(knowledge-based). 
Impact indicators: 
1.3.1 Banks use reference to the DIS to attract new depositors. 
1.3.2 Banks use the parameters of the DIS to launch new savings accounts. 
1.3.3 Banks have a dedicated area where they display information about the DIS in their 
branches. 
1.3.4 Bank staff who work with depositors know about the parameters of the DIS. 
1.3.5 Bank staff are confident in finding appropriate information to answer depositors’ 
queries about the DIS. 
1.3.6 Banks inform depositors about the DIS. 
OBJECTIVE 2 “TO STRENGTHEN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE BANKING 
SYSTEM” 
Success criterion 2.1 There is an increased public confidence in the banking system 
(affection-based). 
Impact indicators: 
2.1.1 Depositors believe their money is safe with the bank where their account is held. 
2.1.2 Depositors are confident in the banking system. 
2.1.3 Depositors recommend savings accounts to their family and friends. 
2.1.4 Depositors keep their savings accounts in times of economic uncertainty in the 
country. 
OBJECTIVE 3 “TO ENCOURAGE HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS IN THE BANKING 
SYSTEM” 
Success criterion 3.1 There is an increase in household savings (behaviour-based). 
Impact indicators: 
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3.1.1 The public opens more savings accounts and/or increases the value of existing 
savings accounts. 
3.1.2 The public opens more savings accounts and/or increases the value of existing 
savings accounts as the changes in the parameters of the DIS are implemented. 
3.1.3 Depositors save more through bank deposits. 
Having defined the impact indicators, the next section will describe the chosen methods of 
data collection (questionnaire, interviews, observations and documents) in more detail. 
4.4 Methods of Data Collection 
As discussed in Section 4.3.2.4 above, it is suggested that research with a critical realist 
perspective is best executed using mixed method, which allows for multiplicity of methods 
of data collection and data analysis, thus supporting the triangulation of data. 
As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 above, the present investigation looks at the DIS as a 
three-level stratified reality, with banks as one of the key stakeholders tasked with 
implementing the information provision aspect of the DIS. 
The next section will present the rationale for choosing the banks where data collection 
took place, followed by descriptions of the techniques employed within the present 
investigation. 
4.4.1 Participating Banks 
When considering the issue of sampling, it is recognised that there are two major groups 
of sampling techniques – probability sampling and non-probability sampling.137 
Given that there are four types of bank in Russia,138 a list of banks in Saint-Petersburg 
by type was drawn. Saint-Petersburg was chosen as a location for the data collection for 
two reasons. Firstly, it was the first Russian region to introduce a DI fund139 and, 
secondly, it was possible to ensure the participation of a bank-agent for the first insured 
                                               
137 Denscombe (2007) provides extensive descriptions of different types of probability and non-
probability sampling techniques. For other discussions of advantages and disadvantages of 
different sampling techniques see Carter and Williamson (1996), Gomm (2004), and de Vaus 
(2001). 
138 See Chapter 3. 
139 See Chapter 3. 
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event in Saint-Petersburg, thus representing a critical incident and a very valuable 
resource for research into the DIS. 
From this list, several banks were approached using a purposive sampling technique. 
They represented extreme cases of implementing the DIS for the reasons explained 
below.140 It was envisaged that the data collected at these banks could potentially provide 
the most valuable results with regard to the operation of the DIS and its implementation. 
Denscombe (2007: 17) supports purposive sampling by stating that 
[t]he advantage of purposive sampling is that it allows the researcher to home in on people 
or events which <...> will be critical for the research. Instead of going for the typical 
instances, a cross-section or a balanced choice, the research can concentrate on instance 
which will display a wide variety – possibly even a focus on extreme cases – to illuminate 
the research question at hand. In this sense it might not only be economical but might also 
be informative in a way that conventional probability sampling cannot be. 
The following six banks representing extreme cases were chosen to take part in the 
research: 
• two network banks (Bank A1 and Bank A2); 
• one regional bank (Bank B1); 
• one Moscow bank (Bank C1); and 
• two banks with 100% foreign capital (Bank D1 and Bank D2).141 
Bank A1 only entered the Saint-Petersburg banking sector in 2007, using the 
parameters of the DIS when offering their first savings account. Bank A2 has been on 
the market since 2004, but suffered during the global financial crisis, and was taken over 
by the governmental corporation. 
Bank B1 has only been working with retail depositors since 2006, whilst Bank C1 has 
always been more orientated towards business depositors. 
Bank D1 is a small bank with 100% foreign capital, whilst Bank D2 is a part of a global 
banking group, and has been actively expanding its retail services in Russia since 2002. 
                                               
140 For different types of purposeful sampling, see Patton (2002). 
141 See Chapter 3 for more details on the classification used when choosing the banks. 
 124 
Short descriptions of each bank, including their ranking against other Russian banks at 
the time of data collection, are presented below.142 
4.4.1.1 Bank A1 
Bank A1 is a network bank. It was founded in 1991 under its first name, but was 
renamed in 2006. Between 1999 and 2001, the major part of its client base was 
connected to the municipal authorities. In 2002 its emphasis shifted towards business 
depositors. In 2003, Bank A1 redirected its services towards retail banking. It joined the 
DIS in the first quarter of 2005. 
At the time of data collection, net assets consisted largely of loans, and liabilities 
consisted mostly of retail deposits. In the ranking of Russian banks on 01 April 2009, 
Bank A1 was in the top 100 by net assets and in the top 30 by the amount of retail 
deposits.  
At the time of data collection, Bank A1 had 11 regional offices and 226 branches across 
Russia, and served over 700,000 retail depositors. 
The regional office in Saint-Petersburg was established in 2007 and, at the time of data 
collection, it had 11 branches, including one in the head office. 
4.4.1.2 Bank A2 
Bank A2 is a network bank. It was founded in 1991, with shareholders coming from the 
telecommunications industry of several post-USSR republics. It joined the DIS in the 
first quarter of 2005. Bank A2 is a large full-service bank, with headquarters in Moscow 
and with a widespread network of regional offices throughout Russia. At the time of data 
collection, it had 49 regional offices and 149 branches, and served over 150,000 retail 
depositors. Bank A2 has well established operations through the Russian Post Offices, 
and even has a line of financial products available solely at the Russian Post Offices (at 
                                               
142 Details of banks’ ratings are based on the information provided by RosBiznesKonsalting and 
can be accessed at http://rating.rbc.ru/. 
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the time of data collection, 119 out of 149 branches of Bank A2 were located in the 
Russian Post Offices). 
At the time of data collection, 35% of the assets and more than 50% of the liabilities 
were associated with the transactions with telecommunications agencies. In September 
2008, Bank A2 was hit by the financial crisis, and was subsequently taken over by the 
governmental corporation which now owns 99.4666% of the bank’s shares. 
Bank A2 did not appear in the ranking of Russian banks on 01 April 2009. However, 
based on the financial statements for the first quarter of 2009, Bank A2 would have been 
in the top 30 by net assets and in the top 100 by the volume of retail deposits. 
The regional office in Saint-Petersburg was established in 2004 and, at the time of data 
collection, it had 3 branches, including one in the Head Office, and 10 mini-offices located 
at Russian Post Offices in Saint-Petersburg. 
4.4.1.3 Bank B1 
Bank B1 is a regional bank. It was founded in 1995 in Siberia under its original name. In 
2003, it was taken over and, in 2004, was renamed and moved to Saint-Petersburg. It 
joined the DIS in the fourth quarter of 2005. Since 2006, it has been focused on offering 
financial products to retail depositors. 
Bank B1 has headquarters in Saint-Petersburg and its network in Russia is comprised of 
1 regional office and 4 branches. 
In the ranking of Russian banks on 01 April 2009, Bank B1 was in top 400 by both net 
assets and the volume of retail deposits.  
At the time of data collection, Bank B1 had 5 branches in Saint-Petersburg, including 
one in the Head Office. 
4.4.1.4 Bank C1 
Bank C1 is a Moscow bank. It was founded in1994 as a limited liability partnership. In 
1999, it was re-organised to a limited liability company, and, in 2009, it became a closed 
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joint-stock company. The bank’s shareholders are Moscow companies and private 
individuals, including the current Chairman of the Board. It joined the DIS in the first 
quarter of 2005. 
Bank C1 has its headquarters in Moscow, with a network of branches across several 
regions of Russia. At the time of data collection, it had 7 regional offices and 14 branches 
in Russia, and served over 4,000 retail depositors. 
At the time of data collection, the bank’s assets were comparatively evenly distributed in 
terms of different financial instruments. The liabilities constituted mainly of balances on 
accounts of business depositors (45% of liabilities), whilst retail deposits accounted for 
marginally less than 17% of liabilities. In the ranking of Russian banks on 01 April 
2009, Bank C1 was in the top 300 by net assets and in the top 200 by the volume of 
retail deposits.  
The regional office in Saint Petersburg was established in 2006 and, at the time of data 
collection, it had 2 branches, including one in the Head Office. 
4.4.1.5 Bank D1 
Bank D1 is a bank with 100% foreign statutory capital. It was established in 1994 in 
Moscow under its original name. It was founded by three scientific-industrial plants with 
interests in ferrous metals. The bank did not show dynamic development and, in 2003, it 
had only 29 employees. In September 2004, it was bought by one of the financial 
corporations in northern Europe. Since then, it has been renamed twice. It joined the DIS 
in the third quarter of 2005. In October 2010, Bank D1 announced its withdrawal from 
the retail deposits market. 
At the time of data collection, the network of Bank D1 in Russia was comprised of 2 
regional offices, 1 representative office and 5 branches. 
At the time of data collection, the majority of assets came from loans, and the majority of 
liabilities came from the parent company. In the ranking of Russian banks on 01 April 
2009, Bank D1 was in the top 50 in relation to net assets, and in the top 300 in relation 
to the volume of retail deposits. 
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The regional office in Saint-Petersburg was established in 2006 and, at the time of data 
collection, it has 2 branches, including one in the Head Office.  
4.4.1.6 Bank D2 
Bank D2 is a bank with 100% foreign statutory capital and was registered in 1993. It is 
owned by one of the biggest financial corporations in the world. Since 2002, the bank has 
been actively expanding its retail services. It joined the DIS in the first quarter of 2005. 
At the time of data collection, the network of Bank D2 in Russia was comprised of 7 
regional offices, 2 representative offices and 45 branches, serving over 800,000 retail 
depositors. 
At the time of data collection, the assets and liabilities were well diversified, and retail 
deposits formed 15% of the bank’s liabilities. 
In the ranking of Russian banks on 01 April 2009, Bank D2 was in the top 30 by net 
assets and in the top 50 by the amount of retail deposits.  
The regional office in Saint-Petersburg was established in 1996 and, at the time of data 
collection, had 12 branches. 
4.4.2 Data Collection Techniques 
There are a plethora of methods of data collection.143 The following sections look at 
different techniques used within the present research to accommodate the mixed method 
research methodology. 
Evaluation research does not have a specific method, and evaluation investigations rely 
on existing social science research methods for data collection and data analysis (Clarke 
and Dawson, 1999). The differences in the scope, size, duration, complexity and time 
span of goals of a public policy or a governmental programme, as well as the purpose and 
                                               
143 For more detailed description of different methods of data collection, or techniques, see Blaikie 
(2007, 2009), Bryman and Bell (2007), Creswell (2009), de Vaus (2001), Denscombe (2007), 
Saunders (2007).  
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circumstances of the evaluation investigation, have important consequences for the choice 
of evaluation approaches and methods. 
Evaluators of governmental programmes and public policies have expanded the range of 
methods, with research designs that use both quantitative and qualitative methods. As a 
result, evaluation research has often been linked to mixed method designs (Greene, 
Caracelli, and Graham, 1989; Hutton and McNeill, 1981; Patton, 2002; Rao and 
Woolcock, 2003; Royse et al., 2010). 
Davidson (2005: 55) argues that no conclusion in evaluation research should be based on 
a single piece of evidence: 
Sometimes you will need at least three or four independent angles on the same issue to 
make absolutely sure that you have a clear picture of what is happening. Where do you get 
these independent angles? From both of the following: 
• Different types of data (both qualitative and quantitative) 
• Multiple sources of information (e.g., existing documentation, observations, input 
from more than one group of stakeholders). 
Patton (2002: 12) further suggests that 
[i]n research as in art, there can be no single, ideal standard, beauty no less than “truth” is 
in the eye of the beholder, and the beholders of research and evaluation can include a 
plethora of stakeholders: scholars, policymakers, funders, program managers, critics, and 
the general public. Any given design inevitably reflects some imperfect interplay of 
recourses, capabilities, purposes, possibilities, creativity, and personal judgments by the 
people involved. 
Since the present investigation adopts a mixed method, non-experimental impact 
evaluation approach, there are several methods that can be used for data collection.144 De 
Vaus (2001: 80) suggests that the most important feature of the data collection method 
is that it should be able to produce “reliable, valid and meaningful data”. Owing to the 
three-level stratified reality of the Russian DIS and the existence of multiple 
                                               
144 Blaikie (2010) suggests that the most commonly used quantitative techniques are self-
administered questionnaires and structured interviews. On the contrary, the qualitative techniques 
are focused and in-depth interviews, as well as various types of observations. For an overview of 
data collection techniques commonly used in evaluation research, see Wholey, Hatry, and 
Newcomer(2004). 
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stakeholders, the following techniques (see Figure 4.12) were chosen to gather data from 
the six participating banks: 
• retail depositor survey; 
• bank staff interviews; 
• in-branch observations; and 
• documents. 
Furthermore, statistics from the CBR and documents from the DIA, presented in Chapter 
3, were collected to provide an independent account, which ensured that the perceptions 
of the DIS among the multiple stakeholders came to the fore. 
Figure 4.12 
Data collection techniques used in the present investigation 
 
Each method of data collection employed in the present research is introduced and 
discussed in more detail below. 
4.4.2.1 Questionnaire 
A questionnaire is a pre-formulated written set of questions that are devised by reference 
to the research purpose and research questions. The main strength of questionnaires is 
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that they can reach a widely dispersed sample at the same time, and at a relatively low 
cost, without any loss of time.  
However, questionnaires have been criticised because response rates are often low. Even 
when questionnaires may not be able to achieve such a high response rate as interviews, 
their qualities can be strong enough to tip the balance in their favour (Kanuk and 
Berenson, 1975). 
Within the present investigation, the questionnaire was designed to measure the level of 
knowledge and perceptions of the DIS among the retail depositors in six participating 
banks. Three bespoke versions of a questionnaire were designed to accommodate specific 
requests from two banks (see Chapter 5).145 
The questionnaire contained 18 questions,146 divided into five, clearly identified, 
sections.147 These represented the demographical data, information on the use of banking 
products and services, and a set of questions in relation to each of the stated objectives of 
the DIS. 
Given that the purpose of the present investigation was to evaluate the impact of the DIS 
and find to out whether the stated objectives had been achieved, the questionnaire was 
designed to gather information on the outcomes of the DIS reform in relation to retail 
depositors. 
Owen (1999: 264) argues that 
[o]utcomes are benefits for participants during or after their involvement with a program. 
Outcomes relate to [the change in] knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, behaviour, 
conditions or status. <...> Examples of outcomes include: increased knowledge of 
nutritional needs, changes in literacy levels, getting a job, having higher self-dependence.148 
To gather information about possible changes in the knowledge, attitude and behaviour of 
retail depositors since the introduction of the DIS in Russia, the following issues were 
                                               
145 Three versions of the questionnaire can be found in Appendices 7, 8, and 9. 
146 Questionnaire for Bank A2 contained 17 questions. 
147 Gillham (2000: 25) suggests that good layout with clustering and progression makes it easier 
for the respondent to fill in the questionnaire and makes “‘doting around’ less likely”. 
148 See also Chapter 2 for a discussion on two groups of outcomes of public policy, one – in relation 
to knowledge and awareness, and the other – in relation to attitude and behaviour.  
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considered when devising a set of questions in relation to each of the stated objectives of 
the DIS. 
Fink (2003: 68) suggests that  
[a]ttitudes are often contrasted with knowledge and behaviour. For example, how a person 
feels about gun control laws, what that person knows about gun control laws, and what he 
or she personally does about guns may or may not be related logically.149 
Therefore, the questions in relation to Objective 1 were aimed at measuring the retail 
depositors’ knowledge about the DIS, and the extent to which respondents felt protected 
by the Federal Law. Questions in relation to Objective 2 were aimed at measuring the 
attitude of retail depositors to the banking system, and questions in relation to Objective 
3 were aimed at measuring the changes in the saving behaviour of respondents following 
the introduction of the DIS. 
Most of the questions had explicit categories as response options. 
Two scales were used in Question 7 and in Questions 14a-14e. The first scale used to 
assess the perceived level of knowledge about the DIS among the respondents, ranged 
from 1 to 5, where 1 meant “no knowledge at all” and 5 meant “excellent knowledge”.150 
This scale mirrors the grading system used in Russian education, and thus was deemed 
familiar to the respondents and suitable for the self-assessment of their knowledge.  
The second scale was used to provide an insight into the levels of agreement or 
disagreement with statements regarding the impact of the DIS on respondents’ behaviour 
and other statements, utilised a Likert scale. 
When a Likert scale is used, the item is presented as a declarative sentence, followed by 
response options that indicate varying degrees of agreement with or endorsement of the 
statements. <...> [E]ither an odd or even number of response options might accompany 
each statement. <...> A common practice is to include six possible responses: “strongly 
disagree”, “moderately disagree”, “mildly disagree”, “mildly agree”, “moderately agree”, 
and “strongly agree”. These form a continuum from strong disagreement to strong 
agreements. A neutral midpoint can also be added (DeVellis, 2012: 93).  
A four-response Likert scale without a neutral midpoint was used in Questions 14a-14e. 
The wording of response options was taken from the Likert scale that was used by 
                                               
149 Emphasis added. 
150 See Question 7 in Appendices 7 and 9, and Question 6 in Appendix 8. 
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VCIOM on several occasions in their opinion polls and, thus, was familiar to the 
respondents.151 
Translation of the Questionnaire 
Russian retail depositors were surveyed by means of a questionnaire that was first 
designed in English, but later translated into Russian by the researcher and subsequently 
tested.152 
Administration of the Questionnaire 
Hard copies of the questionnaire were distributed across all branches of the six 
participating banks in Saint-Petersburg. In branches, the questionnaires were offered to 
all retail depositors, and were filled in whilst waiting for a bank transaction to be 
completed. The responses were collected by each branch, and delivered to the Head Office 
for subsequent collection by the researcher. 
Online administration of the questionnaire was not considered as an option, due to the 
necessity of establishing a link between the retail depositors and the banks they 
patronised. 
Response Rate 
The aim was to obtain a minimum of 1,000 responses from retail depositors, as this 
number was considered to be representative of the population by VCIOM. The present 
investigation did not aim to achieve regional, gender or age representation. 
Contacts were established with each participating bank, which allowed for the monitoring 
of response rates, and for encouraging the completion of additional numbers of 
questionnaires where necessary. 
As a result, 942 questionnaires were completed by the retail depositors, and these were 
split between the six participating banks as follows: Bank A1 – 149 respondents, Bank 
                                               
151 Considerations about the usage of these scales should be made when replicating the present 
investigation in other countries. 
152 For more details about the testing of the questionnaire, see Section 4.4.4 below. 
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A2 – 251 respondents, Bank B1 – 57 respondents, Bank C1 – 142 respondents, Bank 
D1 – 69 respondents, and Bank D2 – 270 respondents. 
4.4.2.2 Interviews 
The interview provides an opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply, to uncover new 
clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive 
accounts that are based on personal experience of participants (Burgess, 1994). 
Within this investigation, the semi-structured interviews were conducted with bank 
clerks, heads of branch, marketing staff from the six participating banks, as well as two 
interviews with representatives of the judiciary. The interviews with bank staff were 
aimed at discovering bank practices with regard to the dissemination of information about 
the DIS, whilst the information obtained from the interviews with the judges shed 
additional light on the level of depositor protection in Russia. 
The interview questions mirrored the list of impact indicators, presented in Table 4.3.153 
4.4.2.3 Observations 
Observations took place in 17 branches with the aim of understanding the practices in 
dealing with retail depositors in six participating banks in relation to the DIS. DIS-
related documents were collected from each branch where observations took place, which 
helped with enriching the data set. 
4.4.2.4 Documents 
There were two types of document which were collected and analysed as part of the 
present investigation. 
The secondary sources, namely the statistics from the CBR and documents from the DIA, 
were discussed in Chapter 3 as part of the literature review on past evaluations of the 
DIS in Russia. 
                                               
153 For more details about the testing of the interview questions, see Section 4.4.4 below. 
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The primary sources for the purposes of this thesis were collected at six participating 
banks, in the form of marketing materials, with or without reference to the DIS, copies of 
bank account contracts and other materials. Similar materials were also collected from 
other Russian banks for comparative purposes. 
 
To conclude, the main methods of data collection used in the present research were retail 
depositor survey questionnaires, semi-structured interviews with banks staff and 
representatives of the judiciary, in-branch observations and primary and secondary 
documents related to the DIS. 
4.4.3 Timing of Data Collection 
A research investigation can be restricted to the present (cross-sectional), be extended 
over a period of time (longitudinal), or embedded in the past (historical). 
In cross-sectional research, there is no time dimension, and data is collected only at one 
point in time, thus allowing the researcher to analyse the data without the need to wait 
for any follow-up stage(s). Longitudinal research measures change over time by 
collecting data concerning at least two time points, thus enabling the researcher to 
examine change and its direction. Historical research looks at events in the past and, 
thus, determines the data collection methods, being written records of some kind or other 
information from or about past events.154 
De Vaus (2001) argues that a cross-sectional approach is widely used in social research, 
as it is not only more cost effective than longitudinal research, but also enables the 
researcher to obtain results relatively quickly. Another positive aspect of the cross-
sectional approach is the fact that this research can minimise some of the ethical problems 
that can arise with a longitudinal design, since no tracking of participants is required and 
it is much easier to ensure anonymity. 
                                               
154 For more information on these approaches individually, and possible combinations, see 
Blaikie(2009: 201-204). 
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The present investigation of the DIS in Russia, being the first research of its kind, 
employed a cross-sectional approach to data collection by gathering data at one point in 
time (spring 2009), with no plan to recall participants for a follow-up investigation. 
4.4.4 Pilot Study 
Academics in several different areas of research agree that a pilot study155 helps to refine 
the overall research design, sampling techniques data collection instruments (including 
their validity, reliability, ease of use) and to anticipate any issues with obtaining access to 
participants prior to the actual data collection (Ary et al., 2010; Blessing and 
Chakrabarti, 2009; Goodwin, 2010; Houser, 2008; Maxwell, 2005; Phelps, Sadoff, 
Warburton, and Ferrara, 2005; Zikmund and Babin, 2007). 
Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009: 114) state that 
[t]he aim of a pilot study is to try out the research approach to identify potential 
problems that may affect the quality and validity of the results. <...> trying out 
the research as planned <...> will reveal that several changes are required if the 
study is to be effective and efficient. 
The first part of the pilot study was conducted in Saint-Petersburg in August-October 
2007 during one-month internships at Bank Saint-Petersburg and at Bank VTB North-
West.156 
The second part of the pilot study, namely the testing of the updated questionnaire, was 
completed in December 2008 before the commencement of the actual investigation itself. 
4.4.4.1 Pilot Retail Depositor Survey 
Since the questionnaire was originally designed using the English language and then 
translated into Russian, it was necessary to increase the reliability of the questionnaire by 
piloting its Russian language version. 
The retail depositor survey questionnaire was piloted on two occasions. 
                                               
155 Sometimes also referred to as a ‘pretest’ (Zikmund and Babin, 2007: 62) or a “trial run” (Ary, 
Cheser Jacobs, Razavieh, and Sorensen, 2010: 95). 
156 Currently known as VTB Bank. 
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Firstly, it was tested during the pilot survey157 (n = 10) at Bank Saint-Petersburg on 17 
October 2007. 
Ten retail depositors participated in the pilot survey (5 males and 5 females). The pilot 
survey showed that Russian retail depositors were uncomfortable with a face-to-face 
survey, so it was decided that using a questionnaire that could be completed in private 
provided a solution to this problem. 
To increase the response rate, the questionnaires were to be distributed by bank clerks so 
they could be filled in by retail depositors whilst awaiting processing of their 
transactions. 
Based on the results of the pilot survey, the following changes were made to the 
questionnaire: 
(i) Considering the questionnaire was to be filled in by retail depositors themselves, a 
short introduction was included to explain the purpose of the survey, and a closing 
statement thanking retail depositors for their participation and asking them to return 
the completed questionnaire to the bank clerk. The questionnaire was designed to be 
anonymous; 
(ii) Questions measuring the attitudes of retail depositors were introduced (with a four-
response Likert scale without neutral midpoint158); 
(iii) Since most of the respondents would have opened their bank accounts after their 
banks became part of the DIS, any questions referring to pre-DIS bank accounts 
were removed; 
(iv) More questions were added to obtain a more accurate overview of depositors’ 
knowledge of the DIS, and their perceptions towards the protection of their rights 
and legal interests as depositors, towards their confidence in the banking system and 
any changes in their saving behaviour. 
(v) The results of the pilot survey showed the need for closed questions, as retail 
depositors were reluctant to spend time writing the answers, and preferred closed 
questions where they could provide an answer by ticking the relevant box. 
                                               
157 A copy of the original questionnaire and the analysis of responses can be found in Appendix 6. 
158 See Section 4.4.2.1 above for more information on Likert scales. 
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As a second part of the pilot survey, the updated version of the questionnaire was tested 
in December 2008 by sending it out by email to a group of Russian retail depositors and 
bank staff (n = 10) who were known via the contacts with banks and via internships. 
Since the questionnaire was originally designed in English and then translated into 
Russian, the comments received from pre-testing made it possible to clarify the wording 
of newly added questions where the correct meaning had been lost in translation. 
Since the Likert scale was introduced to questions measuring attitudes of retail depositors 
only in the updated version of the questionnaire, it was important to receive comments on 
the wording of the four-response Likert scale. 
Comments on the updated version of the questionnaire were also received from staff at 
the six participating banks. 
4.4.4.2 Pilot Bank Staff Interviews 
The interview questions for bank staff were tested through a face-to-face interview with 
one clerk at Bank VTB North-West in December 2008. 
This exercise made it possible to rephrase some questions so as to clarify their meaning. 
Moreover, the pilot interview confirmed what type of information could be supplied by a 
bank clerk and what information can be supplied only by the head of branch or a 
marketing officer, thus reducing the number of questions in the clerks’ interview and 
focusing it more on the dissemination of information on the DIS and the clerks’ 
perceptions of retail depositors’ knowledge about the DIS. 
From the pilot interview, it became clear that the persons in charge of dissemination of 
information on the DIS were the heads of branch and the clerks. 
Furthermore, it was evident that a bottom-up approach to data collection was required to 
avoid the ‘sudden’ improvement of information provision in the six participating banks. 
The order of data collection was agreed as follows: first, in-branch observations; second, 
retail depositor survey (both first and second stages could run in parallel); third, bank 
staff interviews; and fourth, gathering of documents (marketing materials and contracts 
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of bank accounts). In terms of the order of interviews, it was concluded that it was 
preferable to interview heads of branch on the same days as the clerks. 
As a result, the present investigation used the retail depositor survey questionnaire, bank 
staff and judiciary interviews, in-branch observations and documents, because it was 
important “to use different methods or sources to corroborate each other so that <...> 
some form of methodological triangulation [is used]” (Mason, 1996: 25). 
4.4.5 Theoretical Framework of the Evaluation of the Russian DIS 
Further to the impact indicators designed in Section 4.3.3.2 and subsequent justification 
of the chosen techniques of data collection, Table 4.3 presents the overview of how each 
objective with its success criteria and impact indications were operationalised through the 
various methods of data collection. 
 
Section 4.5 below will explore the methods of data analysis suitable for deriving valuable 




How the impact indicators will be operationalised through the four methods of data collection. 
Objectives Success Criteria Impact Indicators Methods of Data Collection 





Success criterion 1.1 
There is a 
transparent system in 
place to compensate 
depositors in case of 
bank insolvency 
(competence-based). 
1.1.1 Depositors get compensation within the 
time stated in the Federal Law. 
• Documents (press releases) from the DIA in relation 
to all insured events 
• Documents (letters) from the DIA in relation to two 
specific insured events 
1.1.2 Depositors are aware of the procedures to 
follow in order to claim deposits in excess of the 
coverage provided by the DIS. 
• Judge Interviews 
• Documents (letters) from the DIA in relation to two 
specific insured events 
Success criterion 1.2 
Depositors know 
what is available in 
terms of deposit 
insurance (knowledge-
based). 
1.2.1 Depositors know about the parameters of, 
and the process of compensation under, the DIS. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Questions 7, 8 and 9 
• Clerk Interview Question 13 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 15 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 15 
1.2.2 Depositors consult the printed/online 
materials about the DIS. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Question 14b 
1.2.3 Depositors’ questions about the DIS are 
less basic and more specific (focused). 
• Clerk Interview Questions 9 and 14 
• Head of Branch Interview Questions 16 and 17 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 16 
1.2.4 Depositors have been made aware of the 
protection of their rights and legal interests. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Question 11 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 18 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 17 
Success criterion 1.3 
There is an increased 
awareness of the DIS 
among the public 
(knowledge-based). 
1.3.1 Banks use reference to the DIS to attract 
new depositors. 
• Head of Branch Interview Questions 5, 6 and 7 
• Marketing Officer Interview Questions 5, 6 and 7 
1.3.2 Banks use the parameters of the DIS to 
launch new savings accounts. 
• Documents (marketing materials) from the six 
participating banks and their peers 
1.3.3 Banks have a dedicated area where they 
display information about the DIS in their 
branches. 
• In-branch observations at the six participating banks 
1.3.4 Bank staff who work with depositors know • Clerk Interview Questions 4, 5, 5a, 10b and12 
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Objectives Success Criteria Impact Indicators Methods of Data Collection 
about the parameters of the DIS. • Head of Branch Interview Questions 4, 4a and 9b  
• Marketing Officer Interview Questions 4, 4a and 9b 
1.3.5 Bank staff are confident in finding 
appropriate information to answer depositors’ 
queries about the DIS. 
• Clerk Interview Question 15 
• Head of Branch Interview Questions 12 and 13 
• Marketing Officer Interview Questions 12 and 13 
1.3.6 Banks inform depositors about the DIS. • Retail Depositor Survey Questions 4, 6, 14a and 16 
• Clerk Interview Questions 7, 10, 10a and 11 
• Head of Branch Interview Questions 9, 10 and 14 
• Marketing Officer Interview Questions 9, 10 and 14 
• In-branch observations at the six participating banks 
• Documents (marketing materials and bank account 
contracts) from the six participating banks and their 
peers 






Success criterion 2.1 
There is an increased 
public confidence in 
the banking system 
(affection-based). 
2.1.1 Depositors believe their money is safe with 
the bank where their account is held. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Question 5 
2.1.2 Depositors are confident in the banking 
system. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Questions 12, 14d and 18 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 23 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 22 
2.1.3 Depositors recommend savings accounts to 
their family and friends. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Questions 3 and 14e 
2.1.4 Depositors keep their savings accounts in 
times of economic uncertainty in the country. 
• Clerk Interview Question 16 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 24 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 23 
• Documents (statistics) from the CBR 
Objective 3 “To 
Encourage 
Household 
Savings in the 
Banking 
System” 
Success criterion 3.1 
There is an increase 
in household savings 
(behaviour-based). 
3.1.1 The public opens more savings accounts 
and/or increases the value of existing savings 
accounts. 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 8 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 8 
• Reports from the DIA 
• Documents (statistics) from the CBR and the six 
participating banks 
3.1.2 The public opens more savings accounts 
and/or increases the value of existing savings 
• Retail Depositor Survey Question 17 
• Clerk Interview Question 16 
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Objectives Success Criteria Impact Indicators Methods of Data Collection 
accounts as the changes in the parameters of the 
DIS are implemented. 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 24 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 23 
3.1.3 Depositors’ save more through bank 
deposits. 
• Retail Depositor Survey Questions 13 and 14c 
• Head of Branch Interview Question 22 
• Marketing Officer Interview Question 21 
 
 142 
4.5 Methods of Data Analysis 
Mixed method is a combination of both quantitative and qualitative techniques of data 
collection and data analysis. This section discusses the data analysis approaches which 
were used in the present investigation.  
4.5.1 Analysis of Quantitative Data 
When conducting statistical quantitative data analysis, there is usually a choice of either 
a parametric test or a non-parametric test. The main difference between the two types is 
as follows. 
Hicks (1990: 77) suggests that “[b]asically, parametric tests are much more sensitive 
tools of analysis than non-parametric tests, in that if there is any support for your 
hypothesis in the data, the parametric test is more likely to pick it up.” 
However, parametric tests can only be used if four conditions or parameters can be met: 
(i) the data must be on an interval/ratio scale;159 
(ii) the data should be approximately normally distributed; 
(iii) the subjects should be randomly selected from the population from which they 
are derived; and 
(iv) variation in the results from each group or condition should be more or less 
similar. 
Obtaining access to the whole population was not the aim of the present research, thus 
limiting the possibility of using parametric tests for statistical analysis. Moreover, not 
every question had a scaled range of response options. 
The majority of responses were treated as categorical and, hence, were examined by 
means of analyses of cross-tabulated findings. 
Additionally, two major non-parametric statistical tests were used for analysis of the 
quantitative data in disaggregate form. In order to assess the existence of any association 
                                               
159 According to Hicks (1990),this condition cannot be waived, whilst the other three conditions 
allow flexibility. See also Pallant (2005). 
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between the bank as an independent variable and some of the dependent variables, the 
two statistical tests – the Kruskal-Wallis test and the Chi-squared test – were chosen. 
The former was used on Likert-type items, whilst the latter, on other ranked items. 
These statistical tests were chosen because most of the dependent variables represent 
data which is measured on nominal (categorical) and ordinal (ranked) scales. Since the 
sample does not contain the continuous data, other statistical tests allowing exploration of 
association between variables (e.g. correlation) could not be used. 
4.5.1.1 Chi-squared Test 
The Chi-squared test belongs to a group of non-parametric techniques, which, according 
to Pallant (2005), are ideal for use on nominal and ordinal data, as these techniques have 
less stringent requirements when compared to the parametric tests, used on continuous 
data. 
The Chi-squared test used for determining the association between the variables is the 
so-called ‘Chi-square test for independence’ (Pallant, 2005: 287).160 The Chi-squared test 
used in this thesis determines the existence of a relationship between two categorical 
variables. As Pallant (2005: 287) outlines: 
[i]t compares the frequency of cases found in the various categories of one variable across 
the different categories of another variable. For example, Is the proportion of smokers to 
non-smokers the same for males and females? Or, expressed another way: Are males more 
likely than females to be smokers? 
For the purposes of the Chi-squared test, all cells should have expected count of greater 
than 1, and at least 80% of cells should have expected counts of 5 or more (Freeman and 
Walters, 2010; Stewart, 2010; Yates, Moore, and McCabe, 1999).161 
The test computed in SPSS produces different pieces of information. The most important 
one is the Pearson Chi-Square value, which should be looked at in conjunction with an 
associated significance level, labelled ‘Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)’, which needs to be 0.05 or 
                                               
160 The other test ‘Chi-square for goodness of fit’ is not used in this thesis. 
161 Pallant (2005) suggests a more strict criterion: the lowest expected frequency in any cell 
should not be less than 5. There is another requirement for the 2 × 2 tables (variables with 2 
categories each); however, 2 × 2 tables are not used in this thesis. 
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smaller to be significant. If the Sig. value is 0.05 or smaller, it means the result of the 
Chi-squared test is indeed significant and, thus, the hypothesis can be considered as 
proved. 
4.5.1.2 Kruskal-Wallis Test 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is another test in the group of non-parametric techniques and is 
an alternative to a one-way between-groups analysis of variance (parametric test).  
This test permits a comparison of the scores on some continuous variable for three or 
more groups. The way this test works is as follows: “scores are converted to ranks and 
the mean rank for each group is compared” (Pallant, 2007: 226). 
In this thesis, these groups are banks so, in total, there will be 6 groups for the purposes 
of the Kruskal-Wallis test.  
There are no additional assumptions for this test. The general assumptions for all non-
parametric tests apply: random sample and independent observation (i.e. each 
person/case can be counted only once). 
The test computed in SPSS produces different pieces of information. The output of the 
test gives a ranking of groups (banks, in this case). Depending on the question, the bank 
with the highest ranking will be considered to be the best and the lowest ranking, the 
worst. 
4.5.1.3 Definition of ψ Value 
Whilst the output of a Kruskal-Wallis test provides a ranking of groups according to the 
mean rank value, the Chi-square test can only confirm or disprove the existence of an 
association between two categorical variables. In order to allow for the ranking (as in the 
output of Kruskal-Wallis test) to take place when analysing categorical data using Chi-
squared test, it is important to execute further analysis of the cross-tabulated output. 
This involves calculating ψ value by using two bespoke formulae. 
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ψ value is a measure of the retail depositors’ performance in the bank they patronise 
represented as a percentage. Each response option (whether positive or negative) in the 
Chi-squared text cross-tabulated output computed by SPSS indicates the extent to which 
the retail depositors’ performance in a specific bank (observed count) differs from the 
expected count calculated by the Chi-squared test. 
ψ value can be calculated using two formulae: ψp– for positive response options; ψn – for 
negative response options. 
The formula for the positive response option (see Equation 4.1) looks at the performance 
of a bank’s retail depositors, firstly by calculating a ratio between the expected count and 
the observed count for each positive response option and, secondly, by subtracting 100, 
where 100 is a normalising factor. If the result is positive, it means the performance of 
the bank’s retail depositors is better than expected. If the result is negative, it means the 
bank’s retail depositors are underperforming in this response option. 
Equation 4.1 






 obs is the observed count, as computed by the Chi-squared test, and 
 exp  is the expected count, as computed by the Chi-squared test. 
ψp values range from -100 (the minimum value; appears when no respondents chose the 
positive answer option) to the maximum value calculated by using the formula presented 
in Equation 4.2. 
Equation 4.2 







To is the total number of respondents answered the question, and 
Tc is the total number of respondents who chose the positive response option. 
The best performance for retail depositors of a certain bank in a positive response option 
would be having all respondents choosing the positive response option, and having no 
respondents choosing the negative response option. If such a situation occurs in reality, 
the retail depositors of such a bank would have achieved the maximum performance 
possible. 
The formula for the negative answer option (Equation 4.3) calculates the same ratio 
between the expected count (taken as 100%) and the observed count as in the case of the 
formula for the positive response option above. However, as a second step, it subtracts 
the ratio from 100 to account for the ‘negativity’ of the response option because, in this 
instance, the higher the observed count, the worse the performance of bank’s retail 
depositors is. 
Equation 4.3 
Formula for calculating ψn value 





 obs is the observed count as computed by the Chi-squared test, and 
 exp  is the expected count as computed by the Chi-squared test. 
ψn values range from 100 (the maximum value; appears when no respondents in the bank 
chose the negative response option) to the minimum value calculated by using the formula 
presented in Equation 4.4. 
Equation 4.4 
Formula for calculating ψn max value 






To is the total number of respondents answered the question, and 
Tc is the total number of respondents who chose the negative response 
option. 
The best performance for retail depositors of a certain bank in a negative response option 
would be having no respondents choosing the negative response option, and having all 
respondents choosing the positive response option. If such a situation occurs in reality, 
the retail depositors of such a bank would have achieved the maximum performance 
possible. 
These two formulae take into account the fact that the expected count, computed by the 
Chi-squared test, is based on the total number of respondents from each bank, and the 
total number of responses for each response option. This means that the expected count 
for a given response option already contains reference to the total number of respondents 
for each given bank and, thus, can be used as a starting point of comparison between 
expected and observed counts to determine whether retail depositors of a given bank 
performed better or worse than expected in this given answer option. 
When calculated, the ψ values allow for the ranking of banks according to their retail 
depositors’ performance in one response option as well as in the question overall. 
The following example illustrates how the ψ values are calculated. 
Imagine there was an obligation on the retail depositors’ side to check, annually, whether 
their bank keeps their up to date contact details, so as to allow DI compensation 
payments to be made on time. Then it would be possible to ask the depositors of different 
banks, “Have you checked with your bank this year that they hold up to date contact 
details for you?” Customers would then have to answer “Yes” or “No”. In the example 
below the data relates to the retail depositors of three banks, Banks X, Y and Z. 
Since such an enquiry is an obligation on the retail depositors’ side, it is expected that 
every depositor would have fulfilled this obligation by actually checking and, if necessary, 
updating, their contact details at their bank and, thus, all respondents would choose 
“Yes” as their answer (the positive response option in this instance). If any of the three 
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banks had an observed count higher than the expected count for this response option, it 
would have meant their retail depositors were performing better than expected. However, 
if the number of actual answers was lower than the expected count, it would have meant 
the performance of retail depositors from these banks was worse than expected. In this 
manner, for the negative response option (“No” in this example), the opposite would 
apply. 
Table 4.4 below illustrates this example with imaginary numbers. 
Table 4.4 
Sample calculations of ψp and ψn values 
Bank Count Yes No Total ψp ψn 
Bank X 
Observed count 155 45 200 
7.3 19 
Expected count 144.4 55.6 200 
Bank Y 
Observed count 60 90 150 
–44.6 –116 
Expected count 108.3 41.7 150 
Bank Z 
Observed count 85 15 100 
17.7 46 
Expected count 72.2 27.8 100 
 Total 325 125 450   
To rank the three banks in this example according to the performance of their retail 
depositors in each answer option, firstly it is necessary to calculate the ψp, i.e. ψ for the 
positive response option (“Yes” in this example) by applying the formula presented in 
Equation 4.1: 
For Bank X, ψp = (155 × 100 / 144.4) – 100 = 7.3 
For Bank Y, ψp = (60 × 100 / 108.3) – 100 = –44.6 
For Bank Z, ψp = (85 × 100 / 72.2) – 100 = 17.7 
As the expected count used to calculate the ψp already reflects the total number of 
respondents surveyed in each bank, the ψp values are not absolute values, but rather 
fractions which, in turn, allows for the ranking of the three banks in this example 
according to the performance of their retail depositors. So the ranking of the three banks 
for the response option “Yes” is as follows: 1st – Bank Z, 2nd – Bank X, 3rd – Bank Y. 
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The same procedure should be followed in order to rank the bank in accordance with the 
performance of their retail depositors in the negative response option. In this instance the 
formula presented in Equation 4.3 will be used as follows: 
For Bank X, ψn = 100 – (45 × 100 / 55.6) = 19 
For Bank Y, ψn = 100 – (90 × 100 / 41.7) = –116 
For Bank Z, ψn = 100 – (15 × 100 / 27.8) = 46 
Considering the ψn values above, the ranking of the three banks according to the 
performance of their retail depositors in the negative response option is as follows: 1st – 
Bank Z, 2nd – Bank X, 3rd – Bank Y. 
Taking into account both rankings it is possible to conclude that the retail depositors from 
Bank Z have the best performance across both answer options, while the retail depositors 
from Bank Y have the worst performance. 
4.5.1.4 Diagrams 
In order to demonstrate the results of quantitative data analysis in disaggregate form in 
Chapter 5, two types of diagram are used – boxplots and bar charts. 
Boxplots 
A boxplot, or a box-and-whisker diagram, provides a graphical non-parametric technique 
for comparing distributions between several groups or sets of numerical data. 
The data is presented with the help of the following points: the smallest observation (also 
known as ‘sample minimum’), lower quartile, median, upper quartile and largest 
observation (also known as ‘sample maximum’). 
Lower quartile and upper quartile form an interquartile range, which amounts to the 
middle 50% of the observations in a given distribution, with 25% on either side of the 
median inside the box. It is possible to determine the symmetry of the middle 50% of the 
observations by looking at the position of the median line within the interquartile range 
(Ott and Longnecker, 2010). 
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The spacings between the different parts of the boxplot help indicate the degree of 
dispersion and skewness in the data. A boxplot may also indicate which observations, if 
any, are outliers. These can be either the extreme outliers, usually depicted with the ‘*’ 
sign, or mild outliers, usually depicted with the ‘•’ sign (Pallant, 2005). 
Bar Charts 
A bar chart, being one of the most common formats used to display quantitative data, 
provides a graphical representation of categorical data. 
Kosslyn (2006: 46) states that “[b]ar graphs have the standard L-shaped framework and 
use bars as content elements; the heights of the bars specific discrete amounts”. 
The variation of bar chart used in Chapter 5 is a so-called ‘divide-bar graph’ which 
conveys a much more accurate impressions of parts of a whole (Kosslyn, 2006: 44). For 
the purpose of this thesis, the bars represent each bank and the segments within the bars 
represent different response options. 
4.5.2 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
There are many techniques used for qualitative data analysis. These include ethnography, 
grounded theory, thematic analysis, discourse analysis, content analysis, narrative 
methods and document analysis, to name but a few.162 
In qualitative data analysis, researchers are translators of the participants’ words and 
actions. However, “analysis is never quite finished, no matter how long a researcher 
seems to work on a study” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 49). 
Denzin (1998: 322) states that 
[i]nterpretation is a productive process that sets forth the multiple meaning of an event, 
object, experience, or test., interpretation is transformation, it illuminates, through lights on 
experience, it brings out, and refines <...> the meanings that can be sifted from a text, an 
object, or slice of experiences. 
                                               
162 For descriptions of different techniques, see Bryman and Bell(2007), Corbin and Strauss 
(2008), Davies (2007), Denscombe (2007), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Saunders et al. (2007), 
and Silverman (2010). 
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For the purposes of the present investigation, a combination of content and documentary 
analyses was used, which involved the interpretation of qualitative data. 
4.5.2.1 Content Analysis 
Davies (2007: 31) states that content analysis is a study of published or otherwise 
recorded material and “it requires high level of theoretical understanding”. Since each 
question in the interview schedules corresponded to a particular impact indicator in the 
theoretical framework of the present investigation, the analysis of interviews with bank 
staff and representatives of the judiciary was of a modest nature. It was used primarily to 
make sense of the answers given to the open-ended questions, whilst the frequencies (a 
more quantitative approach to content analysis) were noted for each closed-ended 
question across all interviewees. No computer software was used to aid the analysis. 
The actual analysis of interviews using the content analysis technique and the findings 
are presented in Chapter 6. 
4.5.2.2 Document Analysis 
In addition to more traditional qualitative sources, such as interviews and observations, 
the use of documentary sources has been popularised in literature as part of qualitative 
data collection and analysis (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2007; Hodson, 1999). 
Altheide (1996: 2) defines the document analysis as an 
<...> integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique for locating, 
identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents for their relevant, significance, and 
meaning. 
Altheide (1996: 24) further states that “[t]he research problem helps inform the 
appropriate unit of analysis, or which portion or segment of relevant documents will 
actually be investigated”. 
Within the present investigation, the documentary sources consisted of marketing 
materials collected at the six participating banks and other Russian banks, as well as 
copies of contracts of bank accounts. Other documents included letters from the DIA to 
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two retail depositors in relation to past insured events. These documentary sources 
provided an insight into the way details of the DIS are communicated to retail depositors 
by individual banks in informal and formal documents. Useful comparisons were drawn 
across the documents collected, and certain irregularities were identified. 
The actual analysis of documents using document analysis and the findings are presented 
in Chapter 7. 
4.6 Limitations of the Chosen Methodology 
The following limitations of the chosen methodology have been identified.  
Undertaking research into the Russian DIS under a critical realist paradigm at PhD level 
provided a snapshot of the implementation of the Federal Law and the establishment of 
the institutional and regulatory environment, and the perceptions of the multiple 
stakeholder of the success of this public policy at one point in time. Therefore, the present 
investigation is more exploratory in nature. 
From research approach considerations, the present investigation proposed and tested a 
set of success criteria and impact indicators for an evaluation of a DIS. These were 
devised using the Federal Law introduced in 2003 in Russia, and it is currently unclear 
whether any future changes to the stated objectives of the DIS will have an effect on the 
success criteria devised and the impact indicators tested within the present investigation. 
Further limitations in the sample may be identified. The choice of the extreme cases of six 
banks in Saint-Petersburg and their client base of retail depositors has influenced the 
results of the present investigation. From the timing and location consideration of data 
collection, this research was devised as a cross-sectional investigation, with the data 
collected at one point in time, in one country and in one region of the country. The choice 
of location of the data collection might have had an impact on the results, because of the 
prior history of DI in Saint-Petersburg. Furthermore, considering the data was collected 
in spring 2009, following the events caused by the global financial crisis (it hit Russia 
hardest in October 2008), the timing of the data collection might also have impacted on 
the results of this research.  
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A further limitation is recognised in relation to the translation of the questionnaire. Given 
the linguistic differences between the English and Russian languages, it required 
considerable skill to design a Russian version of the questionnaire which mirrored the one 
in English. 
Though the demographic data was collected as part of the retail depositor survey 
questionnaire, it was decided not to test the data against the respondents’ age, deposited 
amount and the location of the branch due to the sheer amount of data, and the 
complexity of the analysis undertaken and presented in Chapter 5. Should these have 
been tested, it might have given an additional insight into the perceptions across a varied 
and diverse sample. 
Finally, the role of qualitative data analysis has been shaped by the research question and 
theoretical framework, and, as a result, this did not allow for a more nuanced 
interpretation of the qualitative data. However, this investigation did not aim to attain 
much more in-depth understanding of bank staff perceptions and insights in relation the 
objectives of the DIS. 
4.7 Ethical Implications of the Chosen Methodology 
It is well established that, regardless of the research design, social research should 
conform to four broad ethical principles (de Vaus, 2001; Homan, 1991; Kimmel, 1988). 
These include voluntary participation, informed consent, no harm to participants, and 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
The present research complies with all of the above-mentioned ethical principles, and was 
approved by De Montfort University Faculty of Business and Law Human Research 
Ethics Committee prior to the commencement of data collection. Data collected and 
processed in this research study was handled in compliance with the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
In terms of voluntary participation, people should not be required, or led to believe that 
they are required, to participate in a study, and they should be informed that they can 
withdraw from the study at any point. 
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The retail depositor survey questionnaire clearly stated that the research was voluntary, 
and each retail depositor had a chance to refuse to participate at the time of being offered 
to complete the questionnaire. Since the present investigation included a one-off survey of 
retail depositors, it was not required that respondents participate in further stages of the 
research and, therefore, the right to withdraw from the study at any point was not 
applicable. Banks were informed that their participation was voluntary, and that they 
were free to withdraw their participation at any time. 
De Vaus (2001) argues that voluntary participation can threaten the external validity, 
since certain types of people are more likely than others to decline to participate in 
studies, thus producing biased samples. In order to overcome possible dropouts, the 
participants were encouraged to participate by appealing to their goodwill. The 
introductory statement on each questionnaire contained a reference to the benefits of the 
present investigation in relation to the improvement of the Russian DIS and the 
improvement in the provision of information on the DIS. In terms of the six participating 
banks, their participation was underpinned by an agreement to provide reports based on 
the outcomes of the present investigation and recommendations for changes in the 
practices of dissemination of information about the DIS. 
In relation to informed consent, participants were informed about the purpose of the 
research and its basic procedures, the identity of the researcher and the fact that this is a 
non-commercial research conducted for the purposes of obtaining a degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at De Montfort University, UK. The banks were provided with the 
description of how and why they were selected, and with details of how the data collected 
through the retail depositor survey and interviews with bank staff were to be analysed 
and used.  
The present research study did not put any of the respondents in danger, so there was no 
any real harm to the participants. 
One of the most important considerations in relation to ethical principles was the 
provision of anonymity and confidentiality. It was essential that the way the data was 
collected could provide for, and guarantee, the confidentiality of respondents. De Vaus 
(2001: 87) claims that guaranteeing confidentiality is important for methodological and 
ethical reasons as “if participants are confident that their responses are truly confidential 
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(or even better if they are anonymous), we can expect that people are more likely to 
participate in the study and provide frank and honest answers”. 
In order to protect the respondents’ identities, data were stored in a lockable cabinet, 
accessed only by the researcher and the first supervisor, and all identifying information 
was removed. The questionnaire did not collect any information about the respondent to 
avoid possible identification, and clearly stated that the questionnaire was anonymous. 
The interviewees were prohibited from stating their names and the names of their banks 
for the record. All such references were removed from the data. The six participating 
banks were given a code dependent on the type of the bank and no information that 
identified banks directly or indirectly was or would be made available in any final written 
materials of the investigation. 
4.8 Summary 
Using a critical realist perspective, the present investigation adopted a cross-sectional, 
mixed method research design. To facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the data, a 
bespoke theoretical framework for the impact evaluation of a DIS was devised, which 
included a set of success criteria and impact indicators. This theoretical framework was 
operationalised through four main methods of data collection, namely retail depositor 
survey questionnaires, semi-structured interviews with bank staff and representatives of 
the judiciary, in-branch observations, and primary and secondary documents related to 
the DIS. 
The data collection took place in Saint-Petersburg at the six banks chosen with the help 
of purposive sampling. In total, 942 respondents took part in the retail deposit survey, 32 
interviews and 17 in-branch observations were conducted, and numerous documents 
were collected from the six participating banks and other Russian banks. 
Several statistical techniques were used to analyse the data from the retail depositor 
survey, including a bespoke formula, which enhanced the output from the Chi-squared 




Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
“Statistics is the only science that enables different experts 
using the same figures to draw different conclusions.” 
–Evan Esar (1899-1995) 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study aims to evaluate the Russian DIS by matching its 
stated objectives with the outcomes observed with the help of several components of the 
present investigation, including a retail depositor survey, interviews with bank staff, 
analysis of further documents, and in-branch observations. 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of quantitative data gathered during the survey in 
six participating banks. Subsequent chapters focus on the qualitative data analysis 
(presented in Chapter 6), and on the document and observational data analysis (presented 
in Chapter 7). Detailed discussion of the findings presented in this and subsequent data 
chapters takes place in Chapter 8. 
The quantitative data is analysed in relation to each stated objective (starting with 
Objective 1, then Objective 2, then Objective 3), and provides an insight into 
respondents’ knowledge about the DIS, the extent of the information provision by the six 
participating banks, the level of respondents’ confidence in the banking system, and their 
saving behaviour. 
The following approach is adopted for each of the impact indicators in relation to each 
objective. Firstly, the data is analysed in aggregate form. Then, to add value to the large 
amount of data collected, it is looked at in disaggregate form against the bank as an 
independent variable. This throws further light on any differences between the responses 
of respondents from different banks. 
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5.1 Description of the Survey Data 
5.1.1 Survey Data 
To investigate the research questions, use was made of a retail depositors’ survey. The 
survey, forming the base of the quantitative data analysis, was conducted between March 
and May 2009, with the aim of finding out how the public views the results of the DIS’s 
work since 2004, and also whether the perceptions of the DIS and its benefits for the 
depositors changed after October 2008, when new parameters of the DIS were 
introduced. 
The target population of the survey consisted of retail depositors in six banks. The data 
were collected through a paper-based questionnaire, copies of which can be found in 
Appendices 7, 8 and 9. 
In total, 942 questionnaires were completed and returned. Four questionnaires were filled 
in by respective bank’s employees (as stated in response to Question 3 ‘Why did you 
choose this bank?’ using response option “Other”). Since it was not possible to determine 
what role these respondents occupied in their respective banks and how much they knew 
about the DIS because of their daily job, these four questionnaires had to be excluded 
from the total count. 
All data from the remaining 938 questionnaires were verified and validated in accordance 
with the procedures set out in Appendix 11. 
Table 5.1 
Survey returns by bank 
Bank Frequency Percent 
A1 149 15.9 
A2 251 26.8 
B1 57 6.1 
C1 142 15.1 
D1 69 7.4 
D2 270 28.8 
Total 938 100.0 
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The contribution of each bank to the total number of questionnaires is presented in Table 
5.1 above. As in all other tables throughout this chapter, ‘Frequency’ means a number of 
times a certain answer was chosen by respondents, ‘Percent’ means a percentage of the 
answers chosen by respondents from the total number of questionnaires (938 
questionnaires in this case), and ‘Valid Percent’ means a percentage of the answers 
chosen by respondents from the number of questionnaires where an answer has been 
recorded (excluding questionnaires where the answer was missing). 
5.1.2 Respondents’ Characteristics and Their Use of Banking 
Products and Services 
The initial part of the questionnaire (the introductory questions regarding gender and age 
of the respondents, as well as Questions 1, 2 and 3) was used to gather descriptive data 
on respondents and their use of banking products and services. 
The analysis indicates that of the 938 respondents, 54.5% were female and 45.5% were 
male. In terms of age, the respondents in age groups ‘26-35 years old’ and ‘36-45 years 
old’ formed almost half of the sample (28% and 21.2% respectively), whilst 18.6% of 
respondents fell within the ‘46-55 years old’ age group, 16.7% within the ‘<= 25 years 
old’ age group, 10.8% within the ‘56-65 years old’ age group and only 4.8% of 
respondents were 66 years old or over (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 
Survey respondents by age 
Age of respondents Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
<= 25 150 16.0 16.7 
26-35 252 26.9 28.0 
36-45 191 20.4 21.2 
46-55 167 17.8 18.6 
56-65 97 10.3 10.8 
>= 66 43 4.6 4.8 
Total 900 95.9 100.0 
Missing 38 4.1  
Total 938 100.0  
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With regard to the respondents’ use of banking products and services in their respective 
banks (Questions 1), 36.3% of respondents had a savings account, 30.1% had a current 
account, 27.4% had a card through the ‘salary project’ and 13.7% had some other card 
(credit or debit). 
16.8% of respondents did not have a current account, a savings account or any card with 
their respective bank. These respondents were surveyed when using other banking 
services, which could include, for example, initial consultation before opening an account, 
paying utilities bills or making a money transfer within Russia or abroad. These 
respondents did not answer any bank-related questions on the questionnaire as they 
might have not been familiar with the level of information provision from the respective 
bank in regard to the DIS. 
In Russia, when opening a current account, a depositor does not automatically receive a 
debit card, but having a card through the ‘salary project’ necessitates having a current 
account to and from which the salary payment and other transactions (for example, loan 
repayments) can be made. It is interesting to note that only 6.5% of respondents who 
claimed to have a card through the ‘salary project’ (27.4% of respondents), also 
acknowledged the existence of a current account with their respective bank. 
With regard to the amount of money kept in the bank (Question 2), 94.8% of respondents 
had less than, or equal to, RUB 700,000 in their accounts.163 This means that the values 
of current and savings accounts of almost all of respondents are below the current deposit 
insurance compensation amount. 
The retail depositors were also asked about their reasons for choosing the bank they 
patronise (Question 3), and were able to choose more than one answer. More than a third 
of respondents chose their bank because of the high level of customer service (35%), and 
indicated the importance of the bank’s reputation (32.8%), whilst 29.2% of retail 
depositors chose their bank through recommendation of a member of their family, a friend 
or other person. 
                                               
163 211 respondents did not provide an answer to Question 2. The answers to Question Q2 ‘What 
is the amount of your money deposited in this bank?’ on the Bank D2’s questionnaire have been 
worded differently and provided only two possible answers: ‘<= RUB 700,000’ and ‘>= RUB 
700,001’. 
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The participation of banks in the DIS in Russia is compulsory, yet 28% of respondents 
cited the bank’s membership in the DIS as a reason for choosing a particular bank. A 
similar number of respondents indicated that their bank was chosen by their employer (as 
part of the ‘salary project’), and a further 26.6% of retail depositors chose their bank 
because of the higher interest rate compared to other banks (see Table 5.3 for full 
details). 
Table 5.3 
Respondents’ reasons for choosing the bank they patronise 
Question 3 ‘Why did you choose this bank to 
service your current/savings account?’ 
Responses 
Percent of Cases 
N Percent 
High level of customer service 265 18.0% 35.0% 
Bank’s reputation 249 17.0% 32.8% 
Better savings accounts’ interest rates 202 13.8% 26.6% 
Better savings accounts’ term of contract 68 4.6% 9.0% 
Recommendation by a member of the family, a 
friend, other person 
221 15.0% 29.2% 
Participation of this bank in the DIS 212 14.4% 28.0% 
Participation of my employer in the ‘salary 
project’ 
209 14.2% 27.6% 
Other 43 2.9% 5.7% 
Total 1469 100.0% 193.8% 
 
5.2 Findings from Retail Depositors’ Survey in Relation to 
Objective 1 “To Protect the Rights and Legal Interests of 
Household Depositors” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are 12 main impact indicators relating to 
Objective 1. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data from the survey are 
impact indicators 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.4 and 1.3.6. The remaining indicators are examined in 
Chapters 6 and 7 and in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of this chapter. 
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5.2.1 Depositors Know about the Parameters of, and the Process of 
Compensation Under, the DIS (Impact Indicator 1.2.1) 
5.2.1.1 Aggregate 
When asked to evaluate their own knowledge about the DIS on the scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is the lowest mark and 5 is the highest mark164 (Question 7), only 12.9% of 
respondents stated that they know all or almost all about the DIS in Russia. A third of all 
respondents (30.1%) appraised their knowledge as ‘good’ (4 on the scale), and just over a 
third of respondents (32.2%) would have given themselves a ‘satisfactory’ mark (3 on 
the scale) for their knowledge. 
With regards to one of the parameters of the DIS – the deposit insurance compensation 
amount (Question Q8) – 69.4% of respondents answered correctly (700,000 RUB), with 
the second most popular answer, 21.1%, being ‘Do not know’ (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 
Respondents’ awareness of maximum deposit insurance compensation amount 
Question 8 ‘What is the maximum deposit 
insurance compensation amount?’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
RUB 100,000  23 2.5 2.5 
RUB 400,000  47 5.0 5.1 
RUB 700,000  637 67.9 69.4 
RUB 1,000,000  8 0.9 0.9 
There is no maximum DIS compensation 
amount 
9 1.0 1.0 
Do not know 194 20.7 21.1 
Total 918 97.9 100.0 
Missing 20 2.1  
Total 938 100.0  
 
When asked who is responsible for the organisation of deposit insurance compensation 
(Question 9), 5.7% of respondents treated this question as a multiple-choice question and 
                                               
164 Considering general education is compulsory in Russia, this scale was adopted from Russian 
education system for the ease of understanding by the respondents.  
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gave more than one answer.165 Whilst the correct and the most popular answer was the 
‘Deposit Insurance Agency’, with the 50.1% of respondents choosing this option only, an 
additional 4.6% of respondents chose the ‘Deposit Insurance Agency’ answer as one of 
two or more options. 
The second most popular answer, accounting for 18% of respondents, is ‘Do not know’, 
whilst ‘Central Bank’, ‘Government’ and ‘Bank servicing the savings/current account’ 
were chosen by 12.9%, 11.9% and 10.6% respectively (separately or in combinations 
with other answers). 
5.2.1.2 Disaggregate 
To determine whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the level of 
perceived knowledge about the DIS among retail depositors, and given that the data in 
Question 7 ‘How do you evaluate your knowledge about the deposit insurance scheme?’ is 
ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used.166 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is a statistical difference 
between the banks in respect of the level of perceived knowledge about the DIS among 
the retail depositors. 
Based on the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 7, it was also 
possible to rank the banks in the order of a number of respondents giving the marks to 
themselves (from the highest mark to the lowest): 1st – Bank B1, 2nd – Bank A1, 3rd – 
Bank D1, 4th – Bank A2, 5th – Bank D2, 6th – Bank C1. 
The boxplot chart in Figure 5.13 illustrates the significance of the differences between 
the performance of retail depositors from different banks in this question. 
From Figure 5.13, it appears that four of the six banks, Banks A2, C1, D1 and D2, have 
the same complete range of values, the same inter-quarter range and the same median, 
                                               
165 Since some of the respondents treated this question as a multiple-choice question, it has been 
decided to analyse it as one in order to preserve the data in the same way as it has been expressed 
by the respondents. 
166 For a detailed analysis of data in disaggregate form in this and other sub-sections of this 
chapter, see Appendix 12. 
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with the latter falling onto the ‘satisfactory’ mark (3 on the scale). This may mean that 
the performance of retail depositors from these banks is very similar, even though the 
Kruskal-Wallis test picked up the significance. 
Figure 5.13 
Distribution of responses to a question about depositors’ perceived knowledge about the 
DIS, by bank 
 
On the contrary the difference between Banks B1 and A1, which were ranked first and 
second accordingly, is visible, not only between these two banks, but also in relation to 
the other four banks’ distributions. Whilst both banks have the same complete range of 
values, ranging from 2 to 5, and the same inter-quarter range, ranging between 3 and 4, 
their medians differ as well as the number of outliers. The median of Bank A1 falls onto 
3 and the median of Bank B1 falls onto 4, which may explain a higher ranking by the 
Kruskal-Wallis test.  
 
The next question which was tested against the bank as an independent variable was 
Question 8 ‘What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount?’ To 
 164 
determine whether there is a statistical difference between the banks with regard to 
whether the retail depositors know the correct deposit insurance compensation amount or 
not, the Chi-squared test were carried out in relation to the correct response option ‘RUB 
700,000’. 
The results of the Chi-squared test showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a 
bank and the retail depositors’ knowledge of the correct amount of the deposit insurance 
compensation. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
ψ values were calculated for each bank (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question (from the 
highest number of correct answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank B1, 2nd – Bank A1, 3rd – 
Bank D1, 4th – Bank C1, 5th – Bank D2, 6th – Bank A2. 
Considering Question 9 ‘Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit 
insurance compensation?’ contains nominal data, a separate Chi-squared test was carried 
out in relation to the correct response option ‘Deposit Insurance Agency’ to determine 
whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences retail depositors’ knowledge on 
this matter. 
The results of the Chi-squared test showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a 
bank and the retail depositors’ knowledge of who is responsible for the organisation of the 
deposit insurance compensation. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
ψ values were calculated for each bank (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 9 ‘Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit 
insurance compensation?’ has five response options, including the response option 
‘Deposit Insurance Agency’, which is the only correct answer and was tested against the 
bank as an independent variable in this instance.167 
                                               
167 As noted in Section 5.2.1.1 above, some respondents treated this question as a multiple-
response question and 4.6% chose response option ‘Deposit Insurance Agency’ together with 
other response options. This percentage is not considered significant for the purposes of the Chi-
squared test. 
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Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question (from the 
highest number of correct answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank D1, 2nd – Bank B1, 3rd – 
Bank A1, 4th – Bank D2, 5th – Bank C1, 6th – Bank A2. 
5.2.2 Depositors Consult the Printed/Online Materials about the 
DIS (Impact Indicator 1.2.2) 
5.2.2.1 Aggregate 
Regarding retail depositors’ claimed knowledge of where to find further information 
about the DIS (Question 14b), the majority of respondents (77%) somewhat or 
completely agreed that they knew where to find it, whilst 23% somewhat or completely 
disagreed (see Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 
Respondents knowledge of sources of further information about the DIS 
Question 14b ‘I know where to find 
additional/further information about the DIS’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Completely agree 309 32.9 35.4 
Somewhat agree 363 38.7 41.6 
Somewhat disagree 153 16.3 17.5 
Completely disagree 48 5.1 5.5 
Total 873 93.1 100.0 
Missing 65 6.9  
Total 938 100.0  
 
5.2.2.2 Disaggregate 
To understand whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the perception of 
retail depositors with respect to their understanding of where to find additional 
information about the DIS (outside of the bank branch), and considering the data in 
Question 14b ‘I know where to find further information about the deposit insurance 
scheme’ is ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘I know where to find further information about the deposit insurance scheme’. 
Based on the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 14b, it is 
possible to rank the banks according to the number of respondents providing positive 
answers (from the highest to the lowest): 1st – B1; 2nd – D1; 3rd – D2; 4th – A1; 5th 
– A2; 6th – C1.The boxplot chart in Figure 5.14 illustrates the significance of the 
differences between the performance of banks’ retail depositors in this question. 
It can be seen from Figure 5.14 that, whilst all six banks have their median falling onto 
the ‘Somewhat agree’ response option, Bank C1 is the only bank which has the complete 
range of values ranging from ‘Completely agree’ to ‘Completely disagree’ response 
options. All the remaining banks have the same inter-quarter range, falling between the 
‘Complete agree’ and ‘Somewhat agree’ response options as well as the complete ranges 
of values. Banks B1 and D1 stand out as they have only one outlier each. 
Figure 5.14 
Distribution of responses to a question about depositors’ perceived knowledge of where to 
find additional information about the DIS, by bank 
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5.2.3 Depositors Have Been Made Aware of the Protection of Their 
Rights and Legal Interests (Impact Indicator 1.2.4) 
5.2.3.1 Aggregate 
When asked whether their legal rights as depositors are more protected since the 
introduction of the DIS in 2004 (Question 11), 59.2% of respondents said ‘Yes’, 32.4% 
of respondents said ‘Do not know’ and 8.4% said ‘No’ (see Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6 
Respondents’ perception of protection under the DIS following its introduction of the DIS 
in 2004 
Question 11 ‘Do you feel your rights as depositor are 
more protected since the introduction of the DIS in 
2004?’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Yes 551 58.7 59.2 
No 78 8.3 8.4 
Do not know 302 32.2 32.4 
Total 931 99.3 100.0 
Missing 7 0.7  
Total 938 100.0  
5.2.3.2 Disaggregate 
To demonstrate the extent to which the banks influenced the perception of retail 
depositors about the protection of their rights and legal interests under the DIS, and 
considering the data in Question 11 ‘Do you feel your rights as depositor are more 
protected following the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ is 
nominal, the Chi-squared test was used. 
The results of the Chi-squared test showed that that there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and the way retail depositors feel about the protection of their rights and 
legal interests. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options in this question 
(as described in Chapter 4). 
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Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question (from the 
highest number of correct answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank D1, 3rd – 
Bank D2, 4th – Bank B1, 5th – Bank A2, 6th – Bank C1. 
The bar chart in Figure 5.15 illustrates the significance of the differences between the 
performance of retail depositors from different banks in this question. 
Figure 5.15 
Levels of perception of retail depositors about the protection of their rights and legal 
interests under the DIS by bank, in percentage 
 
Figure 5.15 shows that Bank A1, which was ranked first, has the highest proportion of 
retail depositors who perceive their rights and legal interests are more protected since the 
introduction of the DIS, whilst Bank C1, which was ranked sixth, has the smallest 
proportion of the same and the highest proportion of depositors who believe that their 
rights and legal interests are not protected to a greater extent than before 2004. 
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5.2.4 Banks Inform Depositors about the DIS (Impact Indicator 
1.3.6) 
5.2.4.1 Aggregate 
When asked whether their bank is a member of the DIS (Question 4), 80.7% of 
respondents stated that their bank was a member of the DIS, 16.4% of respondents did 
not know, whilst 2.9% of respondents thought their bank was not a member of the DIS 
at all (see Table 5.7).168 
Table 5.7 
Respondents’ awareness of their bank’s membership in the DIS 
Question 4 ‘Is this bank a member of the DIS?’ Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Yes 613 65.4 80.7 
No 22 2.3 2.9 
Do not know 125 13.3 16.4 
Total 760 81.0 100.0 
Missing 178 19.0  
Total 938 100.0  
 
In order to understand how the respondents were informed about the DIS, they were 
asked to indicate at what stages they received information about the DIS from their 
respective bank (Question 6). In this instance, the respondents were allowed to choose 
more than one answer, as they might have received such information on different 
occasions. Over half of all respondents (55.7%) indicated that they were informed by a 
clerk at the time of opening a savings/current bank account, with just under half of all 
respondents (45.8%) stating that they read about the DIS on the information stand at the 
bank’s branch prior to opening the savings/current account. It appears that only 14.6% 
of all respondents noticed the information about the DIS in the text of the 
savings/current account contract, whilst 11.1% of all respondents did not receive such 
information at all (see Table 5.8). 
                                               
168 The missing number of 178 includes 155 respondents who did not have any banking product or 
service at the respective bank. 
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Table 5.8 
How the respondents were informed about the DIS at the bank they patronise 
Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank 
about the DIS when opening the savings/current 
account?’ 
Responses 
Percent of Cases 
N Percent 
Yes, I read about it on the information stand at 
the bank’s branch before opening the 
savings/current account 
333 36.0% 45.8% 
Yes, I received information from the bank clerk at 
the time of opening the savings/current account 
405 43.8% 55.7% 
Yes, I saw information in the text of the contract 
at the time of opening the savings/current account 
106 11.5% 14.6% 
No, I have not received such information from this 
bank 
81 8.8% 11.1% 
Total 925 100.0% 127.2% 
 
Regarding receiving sufficient information about the DIS from their respective bank 
(Question 14a), a majority of respondents (82.9%) somewhat or completely agreed that 
their bank provided adequate information on the DIS, whilst 17.1% somewhat or 
completely disagreed (see Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9 
Respondents’ attitudes to information provision 
Question 14a ‘I receive enough 
information about the DIS from this bank’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Completely agree 336 35.8 39.0 
Somewhat agree 379 40.4 44.0 
Somewhat disagree 116 12.4 13.5 
Completely disagree 31 3.3 3.6 
Total 862 91.9 100.0 
Missing 76 8.1  
Total 938 100.0  
 
As the changes in the parameters of the DIS, which were introduced in October 2008, 
were still current at the time of the survey, retail depositors were asked about the sources 
of information about the changes (Question 16 ‘How did you hear about the changes?’), 
and were able to choose more than one answer. 
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Just under half of all respondents (44.4%) stated that they found out about the changes 
in the parameters of the DIS via TV, whilst 40.7% reported having been informed by the 
bank they patronise. Other popular answers were ‘Printed press’, chosen by 29.2% of 
respondents and ‘Internet’, chosen by 26% of respondents (see Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 
How did the respondents hear about the changes in the DIS which took place in October 
2008 
Question 16 ‘How did you hear about the 
changes?’ 
Responses 
Percent of Cases 
N Percent 
TV 351 27.1% 44.4% 
Printed press (newspapers, magazines) 231 17.8% 29.2% 
Radio 76 5.9% 9.6% 
Internet 206 15.9% 26.0% 
From a family member, a friend, other person 100 7.7% 12.6% 
In the bank’s branch 322 24.8% 40.7% 
Other 11 0.8% 1.4% 
Total 1297 100.0% 164.0% 
 
5.2.4.2 Disaggregate 
To ascertain whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the retail 
depositors’ knowledge about whether the bank they patronised is a member of the DIS or 
not, and considering the data in Question 4 ‘Is this bank a member of the deposit 
insurance scheme?’ is nominal, the Chi-squared test was used. 
The results of the Chi-squared test showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a 
bank and retail depositors’ knowledge of whether their bank is a member of the DIS. 
To rank the banks according to their performance in this question, ψ values were 
calculated for each bank for each of the response options in this question (as described in 
Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question (from the 
highest number of correct answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank B1, 2nd – Bank A2, 3rd – 
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Bank D1, 4th – Bank A2, 5th – Bank C1, 6th – Bank D2. 
The bar chart in Figure 5.16 illustrates the significance of the differences between the 
performance of banks’ retail depositors in this question. 
Figure 5.16 shows that, whilst Banks A1, B1 and D1 have no respondents stating that 
their bank is not a member of the DIS, Bank B1, which was ranked first, has the highest 
proportion of retail depositors who know that their bank is definitely a member of the 
scheme. Banks A1 and D1 have the second and third highest proportion of the same, 
which confirms their ranking. 
Compared to all banks, Bank D2, which was ranked sixth, has the highest proportion of 
retail depositors who think their bank is not a member of the DIS. 
Figure 5.16 
Levels of knowledge among the retail depositors of whether their bank is a member of the 
DIS, by bank, in percentage 
 
Considering Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ is a multiple-response question and 
contains nominal data, separate Chi-squared tests were carried out in relation to four 
response options: ‘Yes, I read about it on the information stand in the bank’s branch 
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before opening the savings/current account’, ‘Yes, I received information from the bank 
clerk at the time of opening the savings/current account’ and ‘Yes, I saw information in 
the text of contract at the time of opening the savings/current account’ to determine 
whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences retail depositors’ answers to this 
question.  
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the first response option ‘Yes, I read 
about it on the information stand in the bank’s branch before opening the savings/current 
account’, showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a bank and the fact that 
retail depositors read the DIS on the information stand in the bank’s branch before 
opening the savings/current account. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the first 
response option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options 
in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of correct answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank D1, 
3rd – Bank B1, 4th – Bank D2, 5th – Bank C1, 6th – Bank A2. 
 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the second response option ‘Yes, I 
received information from the bank clerk at the time of opening the savings/current 
account’, showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a bank and the fact that the 
retail depositors received information about the DIS from the bank clerks at the time of 
opening the savings/current account. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the second 
response option, it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the 
response options in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of correct answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank D2, 
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3rd – Bank B1, 4th – Bank D1, 5th – Bank C1, 6th – Bank A2. 
 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the third response option ‘Yes, I saw 
information in the text of contract at the time of opening the savings/current account’, 
showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a bank and the fact that the retail 
depositors saw the information about the DIS in the text of contract at the time of 
opening the savings/current account. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the third 
response option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options 
in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank B1, 2nd – Bank D1, 3rd – 
Bank A1, 4th – Bank D2, 5th – Bank C1, 6th – Bank A2. 
 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the fourth response option ‘No, I have 
not received such information from this bank’, showed that there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and the fact whether the retail depositors did not receive the information 
about the DIS from the bank they patronise. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the fourth 
response option, it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the 
response options in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank B1, 3rd – 
Bank C1, 4th – Bank D1, 5th – Bank A2, 6th – Bank D2. 
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In order to ascertain whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the 
perception of retail depositors with respect to receiving sufficient information about the 
DIS from the bank they patronise, and considering the data in Question 14a ‘I receive 
sufficient information about the deposit insurance scheme from this bank’ is ordinal, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is no statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘I receive sufficient information about the deposit insurance scheme from this 
bank’. 
In relation to Question 16 ‘How did you hear about the changes?’ which was aimed at 
gathering data as to the sources of information about the changes in the parameters of 
the DIS, which took place in October 2008, the response option ‘In the bank’s branch’ 
presents the most interest, considering that banks are obliged to provide information 
about the DIS to retail depositors. 
In order to establish whether there is a statistical difference between banks with respect 
to retail depositors’ answers in this instance, and considering the data in this question is 
nominal, the Chi-squared was used. 
The results of the Chi-squared test showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a 
bank and whether the retail depositors were informed by the bank they patronise about 
the changes in the parameters of the DIS, which were introduced in October 2008. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options in this question 
(as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank C1, 3rd – 
Bank D2, 4th – Bank A2, 5th – Bank B1, 6th – Bank D1. 
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5.3 Findings from Retail Depositors’ Survey in Relation to 
Objective 2“To Strengthen Public Confidence in the Banking 
System” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are four main impact indicators relating to 
Objective 2. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data from the survey are 
impact indicators 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. The remaining indicators are examined in 
Chapters 6 and 7 and in Section 5.2 and 5.4 of this chapter. 
5.3.1 Depositors Believe Their Money Is Safe With the Bank Where 
Their Account Is Held (Impact Indicator 2.1.1) 
5.3.1.1 Aggregate 
When asked how confident respondents were concerning the safety of their money in 
their respective bank (Question 5),169 95.4% of respondents were somewhat or 
completely confident (52.3% and 43.1% respectively), whilst the remaining 4.6% of 
respondents felt somewhat or completely unconfident (3.6% and 1.1% respectively). 
Table 5.11 
Respondents’ confidence in the safety of the money deposited in the bank 
Question 5 ‘How confident are you in the 
safety of your money in this bank?’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Completely confident 242 25.8 43.1 
Somewhat confident 294 31.3 52.3 
Somewhat unconfident 20 2.1 3.6 
Completely unconfident 6 0.6 1.1 
Total 562 59.9 100.0 
Missing 376 40.1  
Total 938 100.0  
                                               
169 The data are not covering Bank A2 as this question was not featured in their questionnaire, for 
more details see Chapter 4. 
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5.3.1.2 Disaggregate 
To identify whether the level of perceived confidence of retail depositors in the safety of 
their money was influenced by the bank they deposit their money with, and considering 
the data in Question 5 ‘How confident are you in the safety of your money in this bank?’ 
is ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is no statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ confidence in the safety of 
their money in the bank. 
5.3.2 Depositors Are Confident in the Banking System (Impact 
Indicator 2.1.2) 
5.3.2.1 Aggregate 
In relation to the question of a possible change in the level of confidence in the banking 
system (Question 12), 56.5% of respondents reported increased confidence in the banking 
system since the introduction of the DIS in 2004. The confidence level of 42.3% of 
respondents remained unchanged, whilst for 1.2% it actually decreased. 
Table 5.12 
Respondents’ level of confidence in the banking system following the introduction of the 
DIS in 2004 
Question 12 ‘How did your confidence in 
banking system change since the introduction 
of the DIS in 2004?’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Level of confidence increased 522 55.7 56.5 
Level of confidence decreased 11 1.2 1.2 
Level of confidence remained unchanged 391 41.7 42.3 
Total 924 98.5 100.0 
Missing 14 1.5  
Total 938 100.0  
 
Concerning the influence the introduction of the DIS had on the respondents’ confidence 
in the banking system (Question 14d), a majority of respondents (72.3%) somewhat or 
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completely agreed that the DIS had a major impact on the change of their confidence in 
the banking system, whilst 27.7% somewhat or completely disagreed. 
Table 5.13 
Respondents’ view of the link between the introduction of the DIS and a change in the 
level of confidence in the banking system 
Question 14d ‘Introduction of the DIS to a 
large extent influenced the change of my 
confidence in banking system’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Completely agree 209 22.3 24.1 
Somewhat agree 417 44.5 48.2 
Somewhat disagree 175 18.7 20.2 
Completely disagree 65 6.9 7.5 
Total 866 92.3 100.0 
Missing 72 7.7  
Total 938 100.0  
 
As indicated in Chapter 3, a change occurred in the DIS in late 2008 as a response to the 
financial crisis. When asked whether their level of confidence in the banking system had 
changed after October 2008 (Question 18), when the new parameters of the DIS were 
implemented, 50.4% of respondents stated that their level of confidence had remained 
unchanged, when compared to the confidence level of September 2008 (a month before 
the changes in the parameters of the DIS). The confidence level of 46% of respondents 
increased, whilst 3.6% reported an actual decrease compared to the level of confidence in 
September. 
Table 5.14 
Respondents’ level of confidence in the banking system following the change in the 
parameters of the DIS in October 2008 
Question 18 ‘Did your confidence in banking 
system change since October 2008?’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Level of confidence has increased 420 44.8 46.0 
Level of confidence has remained unchanged 460 49.0 50.4 
Level of confidence has decreased 33 3.5 3.6 
Total 913 97.3 100.0 
Missing 25 2.7  
Total 938 100.0  
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5.3.2.2 Disaggregate 
To determine whether there is a statistical difference between the banks with regard to 
their retail depositors’ level of confidence in the banking system following the 
introduction of the DIS in 2004 (Question 12), and considering the data in this question 
is ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the change in the level of confidence following the 
introduction of the DIS in 2004. 
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test, it 
was possible to rank the banks in the order of the change in level of confidence in banking 
system (from ‘increased’ to ‘decreased’):1st – Bank A1;2nd – Bank B1;3rd – Bank 
D1;4th – Bank D2;5th – Bank A2;6th – Bank C1. 
Figure 5.17 
Distribution of responses with regard to perceived changes in the level of confidence in 
the banking system among the depositors, by bank. 
 
The boxplot chart in Figure 5.17 illustrates the significance of the differences between 
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the performance of banks’ retail depositors in this question. 
It can be seen from Figure 5.17 that Banks A2, B1, D1 and D2 appear to have very 
similar distributions. In contrast, Banks A1 and C1 differ from the other four banks. 
Bank A1’s complete range of values falls between ‘Level of confidence increased’ and 
‘Level of confidence remained unchanged’ with the median falling on the ‘Level of 
confidence increased’ response option. As for Bank C1, not only the complete range of 
values ranges from ‘Level of confidence increased’ to ’Level of confidence decreased’, but 
the median falls on the ‘Level of confidence remained unchanged’, which means that 
contrary to the other five banks, Bank C1 is the only bank where the average 
respondent’s level of confidence remained unchanged. 
 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the retail 
depositors’ perception of the influence the introduction of the DI had on the change in the 
level of their confidence in the banking system, and considering the data in Question 14d 
‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent influenced a change in 
my confidence in the banking system’ is ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent influenced a 
change in my confidence in the banking system’. 
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to Question 14d, the banks can be ranked in order of the number of respondents 
providing positive answers (from the highest to the lowest):1st – Bank A1;2nd – Bank 
B1;3rd – Bank A2;4th – Bank D1;5th – Bank D2;6th –Bank C1. 
The boxplot chart in Figure 5.18 illustrates the significance of the differences between 
the performance of retail depositors from different banks in this question. 
The Figure 5.18 shows that all banks have the same median, which falls onto the 
‘Somewhat agree’ response option. However, the two banks which were ranked first and 
second appear to have a distribution which is different from the other four banks. The 
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complete range of values of Banks A1 and B1 falls between ‘Completely agree’ and 
‘Somewhat agree’ response options and both of these banks also have the same number of 
outliers, three. These outliers fall onto the ‘Completely disagree’ response options, whilst 
in case of other banks, which response option is included in the complete range of values. 
Banks D2 and C1, ranked fifth and sixth accordingly, appear to have a similar complete 
range of values, ranging from the response option ‘Completely agree’ to the response 
option ‘Completely disagree’ and have the same inter-quarter range falling from the 
response option ‘Somewhat agree’ to the response option ‘Somewhat disagree’. 
Figure 5.18 
Distribution of responses with regard to a perceived influence of the DIS on the changes 
in the levels of confidence in the banking system among the depositors, by bank. 
 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the perception of 
retail depositors with respect to their perceived change in the level of confidence in the 
banking system since the latest changes in the parameters of the DIS took place in 
October 2008, and considering the data in Question 18 ‘Has your level of confidence in 
the banking system changed since October 2008?’ is ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was 
used. 
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The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the change in the level of retail depositors’ confidence 
since October 2008. 
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test, the 
banks were ranked in order of the change of level of confidence in banking system (from 
‘increased’ to ‘decreased’):1st – Bank A1;2nd – Bank B1;3rd – Bank A2;4th – Bank 
D1;5th – Bank C1;6th – Bank D2. 
The boxplot chart in Figure 5.19 illustrates the significance of the differences between 
the performance of banks’ retail depositors in this question. 
Figure 5.19 
Distribution of responses in relation to a perceived change in the level of confidence in the 
banking system since October 2008, by bank. 
 
Figure 5.19 shows that the distribution of all banks appears to be the same (same 
complete range of values from the response option ‘Level of confidence increased’ to the 
response option ‘Level of confidence decreased’ and the same inter-quarter range, 
ranging from the response option ‘Level of confidence increased’ to the response option 
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‘Level of confidence remained unchanged’). However, it is noticeable that the median in 
case of Banks A1 and B1 falls onto the response option ‘Level of confidence increased’ 
whilst, in case of all other banks, it falls onto the response option ‘Level of confidence 
remained unchanged’. 
5.3.3 Depositors Recommend Savings Accounts to Their Family and 
Friends (Impact Indicator 2.1.3) 
5.3.3.1 Aggregate 
When asked about the reasons for choosing the bank they patronise (Question 3) (see 
Section 5.1.2), just under a third of all respondents (29.2%) stated that they have chosen 
their specific bank through recommendation by a member of their family, a friend or other 
person. 
With regards to retail depositors’ willingness to recommend keeping money in savings 
accounts to members of their families and friends (Question 14e), a majority of 
respondents (69.7%) somewhat or completely agreed that they do recommend this, 
whilst 30.3% of respondents somewhat or completely disagreed. 
Table 5.15 
Respondents’ agreement with the statement “I recommend to family and friends to place 
their money in savings accounts” 
Question 14e ‘I recommend to family and 
friends to place their money in savings 
accounts’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Completely agree 214 22.8 24.9 
Somewhat agree 384 40.9 44.8 
Somewhat disagree 176 18.8 20.5 
Completely disagree 84 9.0 9.8 
Total 858 91.5 100.0 
Missing 80 8.5  
Total 938 100.0  
 
As presented in Section 5.2.4, retail depositors were also asked to state the sources of 
information about the changes in the parameters of the DIS (Question 16 ‘How did you 
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hear about the changes?’). 12.6% of respondents reported having heard about the change 
in the parameters of the DIS from a member of their family, a friend or some other 
person. 
5.3.3.2 Disaggregate 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the perception of 
retail depositors with respect to whether they recommend to their families and friends to 
keep money in savings account or not, and considering the data in Question 14e ‘I 
recommend to family and friends to place their money in savings accounts’ is ordinal, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is no statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘I recommend to family and friends to place their money in savings accounts’. 
5.4 Findings from Retail Depositors’ Survey in Relation to 
Objective 3 “To Encourage Household Savings in the Banking 
System of the Russian Federation” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are five main impact indicators relating to 
Objective 3. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data from the survey are 
impact indicators 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. The remaining indicators are examined in Chapters 6 
and 7 and in Section 5.2 and 5.3 of this chapter.  
5.4.1 Public Opens More Saving Accounts and/or Increases the 
Value of Existing Savings Account As the Changes in the 
Parameters of the DIS Are Implemented (Impact Indicator 
3.1.2) 
5.4.1.1 Aggregate 
When asked about the actions the retail depositors took or were planning to take in the 
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future as a consequence of the changes in the parameters of the DIS (Question 17),170 the 
majority of respondents (63.9%) stated that they do not plan to either increase the value 
of their savings account in the bank they patronise or open a new savings account in 
another bank. Just under a third of respondents (28.7%) have already increased or were 
planning to increase, the value of their savings accounts at the time of the survey, whilst 
only 9.6% of respondents have already opened, or were planning to open, a new savings 
account in another bank (see Table 5.16). 
Table 5.16 
How did the respondents react, or were planning to react at the time of survey, to the 
changes in the parameters of the DIS which took place in October 2008 
Q17 ‘How will you react/plan to react to these 
changes?’ 
Responses 
Percent of Cases 
N Percent 
I have increased/plan to increase the value of my 
savings account in this bank 
261 28.1% 28.7% 
I have opened/plan to open a new savings 
account in another bank 
87 9.4% 9.6% 
I do not plan to do either of the above 581 62.5% 63.9% 
Total 929 100.0% 102.2% 
5.4.1.2 Disaggregate 
Considering Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
is a multiple-response question and contains nominal data, separate Chi-squared tests 
were carried out in relation to the response option ‘I have increased/plan to increase the 
value of my savings account in this bank’, the response option ‘I have opened/plan to 
open a new savings account in another bank’ and the response option ‘I do not plan to do 
either of the above’ to determine whether the bank, as an independent variable, 
influenced retail depositors’ willingness to act in the face of changing the parameters of 
the DIS. 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the first response option ‘I have 
increased/plan to increase the value of my savings account in this bank’, showed that 
there is, indeed, a relationship between a bank and a retail depositors’ willingness to 
                                               
170 This was a multiple-response question. 
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increase the value of their savings accounts in the bank they patronise. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the first 
response option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options 
in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank B1, 3rd – 
Bank C1, 4th – Bank D1, 5th – Bank A2, 6th – Bank D2. 
 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the second response option ‘I have 
opened/plan to open a new savings account in another bank’, showed that there is, 
indeed, a relationship between a bank and a retail depositors’ willingness to open a new 
savings account in another bank. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the second 
response option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options 
in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank B1, 2nd – Bank C1, 3rd – 
Bank A1, 4th – Bank D1, 5th – Bank D2, 6th – Bank A2. 
 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the third response option ‘I do not plan 
to do anything from the above’, showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a 
bank and the fact that the retail depositors did not plan either to increase the value of 
their savings accounts, or to open a new savings accounts in another bank. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in the third 
response option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options 
in this question (as described in Chapter 4). 
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Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank B1, 3rd – 
Bank C1, 4th – Bank A2, 5th – Bank D1, 6th – Bank D2. 
5.4.2 Depositors Save More through Bank Deposits (Impact 
Indicator 3.1.3) 
5.4.2.1 Aggregate 
When asked about changes in saving behaviour since the introduction of the DIS in 
2004, 60% of respondents claimed their saving behaviour remained unchanged (see 
Table 5.17). Of the remainder, 24% of the respondents did actually increase the value of 
their savings as a result of the introduction of the DIS, whilst the 9.9% of the 
respondents did not increase the value of their savings accounts, despite the introduction 
of the DIS. The remaining 6% of respondents, in spite of increasing the value of their 
saving accounts, did not see any association between the introduction of the DIS and 
changes in their saving behaviour. 
Table 5.17 
Respondents’ saving behaviour following the introduction of the DIS in 2004 
Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour 
change since the introduction of the DIS in 
2004?’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
I increased the value of savings account in 
connection with the introduction of the DIS 
216 23.0 24.0 
I increased the value of savings account 
irrespective of the introduction of the DIS 
49 5.2 5.5 
I did not increased the value of savings account 
despite the introduction of the DIS 
95 10.1 10.6 
My saving behaviour remained unchanged 539 57.5 60.0 
Total 899 95.8 100.0 
Missing 39 4.2  
Total 938 100.0  
Concerning the influence of the introduction of the DIS on respondents’ saving behaviour 
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(Question 14c), a majority of respondents (61.3%) somewhat or completely agreed that 
the DIS had a major impact on changes in their saving behaviour, whilst 38.7% 
somewhat or completely disagreed. 
Table 5.18 
Respondents’ view of the link between the introduction of the DIS and the change in the 
saving behaviour, if any 
Question 14c ‘Introduction of the DIS to a 
large extent influenced the change in my 
saving behaviour’ 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Completely agree 188 20.0 21.8 
Somewhat agree 340 36.2 39.5 
Somewhat disagree 247 26.3 28.7 
Completely disagree 86 9.2 10.0 
Total 861 91.8 100.0 
Missing 77 8.2  
Total 938 100.0  
5.4.2.2 Disaggregate 
Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour change following the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ has the nominal data, so in order to determine 
whether the retail depositors’ change in saving behaviour was influenced by the bank 
they patronised, the Chi-squared test was used. 
As only two response options were of interest in this instance, two separate Chi-squared 
tests were carried out in relation to the response option ‘I increased the value of savings 
account in connection with the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme’ and the 
response option ‘My saving behaviour remained unchanged’. 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the response option ‘I increased the 
value of savings account in connection with the introduction of the deposit insurance 
scheme’, showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a bank and an increased 
value of savings accounts by retail depositors in connection with the introduction of the 
DIS. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response 
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option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank B1, 3rd – 
Bank C1, 4th – Bank D2, 5th – Bank A2, 6th – Bank D1. 
 
The results of the Chi-squared test in relation to the response option ‘My saving 
behaviour remained unchanged’, showed that there is, indeed, a relationship between a 
bank and the saving behaviour of retail depositors remaining unchanged. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response 
option, ψ values were calculated for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
Based on the results of the additional analysis of ψ values, it was possible to rank the 
banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this response option (from 
the highest number of answers to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1, 2nd – Bank B1, 3rd – 
Bank C1, 4th – Bank A2, 5th – Bank D2, 6th – Bank D1. 
 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influenced the retail 
depositors’ perception of the influence the introduction of the deposit insurance had on the 
change in the saving behaviour, and considering the data in Question 14c ‘The 
introduction of the DIS to a large extent influenced a change in my saving behaviour’ is 
ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent influenced a 
change in my saving behaviour’. 
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test, the 
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banks were ranked in the order of a number of respondents providing positive answers 
(from the highest to the lowest): 1st – Bank A1; 2nd – Bank B1; 3rd – Bank D1; 4th – 
Bank D2; 5th – Bank A2; 6th – Bank C1. 
The boxplot chart in Figure 5.20 illustrates the significance of the differences between 
the performance of banks’ retail depositors in this question. 
Figure 5.20 
Distribution of responses in relation to a perceived influence of the DIS on changes in 
retail depositors’ saving behaviour, by bank. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.20, all banks have their complete range of values, ranging 
from the response option ‘Completely agree’ to the response option ‘Completely disagree’ 
as well as the median falling onto the response option ‘Somewhat agree’. Banks A1 and 
B1 are the only banks which have their inter-quarter range ranging from the response 
option ‘Completely agree’ to the response option ‘Somewhat disagree’. 
5.5 Summary 
The results of the quantitative data analysis carried out in this chapter suggest that, 
based on the results of the aggregate data analysis, on the whole, the DIS has been 
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successful in meeting two of its stated objectives, Objectives 1 and 2. The majority of 
retail depositors appear to be more confident in the banking system, and the DIS put in 
place provides for more protection of retail depositors’ rights and legal interests. As for 
Objective 3, there is not enough evidence to confirm that this objective of the DIS has 
been met. The majority of retail depositors report no change in their saving behaviour 
since 2004, and there appears to be no direct link between the introduction of the DIS 
and the changes in the saving behaviour. 
The same data analysed in disaggregate form, based on the bank as an independent 
variable, reveals a statistically significant difference in survey responses by retail 
depositors. Why this might be the case is discussed in Chapter 8. 
Moreover, retail depositors appear to be confused in terms of their knowledge of the DIS, 
in particular with regard to its compulsory nature and the institution responsible for the 
deposit insurance compensation. Retails depositors at some banks appear to be more 
knowledgeable about the DIS than in other banks. 
The link between the results of the quantitative data analysis in this chapter and the 





Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
“There are no facts, only interpretations.” 
–Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study aims to evaluate the Russian DIS by matching its 
stated objectives with the outcomes observed with the help of several components of the 
present investigation, including a retail depositor survey, interviews with bank staff, 
representatives of the judiciary, analysis of further documents, and in-branch 
observations. 
Further to the quantitative data analysis (presented in Chapter 5) and document and 
observational data analysis (presented in Chapter 7), this chapter focuses on the analysis 
of the qualitative data gathered during the present investigation.  
The interpretation and discussion of the qualitative data takes place in Chapter 8, where 
it is examined in conjunction with the quantitative data and the document and 
observational data. 
6.1 Description of the Interviews Data 
32 interviews were conducted in the period between in March-May 2009. 
Of the total number of interviews conducted at the 6 participating banks, 22 interviews 
were conducted with clerks, 8 interviews with heads of branch and 2 interviews with 
marketing officers. 
The interviews took place in 25 different branches from across Saint-Petersburg, 
including 13 branches located in the city centre, and 12 branches located in the suburbs. 
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The total number of interviews was distributed as follows (per bank): 
1) Bank A1 – 5 interviews, 3 branches (2 in the city centre, 1 in the suburbs) 
2) Bank A2 – 5 interviews, 3 branches (1 in the city centre, 2 in the suburbs) 
3) Bank B1 – 5 interviews, 2 branches (1 in the city centre, 1 in the suburbs)171 and 
the Head Office 
4) Bank C1 – 5 interviews, 2 branches (1 in the city centre, 1 in the suburbs) 
5) Bank D1 – 5 interviews, 2 branches (1 in the city centre, 1 in the suburbs)172 
6) Bank D2 – 7 interviews, 3 branches (2 in the city centre, 1 in the suburbs)173 
All interviewees were identified in the following way: 
 
where  
T – is the type of the bank174; 
Nt – is the number of the bank in the type group; 
P – is the position of the interviewee; and 
Np – is the number of the interviewee in this position in this bank. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.1 below, there were 21 female and 11 male interviewees. 
The length of service of the interviewees varied, with 43.75% of them being employed in 
their positions at their respective banks between 6 and 12 months, and with 25% being 
                                               
171 In Bank B1, there are only two clerks in each branch, one working with retail depositors and 
one working with business depositors. 
172 In Bank D1, the head of the chosen branch in the suburbs refused to allow interviews with 
clerks on an individual basis, and suggested a group interview where the head of branch was 
present, thus creating an atmosphere of fear amongst the clerks. The head of branch answered all 
of the questions herself, so this group interview is not analysed as part of this investigation, but 
the individual interview with the head of branch is analysed. 
173 In Bank D2, all interviews with clerks and heads of branches were handwritten in accordance 
with the bank’s internal policy whereby only interviews with senior management staff are allowed 
to be recorded. Therefore, the transcripts of these interviews are not as full as from other banks. 
174 A – for network banks, B – for regional banks, C – for Moscow banks, and D – for banks with 
100% foreign capital. 
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employed between 12 months and 1 year. Bank C1 had the greatest number of 
interviewees with a length of service of less than 6 months, whilst Bank D2 had the 
greatest number of interviewees with a length of service of over 2 years. 
Table 6.1 
Overview of respondents from 6 participating banks 
Interviewee Gender Bank Branch Position Length of service175 Length of the 
interview 
A1C1 Male A1 Suburbs Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:09:03 
A1C2 Female A1 Suburbs Clerk Between 1 and 2 years 00:08:03 
A1C3 Female A1 Centre Clerk Less than 6 months176 00:09:28 
A1C4 Female A1 Centre Clerk Between 1 and 2 years 00:09:03 
A1B1 Male A1 Centre Head of 
Branch 
Between 1 and 2 years 00:34:10 
A2C1 Female A2 Centre Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:17:49 
A2C2 Female A2 Centre Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:10:31 
A2C3 Male A2 Suburbs Clerk Between 1 and 2 years 00:19:39 
A2C4 Female A2 Suburbs Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:16:55 
A2B1 Male A2 Centre Head of 
Branch 
Between 1 and 2 years 00:35:41 
B1C1 Female B1 Centre Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:11:52 
B1C2 Female B1 Suburbs Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:07:44 
B1B1 Male B1 Centre Deputy 
Head of 
Branch 
Between 6 months and 1 year 00:24:30 
B1B2 Male B1 Suburbs Head of 
Branch 
Between 1 and 2 years 00:23:40 




Between 6 months and 1 year 00:28:02 
C1C1 Female C1 Centre Clerk Less than 6 months177 00:10:00 
C1C2 Female C1 Centre Clerk Less than 6 months178 00:09:40 
C1C3 Female C1 Suburbs Clerk Between 6 months and 1 
year179 
00:10:05 
C1B1 Male C1 Centre Head of 
Branch 
Less than 6 months180 00:25:50 




Between 6 months and 1 year 00:17:32 
D1C1 Female D1 Centre Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:08:52 
D1C2 Female D1 Centre Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year 00:08:36 
D1C3 Female D1 Centre Clerk Between 1 and 2 years 00:10:43 
D1C4 Female D1 Centre Clerk Between 2 and 3 years 00:08:53 
D1B1 Female D1 Suburbs Head of 
Branch 
Not recorded Handwritten 
D2C1 Female D2 Suburbs Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year Handwritten 
                                               
175 In their position in their respective bank at the time of the interview. 
176 Work experience in the bank – almost 2 years, in the position of clerk in that specific branch – 
1 month. 
177 Three months. 
178 Four months. 
179 Six months. 
180 Three months in this branch, total experience in the banking system – 15 years. 
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Interviewee Gender Bank Branch Position Length of service175 Length of the 
interview 
D2C2 Male D2 Suburbs Clerk Between 2 and 3 years Handwritten 
D2C3 Female D2 Centre Clerk Between 4 and 5 years Handwritten 
D2C4 Female D2 Centre Clerk Between 4 and 5 years Handwritten 
D2C5 Male D2 Centre Clerk Between 6 months and 1 year Handwritten 
D2B1 Male D2 Suburbs Head of 
Branch 
Between 1 and 2 years Handwritten 
D2B2 Female D2 Centre Head of 
Branch 
Between 3 and 4 years Handwritten 
 
Additionally there were two interviews conducted with representatives of the judiciary181: 
1) CC1J1 – judge at the Constitutional Court of Russian Federation (interview 
conducted on 18 May 2009); 
2) DC1J1 – judge at one of the district courts in Saint-Petersburg (interview 
conducted on 19 May 2009). 
6.2 Findings from the Interviews in Relation to Objective 1 “To 
Protect Rights and Legal Interests of Banks’ Depositors” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are 12 impact indicators related to Objective 
1. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data from the interviews are impact 
indicators 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.4, 1.3.5 and 1.3.6. The remaining 
indicators are examined in Chapters 5 and 7 and in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of this chapter. 
6.2.1 Depositors Are Aware of the Procedures to Follow in Order To 
Claim Deposits in Excess of the Coverage Provided By the DIS 
(Impact Indicator 1.1.2) 
In order to establish the procedures for claiming the outstanding compensation amount 
(the amount over the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount), there were two 
interviews conducted with representatives of the judiciary in Russia – one with a judge 
from one of the district courts in Saint-Petersburg and one with a judge from the 
Constitutional Court of Russian Federation.  
                                               
181 Interviews with both judges were handwritten and, therefore, the transcripts of these 
interviews are not as full as from other interviewees whose interviews were digitally recorded. 
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The Arbitration Court of Moscow could not provide an interviewee, as the court did not 
have a panel of judges that dealt with retail deposits under the DIS (as stated in their 
letter dated 01 March 2009). 
In her 15 years of services in the District Court, DC1J1 could not recall any case in 
which a retail depositor had filed a claim for compensation over the maximum deposit 
insurance compensation amount. She added that she was not sure how such claims are 
regulated and, since there is no such practice in the District Court, she did not know how 
the court would react to such a claim and that she had not heard about such cases at 
all.182 She tried to explain the absence of such claims with the fact that there are no banks 
which are registered (have their legal registered address) in this district of Saint-
Petersburg. 
DC1J1 stated that the rights of consumers are regulated by the Federal Law “On 
Protection of Consumer Rights” from 07 February 1992 (as amended) and also noted 
that if the claim is for less than RUB 100,000, then it should be submitted to the 
Magistrate Court.183 
CC1J1 stated that legal rights and interests of retail depositors are regulated in different 
branches of legislation – by civil legislation, financial legislation and administrative 
legislation184. He stated that there have been no decisions by the Constitutional Court 
involving retail depositors since 2002,185 and that the only cases which are dealt with by 
the court at that moment involved retail depositors with bank accounts opened before 
1990.186 
Both judges were sceptical about the level of financial and legal literacy amongst the 
Russian population. DC1J1 stated that the financial literacy of Russians is at an absolute 
zero level,187 whilst CC1J1 stated that it was difficult for him to judge the level of legal 
                                               
182 “[Таких] исков не было вообще, и чем они регулируются <...>, практики нет, и как мы 
поступим, я не знаю. <...> даже не слышала о дела по вкладам.” (DC1J1). 
183 “<...> по вкладам до 100 000 тысяч – к мировому <...>.” (DC1J1) 
184 “<...> разные отрасли законодательства: гражданское, финансовое, административное 
<...>.” (CC1J1) 
185 “С 2002 года никаких решений, принятых судом, не было.” (CC1J1) 
186 “<...> у нас дела по вкладам, открытых до 1990 года.” (CC1J1) 
187 “Уровень финансовой грамотности нулевой абсолютно!” (DC1J1) 
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and financial literacy, because people, even women, in general, know more about football 
than about banks.188 
6.2.2 Depositors Know About the Parameters of, And the Process 
of Compensation Under, the DIS (Impact Indicator 1.2.1) 
When asked about the knowledge of depositors about the parameters of and the process 
of compensation under the DIS (Clerks Interview Question 13), clerks gave varied 
answers. 
Approximately a quarter of clerks indicated that, in their opinion, depositors know about 
both the parameters and the process of compensation (6 of the 22 clerks – 27.3%). 
Whilst A1C2 indicated that it was due to the fact that they have sufficiently qualified 
personnel, economists by profession, who can adequately explain, D2C2 thought that 
depositors’ knowledge is a function of their being qualified and educated as well as 
watching TV and reading newspapers.189 
However, others were of a different opinion – 8 of the 22 (36.4%) thought that there is a 
clear difference between depositors’ knowledge of the parameters of the DIS and their 
understanding of the process of compensation.  
As noted by C1C2, all depositors are well aware of the fact that deposits are insured and 
that currently the insured amount is RUB 700,000; however, when it comes down to the 
process of compensation, they are not so knowledgeable.190 
B1C1 suggests that it can be due to the fact that, in general, when people hear about the 
amount for which they will undoubtedly be compensated, nothing further interests 
                                               
188 “Трудно судить о юридической грамотности, о финансовой грамотности <...>. О футболе в 
целом знают больше, чем о банках, даже женщины.” (CC1J1) 
189 “Я думаю да, однозначно. Все клиенты квалифицированные, образованные. Все смотрят 
телевизор, газеты читают.” (D2C2). 
190 “Ну не знаю, насчет порядка работы. Я думаю, что все очень хорошо ознакомлены с тем, что 
вклады страхуются, и страхуется, допустим, сумма 700 000 рублей на данный момент. Вот 
здесь они все ознакомлены. А вот именно порядок получения, то я думаю, что не очень.” 
(С1С2). 
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them.191 D2C3 echoes that depositors are interested in the fact that guarantees exist but 
that they do not inquire into the details of the process by which the scheme operates.192 
The remaining 8 clerks (36.4%) could not say that all depositors either know or do not 
know about the parameters of the DIS and the process of compensation. For example, 
A2C1 pointed out that, since everything is based on trust, then if depositors trust the 
bank and know that nothing will happen, then only 30% are literate in such matters and 
would know where to turn in such a case (in case of an insured event).193 D1C1 noted 
that many depositors are not interested in this and they take no interest in it,194 and, as 
noted by D2C4, in general there are moments which are unfamiliar to depositors.195 
Senior Bank Staff Responses 
When asked about the knowledge of depositors about the parameters of and the process 
of compensation under the DIS (Heads of Branches Interview Question 15; Marketing 
Staff Interview Question 15), the heads of branches and marketing staff gave varied 
answers. 
The response of D2B1 was not recorded. 
A1B1 stated that the depositors are well informed about the parameters of and the 
process of compensation under the DIS. He explained that depositors, in general, ask a 
minimum number of questions, because they come to a bank knowing what the DIS is.196 
A2B1 echoed this by saying that depositors already come prepared and that they either 
have no questions at all, or the number of questions is limited. He also added that those 
who come to deposit their money into a savings account are already prepared; they 
                                               
191 “Потому что, в основном, люди слышат эту сумму, которую им точно возместят, и больше 
они не вдумываются, в принципе. Я просто знаю общий случай, когда люди слышат об этой 
сумме и, в принципе, их больше ничего не интересует.” (B1C1). 
192 “Нет, и больше интересует сам факт наличия гарантий, а в детали о порядке работы 
системы они не вникают.” (D2C3). 
193 “Я думаю, что не очень, потому что это все-таки на доверии основано. Если они, допустим, 
доверяют банку и знают, что ничего не случится, то порядок их действий, я думаю, только 30% 
грамотны в этом смысле – куда им обращаться в этом случае.” (A2C1). 
194 “Просто многим это не интересно, и они не интересуются этим.” (D1C1). 
195 “В среднем, я могу сказать, <...> что есть моменты, о которых не знают.” (D2C4). 
196 “Я думаю, что да. В основном клиенты задают минимальный набор вопросов, потому как они 
до того, как придти в банк, <...> [знают], что это все-таки такое.” (A1B1). 
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already know everything and, as a result, the bank staff do not tell them anything specific 
about the DIS.197 
The heads of branch from Bank B1 gave different answers. B1B2, the head of branch 
located in the suburbs, stated that, in his opinion, the depositors are well informed about 
the DIS (his judgements is based on the answers given by depositors to the survey 
questionnaire).198 He also added that, in order to check the depositors’ knowledge, 
something should happen so that depositors would go and use their knowledge. He went 
further to suggest that, since people have different opinions, it is not possible to know to 
what extent the depositors fill in the survey questionnaire correctly.199 
B1B1 – the deputy head of branch located in the centre – said that the knowledge of 
depositors is based around their self-interest. He explained that depositors are primarily 
interested in the compensation amount and clearly understand that, at the moment, it is 
RUB 700,000. However, not all depositors understand the exact process of compensation 
in case of an insured event, and that is where the gap in the knowledge is. He went 
further to state that such a gap is it do with the Russian mentality, whereby while there 
is no problem, Russians do not see it and do not try to foresee it and find out what they 
would be required to do in case a problem actually occurs.200 
B1M1, the marketing officer from the Bank B1, stated in her response to this question 
that not all depositors are well informed. She said that, in all probability, the 
economically literate depositors who have fairly sizeable savings accounts and who are 
concerned about their finances are fully informed about how the DIS works. She added 
                                               
197 “Да, я думаю, да. Я так думаю, потому что <...> вопросов у людей <...> либо нет, либо 
мало. <...> Клиенты идут уже подготовленные. <...> Но мы особо им ничего и не 
рассказываем. Они приходят и уже все знают. Человек, который приходит отдавать деньги, он 
уже подготовлен.” (A2B1). 
198 “Думаю, да. Ну, мы начали работать с данными анкетами и, судя по отзывам в этих анкетах, 
народ осведомлен <...>” (B1B2). 
199 “Ну, опять-таки, понимаете, проверить осведомленность – это значит должно случиться 
что-то такое, чтобы человек пошел и воспользовался этим. <...> Опять-таки, откуда мы знаем 
насколько грамотно и правильно человек оформляет данную анкету.” (B1B2). 
200 “Вкладчики, прежде всего, преследуют свой личный интерес. <...> Их личные интересы, в 
основном, сосредоточены вокруг размера страхового возмещения, то есть они знают четко, что 
это 700 000, но, к сожалению, не все из них представляют конкретную работу [системы] в 
случае наступления страхового случая. Вот как бы в этом плане достаточный пробел имеется, 
но это чисто русский менталитет – пока проблемы нет, человек ее не видит и не пытается ее 
как-то предвидеть и предугадать, что там нужно будет делать.” (B1B1). 
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that there is also a category of depositors who are less economically literate, and that 
they will know about some basic aspects of the DIS, for example the compensation 
amount, but do not see into it in detail.201 
Whilst C1B1, the head of branch located in the city centre, stated that depositors are 
adequately informed and that the parameters of the DIS are not that difficult for the 
depositors not to know them,202 C1M1, the senior clerk with responsibilities for 
marketing from Bank C1, said that the knowledge depends on the depositor, and that all 
depositors should not be judges to have equal knowledge. He explained that there are 
people who are fairly educated and are interested in this issue; furthermore, there are 
depositors who have opened a savings account and are interested in the essence of the 
DIS, but there are also people who are not interested in this at all. Such people know 
about the security of the bank, deposit their money and do not pay any attention to the 
DIS.203 
D1B1 said that sufficiently large number of depositors know about the DIS because they 
come to the bank with experience of banking services.204 
D2B2 stated that depositors might know the maximum compensation amount, but might 
not know about the process of the compensation and the timings involved.205 She added 
that that the level of knowledge depends on whether depositors actually keep deposits in 
                                               
201 “Я думаю, не все. Скорее всего, люди экономически грамотные и имеющие достаточно 
значительные вклады, которые беспокоятся о своих денежных средствах, они осведомлены о 
работе системы страхования вкладов на 100%. А категория граждан менее, скажем так, 
грамотных в экономическом плане, я думаю, что ни знают о системе страхования вкладов, 
знают о сумме, знают какие-то общие моменты, но именно так детально, думаю, что не 
разбирались в этом.” (B1M1). 
202 “Я думаю, что в достаточной степени осведомлены. <...> На самом деле не такие сложные 
параметры, чтобы клиенты о них не знали.” (C1B1). 
203 “Все зависит непосредственно от тех же вкладчиков. Ну, это все индивидуально, нельзя же 
всех под общую гребенку подвести. Есть люди, которые достаточно образованные и которые 
интересуются этим вопросом. Есть люди, которым, если они разместили свои денежные 
средства, интересна сама суть, а есть люди, которым вообще это не интересно. Вот он знает 
непосредственно надежность банка и размещает свои средства и не обращает внимания вообще 
никакого на систему страхования вкладов.” (C1M1). 
204 “Достаточно большая часть клиентов знают, потому что приходят с опытом банковских 
услуг.” (D1B1). 
205 “Могут знать о 700 000, но могут не знать о порядке и сроках.” (D2B2). 
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the bank whether they take loans. The former – know, whilst the latter – not so much.206 
She also referred to an interesting tendency whereby, before the financial crisis, the 
majority of the depositors of Bank D2 were more interested in the name of the bank than 
the DIS, and now there are more advertisements, including advertisements of deposits.207 
6.2.3 Depositors’ Questions about the DIS Are Less Basic and More 
Specific (Focused) (Impact Indicator 1.2.3) 
The clerks were asked to recall how many of their 10 most recent customers (who came 
to the branch for whatever reason, e.g. to renew the savings account, to get information 
on the interest rates etc.) asked questions about the DIS (Clerks Interview Question 9). 
The numbers are presented in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 
Clerks’ view of retail depositors’ questions on the DIS. 
Clerk Number of 
customers (of 10) 
Comments 
A1C1 3  
A1C2  Answer not recorded 
A1C3 2 There were only 2 customers, which makes it 100% 
A1C4  Could not recall 
A2C1 0  
A2C2 0  
A2C3 1  
A2C4 1-2  
B1C1 5  
B1C2 0  
C1C1 2-3  
C1C2 0  
C1C3 0  
D1C1 5  
D1C2 5  
D1C3 0  
D1C4 5  
D2C1  Could not recall 
D2C2 5  
                                               
206 “Те клиенты, которые действительно держат средства – да, а те, кто берут кредиты – я бы с 
такой уверенностью не говорила.” (D2B2). 
207 “Интересная тенденция: если до кризиса большинство клиентов менее интересовала система 
страхования вкладов, только имя <...>, то теперь рекламы больше, рекламы вкладов.” (D2B2). 
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D2C3 1  
D2C4 1  
D2C5 7 If originally the information was given orally; if it 
was given on paper, then 5-6 
 
There is no consistency in the numbers, which may suggest that there is no general 
tendency. However, Banks B1, D1 and D2 showed the highest number of questions (of 
10 recent customers) overall. 
When asked about the nature of questions customers usually ask about the DIS (Clerks 
Interview Question 14), clerks gave varied answers. A2C3 noted that the order of 
depositors’ questions is as follows: the membership of the bank in the DIS, which is the 
most common question, then the maximum compensation amount and whether their 
amount will be covered, and then how quickly can the compensation take place.208 
The most frequent question (recalled by 13 of the 22 clerks – 59.1%) is about the bank’s 
membership in the DIS, with the wording ranging from “Is it true that deposits/savings 
accounts are protected?” (as noted by A1C1209) to “Is the bank a member of the deposit 
insurance scheme?” (as noted by D1C2, who also added that depositors, in principle, 
know about the compensation amount).210 
Clerks noted that some depositors ask about the bank’s membership in the DIS as the 
first question among many, while others are interested only in the fact of membership. 
A1C4 noted that retired persons (pensioners) very often – several times – ask whether 
savings accounts are protected, however they do not go into details. A1C4 believed that, 
for them, the fact of savings account/deposits being insured, already gives substantial 
guarantees.211 
                                               
208 “Они спрашивают, застрахованы ли вклады – это самый распространенный вопрос, 
максимальная сумма – подпадает ли их сумма под страховую выплату и как скоро можно 
получить деньги назад.” (A2C3). 
209 “Правда ли, что застрахованы вклады?” (A1C1). 
210 “Их интересует, входит ли банк в систему страхования вкладов. О суммах застрахованных 
вкладов, в принципе, они все знают.” (D1C2). 
211 “Пенсионеры очень часто спрашивают, по несколько раз – застраховано или нет. В 
подробности не вдаются. Для них сам момент, что вклад застрахован, уже дает гарантии 
большие.” (A1C4). 
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Only clerks from Banks A1, A2, D1 and D2 recalled questions regarding bank’s 
membership in the DIS, while clerks from Banks B1 and C1 did not indicate this type of 
questions. 
The second most common question is about the maximum compensation amount (recalled 
by 11 of the 22 clerks – 50%). The questions are either generic or more concrete. 
Generic questions include those asking about the actual amount, including the questions 
like “Is in your bank the same as in others?”212 More concrete questions referred to the 
situations in which there was an increase in the compensation amount and depositors 
came to the bank branch to clarify the amount. A1C2 recalls that whilst, in general, 
depositors are interested whether anything has been changed, whether the compensation 
amount has not been decreased or increased,213 after the changes of October 2008, there 
were rumours that the compensation amount may be increased further from RUB 
700,000 to RUB 1,000,000, and depositors came to find out whether the rumours were 
true.214  D2C3 echoes this, saying that when there was a change from RUB 100,000 to 
RUB 400,000, some depositors were not sure what the actual compensation amount was, 
and were visiting the bank branch to find out.215 
The third most common questions is the general question about the process of 
compensation under the DIS (recalled by 5 of the 22 clerks – 22.7%), where depositors 
wanted to be told about the process and how quickly they can get their money back. 
A1C1 noted that depositors ask exclusively about the process of compensation,216 whilst 
A1C4 said that depositors with amounts in their savings account higher than the 
maximum compensation amount are very interested in the process of compensation.217 
The fourth most common question is the specific question about the process of 
compensation – 3 of the 22 clerks (13.6%) recalled depositors asking situation-based 
                                               
212 “<...> кто-то не в курсе о сумме и спрашивают «А у вас также как у всех?»” (D2C5). 
213 “Интересуются, в основном, не отменили ли что-то, не снизили ли сумму страхования, не 
повысили.” (A1C2). 
214 “Не повысилась ли сумма с 700 000 до 1 000 000, потому что слухи такие ходили и люди 
пришли узнать.” (A1C2). 
215 “Когда меняли с 100 000 до 400 000, некоторые не были уверены, сколько сумма и 
приходили в банк узнать.” (D2C3). 
216 “Порядок выплат – исключительно.” (A1C1). 
217 “Очень интересуются порядком выплат клиенты, у которых сумма вклада больше, чем сумма 
страхового возмещения.” (A1C4). 
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questions. For example, D1C4 noted that the most frequent question is about the 
compensation amount if a depositor has two savings accounts in two different banks, each 
for the maximum compensation amount of RUB 700,000, would the compensation be 
calculated cumulatively or separately by each bank.218 A1C4 noted that depositors’ very 
first question is whether the bank is a member of the scheme, and then they ask how 
much compensation they will receive if they have savings accounts in different banks, or 
if they divide the amount between two saving accounts – one for the husband and one for 
the wife.219 
Other questions included requests to show the certificate of membership in the DIS 
(recalled by D2C2, 1 of the 22 clerks), requests to show the licence for banking activity 
(recalled by A1C1, 1 of the 22 clerks), questions about which Federal Law regulates the 
DIS and where can they see the copy of it (recalled by 2 of the 22 clerks, D2C4 and 
C1C1), questions about the contract of the savings account and the right of the bank to 
change the conditions of the contract (recalled by C1C1, 1 of the 22 clerks), questions 
about the history (recalled by A1C1) and stability of the bank (recalled by D1C1), and 
questions about where in the branch  depositors can find information about the DIS 
(recalled by D2C4). 
When asked to describe the depositors who ask questions about the DIS, there were two 
main groups, indicated by most of the clerks (see Table 6.3).As recalled by C1C2 these 
two main groups are depositors with large amounts on their saving accounts and 
pensioners (retired persons), who are very worried about their savings.220 
 
 
                                               
218 “Ну, вот у меня самый частый вопрос, который они задают: если <...> в этом банке у них 
будет сумма 700 000 и в другом банке будет сумма 700 000, то <...> они получат только 700 
000 – это будет совокупно складываться – или они от каждого банка получат по 700 000?” 
(D1C4) 
219 “Самый первый вопрос – входим ли мы в систему, потом спрашивают, если в разных банках 
открыты вклады и если наступит страховой случай – какие будут возмещения, или если у него 
и у жены вклады открыты.” (A1C4) 
220 “Наверно, скорее всего, задают вопросы люди, у которых крупная сумма, и пенсионеры, 
которые, видимо, очень беспокоятся о своих сбережениях.” (C1C2) 
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Table 6.3 
Main groups of retail depositors who ask questions about the DIS 
Clerk Depositors who ask questions Comments 
A1C1 Elderly people221  
A1C2 Retired people222 
Business men 
 
A1C3 Retired people  
A1C4 Retired people 
Depositors with large amounts 
 
A2C1  Answer not recorded 
A2C2 Elderly people  




A2C4  Answer not recorded 
B1C1 Retired people  
B1C2  Said that no one asks 
questions224 
C1C1 Elderly people  
C1C2 Retired people 
Depositors with large amounts 
 
C1C3  Said that no one asks 
questions 
D1C1 Women with husbands who are 
foreigners225 
 
D1C2 All/Everybody226  
D1C3  Said that no one asks 
questions 
D1C4 Elderly people  




D2C2  Recalled an example of a 
woman of a retirement age 
                                               
221 The Russian word used was ‘пожилые’. 
222 The Russian word used was ‘пенсионеры’. 
223 “В основном, женский пол у нас вклады открывает.” (A2C3) 
224 In answer to Question 7 (about the stage at which they inform depositors about the DIS), said 
that retired people with small amounts ask about the DIS at the stage of opening the savings 
account in the contrast with people with big amounts who surely already knows everything. 
225 “Возможно, женщины, у которых мужья иностранцы. Вот у меня такое представление.” 
(D1C1) 
226 “Особенности не наблюдала, в принципе, разных возрастов. Интересуются все.” (D1C2) 
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Clerk Depositors who ask questions Comments 
who only recently returned to 
Russia from the USA227 
D2C3  Answer not recorded 
D2C4 Pre-retirement age 
Retired people 
45-60 years old 
D2C5 Older than 40 years old  
 
B1C1 believes that retired people ask questions about the DIS, because they have already 
been deceived by the state, when all accounts at Sberbank were frozen, and in 
comparison, young people, basically, are not afraid yet, they have not “burnt themselves” 
yet.228 
D1C4 thinks that retired people ask more questions because they do not have access to 
the Internet, as young people do, and they are unlikely to read the Federal Law so they 
ask in the bank.229 
However, A1C3 noted that retired people, who come to their bank are prepared in terms 
of the DIS as they have more than one savings account.230 
Senior Bank Staff Responses 
When asked about the questions that depositors ask (Heads of Branches Interview 
Question 16; Marketing Staff Interview Question 16), the heads of branch and marketing 
staff gave the following answers. 
                                               
227 “Самый явный пример – женщина пенсионного возраста, лет 55, вернулась обратно в 
Россию из Америки, просила копию свидетельства. Я ей подарила наклейку на память.” 
(D2C2) 
228 “Люди пенсионного возраста, в основном, старше 55 лет <...>. Наверное, потому, что 
когда-то наша страна их уже однажды обманула, заморозив вклады того же Сбербанка. <...> 
Молодежь, в основном, как-то, еще не боится, наверно, не обожглась.” (B1C1) 
229 “<...> они спрашивают, в основном, потому, что молодые люди могут получить 
неограниченный доступ к этому, например, посредствам Интернета или ее как-то, <...> и они 
все вопросу могут без нас посмотреть. Люди в возрасте, у них просто нет таких возможностей, 
закон они читать тоже вряд ли будут, поэтому они больше интересуются.” (D1C4) 
230 “<...> они были такие подготовленные люди. У них не один вклад уже существует, не 
только в нашем банке, <...> не впервые сталкиваются с вкладами, и были достаточно 
осведомлены, несмотря на то, что они пенсионеры.” (A1C3) 
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A1B1 stated that, whilst the amount of questions depositors ask is decreasing because 
people get more advanced in this area, the main question still remains whether the bank 
is a member of the scheme.231  He also mentioned (referring to the previous changes in 
the parameters of the DIS when the compensation amount was increased from RUB 
100,000 to RUB 400,000) that some depositors did not know about the changes at all, 
and those depositors who knew would ask the bank staff to calculate the compensation 
amount for their savings accounts, because they were not sure about the compensation 
amount on their individual deposits232 due to the rule whereby 100% of the first RUB 
100,000 of deposits was fully protected, then 90% of the remainder of deposits but not 
more that RUB 400,000 in total. 
D2B1233 and D2B2 also mentioned that the question about membership in the DIS is 
either by far the most common or the only question that depositors ask (respectively). 
D2B2 added that those depositors, who initiate such conversations, are well informed 
about the scheme and, if bank staff answer positively, they even ask for a proof and 
sometimes try to catch the bank staff by asking about the compensation amount234.  
B1B1 suggested obtaining such information from the clerk and added that, based on the 
depositors he works with personally, because they generally come via the bush telegraph, 
that is, he is recommended by people, and they do not have any questions about the 
DIS.235 
                                               
231 “Непосредственно на данный момент уже количество вопросов уменьшается, люди 
становятся все более продвинутыми, так скажем, в этом направлении <...>.” (A1B1). 
232 “Вот изначально, когда были изменения, некоторые клиенты вообще не знали, то есть они 
спрашивали. С чем были вообще связаны изменения. Некоторые клиенты знали, что изменения 
были, и они спрашивали информацию о том, какая сумма и какой процент возмещения. <...> 
Тогда они просили рассчитать, как у них будет. Какие у них будут выплаты <...>, чтобы они 
были уверены.” (A1B1). 
233 “Спрашивают «А вклады застрахованы?», других вопросов бывает редко.” (D2B1). 
234 “Только – входит ли банк в систему страхования или нет. Те, кто инициирует разговор, 
хорошо знают и, если ответ «да», то спрашивают показать доказательство, пытаются подловить 
на сумме гарантии.” (D2B2). 
235 “Ну, в принципе, такую информацию, конкретно, мы можем узнать уже у нашего 
операциониста. По тем клиентам, которые со мной общаются, – это, в основном, сарафанное 
радио, то есть, люди меня рекомендуют и, в принципе, вопросов по системе страхования 
вкладов у них не возникает.” (B1B1). 
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B1B2 said that in, general, there are two questions depositors ask, whether the deposits 
are insured and what the bank’s registration number is, so that they can check it in the 
register of the banks-members of the DIS.236 
C1B1 mentioned questions about the parameters of the DIS and about how quickly 
compensation will take place. He also noted that, recently, depositors have been asking 
about the conditions for savings accounts to be protected under the DIS, because they 
have heard or read about that, in some circumstances, the DIA has been contesting the 
savings accounts, which were deposited right before the decision to announce the 
bankruptcy of the bank or to revoke the license. That is why depositors have been 
interested about this.237 
D1B1 stated that there were no cases of depositors asking whether the bank is a member 
of the DIS.238 She explained that some depositors, who bring money from other banks, 
already know about the DIS and they are well aware of the parameters and the 
mechanism of the compensation.239 
Marketing staff gave opposite responses to this question. Whilst B1M1 said that the only 
question the depositors ask is whether the bank is a member of the DIS.240 С1M1 stated 
that the depositors who come to the bank constantly are well informed and very rarely 
ask questions.241Those who come for the first time may ask questions, but they will 
surely know that the bank is a member of the DIS because they come to the bank after 
                                               
236 “В основном, два вопроса: «Застрахованы ли вклады?» и номер регистрационный, «А вдруг 
вы нас обманули, а мы проверим».” (B1B2). 
237 “Они как раз задают вопросы из серии о параметрах возмещения, как быстро будет 
возмещено, при каких условиях их вклад попадает в систему страхования вкладов, потому что 
последнее время они слушают и читают, что в некоторых случаях Агентство по страхованию 
вкладов пытается оспорить некоторые вклады, размещенные в банке накануне принятия 
решения о банкротстве или отзыва лицензии, поэтому вот это всех интересует, конечно.” 
(C1B1). 
238 “Не было случаев, когда бы спрашивали «А вы являетесь участником системы страхования 
вкладов?».” (D1B1). 
239 “Часть клиентов, которые приносят деньги из других банков, уже знают, им механизм 
понятен.” (D1B1). 
240 “Включен ли банк в систему страхования вкладов и, в принципе, все.” (B1M1). 
241 “Скажем так, из тех клиентов, которые постоянно к нам ходят, они проинформированы и 
редко достаточно спрашивают.” (C1M1). 
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having seen an advertisement on the Internet, a flyer or a billboard advertisement, on 
which the logo of the DIS is always displayed.242 
 
The heads of branch were also asked to recall how many depositors ask for additional 
information on the DIS in an ordinary calendar month (Heads of Branch Interview 
Question 17). 
A1B1 found it difficult to give a response to this question. He suggested putting this 
question to the clerks since he does not work with all depositors in the branch.243 
Whilst A2B1 said in his response to Question 15 (see above) that, generally, depositors 
either do not have any questions about the DIS at all, or very few questions, in his 
response to Question 17. However, he recalled 3 depositors asking questions in an 
ordinary calendar month and stated that there were interested in finding out if their 
money would be refunded should the bank fail. He affirmed that, of all the questions that 
depositors ask, this one is the only one which stays sharply. Other questions relate to the 
compensation amount. For example, depositors ask, if they have RUB 650,000 in their 
account, will the full amount be covered or not.244 
B1B2 recalled 1 or 2 depositors asking for additional information maximum and said that 
they were interested in the process of compensation and where they could receive a 
compensation payment in case something happens.245 
D2B2 indicated that of 10 depositors, 7 will ask whether the bank is a member of the 
DIS. She pointed out that such people purposefully visit all banks and find out about their 
                                               
242 “Интересуются, но дело в том, что клиент, который пришел с улицы, по рекламе 
непосредственно, он обязательно будет знать, что банк входит в систему страхования вкладов, 
потому что либо реклама в сети Интернет, либо листовка, либо наружная реклама, где 
обязательно буде стоять знак о системе страхования вкладов.” (C1M1). 
243 “Затрудняюсь ответить. <...> Вам, наверно, проще экономисты ответят на этот вопрос, 
потому что я не со всеми клиентами работаю.” (A1B1). 
244 “Может быть, трое, максимум. Их интересует только одно – в случае, если банк 
обанкротится, нам вернут наши деньги? Если брать многие вопросы, то этот вопрос 
единственный, которые стоит остро. Другие вопросы по суммам: а вот у нас 650 000, и нам все 
650 000 вернут?” (A2B1). 
245 “Один или два максимум. Их интересует процесс и где они могут получить в случае чего 
деньги.” (B1B2). 
 210 
deposit interest rates and whether the bank is a member of the DIS.246 D2B1, on the 
other hand, only recalled 1 depositor asking for additional information about the DIS.247 
The responses of C1B1 and D1B1 to this question have not been recorded. 
When asked to describe the depositors who ask questions about the DIS (any 
particularities) (Marketing Staff Interview Question 16b; Heads of Branch Interview 
Question 17b), the heads of branch gave the following answers. 
A1B1 said that depositors who ask questions about the depositor insurance scheme are 
mainly 30 years old or older. He added that the possible reason for their questions is the 
fact that they, to a higher degree than the current generation, were faced with the 
catastrophe when the population lost their savings and therefore this is more topical for 
them.248 
A2B1 stated that people over 40 years old ask more questions, because they are more 
cautious about their savings and want reassurance. He added that people below the age of 
30-35 years old, are more confident and know that if the bank is a member of the DIS, no 
questions need to be asked because everything is clear.249 
B1B2 stated that these were people of advanced age and one can understand them, 
because the young people, on the contrary, are more progressive, they primarily watch 
ratings, popularity and conditions and they are not interested in the DIS as such.250 
                                               
246 “Из 10 – человек семь спросят, входит ли банк в систему страхования вкладов или нет. Они 
целенаправленно обходят все банки, узнают ставки по депозитам и узнают, входит ли банк в 
систему страхования вкладов.” (D2B2). 
247 “Максимум один человек в месяц.” (D2B1). 
248 “В основном, это люди в возрасте от 30 лет и старше. Ну, они все-таки в большей степени, 
чем мы, столкнулись с той <...> катастрофой, которая была у нас, когда <...> у населения 
уже были какие-то сбережения, которые они потеряли, поэтому для них это в большей степени 
актуально.” (A1B1). 
249 “Люди до 40 лет спрашивают больше. [Они] более кропотливо относятся к свои суммам, 
перестраховываются. Молодые, до 30-35 лет, они более уверены. Если банк находится в 
системе страхования вкладов, можно не спрашивать, и так все понятно.” (A2B1). 
250 “Да, в основном, это люди преклонного возраста <...>, их тоже можно понять. <...> 
Молодежь – она более прогрессивна и она не задается такими вопросами, они смотрят на 
рейтинги, на популярность и условия. <...> Сама система страхования вкладов как таковая их 
мало интересует <...> в отличие от пенсионеров тех же самых.” (B1B2). 
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D1B1 also referred to the category of elderly people and said that it is more complicated 
with them, because the information needs to be explained to them.251 
C1B1 explained that whether depositors ask additional questions or not depends on the 
amount in their savings account. He said that the depositors who deposit considerable 
amounts, i.e. sums approaching the maximum compensation amount, usually know 
everything and do not ask questions. As for the depositors who so to say count every 
penny, they deposit lesser amounts and this is indeed the category of depositors which 
ask questions.252 
C1M1 said that the people who are more interested are most likely to be people of middle 
age and, in terms of social standing, to be middle class,253 whilst D2B1254 and D2B2255 
stated that, generally, these are people of an older age group and retired people 
respectively.  
6.2.4 Depositors Have Been Made Aware of the Protection of Their 
Rights and Legal Interests (Impact Indicator 1.2.4) 
Given that the responses to the questions about the outcome of the deposit insurance 
reform in Russia, and the extent to which the objectives of the reform have been 
achieved, an overview of the bank operations and the status of the banking sector in 
general is required, only senior bank staff – heads of branch and marketing staff were 
asked to comment on whether depositors are legally protected (Heads of Branch 
Interview Question 18, Marketing Staff Interview Questions 17) and whether the 
depositors now – after the establishment of the DIS – are more aware of their rights as 
depositors (Heads of Branch Interview Question 18a, Marketing Staff Interview Question 
17a). 
                                               
251 “С категорией пожилых людей посложнее, <...> им надо [всё] объяснять.” (D1B1). 
252 “Я думаю, что вкладчики, которые размещают значительные денежные средства, то есть 
приближающиеся к сумме гарантированной, те обычно всё знают и вопросы не задают. А 
вкладчики, которые <...> размещают меньшие средства, <...> [у которых] каждый рубль, 
скажем, на счету, вот эта как раз та категория, которая задает вопросы: «А как? А что?».” 
(C1B1). 
253 “Наверно, это более среднего возраста <...> люди. По социальному положению средний 
класс, наверно, больше интересуется этим.” (C1M1). 
254 “[Это] старшая возрастная группа.” (D2B1). 
255 “В основном, пенсионеры.” (D2B2). 
 212 
All 8 heads of branch and 2 marketing officers stated that the DIS protects the legal 
rights and interests of depositors. When prompted, B1B2 explained his opinion by 
reference to the long-term functioning of the DIA in Russia and to the experience of his 
acquaintances who have been receiving compensation in the past.256 C1M1 echoed this by 
stating that the DIS protects depositors, because the DIA compensates the loss caused by 
the bank and, since it compensates, it takes into consideration the interests of 
depositors.257 To explain his opinion, D2B1 referred to the experience of his family who 
have quite quickly received compensation in the past.258 C1B1 said that he follows 
attentively the conditions of the banking system and knows the cases when the banking 
license has been revoked, and that compensation always started within the time frame set 
by the DIA.259 D1B1 stated that the comparison on the level of protection now with that 
of many years ago is like the comparison between night and day. She added, though, that 
big depositors should be aware that the compensation amount is capped.260 Whilst on the 
whole agreeing that the DIS protects the rights and legal interests of depositors, D2B2 
mentioned there is no limit to perfection and that there should not be any cap on the 
compensation amount, and currency exchange risks should be taken into account.261 
When asked to comment on whether depositors know more about their rights now than 
before the introduction of the DIS, most of the respondents (6 heads of branch and 1 
marketing officer262) said that the depositors’ knowledge of their rights as depositors has 
increased. 
                                               
256 “Многолетний опыт работы АСВ и я лично знаю людей, которые получали возмещение по 
вкладам.” (B1B2). 
257 “Потому что защищает. [Агентство] же возмещает ущерб, нанесенный банков 
непосредственно вкладчику, а раз возмещает, соответственно, учитывает интересы 
вкладчиков.” (C1M1). 
258 “Защищает. Мою семью коснулась ситуация – достаточно быстро получили возмещение.” 
(D2B1). 
259 “Я внимательно слежу за состоянием банковской системы, поэтому знаю случаи, когда 
отзывалась банковская лицензия, и как раз в сроки, установленные Агентством по 
страхованию вкладов, начиналось возмещение денежных средств в пределах 700 000.” (C1B1). 
260 “Безусловно, конечно! Если сравнить с годами назад – день и ночь. Крупным вкладчикам 
надо знать о том, что сумма ограничена.” (D1B1). 
261 “В целом, да, но нет предела совершенству. До сих пор есть ограничения по сумме, а также 
не учтены валютные риски.” (D2B2). 
262 The response of B1M1 to this question was not recorded. 
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A1B1 found it difficult to give an objective response to this question, however, he 
mentioned that depositors are fairly informed and the population is growing wiser and 
wiser.263 
A2B1 said that depositors definitely know more now.264 B1B1 stated that the depositors 
know considerably more now than before because, especially under the financial crisis 
conditions, people started collecting information from everywhere, and the level of their 
awareness improved.265 D2B1 agreed, stating that the protection of depositors’ rights 
and legal interests is a very important question for many at present.266 
B1B2 justified his opinion about the increase in the depositors’ knowledge of their rights 
by comparing the current situation with the Soviet era when there was only one bank to 
which people could go, and it dealt with all sorts of financial products and services, 
ranging from deposits to utility payments. He said that, at that time, people were told to 
open savings accounts and they were not concerned and that now the situation is 
different.267 D2B2 also indicated that in 2005, people did not know whether or not their 
money was protected and now almost everyone asks about this.268 
C1M1 referred to the fact that depositors began to get more interested and, whilst they 
have always been interested in the conditions of the bank account contract, with the 
introduction of the DIS, they have naturally more questions.269 
                                               
263 “Я не смогу объективно ответить на этот вопрос <...>. Сейчас они достаточно 
информированы. У нас население умнеет и умнеет <...>.” (A1B1). 
264 “Однозначно, больше сейчас.” (A2B1). 
265 “<...> я думаю, значительно знают больше, чем раньше. Потому что сейчас, в условиях 
кризиса, люди стали собирать информацию отовсюду, и информированность стала лучше.” 
(B1B1). 
266 “Сейчас для многих это важный вопрос.” (D2B1). 
267 “Да. Далеко [за примером] ходить не надо. Возьмем недавний некий большой всем 
известный банк, куда шли все, начиная от пенсионеров и заканчивая коммунальными 
платежами. <...> [Им] на работе сказали завести себе книжку, [они] пошли и завели, их мало 
трогало <...>” (B1B2). 
268 “Думаю, что да. Когда я сама работала в 2005 году, люди <...> не знали, защищены ли их 
средства, а теперь спрашивает почти каждый.” (D2B2). 
269 “Они стали больше интересоваться. <...> Этим всегда клиенты интересовались, а с 
системой страхования вкладов, естественно, вопросов стало больше.” (C1M1). 
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6.2.5 Banks Use Reference to the DIS to Attract New Depositors 
(Impact Indicator 1.3.1) 
In order to assess how banks use the fact of their membership in the DIS (if at all) to 
attract depositors, the senior bank staff were asked three separate questions. 
The first question was aimed at finding out which methods the banks use to attract new 
depositors (Heads of Branch Interview Question 5; Marketing Staff Interview Question 
5) (see Table 6.4), and if senior bank staff did not mention it themselves, they were 
prompted to say what role their membership in the DIS plays in attracting new 
depositors (Heads of Branch Interview Question 5a; Marketing Staff Interview Question 
5a). 
The second question was aimed at finding out which methods the banks use to increase 
the amounts on accounts of existing depositors (Heads of Branch Interview Question 6; 
Marketing Staff Interview Question 6) and what role, if any, does the membership in the 
DIS play in this situation (Heads of Branch Interview Question 6a; Marketing Staff 
Interview Question 6a). 
Finally the senior bank staff were asked what the determining factors are for depositors 
in choosing their bank (Heads of Branch Interview Question 11; Marketing Staff 
Interview Question 11) and, if not already mentioned, whether their bank’s membership 
in the DIS is one of them (Heads of Branch Interview Question 11a; Marketing Staff 
Interview Question 11a). 
In response to the question regarding the methods banks use to attract new depositors, 
A1B1 stated that Bank A1 uses targeted advertising, existing clients’ contacts, personal 
contacts, flyers on the street as well as a bush telegraph system.270 When prompted, he 
noted that, for VIP depositors who have in their savings account more than the maximum 
compensation amount, the bank’s membership in the DIS does not play as big a role as, 
                                               
270 “Это уличное привлечение, это реклама. <...> Опять же, есть такое понятие как 
«сарафанное радио», то есть это клиенты узнают друг от друга. Это опять же знакомые, с 
которыми непосредственно я работаю. Работаю со своими клиентами, которые мне дают какие-
то контакты.” (A1B1). 
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for example, special customer service.271 As for normal depositors, he said that the 
introduction of RUB 700,000 as a new maximum compensation amount was a big 
stimulus for depositors to open new savings accounts.272Finally, he added that all people 
are different and that one must not generalise as to what is the determining factor for 
depositors.273 
Table 6.4 





































Flyers on the street/come from 
the street 
+ +      +  + 4 
Targeted advertising (including 
newspapers, Internet, radio, public 
transport) 
+ + +  + +     5 
Bush telegraph +  +        2 
Existing clients’ 
contacts/recommendations 
+        + + 3 
Big range of savings 
accounts/special offers on other 
banking products 
 +      +   2 
DIS information on marketing 
materials 
  +  + + +    4 
Personal contacts +   +  +     3 
Advertising actions (including 
presents for depositors and joint 
actions) 
   + +   +  + 4 
Direct sales/cold calls     +     + 2 
Corporate clients’ employees      +  +   2 
 
When asked about the determining factors for depositors to choose Bank A1, A1B1 
stated that there are two factors – interest rates and the quality of customer service.274 
                                               
271 “<...> VIP-клиенты высокого уровня, у которых храниться свыше страховой суммы, для 
них это играет не такую большую роль как, допустим, VIP обслуживание.” (A1B1). 
272 “А для простых клиентов, когда ввели 700 000, для них это было большим стимулом для 
открытия новых вкладов.” (A1B1). 
273 “<...> люди все настолько разные, что обобщать нельзя, что именно является решающим 
фактором [для них].” (A1B1). 
274 “Ставки и качество обслуживания.” (A1B1). 
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When prompted, he agreed that the bank’s membership in the DIS is another important 
factor. He said that nowadays, when practically every bank is a member of the DIS, 
people find out whether the bank is a member of the scheme even before they come to the 
branch.275 
A2B1 stated that Bank A2 also uses targeted advertising and distributes flyers on the 
street to attract depositors.276 However, he stressed that it is difficult to attract new 
depositors from the street, because interest rates, in principle, are the same everywhere. 
He said that the most important factor in the process of attracting new depositors is 
having a wide range of savings accounts and that Bank A2 has a variety of savings 
accounts for any depositor and for any need – from savings accounts with non-reducible 
balances to seasonal savings accounts with higher interest rates and to special savings 
accounts for retired people.277 When asked how Bank A2 uses the fact of its membership 
in the DIS, A1B1 pointed out that, whilst they display information on the depositor 
insurance scheme everywhere in the branch and fully inform depositors about the scheme, 
he lays emphasis on the fact that 98% of Bank A2’s shares now belong to the state (via a 
state corporation), which makes it a stable bank.278 
Questioned about the determining factors for depositors to choose Bank A2, A2B1 stated 
that the most important factor for depositors is the interest rate because, in principle, it 
does not make any difference to depositors where they open a savings account if the 
amount is protected, but the interest rate in one bank is 13% and in another, 14.5%279. 
                                               
275 “Конечно. Вот сейчас, на самом деле, уже практически каждый банк является членом 
системы страхования вкладов, но вот фактор, что мы являемся уже членом – он играет, 
конечно, большую роль. Люди непосредственно перед тем, как идут в банк, они уточняют 
информацию о том, являемся ли мы членом.” (A1B1). 
276 “Бывает, волонтеров каких-то [поставим] внизу у подъезда, которые раздают наши буклеты 
с информацией по вкладам. До этого у нас была целевая реклама <...> и в метро, и в газетах и 
по радио.” (A2B1). 
277 “При привлечении самое главное – большая линейка [вкладов]. У нас есть, где 
неснижаемый остаток вклада, есть сезонные вклады, где ставки выше, есть для пенсионеров 
специальные вклады <...>.” (A2B1). 
278 “Мы везде разместили информацию, что мы являемся членом данной системы. <...> Мы 
клиента полностью информируем. <...> На что я делаю упор, что у нас 98% акций 
принадлежит государственной корпорации <...>, [что] мы стабильный банк.” (A2B1). 
279 “Я считаю, что вообще для клиента эффективна ставка сейчас. В принципе, без разницы, 
где хранить деньги, если сумма твоя защищена. Но ставка в одном банке будет 13%, а в другом 
– 14,5%.” (A2B1). 
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When prompted, he also agreed that bank’s membership in the DIS is another important 
factor, according to A1B1.280 He went further to suggest that depositors would be 
deterred from opening an account if the bank were not a member of the scheme and 
expressed his opinion that it is not serious for a bank to be engaged in deposit taking and 
not be a member of the scheme. He also doubted whether depositors would go into such a 
bank.281 
As for Bank B1, the following methods are used to attract new depositors: targeted 
advertising and inclusion of information about the DIS on all marketing materials, 
mentioned by B1B1 and B1M1;282 advertising actions, mentioned by B1B2 and B1M1; 
bush telegraph, mentioned by B1B1;283 personal contacts, mentioned by B1B2,284 and 
direct sales by way of personal meetings with VIP clients, mentioned by B1M1.285 
B1B1 stated that placing attributes of membership in the DIS on the marketing materials 
plays an important role, because depositors actively pay attention to it.286 When 
prompted, B1B2 also said that the bank undoubtedly uses the fact of its membership in 
the DIS to attract new depositors.287 
When asked about the determining factors for depositors to choose Bank B1, B1M1 
stated that there are two main key factors – the bank’s membership in the DIS and the 
                                               
280 “Конечно! <...> Конечно, большой плюс. Огромный.” (A2B1). 
281 “Их бы, наверно, оттолкнуло, если бы мы не были в этой системе. <...> Да я и думаю, что 
это не серьёзно сейчас для банка заниматься вкладами и не входить в эту систему. Вряд ли 
клиент пойдет в такой банк.” (A2B1). 
282 “Мы на всех материалах размещаем обязательно логотип [системы страхования вкладов] 
<...>.” (B1M1). 
283 “Наибольший эффект – это, конечно, прямые, активные рекламные действия <...>: 
размещение рекламы в газетах, различных СМИ, баннерах и так далее. <...> основной упор, 
конечно, на сарафанное радио <...>.” (B1B1). 
284 “Личные контакты, рекламные акции, какие-то акции связанные с подарками для 
вкладчиков.” (B1B2). 
285 “Для привлечения новых клиентов <...> размещаем рекламу точечную, рекламу по нашей 
филиальной сети. Есть небольшой блок интернет-рекламы <...>, а в целом также привлекаем 
клиентов <...> по средствам проведения совместных акций с различными компаниями. И 
непосредственно прямые продажи, личные встреч. Данный канал продаж используется в 
первую очередь для VIP клиентов со значительными суммами вкладов.” (B1M1). 
286 “<...> немаловажную роль играет наличие рекламной продукции с атрибутикой участника 
системы страхования вкладов. На это люди сейчас активно обращают внимание.” (B1B1). 
287 “Да, безусловно.” (B1B2). 
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market interest rates.288 B1B1 found it difficult to answer this question and said that the 
bank is, as yet, not too well-known to the population at large. When prompted, he stated 
that bank’s membership in the DIS does not play a key role, because almost all banks that 
have a license for attracting money into deposits are members of the DIS.289 He added 
that confidence in the banking system as a whole was a more important factor, because 
depositors know that amounts up RUB 700,000 are protected and, at the end of the day, 
it makes no difference for them in which bank they open a savings account.290 B1B2 also 
found it difficult to answer whether the bank’s membership in the DIS is a determining 
factor for depositors when choosing Bank B1.291He pointed out that, generally, the 
determining factors for depositors to choose Bank B1 are the quality of the depositor-
bank relationship and, since the bank is not a well-known, big bank, interest rates and the 
conditions of different savings accounts.292 
With regard to the methods Bank C1 uses to attract new depositors, C1B1 stated that 
they use targeted advertising, personal contacts, inclusion of information about DIS on all 
the bank’s marketing materials and access to employees of existing corporate clients, 
because the bank’s main focus has always been on corporate clients rather than on retail 
depositors.293 
                                               
288 “Для вкладчика <...>, я думаю, что это именно участие банка в системе страхования 
вкладов наряду с рыночными процентными ставками, это два главных ключевых фактора.” 
(B1M1). 
289 “<...> поскольку практически все банки, имеющие лицензию на привлечение денег на 
депозиты от частных лиц, являются участниками системы страхования вкладов, поэтому <...> 
это участие не представляет такой значимости сильной.” (B1B1). 
290 “Здесь уже доверие идёт непосредственно ко всей банковской системе. Вот люди знают, что 
700 000 [застрахованы], и, по большому счёту, им все равно, в каком банке вложить <...>.” 
(B1B1). 
291 “Решающим фактором? Трудно сказать.” (B1B2). 
292 “Ну, в основном, это отношение к клиенту <...>. Да, мы банк не мегаизвестный, не 
крупный, то есть привлечение – это процентная ставка и условия по различным видам 
вкладов.” (B1B2). 
293 “Новых клиентов мы привлекаем с помощью рекламы, с помощью личных контактов, и 
поскольку основой ориентир у банка всегда был на корпоративную клиентуру в большей 
степени, чем на физические лица, поэтому в данном случае привлечение новых кладчиков идёт 
ещё по линии общения с руководством этих юридических лиц. <...> Вся рекламная кампания 
обязательно отражает наше участие в системе страхования вкладов.” (C1B1). 
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C1M1 also mentioned the marketing materials, and said that he always places the big 
logo of the DIS on the flyers.294 He explained that, by doing this, depositors know that 
Bank C1 is not just any credit organisation, which is not a member of the DIS. He 
further pointed out that they must emphasise their membership in the DIS, because few 
depositors know that practically all banks are members of the DIS295.  
When asked about the determining factors for depositors in choosing Bank C1, C1M1 
stated that the quality of customer service (individual approach) is the determining factor 
for depositors.296 However, when further prompted, C1M1 said that the interest rates and 
conditions of savings accounts also play a key role.297 He admitted that the membership in 
the DIS plays its own role, but doubted whether it is still timely to talk about it, because 
people got fairly used to it and those clients, who do not have savings accounts, are 
absolutely not interested in DIS and do not load themselves with the information about 
it298. 
C1B1, in answer to this question, said that, in his opinion, the few reasons why 
depositors would choose Bank C1 include rating of the bank by different rating agencies, 
the bank’s membership in the DIS, which plays an important role, and welcoming 
atmosphere of the bank’s branches.299 He noted that Bank C1 is not in the top 10 or 20 of 
the biggest banks in Russia, and it is not as well-known or as trusted by the population as 
the top banks. He further explained that for Bank C1, a medium-sized bank, the 
                                               
294 “<...> и, в первую очередь, именно в рекламе акцентирую внимание на большой знак 
системы страхования вкладов.” (C1M1). 
295 “<...> чтобы люди не думали, что мы какая-то кредитная организация, в которой этого нет. 
Причем, если учесть тот факт, что практически все банки входят в эту систему, мало кто из 
физических лиц знает об этом, то есть нужно акцентировать внимание.” (C1M1). 
296 “Наверное, качество обслуживания, индивидуальный подход.” (C1M1). 
297 “Ну, естественно первую роль играют ставки по вкладам, условия непосредственно вклада.” 
(C1M1). 
298 “Конечно, свою роль играет также то, что банк входит в систему страхования вкладов, но, к 
сожалению, именно сейчас об этом говорить <...> не то чтобы целесообразно, а своевременно. 
<...> Сейчас люди достаточно привыкли к этому и <...> многие люди, не имея вкладов, они 
не интересуются эти абсолютно, то есть эта информация им не нужна, они не нагружают себя 
ей.” (C1M1). 
299 “В нашем банке, я думаю, на самом деле не так много причин, по которым клиент идёт 
именно в наш банк, но они существуют. Прежде всего, такой причиной является оценка банка 
различными агентствами, различными консалтинговыми компаниями <...>. Плюс к этому, 
безусловно, немаловажную роль играет тот факт, что банк входит в систему страхования 
вкладов, и третье это та атмосфера, которая встречает клиентов <...>.” (C1B1). 
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membership in the DIS has a great significance, because depositors may deposit their 
money with confidence, as they would in a bigger bank.300 
According to D1B1, Bank D1 uses the advertising actions, flyers on the street with 
information on the branch’s existence, special offers on other banking products301 and 
acquires new depositors through existing corporate clients (their employees).302 
When prompted, D1B1 stated that the bank’s membership in the DIS is only one of the 
‘advantages’ for the bank. She further commented that if bank is not a member of the 
DIS, then either it does not want to be or it is a new bank and does not consider retail 
depositors as a target audience.303 
When asked about the determining factors for depositors in choosing Bank D1, D1B1 
said that there is no one single factor, but rather a whole set of factors. These include the 
fact that there are no queues in the banks, the quality of customer service based on strict 
standards of service, and the fact that the bank has 100% of foreign capital. She added 
that they inform depositors that the bank strictly follows the letter of the law, and that it 
is a member of the DIS.304 However, D1B1 noted that these are the factors in choosing 
Bank D1 for a savings account and that in the case of selling a credit card, the bank will 
promote other factors.305 
With regard to Bank D2, both D2B1306 and D2B2 mentioned recommendation by 
existing clients, whilst D2B2 also added such ways as advertising actions and cold calls 
                                               
300 “Мы не входим в топ-10, топ-20 крупнейших банков страны, поэтому, скажем, узнаваемость 
наша и доверие к нам не совсем такие как к тем банкам. Поэтому, конечно же, для нас, как для 
банка среднего, имеет большое значение тот факт, что мы входим в систему страхования 
вкладов, и клиент может также спокойной размещать свои денежные средства в нашем банке, 
как и в крупнейших банка России.” (C1B1). 
301 “Разные методы – промо-кампании, информация о существовании дополнительного офиса, 
специальные предложения <...>, в ноябре 2008 года дарили карту без комиссии за 
обслуживание на один год.” (D1B1).  
302 “<...> сотрудники клиентов (юридических лиц).” (D1B1).  
303 “Участие в системе страхования вкладов это только одно из преимуществ. Если банк не 
участвует в системе страхования вкладов, то либо не хочет, либо новый и не рассматривает 
физических лиц как целевую аудиторию.” (D1B1). 
304 “Совокупность факторов: нет очередей, качество сервиса (жесткие стандарты сервиса), банк 
с иностранным капиталом, проговариваем, что четко следуем букве закона.” (D1B1). 
305 “При продаже карты будут другие факторы.” (D1B1) 
306 “<...> звонки от имеющихся клиентов <...>.” (D2B1). 
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to attract new depositors, and that some new depositors come into the branch of their 
own accord.307 
When prompted, D2B1 stated that the bank uses the information about its membership in 
the DIS for information only, and not as an instrument to attract new 
depositors.308Further, he said that, even though the interest in the DIS among the 
population has recently increased, the bank still does not position it as a plus.309 D2B2, on 
the other hand, said that bank’s membership in the DIS plays a certain role, and that it 
depends on the depositors. Those new depositors who come of their own accord ask about 
the DIS and demand to see the certificate of membership, whilst those new depositors 
who come on the recommendation of an existing depositor have no questions.310When 
asked about the determining factors for depositors in choosing Bank D2, D2B1 stated 
that firstly, the interest rate is the most important and secondly, the bank’s reputation311. 
 
In respect of the question regarding the methods the banks use to increase the amounts in 
accounts of existing depositors (Heads of Branch Interview Question 6; Marketing Staff 
Interview Question 6), half of the senior bank staff said they would offer a greater 
flexibility to continuing depositors, and would tie the interest rate in with the amount in 
the savings account, thus promoting the higher deposits. Others pointed out that they try 
to get from the depositors the maximum amount possible at the very beginning. Some 
senior bank staff also said that their bank’s membership in the DIS plays a role in the 
increase of the amounts in accounts of existing depositors. 
                                               
307 “Система рекомендаций от существующих клиентов, холодные звонки, небольшие 
маркетинговые мероприятия в торговых центрах, а также есть те, кто сами по себе заходят.” 
(D2B2). 
308 “Для информации только <...>. Как инструмент привлечения [клиентов] – не используем.” 
(D2B1). 
309 “[Население] стало больше интересоваться системой страхования вкладов в последнее 
время, но как плюс мы это не используем.” (D2B1). 
310 “Играет [роль] – те клиенты, которые приходят [сами], спрашивают о членстве, требуют 
предъявить свидетельство, тогда как у «рекомендованных» клиентов вопросов не возникает.” 
(D2B2). 
311 “Процентная ставка и репутация банка.” (D2B1). 
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A1B1 stated that in Bank A1, the membership in the DIS plays its role in the increase of 
the amounts in accounts of existing depositors312. He explained that all clerks are 
psychologists in a way, and that they try to see whether depositors have a barrier and if 
so, whether it is because they do not actually have the amount or whether depositors are 
simply not sure, and if the latter is the case, then they emphasise the bank’s membership 
in the DIS and on the fact that a certain amount is guaranteed 100%.313 
A2B1 said that in Bank A2, they do not pressurise depositors so that depositors do not 
walk away, but rather try to entice them by offering savings accounts with higher 
interest rates for higher amounts.314 
With regard to Bank B1, all three senior bank staff, B1B1,315 B1B2316 and B1M1,317 
stated that bank’s membership in the DIS is not relevant when trying to increase the 
amount in accounts of existing depositors, because the existing depositors already know 
about the scheme. 
B1M1 noted that they provide existing clients with the information regarding new 
products via telephone, email, direct mail and in person.318 She added that these are the 
                                               
312 “Естественно, такой разговор с клиентами ведется, потому мы заинтересованы в увеличении 
денежного потока от клиентов.” (A1B1). 
313 “У нас все работники своего рода психологи, которые, разговаривая с клиентами, понимают, 
что им всё-таки необходимо. Они готовы услышать, в чем у него проблема, из-за чего у него 
<...> барьер, почему он не хочет внести деньги. Есть вероятность того, что у него просто нет 
денег, которые он хочет вложить. Но если они у него есть – есть возможность вложить какую-
то энную сумму денег, то на это можно делать ударение, чтобы человек просто увеличил сумму, 
разговаривая о том, что у нас вот есть такая сумм, которую он может сохранить стопроцентно.” 
(A1B1). 
314 “Очень сильно мы не давим на клиента и как-то особенно его не провоцируем, чтобы он 
увеличил. Главное, не передавит на клиента <...>, чтобы он совсем не ушёл. <...> Я 
предлагаю <...> один из вкладов, где ставки выше от суммы.” (A2B1). 
315 “<...> при увеличении вклада со стороны уже действующего у нас клиента, в принципе, 
это не играет уже значительною роль, так как клиент изначально вошел в наш банк, зная о 
том, что банк является участником [системы страхования вкладов].” (B1B1). 
316 “<...> человек он однозначно все равно [уже] знает о том, что банк входит в систему 
страхования вкладов <...>.” (B1B2). 
317 “Как правило, клиент, который к нам уже пришел, как вкладчик, уже знает о том, что банк 
включен в систему страхования вкладов, и я лично не вижу необходимости повторно как-то 
акцентировать на этом внимание.” (B1M1). 
318 “<...> это информирование наших клиентов о новых продуктах, тут и телефонные звонки, 
и e-mail рассылки различные, и, непосредственно, информирование клиентов при [их] 
посещении офисов. Также мы периодически делаем рассылку direct mail так называемую, с 
новыми предложениями.” (B1M1). 
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methods they use, not only to increase the amounts on existing accounts, but also to 
increase the number of accounts per depositor, since they have depositors with more than 
one savings account in the bank319. 
Both B1B1320 and B1B2321 added that they provide existing depositors with the increased 
flexibility of the savings account, including increased interest rates which directly relate 
to the amount in the savings account. B1B2 also mentioned such aspects as high quality 
personable customer service and additional services to the existing clients.322 
Both C1B1323 and C1M1324 stated that in Bank C1, in order to increase the amount in the 
account of existing depositors, they would inform depositors about the increased 
maximum compensation amount. C1B1 added that when the maximum compensation 
amount was RUB 450,000325, it was difficult to explain and persuade depositors to 
deposit a higher amount.326 
As for Bank D1, D1B1 pointed out that they telephone existing clients regarding the 
balance on their savings accounts327 as well as offering the initial interest rate in direct 
                                               
319 “Как правило, вот такие методы используются либо для увеличения размеров текущих 
вкладов, либо для увеличения количества вкладов одного клиента. Потому что в принципе у 
нас есть клиенты, которые держат свои денежные средства не в одном вкладе, а в нескольких 
различных [вкладах].” (B1M1). 
320 “Повышение привлекательности условий, то есть возможность частичного досрочного 
снятия суммы с вклада или счета. <...> увеличение гибкости вклада, условий и плюс, конечно 
же, увеличение процентов в зависимости от суммы вклада.” (B1B1). 
321 “<...> также увеличение процентных ставок, то есть улучшение условий для размещения 
средств.” (B1B2). 
322 “Это дополнительные услуги – раз, индивидуальное обслуживание – это два <...>.” 
(B1B2). 
323 “После того, как в 2008 году изменилась сумма страхования вкладов, то есть она 
повысилась до 700 000, естественно, в общении с клиентами мы упоминаем об этом факте.” 
(C1B1). 
324 “<...> и мы сами в различных случаях предупреждаем клиентов не беспокоиться, потому 
что все суммы застрахованы до 700 000, поэтому никаких проблем в этом плане не должно 
возникать <...>.” (C1M1). 
325 C1B1 was clearly mistaken when giving this example. 
326 “<...> в тот период, когда было 450 000, трудно было убеждать и объяснять клиентам, что 
можно разместить и большую сумму <...>.” (C1B1). 
327 “Стимулируем клиента для пополнения вклада путём прозвона по остаткам [на вкладе].” 
(D1B1). 
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relation to the amount in and the term of the savings account,328 as in the cases of Banks 
A2 and B1. 
D2B1 said that Bank D2 uses an individual approach and high quality customer service, 
including knowledgeable managers,329 whilst D2B2 stated that they do customer profiling 
and from the beginning get the maximum amount possible. However, she added that new 
depositors look closely at the bank in the first six months or so and are not prepared to 
deposit more than RUB 700,000, whilst those depositors with amounts greater than 
RUB 700,000 are usually those who have been with the bank for a long time as they 
trust the bank and do not care about anything else.330 
D2B2 also stated that they would mention the DIS to any client (whether depositor or 
not) because the bank’s membership in the DIS is an indicator that their bank is not a 
‘Mickey Mouse outfit’. She stressed that the bank’s membership in the DIS is a plus.331 
However, D2B1 suggested that the maximum compensation amount of RUB 700,000 is 
a psychological barrier for depositors.332 
6.2.6 Banks Use the Parameters of the DIS to Launch New Savings 
Accounts (Impact Indicator 1.3.2) 
There was no specific question about the usage of DI parameters to launch new savings 
accounts. However, B1M1 noted that, from her knowledge, many banks introduced so-
                                               
328 “При предложении депозитного продукта делаем акцент на процентную ставку в прямой 
зависимости от суммы и срока.” (D1B1). 
329 “Общаемся с клиентами, оказываем сервис, у нас грамотные менеджеры.” (D2B1). 
330 “Изначально задача извлечь максимум денег сразу. Мы проводим профилирование клиентов. 
<...> те клиенты, у которых больше 700 000 рублей, они давно с банком, они доверяют банку 
и не заботятся ни о чём. Новые же клиенты в первые полгода не готовы внести больше 700 000 
рублей – присматриваются.” (D2B2). 
331 “Если клиент приходит взять кредит, членство в системе страхования вкладов тоже 
показатель, что банк – не шарашкина контора, поэтому упоминаем о системе страхования 
вкладов любому клиенту, вне зависимости от того, с какой целью он пришёл. Для банка это 
плюс.” (D2B1). 
332 “700 000 рублей – это психологический барьер [для клиентов]. Клиент будет думать, что 
больше в банк вкладывать нельзя.” (D2B1.) 
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called ‘fully guaranteed deposits’ as soon as the maximum compensation amount was 
increased in October 2008, whereby the amount of deposit is limited to RUB 700,000.333 
6.2.7 Bank Staff Who Work with Depositors Know About the 
Parameters of the DIS (Impact Indicator 1.3.4) 
In order to assess the knowledge of bank staff of the DIS, respondents were asked a 
series of questions probing their understanding of how the DIS works, their knowledge of 
the objectives of the reform, and whether they were familiar with the Federal Law and 
the Recommendations of the DIA. 
When asked to name the objectives of the DI reform (Clerks Interview Question5), not 
all clerks could name all three objectives and opted for either one or two objectives. 
Looking at Table 6.5, it is interesting to note that Objective 3 was mentioned the fewest 
number of times, with clerks from Bank D1 not mentioning it at all, and Banks A1 and 
D2 only mentioning it once. In contrast 3 (of the 4) clerks from Bank A2 and 2 (of the 3) 
clerks from Bank C1 mentioned Objective 3. 
Objective 1 and Objective 2 were mentioned by 15 and 13 (of the 22) clerks respectively. 
All clerks from Bank A1 and Bank B1 mentioned Objective 1, whilst no clerk from Bank 
C1 mentioned it. 3 (of the 4) clerks from Bank D1 and 4 (of the 5) clerks from Bank D2 
mentioned Objective 1. 
When it comes to Objective 2, 3 (of the 4) clerks from Bank A2, 3 (of the 4) clerks from 
Bank D1 and 4 (of the 5) clerks from Bank D2 mentioned it, whilst only 1 (of the 4) 
clerk from Bank A1 and 1 (of the 3) clerks from Bank C1 mentioned it. (There is no 
reference to Bank B1 as there are only 2 clerks and the results of their answers can be 
seen from Table below.) 
 
 
                                               
333 “<...> более того, очень многие банки ввели, так называемые, гарантированные депозиты, 
где как раз сумма вклада ограничена и составляет 700 000 рублей.” (B1M1). 
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Table 6.5 
Clerks’ recollection of objectives of the DIS. 
Clerk Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3 
A1C1 Yes No No 
A1C2 Yes No No 
A1C3 Yes No No 
A1C4 Yes Yes Yes 
A2C1 No Yes Yes 
A2C2 Yes Yes No 
A2C3 No No Yes 
A2C4 Yes Yes Yes 
B1C1 Yes Yes Yes 
B1C2 Yes No No 
C1C1 No No Yes 
C1C2 No Yes No 
C1C3 No No Yes 
D1C1 No Yes No 
D1C2 Yes Yes No 
D1C3 Yes Yes No 
D1C4 Yes No No 
D2C1 No Yes Yes 
D2C2 Yes No No 
D2C3 Yes Yes No 
D2C4 Yes Yes No 
D2C5 Yes Yes No 
Total 15 13 8 
 
When asked about their understanding of how the DIS works (Clerks Interview Question 
4), clerks had to describe, in their own words, how they thought the DIS works. 
The answer to this question, given by D2C2, was not possible to analyse, as it contained 
only generic information334 and therefore will not be included in the total count. 
There have been 18 points in total that were mentioned by clerks when describing how 
the DIS works in their own words. 
17 (of the 21) clerks mentioned that the compensation takes place when some insured 
event happens. 
                                               
334 “Система страхования вкладов защищает наших клиентов в результате событий, связанных 
с банковской деятельностью, с экономикой.” (D2C2) 
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14 (of the 21) clerks mentioned the compensation amount, including 13 clerks stating the 
current maximum compensation amount of RUB 700,000, including B1C1, who also 
stated that there was a change in the maximum compensation amount in October 2008,335 
and the remaining 1 clerk, D1C2, referred to the compensation amount as a certain 
amount set by the Federal Law.336 
13 (of the 21) clerks mentioned the existence of the DIA, including 7 clerks who also 
mentioned that it is the DIA that is responsible for the compensation. 
4 (of the 21) clerks attempted to state the timings relevant to the process of the 
compensation, with only 1 clerk mentioning them correctly. A2C2 stated that the 
compensation happens ‘within some time’,337 A2C3 mentioned a ‘short period’,338 D1С3 
stated that depositors should receive compensation within the stated time, before the end 
of the act of revoking of the licence,339 and only D2C5 correctly stated two important 
time frames, namely the time for submitting a claim is not earlier than 14 days since the 
insured event, and the time for payment is 3 days after submitting the claim.340 
3 (of the 21) clerks mentioned the existence of a Federal Law which regulates the DIS, 
including 1, B1C1, referring only to the amendments to the Federal Law in October 
2008, and 3 (of the 21) clerks mentioned the existence of the register of banks-
participants of the DIS. 
There were 4 (of the 18) points, which were covered by 2 clerks each. These points 
were: 
1) the fact that their bank is a member of the DIS, mentioned by A1C3341 and 
D2C5342; 
                                               
335 “Вот законом от 13 октября 2008 года эта става повышена до 700 000 рублей, <...> 
раньше эта ставка составляла 400 000 рублей <...>.” (B1C1) 
336 “Клиент может получить определенную сумму, установленную в законе <...>.” (D1C2) 
337 “<...> и в течение какого-то времени выдаются деньги до 700 000.” (A2C2) 
338 “<...> а до 700 000 получают гарантированно, в короткий период.” (A2C3) 
339 “Клиент должен в указанные сроки, до момента завершения отзыва лицензии, <...> придти 
в этом место получить свою страховую сумму.” (D1C3) 
340 “<...> порядок выплат состоит из <...>, подачи заявки не ранее 14 дней со дня 
наступления страхового случая и выплате суммы возмещения в течение 3 дней.” (D2C5) 
341 “Банк является участником системы страхования <...>.” (A1C3) 
342 “<...> наш банк включен в систему страхования вкладов <...>.” (D2C5) 
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2) the fact that there are bank-agents who are appointed by the DIA and carry out 
the compensation on its behalf, mentioned by A1C2343 and A1C3;344 
3) the fact that depositors are informed by the media when the insured event 
happens, mentioned by D1C3345 and D2C5;346 and 
4) the fact that there is a process for depositors to claim an additional amount after 
the compensation from the DIA, mentioned by A2C1347 and A2C3.348 
There were 7 (of the 18) points, which were covered by 1 clerk each. These points are:  
1) the fact that banks pay contributions to the DI fund, mentioned by A1C1;349 
2) that all deposits in their bank are insured, mentioned by A1C3350,contrary to, for 
example, A2C4, who stated that deposits in any bank included in the register of 
the banks-participants of the DIS, are insured;351 
3) that no special insurance contract is required by the depositors, mentioned by 
A1C4;352 
4) that if depositor has more than one account in a bank, he will get a total 
compensation of RUB 700,000 maximum, whilst if a married couple open two 
separate accounts in one bank (one account per spouse), then they will get a 
compensation up to RUB 700,000 each, mentioned by A2C3;353 
5) that the compensation is based on the principle that a depositor can get 
compensation of up to RUB 700,000 in one bank, mentioned by C1C3;354 
                                               
343 “Банк выкупает какие-либо долги и выплачивает клиентам все сбережения.” (A1C2) 
344 “Банк <...> сейчас выплачивает по трем банками, является агентом по трем банкам 
<...>.” (A1C3) 
345 “<...> клиент об этом извещается в средствах массовой информации, <...> вывешивается 
информация для вкладчиков <...>.” (D1C3) 
346 “<...> порядок выплат состоит из специального объявления о банкротстве <...>.” (D2C5) 
347 “<...> еще клиент может взыскать какую-то сумму за моральный ущерб, но это уже не 
через Агентство.” (A2C1) 
348 “Свыше 700 000 вкладчики получают впоследствии, не сразу, <...> например, когда у 
банка будет уже имущество распродаваться, но это уже долгий процесс.” (A2C3) 
349 “Банки делают отчисления, а АСВ деньги приумножает <...>.” (A1C1) 
350 “Все вклады у нас застрахованы.” (A1C3) 
351 “<...> государство гарантирует всем вкладчикам в любом банке – там у них определенный 
список банков <...>.” (A2C4) 
352 “Вкладчикам не надо заполнять никаких специальных договоров по страхованию вкладов.” 
(A1C4) 
353 “<...> если даже вкладчик открыл несколько вкладов в одном банке, то ему выплачивается 
общая сумма до 700 000. А если у супругов, то каждому супругу выплачивается в 
отдельности, то есть можно на разные фамилии открыть.” (A2C3) 
354 “<...> 700 000 на данный момент, физическое лицо в одном банке.” (C1C3) 
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6) that not everything is insured under the DIS, mentioned by D1C4;355 and 
7) that the compensation is carried out only in RUB and, if the account was in 
foreign currency, then it is calculated based on the exchange rate on the day of 
insured event, mentioned by D2C1.356 
3 (out of the 21) clerks, though covering from 3 to 4 points in their descriptions, gave 
clearly false statements concerning the compulsory nature of the DIS. D1C1 stated that 
the compensation will be carried out by the DIA, if the bank is a part of it. D2C3 stated 
that banks can be insured not on the compulsory basis and that is it some sort of prestige. 
In her description, D2C4 referred to the clients of banks which are part of the DIS, 
whilst all banks dealing with retail depositors are/have to be members of the scheme. 
Table 6.6 provides an overview of all points covered by bank clerks when describing in 
their own words how the DIS operates. 
                                               
355 “<...> есть то, что не подлежит страхованию <...>.” (D1C4) 
356 “Клиент <...> до 700 000 рублей получит со всех счетов в банке, в рублях, только в 
рублях, на день страхового случая.” (D2C1) 
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Table 6.6 





































































































































































































































A1C1 + + +                3  
A1C2      +    +         2  
A1C3    + + +             3  
A1C4  +     + + + +         5  
A2C1  + +       +  +    +   5  
A2C2  + +       +  +     +  5  
A2C3  +        +  +    + + + 6  
A2C4        +  +         2  
B1C1       +
358 
  +  +       3  
                                               
357 “У нас”. 






































































































































































































































B1C2  + +       +  +       4  
C1C1          +         1  
C1C2  + +       +         3  
C1C3  +          +   +    3  
D1C1  + +       +  +       4 +359 
D1C2       + +  +  +
360 
      4  
D1C3          + + +     +  4  
D1C4  +          +  +     3  
D2C1  +        +  + +      4  
D2C2                   -  
D2C3  +        +  +       3 +361 
                                               
359 “<...> и это будет делать Агентство по страхованию вкладов, если банк в него входит.” (D1C1)  






































































































































































































































D2C4  + +       +  +       4 +362 
D2C5     +363     + + +     +  5  
Total 1 13 7 1 2 2 3 3 1 17 2 14 1 1 1 2 4 1  3 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
361 “<...> банки могу страховаться не на обязательной основе, это некий престиж.” (D2C3) 
362 “Клиенты банков, включенных в систему страхования вкладов <...>.” (D2C4) 
363 “<...> наш банк включен в систему страхования вкладов <...>.” (D2C5) 
 233 
Questioned about whether they had read the Federal Law (Clerks Interview Question 
5a), 19 of the 22 clerks said that they had have read it. The answers of these 19 clerks 
can be divided into three categories. The first category (10 of the 19 clerks) were certain 
that they had read the law, with 1 clerk , C1C2 , even remembering the serial number of 
the Federal Law364 and 1 clerk, A1C4, mentioning that she had read the Federal Law 
more than once because depositors check clerks’ knowledge every day. 365 The second 
category (4 of the 19 clerks) said that they had read the Federal Law a long time ago,366 
with1 clerk, A2C1, saying that, whilst they had read the changes from October 2008 
fully, they read the Federal Law itself quite a long time ago.367 The third category (5 of 
the 19 clerks) said that they have browsed through368 the Federal Law or had read it 
briefly.369 
Of the remaining 3 (of the 22) clerks, 1 clerk, D1C3, was not sure whether she had read 
the Federal Law or not.370 The remaining 2 clerks said they had not read it. C1C3 said 
that she had not have time yet to read it,371 as she had been in the job for only 6 months 
with no prior work experience in retail banking, whilst D2C2 said that he had not read it 
word for word, but imagined what it is about.372 
 
When asked whether they had seen the Recommendations of the DIA (on how best to 
inform the depositors about the DIS) (Clerks Interview Question 10b), only 5 of the 21 
clerks373 could answer positively, including D2С5, who saw the document at the branch 
information stand and then read it for himself.37414 of the 21 clerks had not read this 
document, including C1C3, who knew that such a document existed but had not had time 
                                               
364 “177? Да.” (C1C2) 
365 “Читали и не раз. Вкладчики наши проверяют нас на наши знания каждый день.” (A1C4) 
366 The Russian words used were ‘давно’, ‘давненько’ и ‘плохо помню’. 
367 “Ну, обновления, которые были от 14 октября, мы их полностью читали, а сам федеральный 
закон читали давненько.” (A2C1) 
368 The Russian word used was ‘просматривала’. 
369 The Russian word used was ‘примерно’, ‘поверхностно’ и ‘вкратце’.  
370 “Честно говоря, может быть, и читала, давно, не помню”. (D1C3) 
371 “По-моему, еще нет, не успела.” (C1C3) 
372 “Дословно не читал, но представляю, о чем он гласит.” (D2C2) 
373 The response of D2C1 to this question was not recorded. 
374 “Я увидел его на стенде, а потом собственноручно нашел и прочитал.” (D2C5) 
 234 
to read it yet375 for the reasons indicated above,. The 3 remaining clerks were not sure 
whether they had read it or not because, as A2C1376 and C1C1377 put it, they had read a 
lot of documents and could not remember whether it was called ‘recommendations’.  
The comparison of clerks’ acquaintance with the Federal Law and the Recommendations 
of the DIA are presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 
Familiarity of bank clerks with the Federal Law and the DIA’s Recommendations 
Clerk Federal Law Comments Recommendations Comments 
A1C1 +  +  
A1C2 +  +  
A1C3 + Long time ago ?  
A1C4 +  -  
A2C1 + Long time ago +/- Could not 
remember for sure 
A2C2 + Browsed through -  
A2C3 + Briefly -  
A2C4 + Long time ago -  
B1C1 +  -  
B1C2 +  -  
C1C1 +  +/- Could not 
remember for sure 
C1C2 +  +/- Could not 
remember for sure 
C1C3 -  - Knows that it 
exists 
D1C1 + Long time ago -  
D1C2 + Briefly -  
D1C3 +/- Could not remember 
for sure 
-  
D1C4 + Briefly -  
D2C1 +  // Answer not 
recorded 
D2C2 -  -  
D2C3 + Browsed through +  
D2C4 +  +  
D2C5 +  +  
Total 19 “+”  5 “+”  
                                               
375 “Ну, я знаю, что он есть, но еще не ознакомилась.” (С1С3) 
376 “Может быть, так получиться, что я читала, но не помню, что он так называется, что это 
рекомендации, потому что читать-то мы много чего читаем, просто не помню, что он именно так 
называется.” (A2C1) 
377 “Может быть, и читала. Я уже честно не помню. Я читала много информации.” (C1C1) 
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Senior Bank Staff Responses 
Senior bank staff were also asked to name the objectives of the DI reform (Heads of 
Branch Interview Question 4; Marketing Staff Interview Question 4) and no one could 
name all three objectives. 
Looking at Table 6.8, it is interesting to note that, as in the case of the clerks’ responses, 
Objective 3 was mentioned the fewest number of times, with senior bank staff from 
Banks B1 and C1 not mentioning it at all. 
Objective 1 and Objective 2 were mentioned by 5 and 7 (of the 9378) senior bank staff 
respectively. All heads of branch mentioned Objective 2, whilst both marketing officers 
mentioned only Objective 1. 
Table 6.8 
Senior bank staff’s recollection of objectives of the DIS. 
 Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3 
A1B1 Yes Yes Yes 
A2B1 No Yes Yes 
B1B1 No Yes No 
B1B2 Yes No No 
B1M1 Yes No No 
C1B1 Yes No No 
C1M1 Yes No No 
D1B1 Question not asked Question not asked Question not asked 
D2B1 No Yes Yes 
D2B2 Yes Yes No 
Total 6 5 3 
 
The only respondent from among the senior bank staff who named all three objectives 
was A1B1 who, in his response, noted that economic development in Russia was very 
unstable and the depositors’ confidence in the economic system was very low. He believed 
that, in order to raise this confidence, the state created the DIA, which directly gave 
                                               
378 The response of D1B1 to this question was not recorded. 
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impetus to people’s savings. He also added that, before the establishment of the DIS, 
depositors were not certain that their money would be in the bank the next morning.379 
Of the three senior bank staff who admitted not reading the Federal Law in full, A2B1 
stated only two objectives, Objective 2 and Objective 3, calling Objective 2 the principal 
objective of the reform.380 B1B1 named only Objective 2, stating that the objective of the 
reform is to raise the level of confidence in the banking system among the population,381 
whilst B1M1 recalled only Objective 1 and said that, in her opinion, the DIS allows the 
depositors to feel protected by the state.382 
 
On the issue of whether they had read the Federal Law (Heads of Branch Interview 
Question 4a, Marketing Staff Interview Question 4a), 6 of the 9 senior bank staff said 
that they had read it.383 They used words like “of course”384 and “certainly”.385 3 of the 9 
senior bank staff said that they had not read the Federal Law fully. A2B1386 and B1B1387 
stated that they had read only the parts which are relevant to their immediate work, 
whilst B1M1388 just browsed through the Federal Law. 
When asked whether senior bank staff had read the Recommendations of the DIA (on 
how best to inform the depositors about the DIS) (Heads of Branch Interview Question 
9b, Marketing Staff Interview Question 9b), 6 of the 8 senior bank staff answered 
positively, including A1B1, who was not sure at first and only confirmed that he had read 
                                               
379 “Развитие экономики очень нестабильно и доверие населения относительно экономической 
системы в стране низкое. Для того чтобы повысить это доверие, было государством <...> 
[создано] Агентство по страхованию вкладов, которое непосредственно дало толчок тому, 
чтобы люди делали депозиты в банках. До этого они не были уверены в том, что они завтра 
проснутся и окажутся без денег.” (A1B1). 
380 “Как мне кажется, основная цель <...>. Смысл этой системы в том, наверно, и был, чтобы 
вернуть доверие людей.” (A2B1). 
381 “Повысить доверие населения к банковской сфере, к банковской отрасли.” (B1B1). 
382 “По моему мнению, система страхования вкладов <...> позволяет вкладчикам <...> 
чувствовать защищенность со стороны государства <...>.” (B1M1). 
383 The response of D1B1 to this question was not recorded. 
384 The Russian words used were ‘конечно’.  
385 The Russian words used were ‘безусловно’. 
386 “Нет, не читал, основные положения только. Для себя я выбрал только то, что именно мне 
пригодится.” (A2B1). 
387 “В той части, которая касается непосредственно моей работы.” (A2B1). 
388 “Не полностью. Просматривала, я бы сказала так.” (A2B1). 
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it after having seen the document itself.389 He explained it by the sheer number of 
documents he has to deal with.390 2 of the 8 senior bank staff (heads of branch) had not 
read this document at all. 
The comparison of senior bank staff’s acquaintance with the Federal Law and the 
Recommendations of the DIA are presented in Table 6.9.  
Table 6.9 
Familiarity of senior bank staff with the Federal Law and the DIA’s Recommendations 
Staff Federal Law Comments Recommendations Comments 
A1B1 +  + After having 
seen the 
document 
A2B1 -/+ Only the main 
provisions 
+  
B1B1 -/+ Only the main 
provisions 
-  
B1B2 +  +  
B1M1 -/+  // Answer was 
not recorded 
C1B1 +  +  
C1M1 +  +  
D1B1 // Answer was 
not recorded 
// Answer was 
not recorded 
D2B1 +  -  
D2B2 +  +  
Total 6 “+” 
3 “-/+” 
 6 “+”  
6.2.7 Bank Staff Are Confident in Finding Appropriate Information 
to Answer Depositors’ Queries about the DIS (Impact 
Indicator 1.3.5) 
In order to assess the way bank staff get information about the DIS, whether in the 
course of their work or when depositors ask questions, when they did not know the 
answer, respondents were asked a series of questions. 
                                               
389 The responses of B1M1 and D1B1 to this question were not recorded. 
390 “Просто очень много документов. Давайте я посмотрю. <...> Да, я читал этот документ.” 
(A1B1). 
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When asked about how clerks personally, in the course of their job, receive information 
about changes in the DIS (Clerks Interview Question 12), the majority of respondents 
mentioned getting such information by email (19 of the 22 clerks). 
As can be seen from Table 6.10, only 6 of the 19 clerks, 31.6%, said they would receive 
such information by email from a designated person in the head office or via a bank-wide 
emailing. This number included 4 clerks from Bank D2, and clerks A1C3 and B1C1. 
While A1C3 mentioned that there are special people in the bank who are responsible for 
informing clerks about the changes in the DIS,391 B1C1 said that while there is a 
designated person in the head office who informs clerks about the changes in the 
legislation in force, the line manager also sends out emails with specific points to which 
clerks should pay attention.392 As for the 4 clerks from Bank D2, they all specifically 
mentioned a bank-wide emailing, referring to it as a ‘common emailing around the 
bank’,393 ‘internal emails from designated people’,394 ‘emailing for personnel’395 and 
‘official emailing around the bank’.396 
Table 6.10 
Methods used to receive information on changes in the DIS, internally within banks 






















A1C1 +    +   
A1C2 +       
A1C3  +      
A1C4 +       
A2C1   +     
                                               
391 “У нас есть специальные на это люди, которые нас уведомляют.” (A1C3) 
392 “<...> есть ответственное лицо в главном банке, которое рассылает нам изменения в 
действующем законодательстве. <...> Либо начальство нам рассылает конкретно те моменты, 
на которые нужно обратить внимание.” (B1C1) 
393 “Общая рассылка по банку.” (D2C1) 
394 “Путём писем по внутренней почте от ответственных за это людей.” (D2C2) 
395 “Рассылка для персонала по электронной почте.” (D2C3) 
396 “Официальная рассылка по банку <...>.” (D2C4) 
397 The Russian words used were ‘руководство’, ‘руководитель’ и ‘начальство’. 
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A2C2 +       
A2C3 +    +   
A2C4 +       
B1C1 + +      
B1C2   +     
C1C1   +   +  
C1C2    +    
C1C3    +    
D1C1   +     
D1C2      +398 + 
D1C3    + +   
D1C4 +       
D2C1  +      
D2C2  +      
D2C3  +      
D2C4  +   +   
D2C5   +  +   
 8 6 5 3 5 2 1 
 
The other email-related responses were getting an email with information on changes in 
the DIS from a line manager (8 of the 19 clerks, 42.1%) or getting an email in general, 
without mentioning where it would come from (5 of the 19 clerks, 26.3%). 
Non-email-related responses included: 
1) receiving the information from their line manager (without mentioning the 
method) – 3 of the 22 clerks; 
2) getting the information from the press – 5 of the 22 clerks; 
                                               
398 “Ну, опять-таки из нашего сайта следим за изменениями, ну, и периодически – закон.” 
(D1C2) 
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3) retrieving the information from, or checking the changes in, the legislation 
software – 2 of the 22 clerks; 
4) checking the bank’s website for the information on changes in the DIS – 1 of the 
22 clerks. 
It is interesting to note that, whilst A2C1 mentioned that they receive information by 
email in a timely manner, even ahead of the appearance of such information in the press 
or Internet.399 D2C5, on the contrary, said that, despite receiving the information by 
internal email, the personal/individual control via Internet is quicker than the bank 
communications.400 
When asked about the course of action taken in a situation when a depositor asks 
questions that the clerk could not answer (Clerks Interview Question 15), respondents 
gave different ways of finding the answer (see Table 6.11). 
As can be seen from Table 6.11, there is no consistency in the answers, either within 
each bank or across all banks, which may suggest that there is no general approach to 
dealing with queries regarding the DIS. 
The most common courses of action were asking colleagues for help and looking for an 
answer in the Federal Law (6 out the 22 clerks in both cases). Of these 6 clerks, in the 
first instance (asking colleagues for help), there were1 clerk from Bank A2, 2 clerks from 
Bank D1 and 3 from Bank D2, and only2 of them said they consulted colleagues as the 
only source of information, whilst the other 4 complemented colleagues’ advice from 
other sources. 
The clerks who claimed they looked for an answer in the Federal Law were from Bank 
A1 (1 clerk), Bank B1 (1clerk), Bank C1 (1 clerk), Bank D1 (1 clerk) and Bank D2 (2 
clerks), and used it as the only source of information, except for the2clerks from Bank 
                                               
399 “<...> если что-то у ЦБ новое вводится, то это в первую очередь рассылается и всем нам. 
Поэтому я считаю, что мы это узнаем оперативно. Мы узнаем, а на следующие дни эта 
информация появляется в прессе или в сети Интернет <...>.” (A2C1) 
400 “По внутренней почте, а также слежу за новостями в сети Интернет. Иногда личный 
контроль опережает внутреннюю электронную почту.” (D2C5) 
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D2, who also looked for help from colleagues401 or tried to get an answer from the 
specialist DI officer.402 
Table 6.11 



















A1C1 +        
A1C2   +      
A1C3   +      
A1C4      +   
A2C1  +       
A2C2 +        
A2C3 +        
A2C4 +    +    
B1C1      +   
B1C2        + 
C1C1      +   
C1C2    +     
C1C3    +    + 
D1C1     +  +  
D1C2     +    
D1C3      +   
D1C4        + 
D2C1  +    +   
D2C2   +      
D2C3     +    
D2C4     + +   
D2C5     +  +  
Total 4 2 3 2 6 6 2 3 
 
Whilst clerks from Bank A2 did not see looking for an answer in the Federal Law as a 
possible way of solving a depositor’s query, 3 of them indicated that they would normally 
consult the line manager – the second most common course of action (4 of the 22 clerks). 
                                               
401 “Искать информацию буду в законе в первую очередь, потом спрошу у более опытных 
сотрудников.” (D2C4) 
402 “Есть контактное лицо в банке, отвечающее за рассылки о системе страхования вкладов. 
Рядом с кассой висит ФЗ – можно освежить память.” (D2C1) 
403 The Russian words used were ‘руководство’, ‘руководитель’ и ‘начальство’. 
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The third most common option was to consult specialist officers in the head office (3 of 
the 22 clerks). These specialist officers would be mainly from the customer services404 or 
other employees specially trained to deal with depositor enquiries.405 
The fourth most common option was to consult the head of retail, and to consult the 
specialist DI officer in the head office (2 of the 22 clerks in both cases). The2 clerks who 
would have consulted the head of retail were from Bank C1, and their course of action 
can be explained by the fact that the head of retail sits in with the clerks in one of the 
branches so clerks have an easy access to her.406 Of the 2 clerks who would have 
consulted the specialist DI officer in the head office, only 1 would have used solely 
specialist officers’ knowledge,407 while the other clerk would have also looked for an 
answer in the Federal Law. 
Other courses of action included consulting the ‘magic folder’ containing the information 
on DIS, 408using the cheat-sheets from the DIA,409 and advising a depositor to visit the 
Q&A page on the bank’s website (or printing it out if the depositor does not have Internet 
access).410 
Another interesting fact is that only 4 of the 22 clerks mentioned that, if they are unable 
to find the answer while a depositor was waiting, they would ask the depositor for their 
telephone number and would call them back once they had found the answer.411 These 
clerks were from Bank A1 (1 clerk) Bank A2 (1 clerk) and from Bank D2 (2 clerks from 
the same branch). 
                                               
404 “<...> обращусь в сервисную службу в нашем филиале, а потом – в головной офис.” 
(D2C2) 
405 “У нас очень много сотрудников – и тренера, и супервизоры, которые помогут нам в 
решении каких-либо вопросов, проблем.” (A1C2) 
406 “В первую очередь, позвоню – самый простой вариант – позвонить начальнику управления 
розничного бизнеса, выяснить у нее <...>.” (C1C2) 
407 “Если бы это было до 6 часов вечера, то можно было бы позвонить в головной банк, так уже 
пообщаться конкретно с тем, кто этим занимается.” (A2C1) 
408 “У нас есть волшебная папочка, я залезу в папочку почитать.” (B1C2) 
409 “У нас есть шпаргалки от именно этого Агентства, от самого, то <...> там посмотрю, если 
не знаю.” (C1C3) 
410 “Я скажу, что на нашем сайте, если у клиента есть доступ, то есть очень хорошая страница 
с «вопросом-ответом». И были такие клиенты, у которых нет доступа, я им просто 
распечатывала <...>.” (D1C4) 
411 “Попрошу подождать, найду информацию, а если не смогу сразу найти, то попрошу номер 
телефона и перезвоню.” (D2C4) 
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Senior Bank Staff Responses 
When asked about how they, personally, in the course of their job, receive information 
about changes in the DIS (Heads of Branch Interview Question 13; Marketing Staff 
Interview Question 13), all of the senior bank staff mentioned getting such information 
internally, with only 5 of the9412 respondents saying that they would also consult external 
sources. 
A1B1 stated that, in Bank A1, they would normally get updated on any changes in the 
DIS from the trainers in the head office, who are specifically responsible for this.413 
With regard to Bank A2, A2B1 said that he would personally receive the information on 
the changes in the DIS from his immediate line managers in the Operations Department, 
or from newspapers.414 
From the responses the2 heads of branch at Bank B1, it appears that there is no uniform 
way in which they get information on changes in the DIS, as each of them gave a 
different answer. 
B1B1 stated that the Legal Department of the bank is responsible for all the changes in 
any legislation, including legislation on the DIS, and that this department would analyse 
the information and would send it to the branch via email.415 
B1B2, in turn, specified that they monitor the legislation database in the branch on a 
weekly basis, and that is how they get information on any changes, including those 
related to the DIS.416 
Both the head of branch and the marketing officer from Bank C1 named the Internet as a 
possible source for the information on changes in the DIS. C1B1 also mentioned the 
                                               
412 The response of B1M1 to this question was not recorded. 
413 “<...> у нас есть тренеры в главном офисе <...>, которые представляют информацию, все 
обновления исходят непосредственно от них.” (A1B1). 
414 “Непосредственно от своих руководителей с операционного департамента или 
самостоятельно, из газет.” (A2B1). 
415 “Изменением любого законодательства, в том числе, и системы страхования вкладов, у нас 
занимается <...> наш юридический департамент, которые анализирует всю информацию и 
<...> спускает нам в электронных сообщениях.” (B1B1). 
416 “У нас проводится мониторинг всей законодательной базы на еженедельной основе. <...> 
если что-то появляется, то мы это видим и обновляемся.” (B1B2). 
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Central Bank’s normative documents, which they receive timely, as the internal sources, 
as well as TV and radio as other possible external sources,417 whilst C1M1 also 
mentioned employees in the head office of the bank.418 
D1B1 stated that, in Bank D1, they would receive information on changes in the DIS via 
centralised internal emailing as well as via new, updated, marketing materials. As for the 
external sources, they would monitor the media, but D1B1 specifically pointed out that 
the Head Office would always send them information on the changes before they appear 
in the major Russian newspapers.419 
The responses of the 2 heads of branch from Bank D2 were very similar. D2B1 stated 
that they would receive information on changes in the DIS via internal email, at internal 
meetings or on the Internet.420 D2B2 echoed this by mentioning centralised emailing and 
special training sessions for staff.421 
 
When asked who is responsible for provision of information on DIS bank-wide (Heads of 
Branch Interview Question 12; Marketing Staff Interview Question 12), not all 
respondents could clearly describe whether their banks have a dedicated person in charge 
of provision of information on the DIS.422 
In Bank A1, there appears to be a two-tier system which, according to A1B1, includes 
the trainers in the head office, who would be the first point of contact for the bank’s 
employees if they have any questions, including those about the DIS and, at branch level, 
                                               
417 “Масса источников – сеть Интернет, <...> нормативные документы Центрального банка, с 
которыми нас своевременно знакомят, телевидение, радио.” (C1B1). 
418 “Либо через сотрудников банка [головного офиса] <...>, либо сами через сеть Интернет.” 
(C1M1). 
419 “Центральная рассылка внутри банка и раздаточные материалы. Сами также отслеживаем 
СМИ. Не было случая, кода центральный офис не прислал информацию до того, как она 
появилась в центральных российских газетах.” (D1B1). 
420 “В сети Интернет, по внутренней почте, на собраниях.” (D2B1). 
421 “Любые изменения в законодательстве они централизованно приходят по рассылке. Также 
мы организуем тренинги.” (D2B2). 
422 The response of B1M1 to this question was not recorded. 
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the head of the branch who takes on a controlling role and checks to what extent the 
employees have familiarised themselves with one or another information.423 
A2B1 may have been confused and, in his answer to this question, mentioned the 
department of retail depositors’ services in the headquarters of the Bank A2 in Moscow, 
rather than the head office in Saint-Petersburg. Moreover, he stated that in the branch, in 
all probability, he would be the dedicated person responsible for information provision 
and, in his absence, any of the clerks would be able to provide the necessary information, 
because the head of branch and the clerks are interchangeable in this respect.424 
From the responses of 2 heads of branch, it appears that Bank B1 also has a two-tier 
system. Whereas B1B1 mentioned the department for development of the banking 
network, and in particular the head of the division for banking network support and 
maintenance,425 B1B2 said that the person with overall responsibility for provision of 
information on the DIS is the head of branch.426 He added that, in principle, the 
information provision depends on the depositors and it is their choice – they can read the 
information on the information stands in the branch or during the conversation with the 
clerk.427 
As for Bank C1, C1B1 stated that, in the branch, they always have 1clerk on each of the 
2 shifts who works with retail depositors, and it is her responsibility to provide 
depositors with the information on the DIS, and that the head of branch would inform the 
                                               
423 “<...> у нас есть тренеры в главном офисе. <...> Я же здесь исполняют роль 
контролирующего органа, то есть проверяю, насколько сотрудники знакомились с той или иной 
информацией.” (A1B1). 
424 “Вот непосредственно про головной банк <...>. У них есть отдел обслуживания 
физических лиц, они занимаются вкладами, депозитами. [Это] если брать Москву. Если брать 
наш дополнительный офис, то привлечением занимаюсь я, то, скорее всего, я. А если я 
отсутствую, то проконсультировать может любой операционист <...>. У нас 
взаимозаменяемость.” (A2B1). 
425 “Непосредственно по дополнительным офисам, такую информацию нам спускает 
департамент развития банковской сети в лице руководителя отдела поддержки и 
сопровождения банковской сети <...>.” (B1B1). 
426 “Вообще отвечает за все руководитель структурного подразделения <...>.” (B1B2). 
427 “А именно непосредственно доведение информации до каждого клиента это как бы выбор 
клиента. <...> [Он может] все почерпнуть, допустим, либо из информации, которая 
расположена на стендах, либо при личной беседе.” (B1B2). 
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depositors he works with personally.428 When prompted to imagine the situation where a 
clerk would not know something and would need to seek advice from someone else in the 
bank, C1B1 claimed that the bank’s clerks know everything about the DIS.429 
Furthermore, C1M1 said that the head of Department of Retail Business has the overall 
responsibility for the provision of information on the DIS in the bank.430 
D1B1 described the system in place in Bank D1 as a system of centres of competence, 
whereby one employee in the branch studies some issue fully and thus become the 
dedicated person whom all other employees can approach if they do not know something. 
With regard to the DIS, the senior clerk, who is the centre of competence for this issue in 
the branch, is responsible for monitoring all issues related to the DIS, including ensuring 
that the branch does not run out of the green brochures.431 
The2 heads of branch from Bank D2 gave different answers. Whilst D2B1 stated that 
the person responsible for providing the information on the DIS are the clerks,432 D2B2 
said that the dedicated person in the branch is the head of branch, and in the head office, 
the dedicated persons are the head of the department of retail business and the lawyer.433 
6.2.8 Banks Inform Depositors about the DIS (Impact Indicator 
1.3.6) 
In order to understand what information banks provide about the DIS to their depositors 
and potential clients, respondents were asked a series of questions concerning the type of 
information they provide, at what stage of the process do they provide the information, 
and how banks keep their depositors abreast of the changes in the DIS. 
                                               
428 “У нас работают две смены и в каждой смене есть специалист, который обслуживает 
непосредственно физических лиц. При общении с клиентами и потенциальными вкладчиками в 
её обязанности входит как раз информирование о системе страхования вкладов. Естественно, 
когда я общаюсь с вкладчиками, то я довожу до них информацию.” (C1B1). 
429 “Я думаю, что она всё знает.” (C1B1). 
430 “Начальник отдела розничного бизнеса.” (C1M1). 
431 “У нас установлена система центров компетенции, когда один сотрудник изучает какой-
либо вопрос в полном объёме. У нас есть старший специалист, который является 
ответственным за мониторинг вопросов о системе страхования вкладов, а также за наличие 
буклетов.” (D1B1). 
432 “Сотрудники в отделении.” (D2B1). 
433 “В рамках отделения – управляющая, а там [в головном офисе] – непосредственно 
руководитель и юрист.” (D2B2). 
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Clerks were asked at which stage of the process of opening a bank account they inform 
the retail depositors about the DIS (Clerks Interview Question 7). As there are 
differences between the banks as to the process of opening of bank savings accounts, the 
responses will be analysed in groups (according to banks). 
All 4 clerks from Bank A1 said that they would normally inform the depositors at the 
consultation stage, when depositors decide whether to open a savings account in their 
bank and look at the product range to choose the interest rates. 
Clerks from Bank A2 differed in their responses. A2C1 said that she would provide the 
information at the very beginning to depositors who open an account for the first time, 
whilst those who come to renew an account will already be informed.434 However, she 
then added that this does not happen straight away when the depositors come into the 
branch, but that it is done during the discussion about the amount, term of the deposit 
and so on. Further, she said that they do not ‘scare’ depositors straight away by saying 
that the depositors are insured so that depositors do not run away.435 
A2C2 said that she would not tell every depositor about the DIS, and would talk about it 
if the depositors have doubts because, in her opinion, those who appear confident 
probably know about the scheme and are not interested.436 A2C3 mentioned that, 
normally, he would mention the DIS at the consultation stage, adding that when and if 
the depositor enquires.437 A2C4 said that, in her experience, depositors themselves 
always ask about the DI at an early stage. She added that, before opening a savings 
account, they research the banks, their interest rates and whether the deposits are 
insured because, for depositors, the fact that deposits are insured is one of the most 
                                               
434 ‘<...> обычно, кто переоформляет – они уже все в курсе изначально. А те, кто приходит с 
улицы, мы, конечно же, сразу де им говорим.’ (A2C1) 
435 ‘Я не могу сказать, что это прямо сразу происходит. Я имею в виду, клиент приходит и 
говорит: «Я хочу открыть вклад», а мы ему сразу же вот начинаем, что вот у нас вклады 
застрахованы. Конечно, это не так, это все в процессе объясняется, когда он сумму выбирает, 
сроки и так далее. Но сразу мы его никогда не пугаем, что все вклады у нас застрахованы, 
чтобы он никуда не убежал <...>.’ (A2C1) 
436 ‘Ну, если человек приходит и сомневается о том, что хочет он или не хочет открыть, то, 
конечно, мы говорим <...>. А если человек приходит, и если он уверен, то он, по всей 
видимости, знает о системе страхования, то есть если уверены люди, то их, в принципе, это не 
интересует.’ (A2C2) 
437 ‘На стадии консультирования. В основном-то говорим, когда клиент интересуется.’ (A2C3) 
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important questions, and they will not open a savings account in a bank where deposits 
are not insured.438She also added that they say that deposits are insured somewhere 
between the words.439 
Clerks from Bank B1 said that they would tell the depositors about the DIS at a very 
early stage but explained such a course of action differently. B1C1 said that she will 
generally inform the depositors at the initial stage440 and, when asked further about 
depositors with small amounts, said that she mentions the DIS to everyone.441 B1C2, on 
the other hand, mentioned that she would inform the depositors about the DIS when they 
come to the branch, but only as a reaction to their questions. She said that, in most cases, 
depositors already know what they want and are simply interested whether deposits in 
the bank are insured.442 
Clerks from Bank C1 differed in their responses. Whilst C1C1 said she would inform the 
depositors at the initial stage when they discuss the options and sign a contract,443 C1C2 
and C1C3 would only mention the DIS to the depositors when they444 ask and if they 
ask,445 respectively.  
All 4 clerks from Bank D1 said they would inform the depositors about the DIS at the 
initial stage. It should be noted that, due to the nature of the process of opening a bank 
account at the bank, the depositors firstly open a current account and only then open a 
savings account. The ‘initial stage’ in clerks’ responses refers to the very early stage, 
before filling in the forms for the current account.446 D1C2, D1C3 and D1C4 also 
                                               
438 ‘Как правило, клиенты всегда спрашивают. Они, прежде чем открыть вклад <...> ходят по 
разным банкам, смотрят, где какие проценты и застрахован вклад или нет. Естественно, для 
них это один из самых важных вопросов, потому что если не застрахован, они не будут 
открывать вклад в этом банке.’ (A2C4) 
439 ‘<...> и где-то промеж слов мы ему говорим, что вклады, конечно, застрахованы.’ (A2C4) 
440 ‘Ну, вообще, рассказываю на начальной стадии.’ (B1C1) 
441 ‘Ну, <...> стараюсь каждому рассказывать.’ (B1C1) 
442 ‘Чаще всего, когда только приходят. <...> Но чаще всего клиент уже знает, что хочет, его 
просто интересует, страхуем ли мы.’ (B1C2) 
443 ‘На первой стадии, когда идет оформление договора, когда предлагаешь продукцию, можно 
так сказать.’ (C1C1) 
444 ‘<...> если человеку нужна информация, он начинает задавать вопросы, тогда, 
естественно, более подробно уже рассказываем об этом.’ (С1С2) 
445 ‘По мере необходимости, то есть если сами спрашивают.’ (С1С3) 
446 ‘<...> изначально при открытии счета, пока они заполняют анкеты, мы им все 
проговариваем.’ (D1C1) 
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mentioned that they would normally tell the depositors at the initial stage, unless 
depositors asked them first.447 
Clerks from Bank D2 gave differing responses. Whilst 3 of the 5 clerks mentioned that 
they would inform the depositors about the scheme before or during the filling in of the 
application for the service package (which in this bank includes a current account and a 
credit card in the first place, with the opportunity to open a savings account once the 
current account has been set up), D2C4 said they try to tell the depositors, but it does not 
happen every time448 and D2C3 stated that she does not automatically inform the 
depositors if they do not ask questions.449 
When asked whether the provision of information about the DIS by their bank is more 
commonly provided orally, or in a written form, (Clerks Interview Question 11), clerks 
gave the following answers (see Table 6.12).450 
Overall, there were 10 of the 20clerks (50%) who said that the provision of information 
was both in oral and written form equally, apart from response from D2C5, as illustrated 
below. Of the remaining 10 clerks, 9 stated that the information was provided mostly 
orally. Some of the clerks went on to explain their responses. 
A2C3 stated that the information is conveyed predominantly orally because, whilst there 
is information about the DIS on the information stand, the depositors do not like to read 
and sometimes do not know how to read.451 C1C2 agreed, saying that, whilst there is a 
lot of information displayed in the branch, it does not mean that depositors will read it.452 
D2C4 was the only clerk (of the 20) who said that the provision of information was 
mainly in a written form. This response contradicts the answers given by clerks from the 
                                               
447 ‘Да, в принципе, мы говорим им <...> при открытии. В основном сейчас, на самом деле, 
клиенты всегда первые интересуются.’ (D1C4) 
448 ‘Стараемся говорить. Не каждый раз, но говорим.’ (D2C4) 
449 ‘В обязательном порядке, если не спрашивают, – нет.’ (D2C3) 
450 The responses of D1C4 and D2C1 were not recorded, so will not be analysed, hence, the total 
count for this question is 20 clerks. 
451 ‘У нас на стенде <...> есть информация о страховании вкладов. В основном, устно <...> 
потому что люди читать у нас не любят, не хотят, им не понятно это. Они даже читать не 
умеют почти что.’ (A2C3) 
452 ‘Информации много размещено в самом дополнительном офисе, но не факт, что они будут 
все это читать.’ (C1C2) 
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same bank, where D2C3 said the information was conveyed mainly orally and D2C2 and 
D2C5 mentioned that, in their opinion, the ratio of oral to written information was 50/50 
and 60/40 respectively. 
Table 6.12 
The format of information about the DIS provided to retail depositors 
Clerk Oral Written Comments 
A1C1 + + In the contract and the brochure 
A1C2 + + Firstly orally, then also to read 
A1C3 +   
A1C4 +  90% oral information 
A2C1 + + Orally and written 
A2C2 +  In majority – orally 
A2C3 +  People do not like to read, do not want, they event 
cannot even read almost 
A2C4 + + 50/50 (mentioned DIA brochure as theirs)453 
B1C1 +   
B1C2 +   
C1C1 + + 50/50 
C1C2 +  There is a lot of information in the branch, but it 
does not mean depositors will read it  
C1C3 + + Equally 
D1C1 + + Orally plus open our green brochure before them 
(while speaking)454 
D1C2 + + Orally plus give them written information 
D1C3 +   
D1C4   Answer was not recorded 
D2C1   Answer was not recorded 
D2C2 + + 50/50: orally plus give them our own brochure 
D2C3 +   
D2C4  +  
D2C5 + + 60% orally, 40% written 
 
When asked what steps the bank would take should changes in the DIS occur (Clerks 
Interview Question 10a), a majority of clerks said that they would update the information 
stands in the branch (8 clerks of the 22) and informed the depositors orally (12 of the 22 
clerks) – the existing depositors when they come to re-new their savings accounts and 
the new depositors when they want to open an account with the bank. 
                                               
453 See footnote below: 
454 Referred to the DIA brochure like to their bank’s own. 
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For example, A1C3 stated they have to change the information stands promptly and will 
also inform depositors about the changes at the consultation stage.455.A2C3 mentioned 
the fact that the depositors come to his branch to receive their monthly pension, or simply 
to check whether the bank is still there and that this is when they would also update them 
on any changes in the DIS.456 
All 4 clerks from Bank D1 mentioned their bank’s website as the source of information on 
changes in the DIS.457 Only 2 other clerks (of the 5 remaining banks), A1C2 and C1C1, 
mentioned the Internet as a platform for informing depositors about changes.458 
With regard to informing depositors individually of any changes, only 3 of the 22 clerks 
said that it is, or might be done, in their banks. D1C1 said that, though she was not 
100% sure, there are updates about any changes sent via the online bank account to 
those depositors who have access to online banking.459 A1C2 indicated that, upon 
signature of the contract, depositors may choose to be updated on any relevant issues, 
either in a written form or over the telephone.460 Similarly, D2C3 stated that, whilst she 
has not contacted the depositors personally, the bank might have been sending out 
information via email or SMS, as there is such a service to which depositors can subscribe 
when applying for the service package with the bank.461 
There were also 5 of the 22 clerks, who explicitly stated that they do not inform the 
depositors about changes in the DIS personally by post or over the telephone. B1C1462 
                                               
455 ‘<...> мы должны оперативно менять стенд, на этапе консультаций будем говорить об 
изменениях.’ (A1C3) 
456 ‘Они заходят часто сюда, мы с ними общаемся, передаем. Они пенсию получают или, бывает, 
просто заходят – им интересно, здесь ли мы ещё.’ (A2C3) 
457 ‘Вся информация об изменениях – на нашем сайте.’ (D1C2) 
458 ‘Если изменения, то <...> размещаем тут на стендах, можем разместить в сети Интернет 
<...>.’ (C1C1) 
459 ‘<...> также возможно – не могу 100% сказать – у нас есть Интернет-банк и тем, у кого 
подключен Интернет-банк, новости присылают о том, что происходит, об изменениях любых.’ 
(D1C1) 
460 ‘<...> информация идёт <...> посредством телефонных звонков <...>. Спрашиваем 
клиента, каким образом оповещать – письменно или по телефону.’ (A1C2) 
461 ‘С точки зрения меня, не информирую. Может, банк рассылает маркетинговую информацию 
по электронной почте или SMS-оповещением, на которые клиенты могут подписаться при 
подаче заявления.’ (D2C3) 
462 ‘По телефону мы, конечно, никого не обзваниваем.’ (B1C1) 
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and D2C4463 said that they did not make individual telephone calls to their depositors. 
A2C1 argued that, even though they do not work with depositors individually, maybe it 
is something which needs to be done, but would have to be discussed with the line 
manager,464 whilst A2C3 indicated that they did not telephone depositors because there 
was no such instruction given to them.465 C1C3 mentioned that, although they did not 
inform the depositors personally, they would inform the depositors about the changes if 
they telephoned the branch.466 
Interestingly enough, clerks from Bank D2, who work as individual client managers, 
provided two contrasting statements about the update of information to their depositors 
over the telephone. Whilst, as reported in the paragraph above, D2C4 said that they did 
not make individual telephone calls, D2C5 stated that he tried to inform all the depositors 
for whom he had opened a savings account by telephone.467 
D2C4 also mentioned providing additional training to personnel of the branch should any 
changes in the DIS necessitate it.468 
 
When asked about the information banks provide to the depositors in respect of the DIS 
(Clerks Interview Question 10), clerks presented the general information given to 
depositors orally, which is supposed to inform them about the DIS and their rights under 
the scheme. Table 6.13 below provides an overview of all points mentioned by bank 
clerks in their answers to this question. 
A1C2 stated that she has not worked with new depositors yet (as she has only recently 
started working with retail depositors469), so she could not give a full answer. Her answer 
to this question included the information on what depositors ask when they come into the 
                                               
463 ‘По телефону не обзваниваем.’ (D2C4) 
464 ‘Отдельно мы с ним не работаем. Может, это и нужно было бы делать как-то – связываться 
по почте, но это все нужно обговаривать с руководством.’ (A2C1) 
465 ‘А так специально мы не обзванивали – не было такого указания.’ (A2C3) 
466 ‘Лично, конечно, никого не информировали. По телефону, допустим, если кто-то звонит, то, 
естественно, ты ему говоришь, что сумма такая-то.’ (C1C3) 
467 ‘Своих существующих клиентов, кому я депозиты размещал, старался звонить и 
информировать об изменении суммы возмещения.’ (D2C5) 
468 ‘<...> проводим дополнительные тренинги с персоналом.’ (D2C4) 
469 ‘С вкладами буквально недавно работаю.’ (A1C2) 
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branch, rather than what kind of information she would provide to the depositor 470As a 
result, this answer will not be included in the total count. 
12 of the 21 clerks stated that they would say to the depositors that their bank is a 
member of the DIS, and these clerks were from Bank A1 (50%), Bank A2 (50%), Bank 
D1 (100%) and Bank D2 (80%). For example, A2C4 mentioned, in the answer to a 
different question (Clerks Interview Question 7), that they would tell their depositors not 
only that the bank is a member of the DIS, but also that 98% of the bank belongs to the 
state, and that Vladimir Putin is the head of the supervisory council of the head 
organisation. He added that this provokes interest among the depositors and that they 
like to hear this.471 
14 of the 21 clerks (66.7%) would mention the compensation amount. 
5 of the 21 clerks (23.8%) would inform the depositors that there will be a compensation 
if something happens to the bank and 4 of the 21 clerks (19.04%) said that they would 
say that all deposits are insured. 
When it comes to informing the depositors about the process of compensation, there were 
only 2 clerks who explicitly said that they will convey such information to the depositors, 
whilst 3 other clerks mentioned that they would cover it if depositors asked specifically 
about it. In particular, A1C4 stated that she would tell the depositors that all deposits are 
insured and inform them about the compensation amount. From her experience, 
depositors then, as a general rule, start taking interest in finding out more about the 
process of compensation.472 This was echoed by C1C1, who said that she would inform 
the depositors about the amount, and the conditions for compensation, but would explain 
                                               
470 ‘С новыми клиентами я пока что еще не работала. В основном, они приходят, спрашивают 
ставки по вкладам, а потом начинают – а у вас как со страхованием. Это их обычный вопрос. 
Начинаешь рассказывать, что согласно закону о страховании и так далее, и так далее.’ (A1C2) 
471 ‘Говорим, что мы не только входим в систему страхования вкладов, что мы являемся 
государственной на 98% структурой, во главе наблюдательного совета которой – Путин, 
государственный лидер наш российский, что у людей сразу появляется интерес, то есть им 
приятно это слышать.’ (A2C3) 
472 ‘Дальше уже клиенты, как правило, начинают идти на контакт и интересоваться более 
подробно, как это возмещение происходит.’ (A1C4) 
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the process of compensation only if depositors were interested in further information.473 
С1С2 also said that she would tell depositors about the fact that all deposits are insured 
and will state the compensation amount, after which she would await questions from the 
depositors.474 
Some clerks said that they would complement the information provided orally with some 
written information. For example, D2C1 mentioned that, apart from telling depositors 
that the bank is a member of the DIS, she would give them their own brochure.475 A1C3 
said that, apart from telling the depositors that the bank is a member of the DIS and that 
all deposits are insured in full up to RUB 700 000, she would also provide the depositors 
with a special folder containing information on the DIS.476 A2C1 stated that she would 
give depositors a copy of the Federal Law to read and that, as they have a DIA logo in all 
branches of the bank, depositors see it straight away and, as a consequence, do not ask 
additional questions.477 
Overall, it can be seen from the responses that clerks would limit the information to two 
points, namely the fact that the bank is a member of the DIS and/or the compensation 
amount. This can be explained with the response given by B1C1, in which she stated that 
she would inform the depositors about the licence, about the compensation amount, 
including the fact that it was increased by the ‘so and so’ law, because this is all that 
depositors are still listening to.478 C1C3, in her response, also stated that she would 
                                               
473 ‘Какая сумма страхуется, при каких условиях, если что-то происходит, и если человек уже 
дальше интересуется, то можно рассказать, куда обращаться, что делать.’ (C1C1) 
474 ‘Я ему сообщу, что, естественно, все наши вклады застрахованы, и дальше буду ждать, 
последуют ли какие-то вопросы, ну, сумму назову.’ (C1C2) 
475 ‘Что наш банк входит в систему страхования вкладов, даю наш собственный буклетик.’ 
(D2C1) 
476 ‘Что банк является участником системы страхования, что все вклады застрахованы в полном 
объеме до 700 000, и предоставляем папочку [по страхованию] клиентам.’ (A1C3) 
477 ‘Даем прочитать этот закон, обновленный. У нас этот значок, он всегда сопутствует, во всех 
отделениях, и клиент сразу же видит, поэтому вопросы дополнительные он особо и не задает 
<...>.’ (A2C1) 
478 ‘В основном, что банк имеет лицензию, о сумме страхования вкладов, о том, что по данному 
закону от такого-то числа она была повышена – в принципе, это основное, что они еще 
слушают.’ (B1C1) 
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inform depositors about the compensation amount only, because this is what is of greatest 
interest to depositors nowadays.479 
Only 3 of the 21 clerks mentioned that they would inform the depositors of the DIA’ 
existence and/or provide the depositors with its contact details. B1C2 stated that she 
would provide the information about the Agency, which insures the deposits and provide 
the depositor with its address, because many depositors ask to write it down480 D2C4 and 
D2C5 also said that they would tell the depositors who is guaranteeing their deposits481. 
Only 2 clerks, D1C1482 and D2C2483, mentioned that they would inform the depositors 
about the fact that accounts in foreign currencies are also insured, and that the 
compensation will be calculated based on the daily exchange rate of the Central Bank.  
Moreover, only C1C1484 and D2C4485 stated that they would inform the depositors about 
the conditions leading to the deposit insurance compensation. 
The remaining 5 (of the 17) points, which were covered by 1 clerk each include: 
• that the bank is paying out the compensation on behalf of the DIA(bank-agent), 
mentioned by A1C1;486 
• that depositors will be informed in case of the insured event over the telephone or 
via media, mentioned by A2C3;487 
• that the bank has a banking licence, mentioned by B1C1;488 
                                               
479 ‘<...> так как сейчас всех интересует, кто, сколько получит, первым делом называется 
страховая сумма, то есть всех интересует это.’ (С1С3) 
480 ‘<...> Агентство, которое страхует – у нас есть адрес, многие просят адрес записать.’ 
(B1C2) 
481 ‘<...> а также о порядке выплаты и кто гарантирует.’ (D2C5) 
482 ‘<...> что сумма в размере 700 000 рублей и эквивалент возмещается.’ (D1C1) 
483 ‘<...> что все средства, соответствующие сумме – рубли и валюта по курсу ЦБ – 
застрахованы <...>.’ (D2C2) 
484 ‘Какая сумма страхуется, при каких условиях, если что-то происходит <...>.’ (C1C1) 
485 ‘Очень подробно я бы не стала говорить – кто, в каких случаях, сумма, какие вклады 
страхуются.’ (D2C4) 
486 ‘<...> что банк также выплачивает клиентам других банков выплаты, то есть по банку-
партнеру, который разорился <...>.’ (A1C1) 
487 ‘Что <...> оповестят об этом – сообщат по телефону или в средствах массовой информации 
<...>.’ (A2C3) 
488 ‘<...> что банк имеет лицензию <...>.’ (B1C2) 
 256 
• that the compensation amount has been increased by the Federal Law in October 
2008, mentioned by B1C1;489 and 
• that there are different types of bank accounts that are insured under the DIS, 
mentioned by D2C4.490 
                                               
489 ‘<...> о том, что по данному закону от такого-то числа она была повышена.’ (B1C1) 









































































































































































































































A1C1 + + +              3  
A1C2                 -  
A1C3 +491 +  +           +  4  
A1C4    + + !492           2  
A2C1     +  +          2  
A2C2 + +      +         3  
A2C3  +      +
493 
+        3 + 
                                               
491 ‘<...> все вклады застрахованы в полном объеме до 700 000 <...>.’ (A1C3) 
492 ‘Дальше уже клиенты, как правило, начинают идти на контакт и интересоваться более подробно, как это возмещение происходит.’ (A1C4) 






































































































































































































































A2C4    + + +        +   4  
B1C1     +     + +      3  
B1C2     +       +     2  
C1C1     + !       +    2  
C1C2    + +494 !           2  
C1C3     +            1  
D1C1  +   +495            2 + 
D1C2  +   +496            2  
D1C3  +   +   +         3 + 
                                               
494 ‘Я ему сообщу, что, естественно, все наши вклады застрахованы, и дальше буду ждать, последуют ли ещё какие-то вопросы, ну, сумму назову.’ 
(C1C2) 
495 ‘<...> что сумма в размере 700 000 рублей и эквивалент возмещается.’ (D1C1) 






































































































































































































































D1C4 +497 +               2  
D2C1  +498            +   2  
D2C2 +499 +      +         3  
D2C3  +   +            2  
D2C4     +       + +   + 4  
D2C5  +   + +  +    +     5  
Total 5 12 1 4 14 2 
(5) 
1 5 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1  3 
 
                                               
497 ‘<...> и о том, что <...> вклад застрахован, и сумма 700 000.’ (D1C4) 
498 ‘Что наш банк входит в систему страхования вкладов, даю наш собственный буклетик.’ (D2C1) 
499 ‘<...> что все средства, соответствующие сумме – рубли и валюта по курсу ЦБ – застрахованы <...>.’ (D2C2) 
 260 
There were also 2 of the 21 clerks who, in their responses, used statements aimed at 
comforting the depositors by saying that they should not worry. To illustrate, A2C3 used 
the words ‘and you do not need to worry’ as the ending to her explanation of the DIS to 
the depositors,500 and D1C3 used the wording ‘so that they do not worry’ when referring 
to the depositors.501 This differs from the statement made by D1C1, who said that she 
would hope that the depositors could be 100% confident that, even if something happens, 
they would get their money and that this is the main thing they want to hear.502 
D2C4 stated that she would not provide too many details to the depositors, only details of 
who is responsible for payment of the compensation, what the conditions are, the amount 
of compensation, and what type of savings accounts are insured.503 
D2C5 stated that, whilst he would say that the bank is a member of the DIS and that, in 
case of unfavourable conditions, a depositor would receive the amount on his savings 
account up to RUB 700 000 as well as explaining the process of the compensation and 
who guarantees the deposits, he would not use any negative words, which would incline 
depositors towards negative thoughts. He added that he attunes the depositors positively 
because when it comes to the reputation of the bank, one should not use word 
‘bankruptcy’.504 
Senior Bank Staff Responses 
When asked about the information banks provide to the depositors with respect to the 
DIS (Heads of Branch Interview Question 9; Marketing Staff Interview Question 9), 
senior bank staff talked mostly about the types of information which is provided to 
                                               
500 ‘<...> и что можете не переживать.’ (A2C3) 
501 ‘<...> чтобы <...> не переживали <...>.’ (D1C3) 
502 ‘Так что они могут быть стопроцентно уверены в том, что даже, если что-то случится, они 
их получат. Это главное, что они хотят слышать.’ (D1C1) 
503 ‘Очень подробно я бы не стала говорить – только кто, в каких случаях, сумма, какие вклады 
страхуются.’ (D2C4) 
504 ‘Что наш банк входит в систему страхования вкладов и в случае неблагоприятных условий 
клиент получит сумму вклада до 700 000 рублей, а также о порядке выплаты и кто 
гарантирует. Мы пытаемся не говорить негативные слова, которые настраивают клиента на 
отрицательную волну. Когда речь идет о репутации банка, употреблять слово «банкротство» 
нельзя. Я настраиваю клиентов позитивно.’ (D2C5) 
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depositors, rather than the exact information which is conveyed, about which the clerks 
commented.  
The responses of senior bank staff will be looked at on a bank by bank basis for the ease 
of comparison between banks as well as comparison with responses of clerks. 
According to A1B1, Bank A1 provides depositors with a copy of the Federal Law, and 
with the information on how to get the compensation. In addition, Bank A1 displays the 
certificate of membership in the DIS and the stickers supplied by the DIA in each 
branch.505 
A2B1 stated that, in his opinion, they fully inform depositors about deposits,506 and that 
Bank A2 displays all information about the DIS on information stands in the branches 
and puts up stickers which allow depositors to see that the bank is a member of the 
DIS.507 He added that they also have brochures which contain information on the DIS, 
and said that they give such brochures out to each depositor.508 Whilst he was referring 
to the standard, green brochure issued by the DIA, it was not clear whether he was 
aware that these brochures are not a creation of Bank A2, and that all other banks have 
the same brochures.  
As for Bank B1, B1M1 indicated that the bank would inform the depositors about the 
amount of compensation, about the bank’s membership in the DIS and about the DIA, 
which is responsible for the DIS and would organise the process of compensation, should 
the bank fail. She also referred to the availability of information materials, including the 
standard, green brochure which Bank B1 had recently received from the Northwest 
Association of Banks.509 Whilst B1M1 referred mainly to the oral information provided to 
                                               
505 “У нас есть, во-первых, закон о страховании вкладов, во-вторых, информация о том, как они 
могут получить возмещение <...>, где они могут получить возмещение <...>, 
непосредственно, само свидетельство <...>. У нас есть <...> наклеечки, что мы являемся 
участником [системы].” (A1B1). 
506 “Мне кажется, что мы полностью клиента информируем по тому, что касается вкладов.” 
(A2B1). 
507 “У нас есть вся информация на стендах, потом есть наклейки <...>, по которым люди 
видят, что банк находится в системе страхования вкладов <...>.” (A2B1). 
508 “У нас есть еще такие буклеты, которые мы выдаем каждому вкладчику <...>.” (A2B1). 
509 “Прежде все это сумма страхового возмещения и то, что банк включен в систему 
страхования, и то, что в случае каких-то сложностей, Агентство по страхованию вкладов несёт 
ответственность и организует работу по возврату денежных средств вкладчиков. <...> так же 
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the depositors, 2 heads of branch also described the written information which is 
displayed in the branches of the bank. 
B1B1 mentioned the availability of excerpts from the Federal Law, including the course 
of action in case of an insured event, and other reference materials, which would allow 
depositors to obtain the most complete information.510 He added that the information is 
displayed on the information stands in the branch, including the colour copy of the 
certificate confirming the membership of the bank in the DIS, brochures and the stickers 
which are displayed wherever possible.511 
B1B2 said that the provision of information on the DIS is stipulated by the internal 
procedures,512 and that they provide all information which is available in open access, for 
example on the website of the DIA, which includes the Federal Law and explanatory 
notes,513 the brochures about the DIS, which have been developed specifically for Bank 
B1.514 Moreover, the information is also contained in the contract of bank account.515 
The senior bank staff from Bank C1, although not contradicting each other, referred to 
different aspects of the information provision. C1M1, as in case of the response from the 
marketing officer from Bank B1, stated that, in the main the information which is 
provided to the depositors is oral, whilst C1B1 concentrated mostly on where such 
information is provided in the branch. 
                                                                                                                                          
у нас есть информационные материалы и буквально недавно мы получили [брошюры], по-
моему, из Ассоциации банков северо-запада <...>.” (B1M1). 
510 “Выдержки из закона, то есть все положения <...>, которые касаются информирования 
населения, в том числе порядок действий в случае наступления страхового случая, <...> [и] 
справочная информация, которая позволит клиенту наиболее полно получить информацию 
<...>.” (B1B1). 
511 “<...> включая цветную копию свидетельства, что мы являемся участниками системы 
страхования вкладов. Затем, справочная информация <...> в виде буклетов <...> доступна в 
зале и стикеры наклеены везде, где только можно.” (B1B1). 
512 “Вообще размещение информации о страховании прописано внутренними порядками.” 
(B1B2). 
513 “Всю информацию, которая есть в открытом доступе, как на сайте АСВ, то есть <...> 
федеральный закон, разъяснения по этому закону.” (B1B2). 
514 “<...> у нас есть брошюры по страхования вкладов, разработанные непосредственно под 
наш банк <...>.” (B1B2). 
515 “<...> помимо этого еще информация естественно присутствует в договоре.” (B1B2). 
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C1M1 said that they inform depositors about the amount of compensation and the timings 
involved in the process of compensation,516 and that advertisements and emails sent to 
depositors include information that the bank is a member of the DIS.517 C1B1 stated that 
each of their marketing flyers and posters, displayed in the branch, have information on 
the bank’s membership in the DIS and that they have special, green brochures, which 
contain information solely about the DIS.518 
D1B1 indicated that Bank D1 informs the depositors about how the DIS works, provides 
them with the green brochure, printouts of the Federal Law, even though there were no 
clients who read it straight away, and keeps a special folder containing all necessary 
information in branch.519 
With regard to Bank D2, whilst all the necessary information is displayed in the 
branches, both responses from the senior bank staff indicated that the depositors are not 
automatically directed to this information. 
D1B1 stated that when depositors come to the bank, they already possess the 
information about the DIS, and that, if requested, they will be directed to the information 
stand, which displays a copy of the Federal Law, including all amendments, and the 
certificate confirming the membership of the bank in the DIS.520 Moreover, D1B1 claimed 
that all employees of the branch, irrespective of their position, know how the DIS 
works.521 D2B2 mentioned that they try to follow the recommendations issued by the 
DIA and display stickers and the certificate confirming the bank’s membership in the 
                                               
516 “В первую очередь о сумме возмещения и о сроках возмещения.” (C1M1). 
517 “<...> в рекламе, либо когда в электронном виде я отправляю письмо клиенту, я 
обязательно указываю, что банк является участником системы страхования вкладов под 
номером таким-то от такого-то числа.” (C1M1). 
518 “У нас в каждом рекламном буклете указано, что банк входит в систему страхования 
вкладов, плакаты, размещенные в дополнительном офисе, также об этом говорят. <...> у нас 
есть специальные буклеты, которые рассказывают исключительно о системе страхования 
вкладов.” (C1B1). 
519 “Мы рассказываем о механизме [работы системы страхования], у нас есть специальная 
папка для клиентов, [также] мы выдаем буклет и распечатываем федеральный закон. Правда, 
не было клиентов, которые сразу бы читали закон.” (D1B1). 
520 “По запросу [показываем] стенд возле кассы с федеральным законом со всеми изменениями 
и свидетельством. <...> Когда клиент приходит в банк, он уже обладает информацией.” 
(D2B1). 
521 “<...> все сотрудники, вне зависимости от должности, знают о работе системы страхования 
вкладов.” (D2B1). 
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DIS, and the text of the Federal Law in open access, as well as bank’s own brochures on 
this subject.522 However, she noted that depositors very often question the authenticity of 
the stickers when they see them.523 Finally, she added that, whilst they inform depositors 
about the DIA and its operation, the compensation amount and the process of 
compensation under the DIS, they simply inform new depositors as necessary.524.  
 
When asked whether their bank provides more oral than written information about the 
DIS (Heads of Branch Interview Question 10, Marketing Staff Interview Question 10), 
senior bank staff gave the following answers. 
It appears that Bank A1 and Bank C1 provide information mostly orally, and supplement 
it with either a brochure or the information displayed on the information stands in 
branches. When prompted to explain his response, A1B1 noted that, even if the 
depositors come into the branch and read the brochure, the information contained in the 
brochure would rather raise the questions to depositors, and they would want to clarify 
whether they have understood something correctly or not.525 C1M1 explained the 
prevalence of the information provision orally by referring to the fact that depositors who 
come to open a bank account do not look at the written information displayed in the 
branch.526 He stated that they display sufficient written information, but depositors would 
read it only if they have a few minutes whilst they wait in the branch, provided the 
depositors are interested at all.527In his response C1B1 said that, because Bank C1 is not 
                                               
522 “Стараемся соблюдать рекомендации, данные банкам. <...> наклейки, сертификат, 177 ФЗ 
в открытом доступе, внутренние брошюрки по этой теме.” (D2B2). 
523 “Очень часто говорят: «Замечательно, что у вас есть наклейки, а вдруг они фальшивые?».” 
(D2B2). 
524 “Что есть <...> Агентство по страхованию вкладов и его деятельность, размер и порядок 
выплат. <...> Каждому встречному не кричим, новых клиентов информируем по мере 
необходимости.” (D2B2). 
525 “В большей степени устно, но у нас есть рекламка, но все равно клиент, придя, прочитает 
рекламу <...> [и] у него скорее возникают вопросы. Он всегда хочет уточнить, <...> 
правильно ли он все понял.” (A1B1). 
526 “<...> но клиент, который приходит с целью открыть вклад, он не смотрит на эти стенды и 
папки <...>.” (C1M1). 
527 “Письменной информации достаточно много <...>. <...> если у клиента есть время, 
минутки три или четыре или более, во время оформления вклада, либо какой-то другой 
операции, то клиенты садятся и смотрят эти папки, смотрят на стенде информацию. Но в 
зависимости от клиента, на сколько это ему интересно.” (C1M1). 
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such a large bank, in principle, they work with each depositor individually, and convey 
information orally. He added that, naturally, should they choose to, depositors can also 
acquaint themselves with the written information displayed in the branch.528 
Contrary to responses from Banks A1 and C1, senior bank staff from Bank D1 and Bank 
D2 noted that their banks, whilst also providing information orally, placed more emphasis 
on providing information in written form. D2B1 stated that the majority of the 
information on DIS is written,529 and D2B2 specified that they would convey to the 
depositors the key features, like the existence of the DIS, the compensation amount and 
the process of the compensation, but would also give each depositor a document pack, 
which would include their own brochure, with the necessary information on the DIS.530 
D1B1 said that they provide information both orally and in written form, with the latter, 
in her opinion, being very important for depositors.531 
In the case of Bank B1, there was no coordination in the responses given by this bank’s 
senior staff. Whilst B1B1 mentioned above all, the written information on the DIS, both 
B1B2532 and B1M1 stated that their bank provides information predominantly in an oral 
form. 
B1B1 said that, first of all, the information is displayed on the information stands in the 
branch, then the clerks inform the depositors that the bank is a member of the DIS and, if 
depositors want to know something in more detail, they are provided with such 
information.533 B1M1 explained her response by stating that the main points are 
                                               
528 “<...> наш банк не столь крупный банк, поэтому, в принципе, у нас идет индивидуальная 
работа с каждым вкладчиком <...>, поэтому мы новую информацию доносим устно до него. 
Естественно, это не означает, что он не имеет возможности и если он хочет, он может спокойно 
ознакомиться и с письменной информацией.” (C1B1). 
529 “Письменно.” (D2B1). 
530 “И устно, и письменно. Устно мы рассказываем ключевые моменты – что есть система 
страхования вкладов, какова страховая сумма и порядок возмещения. Также любому клиенту 
дается пакет документов, в том числе [наша] брошюра.” (D2B2). 
531 “И то, и другое. [Для клиентов] важно письменно.” (D1B1). 
532 “Устно.” (B1B2). 
533 “В первую очередь, это информация на стендах в банках <...>. И, естественно, сотрудники 
уведомляют, что банк является участником системы страхования вкладов, но, если клиент 
какую-то подробную информацию просит узнать, то вся она подается.” (B1B1). 
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conveyed mainly orally because, in practice, people may be lazy, and may not read the 
written information at all.534 
As for Bank A2, A2B1 was undecided in his response to this question, and could not say 
whether or not the bank is providing the information on the DIS mostly orally or in 
written form. He did, however, mention that, in his opinion, the written form is not 
convenient for depositors.535 
 
When asked about how they inform the depositors about the changes in the DIS (Heads 
of Branch Interview Question 14, Marketing Staff Interview Question 14), the senior 
bank staff would equally update the information stands in the branch (6 responses of the 
9) and inform the depositors orally (6 responses of the 9).536 The overview of all methods 
used by banks when informing depositors about the changes in the DIS is presented in 
Table 6.14 below. 
A1B1 stated that staff in Bank A1 would inform depositors about the changes in the DIS 
when they come into the branch.537 
A2B1 said that, in Bank A2, when the information on changes comes from the head 
office, they would display the new information on the information stands and all new 
depositors or existing depositors, who come to re-new their bank account, will receive 
this information immediately.538 When prompted, he also stated that they do not normally 
                                               
534 “<...> все-таки больше основные моменты они как-то устно доносятся, потому что 
письменную информацию, как показывает практика, люди, могут просто не прочитать, 
полениться.” (B1M1). 
535 “Письменно, мне кажется, неудобно для клиента. У нас не спрашивают. Буклеты прочитал 
– письменно, потом спросил – устно, если что-то не понятно, то мы можем ему прислать 
распечатать.” (A2B1). 
536 The response of B1M1 to this question was no recorded. 
537 “Непосредственно, когда они приходят в банк.” (A1B1). 
538 “К нам приходит с головного офиса [информация] <...>. Мы это размещаем на стойках, 
стендах, в кассе. Если это какая-то новая горячая информация, то каждый новый вкладчик или 
старый [, когда] приходит переоформлять, то он сразу же получит эти изменения.” (A2B1). 
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telephone existing clients, and that they did not do it when the compensation amount 
changed to RUB 700,000.539 
Table 6.14 
Methods used by banks in order to inform retail depositors about the changes in the DIS 
Clerk In person Information 
stands 
SMS Email Telephone Website Online 
banking 
A1B1 +       
A2B1 + +      
B1B1  + +     
B1B2 + +      
B1M1        
C1B1 + +      
C1M1  +      
D1B1  +  + + + + 
D2B1 +       
D2B2 +    +   
Total 6 6 1 1 2 1 1 
 
In the case of Bank B1, both B1B1 and B1B2 stated that they would update the 
information stands, and each added other ways to inform the depositors about the 
changes in the DIS.  
B1B1 stated that the changes, which do not concern the immediate relationship between 
the bank and the existing depositor, would be displayed on the information stands. He 
added that, if changes would relate the contract of the bank account, then they would 
inform the existing depositors via, for example, SMS-notification.540 When prompted, he 
also stated that, in October 2008, it was only necessary to update the information stands, 
                                               
539 “<...> практики [обзванивания] у нас нет. <...> когда было изменение до 700 000, то мы 
этого не делали.” (A2B1). 
540 “Обновления идут на информационном стенде, то есть, если это не касается 
непосредственно отношения нашего банка с нашими конкретным клиентом <...>. Если же эта 
информация отражается на условиях договора <...>, то мы клиентов уведомляем, <...> в том 
числе и SMS-информированием.” (B1B1). 
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because TV and newspapers played a major part in the coverage of the changes in the 
DIS.541 
B1B2 indicated that, apart from updating the information stands in the branch,542 they 
would inform the depositors personally when they come to the branch, provided 
depositors are interested.543 
Both senor bank staff from Bank C1 stated that they would update the information 
stands and special folders on the DIS.544 C1B1 explained that, in all likelihood, there will 
be different approaches to different depositors: existing depositors will be informed orally 
when they come to the branch to renew their bank account or for any other reason, 
potential depositors would be informed via the updated information stands, and those 
clients who do not have deposits, but use the banks for other services, would be informed 
via the information displayed in branch.545 
As for Bank D1, even though the branch where D1B1 worked was opened only after the 
changes were implemented in October 2008, staff would be very proactive and, apart 
from updating the information stands in the branch, they would inform existing 
depositors by email and over the telephone. They would also update the website, and 
place an announcement in the online banking website. 546 D1B1 added that they even 
inform existing depositors about new savings accounts.547 
It appears that Bank D2 would also be proactive in informing the depositors about the 
changes in the DIS, however, it would depend on the type of depositor affected. 
                                               
541 “Для этого достаточно было просто обновить информацию на стендах, а так телевидение и 
газеты сыграли очень большую роль в освещении.” (B1B1). 
542 “Информация размещается сразу же <...>.” (B1B2). 
543 “При личном присутствии. <...> Но опять-таки, если это интересно клиенту.” (B1B2). 
544 “Обязательно должно быть объявление в операционном зале, это на стенде и в папке 
<...>.” (C1M1). 
545 “Скорее всего, тех клиентов, <...> у которых размещены вклады, мы их проинформируем в 
тот момент, когда они придут к нам по своим делам. Потенциальных клиентов мы 
проинформируем размещением информации в помещениях дополнительного офиса. Скорее 
всего, разместим аналогичную информацию в кассовом узле для тех клиентов. Которые не 
размещают у нас вклады, но, скажем, пользуются услугами.” (C1B1). 
546 “Изменений мы не застали. Мы поддерживаем коммуникацию постоянно, по электронной 
почте, обзваниваем существующих клиентов. Мы также повесим объявление в отделении банка, 
на нашем сайте и в системе интернет-банкинга.” (D1B1). 
547 “<...> обзваниваем клиентов о новых депозитных продуктах.” (D1B1). 
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According to D2B2, they have key depositors with whom they work proactively and 
inform them of changes over the telephone. As for the other existing depositors, they do 
not appear to have any deliberate course of action in place to inform them about the 
changes. D2B2 noted that new depositors would be informed about the changes when 
they come to the branch for the first time.548 
D2B1 added that, when the changes were introduced in October 2008, Bank D1 were 
oriented towards investments, not deposits, and therefore only informed the depositors 
when they came to the branch.549 
6.3 Findings from the Interviews in Relation to Objective 2 “To 
Strengthen Public Confidence in the Banking System” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are four impact indicators related to Objective 
2. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data from the interviews are impact 
indicators 2.1.2 and 2.1.4. The remaining indicators are examined in Chapters 5 and 7 
and in Sections 6.2 and 6.4 of this chapter. 
6.3.1 Depositors Are Confident in the Banking System (Impact 
Indicator 2.1.2) 
Senior bank staff were asked whether, in their opinion, the level of depositors’ confidence 
in the banking system has changed (Heads of Branch Interview Question 23, Marketing 
Staff Interview Question 22). In addition, if heads of branch confirmed a change in 
depositors’ confidence in the banking system, they were prompted to state whether the 
DIS was the only reason for such a change, or if they thought there were other reasons 
as well (Heads of Branch Interview Question 23a). 
8550 senior bank staff said that the level of depositors’ confidence in the banking system 
had increased, and A1B1 even called it the most principal advantage of the DIS.551 
                                               
548 “Есть ключевые клиенты – мы их обзваниваем в любом случае, действуем проактивно. По 
текущим клиентам целенаправленная работа не ведется, а новым клиентам сразу сообщаем об 
изменениях.” (D2B2). 
549 “Когда были изменения, мы были ориентированы на инвестиции, поэтому информировали 
клиентов устно.” (D2B1). 
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When asked to explain his opinion, A2B1 referred to the example of depositors from 
another bank, who were using Bank A2, an agent of the DIA in that case, to get 
compensation under the DIS. He said they were heartbroken, but when coming to Bank 
A2 for their compensation, they could see that they were not left alone, that they could 
get compensation or transfer their money to Bank A2, and that there was no risk 
involved552 D2B2 stated that depositors’ confidence in the banking system increased 
because state guarantees boost public confidence553. 
D2B1 said that, based on statistics, it is clear that depositors have more confidence in 
banks rather than in other money -saving methods.554In his answer, C1B1 recalled the 
default in 1998, when there were no banks whose financial stability had not suffered 
from the bank run. He compared that time to the last quarter of 2008 and, said that the 
situation had changed, that the depositors’ confidence had strengthened and that they had 
become a lot calmer555. 
B1M1 stated that, whilst she thinks that the level of depositors’ confidence has increased, 
she found this question difficult as, in general, the confidence level should have increased, 
especially when people could see that the process of compensation works. She could not 
say, however, to what extent the confidence level has increased.556 
C1B1 said that, in terms of depositors’ saving behaviour, there was a general shift from 
state-owned banks to privately-owned banks since the introduction of the DIS. He 
                                                                                                                                          
550 D1B1 said that the level of confidence increased. 
551 “<...> самый главный плюс, который произошел, – это повышение доверия.” (A1B1). 
552 “Конечно, больше [доверия стало], потому что даже клиенты, которых мы переманивали 
<...>, они же приходили убитые горем. А тут они видят, что их не бросили, что им 
выплачивают или предлагают перевести [деньги], что риска никакого [нет].” (A2B1). 
553 “Мне кажется, люди стали больше доверять банкам. Гарантии со стороны государства 
доверие укрепляют.” (D2B2). 
554 “По статистике можно увидеть, что банками доверяют больше, чем «замкáм» и прочему.” 
(D2B1). 
555 “Вспоминая несколько последних месяцев прошлого года, могу сказать, что доверие 
укрепилось, ибо вот в 1998 году в этой же ситуации не было ни одного банка, финансовая 
устойчивость которого не пострадала от поведения вкладчиков. Сейчас ситуация изменилась, 
сейчас вкладчики гораздо более спокойными стали <...>.” (C1B1). 
556 “<...> на самом деле [это] сложный вопрос, потому что в целом я думаю, что с момента 
введения системы страхования вкладов доверие должно было вырасти, особенно, когда стал 
механизм этот работать, и люди <...> увидели, что действительно эта система работает. 
Думаю, что выросло, но намного ли? Не могу сказать.” (B1M1). 
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explained that, whereas before the introduction of the DIS the lion’s share of depositors 
only knew about Sberbank, after the introduction of the DIS, the depositors had a chance 
to look to the left and look to the right and be certain that, by looking to the left, they 
would not lose anything. That is why, in his opinion, the depositors started to re-
distribute their savings accounts, and that the number of deposits with other banks has 
increased. C1B1 also added that, because the number of banking services available to 
depositors in other banks is higher than in Sberbank, it also led to an increase in 
depositors’ financial literacy.557 
In his response, A1B1 could not separate depositors’ confidence in the banking system 
and their saving behaviour, and said that the only way to assess confidence is by looking 
at depositors’ saving behaviour. In the case of his bank, he described the increase in 
saving behaviour, and thus, in deposits, as a geometric sequence. He added that such an 
increase in deposits means that depositors trust the banking system more and more.558 
 
When asked about whether the establishment of the DIS was the sole reason for the 
increase in the depositors’ confidence in the banking system, B1B1 attributed the 99% of 
the increase in confidence to the introduction of the DIS, because, in his opinion, the 
Russian population trusts only state guarantees.559 
D2B1 said that it is difficult to say whether the DIS was the only reason for the increase 
in the level of depositors’ confidence in the banking system. He added that, in general, 
people’s confidence in the state and in the country has increased, as can be seen from the 
                                               
557 “<...> до введения системы страхования вкладов львиная доля вкладчиков знала только 
Сбербанк <...>. После введения системы страхования вкладов, поскольку у вкладчиков 
появилась возможность посмотреть налево, направо и быть уверенным, что, посмотрев налево, 
они ничего не потеряют, стали вклады перераспределяться, увеличилось количество вкладов в 
других банках и, соответственно, поскольку в других банках зачастую количество услуг 
банковских для физических лиц было больше, чем в Сбербанке, то и, соответственно, 
[финансовая] грамотность населения <...> повысилась.” (C1B1). 
558 “Доверие, оно в чем заключается? <...> мы можем оценивать только по тому, как люди 
несут деньги <...>. Просто на образе нашего банка, это геометрическая прогрессия, то есть 
это не уменьшение, а увеличение постоянное. И это увеличение просто говорит нам о том, что 
вкладчики все больше и больше доверяют банковской системе.” (A1B1). ZZZ 
559 “Ну, скажем, так, наверное, <...> 99% связано именно с этим, потому что люди в России 
доверяют только государственным гарантиям.” (B1B1). 
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results of the recent elections, and that people may identify the DIA with the state and 
that this only or in addition to the fact of Agency’s existence may explain the rise in 
confidence.560 
C1B1 and D1B1’s responses were not recorded. 
Other possible reasons for the increase in the depositors’ confidence in the banking 
system included: 
• more information available about banks in general, mentioned by A2B1;561 
• more banking products and services became available and used by the general 
public, mentioned by A2B1562 and C1B1, which also resulted in an increase in the 
level of financial literacy of the population;563 
• the increased number of banks across Russia, which led to more choice for 
depositors, mentioned by B1B2;564 and 
• the fact that there have been no high-profile bankruptcies in a long time, 
mentioned by D1B1.565 
6.3.2 Depositors Keep Their Savings Accounts in Times of 
Economic Uncertainty in the Country (Impact Indicator 2.1.4) 
In response to a question about the change in depositors’ perception of the DIS (Heads of 
Branch Interview Question 24, Marketing Staff Interview Question 23), the senior bank 
staff gave the following answers. 
                                               
560 “В целом доверие к государству, стране возросло, как показывают результаты выборов. 
<...>Трудно сказать, сам факт наличия АСВ или то, что люди отождествляют его с 
государством, или всё вместе. ” (D2B1). 
561 “Просто о банках стали больше рассказывать везде.” (A2B1). 
562 “Люди стали больше за кредитованием в банки обращаться, пластиковые карты дали. Народ 
стал больше обращаться к банковским услугам и природнился. Раньше их не загонишь. Просто 
народ побаивался.” (A2B1). 
563 “Я думаю, что есть еще причина, связанная с тем, что у нас был финансовый рост на 
протяжении последних 10 лет, докризисных, и, соответственно, появлялось все больше и 
больше возможностей у населения пользоваться банковскими услугами, и, соответственно, 
повышалась грамотность населения в этом смысле.” (C1B1). 
564 “<...> это увеличение количества банков, то есть если раньше это было пять, то сейчас – 
тысяча. <...> и в каждом банке свои условия, в каждом банке есть своя какая-то эксклюзивная 
фишка <...>. То есть у людей появился выбор.” (B1B2). 
565 “Громких банкротств не было давно, может, поэтому клиенты доверяют банкам.” (D1B1). 
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A2B1 reported that they had been worried that depositors would take their money out in 
autumn 2008, when the bank was in financial difficulties. He said a withdrawal of 
deposits took place, but it was minimal.566 
B1B1 gave an interesting account of what has happened since October 2008. He said 
that, when the devaluation of the national currency started, depositors started taking 
money from the banks because they did not know what would happen. However, when 
depositors saw the foreign currency strengthen, they exchanged the national currency 
into foreign currency and brought their money back to the banks, thus diversifying risks. 
He added that, in principle, depositors’ confidence in the banking system has not been 
undermined by the financial crisis,567 but indeed the quality of their confidence has 
increased as they now understand that they can trust the DIS568and gather more 
information to be informed.  
B1B1 also noted that the increase in the maximum compensation amount in October 
2008 has significantly impacted on the level of depositors’ confidence in the banking 
system and that, as a result, the government managed to avert the crisis in the banking 
system.569Moreover, he stated that if not the DIS and not the increase in the 
compensation amount to RUB 700,000 in October 2008, then the banking crisis would 
have affected Russia much more than other countries.570 
B1M1 stated that, during the financial crisis among depositors, there was a tendency to 
switch banks and transfer their savings from privately-owned banks to state-owned 
                                               
566 “В этот период мы боялись потерь депозитов <...>, но такого не было. Был отток, но 
минимальный.” (A2B1). 
567 “Когда рубль стал девальвироваться, <...> люди стали забирать деньги из банков, то есть, 
они не знали пока, что будет происходить. Но когда [они] увидели, что начинали крепнуть 
доллар, евро, они сразу деньги отнесли в банки обратно, просто диверсифицировав свои риски 
и направив все эти средства, рублёвую массу, на валюту. <...> но, в принципе, доверие не 
подорвано было этим кризисом.” (B1B1). 
568 “<...> они уже знают, что можно доверять этой системе, и уже качество этого доверия 
выше.” (B1B1). 
569 “<...> достаточно серьезно повлияло на уровень доверия клиентов увеличение <...> 
страховой базовой максимальной суммы.” (B1B1). 
570 “То есть, если бы этого не было, если бы в октябре [2008 года] сумма страховых выплат не 
была увеличена до 700 000, то нас бы банковский кризис затронул больше, чем остальные 
страны.” (B1B1). 
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banks, but this flow was not as critical as it could have been,571 because there was an 
increase in the maximum compensation amount.572 However, B1M1 noted that, with 
respect to Bank B1, there were no big withdrawals by depositors during the unstable 
situation in the banking system in autumn 2008.573 
D1B1 stated that, whilst in general the depositors’ confidence increased, all banks 
experienced an outflow of deposits in autumn 2008.574 
6.4 Findings from the Interviews in Relation to Objective 3 “To 
Encourage Household Savings in the Banking System of the 
Russian Federation” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are five impact indicators related to Objective 
3. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data from the interviews are impact 
indicators 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. The remaining indicators are examined in Chapters 5 
and 7 and in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this chapter. 
6.4.1 The Public Opens More Savings Accounts and/or Increases 
the Value of Existing Savings Accounts (Impact Indicator 
3.1.1) 
When asked whether there were any changes in the structure of deposits (either an 
increase in the number of deposits or an increase of amounts in savings accounts) in the 
bank from the establishment of the DIS (Heads of Branch Interview Question 8; 
Marketing Staff Interview Question 8), senior bank staff provided the following 
responses.575 
                                               
571 “<...> переток в банковской сфере в связи с кризисом из частных банков в 
государственные, он тоже наблюдался в целом по рынку, но я все-таки считаю, что оттоки 
денежных средств в государственные банки, они были не такие критичные, как могли бы быть.” 
(B1M1). 
572 “<...> потому что увеличили сумму гарантированного возмещения денежных средств по 
вкладам.” (B1M1). 
573 “У нас не было больших выносов денежных средств в связи с началом нестабильной 
ситуации в банковской системе, которое осенью наблюдалось.” (B1M1). 
574 “Доверие увеличилось, но осенью все банки испытали отток.” (D1B1). 
575 The response of D1B1 to this question was not recorded. D1B1 was not able to comment 
because the branch was opened only a few months before the interview. 
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According to A1B1, Bank A1 witnessed both an increase in the number of savings 
accounts opened since the establishment of the DIS, and an increase in the amounts 
deposited by the bank’s clients. He stated that, when the DIS was introduced, the 
depositors distributed their money across different banks and opened several savings 
accounts up to the maximum compensation amount, RUB 100,000 at the time. 
Furthermore, as the maximum compensation amount has been increasing over the years, 
depositors have been amalgamating their scattered savings into one bank and, in the 
opinion of A1B1, it has not only been convenient for depositors, but also beneficial for 
Bank A1.576 
A2B1 also confirmed that there was an increase in the amounts in the savings accounts 
in Bank A2. He said that he could see the increase especially in the last six months, when 
the amounts rose from under RUB 200,000 to RUB 300,000 minimum and even 
more.577 When prompted to name the reasons for such an increase, he did not think that 
this was due to people getting more money than before, but more likely due to them 
having savings account in other banks or savings at home. He argued that people, by 
finding out more about savings accounts, got more educated, and they are not afraid that 
they will be betrayed and will not get a compensation.578 However, he pointed out that 
there are few and far savings accounts with amounts of more than RUB 700,000, 
because the maximum compensation amount, in his opinion, is a psychological barrier for 
people.579 
                                               
576 “Увеличились и количество и суммы открытия вкладов. <...> [Вкладчик мог] раньше 
пойти, допустим, разложить там по 100 000. У нас в Санкт-Петербурге банков достаточно для 
того, чтобы сделать много вкладов, но теперь <...> как только страховая сумма увеличилась, 
то клиенту не нужно теперь бегать и раскладывать <...> Он может прийти в один банк и 
положить 700 000. Это стало удобнее для клиента, ну и в целом для банка, для нас полезно.” 
(A1B1). 
577 “Мне кажется, стало. Мне кажется, что вклады сейчас, за последние полгода, стали расти. 
Раньше были вклады до 200 000. На данный момент <...> минимум 300 000 и даже больше.” 
(A2B1). 
578 “Я не думаю, что они стали [больше] получать. Может, были в другом банке, может, были 
подкоплены. Люди стали больше узнавать о вкладах. Раньше бытовало мнение «Нас обманут, 
банк развалится, нам не компенсируют». А сейчас люди стали более образованными, 
подкованными.” (A2B1). 
579 “Мне кажется, что у нас вкладов с суммой более 700 000 их вообще единицы. Этот 
психологический барьер тяжело людям даётся.” (A2B1). 
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Only one of three senior bank staff from Bank B1 could definitely say that there was, 
indeed, an increase in the amounts in savings accounts from the establishment of the DIS. 
B1B2 stated that the amounts have been increasing,580 however, he argued that the step 
by step increase in the maximum compensation amount has been simply the additional 
stimulus for depositors, rather than the deciding factor.581 
B1M1, though not able to comment on the overall change in the structure of depositors 
due to her being employed by the bank only for six months,582 agreed with B1B2 insofar 
as the stimuli for depositors to open new savings account or increase the amount in the 
existing savings account are concerned. Whilst she confirmed the increase in the number 
of savings accounts in the past months, in her opinion, this was primarily due to 
competitive conditions of savings account in the bank as well as to the fact that depositors 
are interested in what the bank has to offer.583 She further added that, when it comes to 
changes in the maximum compensation amount in October 2008, the bank witnessed an 
increase in the amounts on depositors of the existing depositors, however, in her opinion, 
it did not bring new clients to the bank584 
B1B1 also refused to comment because it was difficult for him to retrace the dynamics 
since he had only worked in the bank since 2008585. 
As for Bank C1, C1M1 could not answer this question because he unfortunately did not 
have any statistics on this matter,586 whilst C1B1 only commented on the situation after 
October 2008, when the maximum compensation amount was increased to RUB 
700,000, because he had been employed by the bank for only three months at the time of 
the interview.  
                                               
580 “Да, да, увеличение сумм.” (B1B2). 
581 “<...> это не связано с тем, что вот, раз уж АСВ повысило [сумму страхования], 
прогарантировало, поэтому мы, вот, придём и положим, нет. Это просто дополнительный 
стимул для людей.” (B1B2). 
582 “Я не работала, я не могу <...> ответить <...>” (B1M1). 
583 “<...> рост вкладов идёт. <...> Но моё мнение, что всё-таки основная причина роста 
вкладов и количества вкладов это, прежде всего, наши конкурентные условия, и второй момент 
это наше интересное предложение с точки зрения клиента <...>” (B1M1). 
584 “А именно увеличение суммы страхования, конечно, оно повлияло на то, что люди стали 
больше приносить, но именно новых клиентов этот факт, я думаю, не дал.” (B1M1). 
585 “Мне сложно проследить такую динамику, поскольку я в этом банке [только] с 2008 года.” 
(B1B1). 
586 “К сожалению, такой статистики у меня нет.” (C1M1). 
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Neither of the two heads of branch from Bank D2 could say whether there was an 
increase in the structure of deposits since the establishment of the DIS. 
D2B1 could not answer this question fully because, according to him, he did not possess 
the necessary statistics. However, he mentioned that the number of deposits in the bank, 
and in his branch in particular, has increased between January and March 2009.587 He 
added that, during that time, Bank D2 increased the interest rates on their savings 
accounts.588 D2B2, on the other hand, whilst not being able to comment on the question 
itself, reported a recent tendency among depositors to pay more attention to the DIS in 
general. She further explained that, in the past, depositors rarely asked about it and these 
days they often say that they know about it or they have heard about it.589 
6.4.2 Public Opens More Saving Accounts and/or Increases the 
Value of Existing Savings Account As the Changes in the 
Parameters of the DIS Are Implemented (Impact Indicator 
3.1.2) 
Because the time of economic uncertainty (the global financial crisis in this case) and the 
changes in the parameters of the DIS (an increase in the coverage limit) happened at the 
same time, the respondents could not clearly differentiate between the two in their 
answers (Heads of Branch Interview Question 24; Marketing Staff Interview Question 
23). The responses of senior bank staff to these questions have been partially analysed in 
Section 6.3.2 above, with regard to the changes in the level of confidence in the banking 
system in time of economic uncertainty. 
This section will look at the senior bank staff responses in respect of the situations in 
which retail depositors increased the amount in their savings accounts or opened new 
savings accounts following the change in the parameters of the DIS introduced in October 
2008. 
                                               
587 “Статистику не могу привести. Количество вкладов с января по март увеличилось по 
[банку] в целом и по отделению в частности.” (D2B1). 
588 “Ставки [по депозитам] увеличились.” (D2B1). 
589 “Вообще это тенденция последнего времени – по моим ощущениям, стали больше обращать 
внимание, раньше редко спрашивали, а сейчас «Да знаем», «Да, слышали».” (D2B2). 
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A1B1 noted that the introduction of a higher maximum compensation amount in October 
2008 was a big stimulus for opening new savings accounts by depositors.590 He even 
went on to say that it was the main factor contributing to the depositors bringing more 
money into the bank591. He also stated that depositors have mentioned repeatedly that 
they will deposit RUB 700,000 only because the maximum compensation amount 
increased in October 2008 and that, in general, the perception of the DIS has 
significantly changed.592 
A2B1 could not answer the question, and said that the emphasis on the DIS (the 
emphasis in the question) is too strong. He added that, in reality, depositors come and 
bring their money to the bank and that it is enough for them to know the compensation 
amount, to know that the bank is a member of the DIS and that they are not be left alone. 
In his opinion, depositors do not want to know anything else.593 
B1B1 mentioned that the dynamic of the amount of savings accounts right now is on the 
same level as before the financial crisis, however, because of the crisis, the dynamic is of 
a higher quality, meaning that depositors started to treat their money with more 
knowledge and they not so easily bring their money into the bank.594 With respect to the 
increase in the compensation amount in October 2008, he added that the maximum 
compensation amount is now more credible, and that there was a clear increase in 
deposits especially when the compensation amount increased from RUB 400,000 to RUB 
                                               
590 “А для <...> клиентов, когда ввели 700 000, для них это было большим стимулом для 
открытия новых вкладов.” (A1B1). 
591 “<...> для людей, я ещё раз подчеркну это, основным факторов того, что они начали нести 
больше денег в банк, является увеличение до 700 000.” (A1B1). 
592 “Кончено, очень сильно изменилось <...>. Клиенты уже неоднократно говорили о том, что 
«я буду ложить 700 000 только потому, что это страховая сумма».” (A1B1). 
593 “Не знаю. Акцент на систему страхования вкладов сделан очень громкий, очень жесткий. 
На самом деле клиент идет, несет вклад. <...> Он знает 700 000, он знает, что банк в системе 
страхования вкладов, он знает, что он не брошен. Всё, ему больше не надо ничего знать 
<...>.” (A2B1). 
594 “<...> динамика <...> сохранилась на прежнем уровне, что и до кризиса. Но учитывая 
фактор кризиса, можно говорить о том, что <...> динамика, которая сейчас, она более 
качественная, чем до кризиса, то есть, люди стали с пониманием относиться к своим деньгам. 
Они уже не так спокойно относят деньги в банк <...>.” (B1B1). 
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700,000. He said that depositors started to actively deposit their money when this new 
compensation amount came into force.595 
B1B2 related the change in depositors’ perception of the DIS since October 2008 to the 
increase in the amounts in the savings accounts. If before the increase in the coverage 
limit a depositor had RUB 400,000 in different accounts in different banks which allowed 
him to sleep without worry, now there are depositors who have RUB 700,000 in their 
savings accounts and, the opinion of B1B2, this is the main indicator of the change in 
depositors’ perception.596 
B1M1 said that the depositors’ perception of the DIS has not changed much since 
October 2008, though she believed that the fact of an increase in the maximum 
compensation amount on its own has been, without a doubt, been highly appreciated597 
and encouraged depositors to bring more money to the bank.598 
C1M1 did not think that the depositors’ perception changed at all, because the DIA was 
there before and is there now and it is the only one. However, he also said that if looking 
from the change in parameters side, then it is good indeed that they have increased the 
maximum compensation amount.599 He added that, prior to the increase in the 
compensation amount, there were depositors with approximately RUB 100,000 in their 
savings accounts (when the first RUB 100,000 were protected 100%) and when told 
that the maximum compensation amount increased, they increased it to RUB 700,000.600 
                                               
595 “Ну, он не такой смешной, как 400 000, то есть, все-таки, заметна тенденция к увеличению 
вкладов была именно когда с 400 000 до 700 000 подняли. Люди все-таки активнее стали 
размещать в пределах этой суммы.” (B1B1). 
596 “Да, <...> только лишь в части <...> увеличения остатка по вкладам <...>. То есть, если 
раньше человек в размере 400 000 размещал и спал спокойно, шел в другой банк, размещал 
ещё 400 000 и спал спокойно, то сейчас появились вкладчики, в большей степени, порог суммы 
которых стал 700 000 рублей. Это основной показатель.” (B1B2). 
597 “Я думаю, что на самом деле не особо. <...> сам факт увеличения суммы возврата был, 
безусловно, положительно оценен <...>.” (B1M1). 
598 “<...> увеличение суммы страхования, конечно, оно повлияло на то, что люди стали больше 
приносить <...>.” (B1M1). 
599 “Да нет. Ну, было Агентство по страхованию вкладов и осталось, оно единственное. Ну да, 
хорошо, сумму увеличили, разве что с этой стороны .” (C1M1). 
600 “Были вкладчики, которые имели, предположим, порядка 100 000 рублей до повышения 
возмещения, то есть когда было до 400 000 рублей непосредственно. То есть был вкладчик, 
имея 100 000 рублей, он хотел пополнить вклад, поинтересовался, до какой суммы страховое 
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C1B1 agreed, giving a real example when a depositor had a savings account for the 
amount of RUB 430,000 and, once the changes in the parameters of the DIS were 
introduced, step by step, he increased the amount to up to almost RUB 700,000.601 
However, he noted that there are a few depositors who might want to deposit bigger 
amounts, but have not made up their minds so far.602 
6.4.3 Depositors Save More through Bank Deposits (Impact 
Indicator 3.1.3) 
Senior bank staff was asked whether the level of depositors’ saving behaviour has 
changed (Heads of Branch Interview Question 22, Marketing Staff Interview Question 
21). In addition, if the heads of branch and marketing staff confirmed the change in the 
depositors’ confidence in the banking system, they were prompted to state whether the 
DIS was the only reason for such a change or if, in their opinion, there were other 
reasons as well (Heads of Branch Interview Question 22a, Marketing Staff Interview 
Question 21a). 
Almost all603 senior bank staff said that the level of depositors’ saving behaviour had 
increased, including 2 respondents, B1B1 and B1M1, who mentioned that there was a 
temporary decrease in the level of saving behaviour during the financial crisis. D2B2 
found it difficult to answer this question. 
When asked to explain her opinion, B1M1 stated that in 2004, people in general became 
more active in investing their money into different financial instruments, including 
deposits made because of the newly established DIS604. 
                                                                                                                                          
возмещение, его проинформировали, и он именно до этой суммы увеличил сумму клада.” 
(C1M1). 
601 “Могу привести конкретный пример <...>, когда вкладчик размещал у нас депозит в сумме 
430 000 рублей, а после внесения изменений и увеличения суммы страхования, 
последовательно, он увеличил ее почти до 700 000.” (C1B1). 
602 “Есть несколько клиентов, которые хотели бы разместить большие средства, но пока не 
решаются.” (C1B1). 
603 D2B2 could not provide any answer. 
604 “В 2004 году, я думаю, что в принципе люди стали очень активно инвестировать денежные 
средства в различные инструменты финансового рынка, в том числе и во вклады, потому что 
появилась система страхования вкладов.” (B1M1). 
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A1B1, in his response, could not separate depositors’ confidence in the banking system 
and their saving behaviour. In relation to Bank A1, he described the increase in saving 
behaviour, and thus, in deposits, as a geometric sequence. 
In A2B1’s opinion, depositors took their money from their stockings and brought them to 
the bank.605Furthermore, according to B1B1, depositors now gather more information 
about banks and do not bring their money readily to any bank anymore, but were more 
selective. D2B1 explained his answer by saying that, before 2004, depositors were afraid 
and now they know that DIA equals the state, and that it will compensate if something 
happens.606 D1B1 said that when the DIS was being introduced in 2004, depositors 
started to distribute their savings among different banks in amounts not more than the 
maximum compensation amount, and that nowadays depositors are much calmer and they 
start to accumulate their savings.607 
 
When asked about whether the establishment of the DIS was the sole reason for the 
increase in the depositors’ saving behaviour, the senior bank staff said that, apart from 
the DIS as such, there were other possible factors which contributed to the increase in 
the saving behaviour, which included;608 
1) higher quality of customer service, mentioned by A1B1;609 
2) higher level of financial literacy and, as a result, usage of such products and 
services, like currency exchange or payment with debit and credit cards, 
mentioned by A1B1610; 
3) more information available to the depositors, mentioned by A2B1;611 
                                               
605 “Мне кажется, из чулок достали деньги и стали больше хранить в банках.” (A2B1). 
606 “Наверно, в положительную сторону. Если раньше люди боялись, то теперь знают, что АСВ 
равняется государству, что оно возместит.” (D2B1). 
607 “Когда только вводили систему страхования вкладов, клиенты стали раскладывать по 
банкам суммы, не превышающие сумму страхования. Сейчас же население стало спокойно 
аккумулировать деньги.” (D1B1). 
608 The response of D2B1 to this question was not recorded. 
609 “<...> это повышение качества обслуживания <...>.” (A1B1). 
610 “Люди стали финансово образованы, поэтому они начинают заниматься такими вещами как, 
например, обмен, <...> карточки. Например, не ходишь с большим лопатником денег, а берешь 
карточку и расплачиваешься с ней в любом магазине.” (A1B1). 
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4) improvement of the legislative base in relation to the banking activities, 
mentioned by B1B2;612 and 
5) an increase in opportunities for the depositors on the market,613 including an 
introduction of new products and services614 mentioned by B1B2. 
6.5 Summary 
The results of the qualitative data analysis carried out in this chapter show that the 
knowledge about the DIS among the bank staff is not uniform across the participating 
banks. Some of the clerks are confused by the operation of the DIS works, including its 
compulsory nature. Moreover, it appears there is no specific system in place to provide 
support to front office staff when it comes to questions about DIS outside of their 
immediate knowledge. 
Whilst the heads of branch and marketing officers understandably claim that the DIS has 
met its stated objectives, the evidence suggests that the most frequently asked question 
by retail depositors is still whether the bank is a member of the DIS. This clearly indicates 
a lack of basic knowledge about the principles of the Russian DIS among retail 
depositors. 
With regard to the amount and content of the information about the DIS provided by 
banks to retail depositors, it varies from bank to bank, and even from branch to branch in 
some banks. Some clerks admitted to not providing any information about the deposit 
insurance compensation mechanism at all, whilst others stated that they would provide 
such information only if asked by retail depositors directly. 
The link between the results of the qualitative data analysis in this chapter and the 
results of the quantitative and document and observational data analyses will be 
discussed in Chapter 8.
                                                                                                                                          
611 “<...> стали больше рассказывать везде в информационных источниках, народ больше 
просвещать стали.” (A2B1). 
612 “Вообще улучшение законодательной базы в части банковской деятельности <...>.” 
(B1B2). 
613 “<...> увеличение возможностей <...>.” (B1B2). 
614 “<...> введение каких-то новых продуктов, введение новых услуг.” (B1B2). 
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Chapter 7 
Document and Observational Data Analysis 
 
“Science progresses best when observations force us to alter 
our preconceptions.” 
–Vera Rubin (1928-) 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study aims to evaluate the Russian DIS by matching its 
stated objectives with the outcomes observed with the help of several components of the 
present investigation, including a retail depositor survey, interviews with bank staff, 
analysis of further documents, and in-branch observations. 
Further to the chapters on quantitative data analysis (presented in Chapter 5) and 
qualitative data analysis (presented in Chapter 6), this chapter focuses on the analysis of 
relevant documents as well as on observational data gathered during visits to branches of 
the six participating banks. 
7.1 Description of Data 
The data consists of 17 in-branch observations and the following documents: 11 
savings/current account contract templates and numerous marketing materials from the 
six participating banks, letters of the DIA to the retail depositors whose banks had their 
banking license revoked (insured events), financial reporting data from the CBR and 
other information. 
The data will be analysed in relation to each stated objective (i.e. Objective 1, then 
Objective 2, then Objective 3) and will give an insight into the extent the three objectives 
of the DIS has been achieved. 
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7.2 Findings from In-Branch Observations and from Document 
Analysis in Relation to Objective 1 “To Protect the Rights and 
Legal Interests of Household Depositors” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are 12 main impact indicators relating to 
Objective 1. The impact indicators to be evaluated with the data gathered through 
observations and document analysis are impact indicators 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, and 
1.3.6. The remaining indicators are examined in Chapters 5 and 6 and Sections 7.3 and 
7.4 of this chapter. 
7.2.1 Depositors Get Compensation within the Time Stated in the 
Federal Law (Impact Indicator 1.1.1) 
7.2.1.1 Compensation Period 
Apart from three insured events where retail depositors did not receive any compensation 
at all because the obligations in relation to retail depositors of the respective banks were 
taken over by other banks, the compensation in all but four insured events commenced 
within the time stated in Article 12(4) of the Federal Law. 
As can be seen from Figure 7.21, in the majority of the insured events, the compensation 
commenced between 7 and 14 days (inclusive), with the shortest compensation 
commencement period being 6 days (for the insured event on 26 January 2006). On 
average, it took the DIA 12 days to commence the payout across the 110 insured events 
since the start of the DIS. 
The four insured events for which the compensation did not commence within 14 days 
were on 26 December 2008 (compensation commenced within 21 days), 30 December 
2008 (compensation commenced within 20 days), 24 December 2009 (compensation 
commenced within 21 days) and 29 December 2009 (compensation commenced within 
15 days). It is interesting to note that these four insured events took place late in the 
respective year, so considering there are always long winter public holidays in Russia 
(sometimes lasting more than a week and a half), this may explain the delay in starting 
the payout. For example, in 2008-2009, the winter public holidays lasted 10 days 
between 1 January 2009 and 10 January 2009 (Gritsyuk, 2008) and in 2009-2010 the 
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winter holidays also lasted 10 days between 1 January 2010 and 10 January 2010 
(Gritsyuk, 2009). 
Figure 7.21 
Number of days taken by the DIA to start the deposit insurance compensation process 
from the date of the insured event 
 
Source: Press-releases in relation to each of the insured events issued by the DIA.615 
7.2.1.2 Compensation Process 
In order to observe the procedural side of the deposit insurance compensation, it was 
possible to take part in the compensation process on behalf one of the retail depositors 
who had a savings account with the Saint-Petersburg Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, whose license for banking operations was revoked on 03 May 2007 (an 
insured event). 
The DIA issued an official letter to this retail depositor on 25 May 2007, which was 
posted on 04 June 2007 (and received on 14 June 2007). This was in accordance with 
Section 12(1) of the Federal Law, which stipulates that the DIA should send the 
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information about the insured event and about how to receive compensation to each retail 
depositor within one month and seven days from the date of the insured event. 
As provided by Section 10(5) of the Federal Law, the retail depositors may give a notary 
certified power of attorney to their representatives to receive the compensation on their 
behalf, which was done in this case. 
For this insured event, the DIA appointed a bank-agent to pay out the compensation to 
retail depositors. 
It is interesting to note that the letter from the DIA contained a form of the deposit 
insurance compensation claim (printed with the name and details of the bank specifically 
for this particular insured event) on two double-sided A4 pages. In this case, the claim 
form was downloaded from the DIA website, was filled in electronically and then printed. 
However, in the bank-agent’s branch, the clerk discarded the self-completed claim form 
and filled in another one on the computer and then printed it off for signing. The clerk 
also took a copy of the power of attorney for any future reference. Apart from the amount 
from the savings account received in cash, the clerk also issued a copy of the cash order, 
confirming the payment, and the extract from the register of bank’s obligations, with full 
details of the retail depositor and the savings account in question. 
The compensation in this case was for a very small amount (RUB 1.03), and the clerk of 
the bank-agent was very surprised by a claim for compensation for such an amount. 
The other insured event, for which the documents became available, was in relation to 
Gazinvestbank, whose license for banking operations was revoked on 04 December 2008.  
The DIA issued an official letter to this retail depositor on 22 December 2008, which 
was posted on 26 December 2008, and received on 29 December 2008. This was also in 
accordance with Section 12(1) of the Federal Law. 
For this insured event, the DIA also appointed a bank-agent to pay out the compensation 
to retail depositors. Since 2007, the deposit insurance compensation claim form became 
more streamlined and, whereas in 2007 it was over two double-sided A4 pages, in 2008 
it was reduced to one double-sided A4 page. 
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The compensation in this case was for an amount exceeding the maximum compensation 
amount, so the letter from the DIA contained the information on the actions a retail 
depositor is supposed to take to claim the outstanding amount. From our understanding, 
the retail depositor opted for opening a new savings account with the bank-agent, so no 
compensation payout took place. 
7.2.2 Depositors Are Aware of the Procedures to Follow in Order To 
Claim Deposits in Excess of the Coverage Provided By the DIS 
(Impact Indicator 1.1.2) 
The letter which the DIA sends to each retail depositor in the case of an insured event in 
relation to the bank they patronise, states that they would need to claim the outstanding 
amount as part of the liquidation process, should the deposit insurance compensation not 
cover the amount of their savings/current account in full. 
In case of an insured event in relation to Gazinvestbank (mentioned in Section 7.2.1 
above), it was suggested that the retail depositor submit a claim to Gazinvestbank for the 
difference between the amount of the savings account and the maximum compensation of 
RUB 700,000. Such a claim could be submitted either to the temporary administration, 
or to the liquidators of Gazinvestbank. The letter from the DIA further provided details 
of the webpage where a retail depositor could find a template for such a claim, and a list 
of supporting documents. The DIA also referred the retail depositor to their ‘hotline’ 
where further information on this process can be found. 
In the case of Gazinvestbank, the retail depositor submitted a claim for the remainder of 
the deposit to the temporary administration of the bank on 22 January 2009. Even 
though retail depositors enjoy a priority over any other creditors (secured creditors) in 
insolvency proceedings in Russia, as of now there have been no notifications of any 
repayment to the retail depositor, neither from the temporary administration of 
Gazinvestbank, nor from the DIA. 
7.2.3 Banks Use the Parameters of the DIS to Launch New Savings 
Accounts (Impact Indicator 1.3.2) 
There are two distinct examples that could be presented from the six participating banks. 
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The prime example of banks using the DI parameters to launch new savings account is 
Bank A1. When entering the banking market in Saint-Petersburg, one of Bank A1’s 
savings accounts specifically featured the DI parameters relevant at the time. It was 
possible to obtain a copy of the promotional flyer, distributed in Saint-Petersburg in 
August 2007. 
The savings account was called ‘100% Security’ and had the following conditions: 
• term – two, three or six months; 
• amount – from RUB 5,000 up to RUB 400,000, the maximum compensation 
amount at the time; 
• interest rate – 10% per annum; 
• interest payment – monthly or on maturity; and 
• currency – RUB, USD or EUR. 
Whilst it appears from the flyer that this particular savings account was initiated in 
February 2007, the branch of Bank A1 in Saint-Petersburg was registered with the 
Central Bank of Russia in July 2007. This demonstrated that Bank A1 did, indeed, use 
this savings account, among other banking products and services, as a promotional tool 
when entering the banking market in the region. 
The flyer is double-sided 1/3 of an A4 page. It prominently features the DIS sign on the 
first side; no other information about the DIS is provided. 
This savings account is still available at Bank A1, though with different conditions, and 
is promoted as a ‘special savings account for new clients’. 
The second example, Bank A2, is not so much showcasing the usage of DI parameters to 
launch new savings accounts, but rather the usage of the unforeseen (or foreseen) 
opportunity to the bank’s advantage. 
Bank A2 was appointed as the bank-agent for post-2003 only insured event in Saint-
Petersburg at the time.616 As this was the fourth insured event for which Bank A2 was 
                                               
616 Bank A2 was among the first banks who received accreditation by the DIA in June 2005 in 
order to take part in tenders to be appointed as bank-agent in the DI compensation process. 
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the bank-agent, they prepared for the deposit insurance compensation process by creating 
a special savings account for the retail depositors of the failed bank. The scheme worked 
as follows: when the retail depositors came to receive the compensation payment, it was 
the role of the clerks to entice the retail depositors with a special offer. If the retail 
depositors agreed to open a new savings account with Bank A2, no withdrawal of deposit 
insurance compensation amount took place. 
The savings account was called ‘Compensatory’ and had the following conditions: 
• term – from 1 to up to 181 days; 
• amount – from RUB 5,000 up to RUB 400,000, the maximum compensation 
amount at the time; 
• interest rate – 9.5% per annum; and 
• currency – RUB. 
Additionally, all retail depositors who agreed to open this savings account were able to 
receive a VISA card issued by Bank A2, without the initial yearly service fee. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain the flyer promoting this savings account. It is 
possible to assume that no such flyer has been officially distributed, as the savings 
account was not open to the general public.  
Other examples of Russian banks using the DI parameters when launching new savings 
accounts are presented in Table 7.1 below. 
From the overview of savings accounts offered by different banks in Russia, it is clear 
that the deposit insurance compensation amount, currently RUB 700,000, has become 
not only the tool used to launch new savings accounts, but also a point of gradation in 
determining the interest rate for many banks. For example, the savings account with an 
amount less than RUB 700,000 will have a lower interest rate than the same type of 
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Source: Information on banks’ websites. 
                                               
617 This savings account was offered by Absolut Bank on 1 November 2008 as an anti-crisis 
measure. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain a flyer and, therefore, the exact interest rate 
offered at the time is not known. The information has been taken from the bank’s website 
(accessed on 12 February 2011). This account is no longer being advertised to the public. 
618 This savings account was offered by National Bank TRUST in May 2009 with the initially 
deposited amount – RUB 700,000 – fully covered by the DIS. This savings account had an option 
of topping up. The information has been taken from the bank’s website (accessed on 12 February 
2011). This account is no longer being advertised to the public. 
619 This savings account was advertised for new clients of Asian-Pacific Bank who were concerned 
about the safety of their money. This savings account was valid at the time of accessing the bank’s 
website (12 February 2011). It had an option of topping up the amount up to the total amount of 
RUB 700,000. 
620 This savings account is valid from 5 October 2010, has an option of topping up the amount up 
to the total amount of RUB 700,000. 
621 This savings account is designed for pensioners and students. This savings account was valid 
at the time of accessing the bank’s website (12 February 2011). It had an option of topping up the 
amount up to total amount of RUB 700,000. 
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7.2.4 Banks Have A Dedicated Area Where They Display 
Information about the DIS in Their Branches (Impact 
Indicator 1.3.3) 
As described in Chapter 4, a number of branches from each of the six participating banks 
have been chosen for observation of the dedicated area concerning the DIS, where it 
existed. 
7.2.4.1 Dedicated Areas in Bank A1’s Branches 
There were four branches of Bank A1 which were selected for observation, three in the 
city centre,622 and one in the suburbs623. All four branches had very awkward layouts, so 
the information about the DIS and the current and savings accounts was not easily 
available. As such, none of the four branches had an information stand dedicated to the 
DIS. The certificate of membership in the DIS was placed on the information stand with 
other notices and certificates not related to the DIS, except the branch in the suburbs, 
where no certificate of membership in the DIS was displayed at all. There was no text of 
the Federal Law, no contact nor any other DIA-related information displayed in any of 
the branches observed.  
None of the four branches featured the stickers of the DIS sign in the shape and size 
provided by the DIA. Further, considering Bank A1’s branches did not possess the DIS 
brochures issued by the DIA either, it is possible to assume that they simply did not 
receive the stickers, at least in Saint-Petersburg. Instead, they have created their own 
sticker featuring the DIS sign, and these stickers were placed on the glass of each 
cashier’s window. Bank A1’s sticker featured the DIS sign with the following words, 
“Find out everything about the DIS” and “Amounts up to RUB 700,000 are 100% 
insured”, above and below the DIS sign respectively. A poster of a similar content and 
layout were placed on walls in the branches observed. 
No sticker with the DIS sign was attached to the entrance door in any of the four 
branches observed. 
                                               
622 Observations took place on 19 March 2009, on 27 March 2009 and on 2 April 2009. 
623 Observations took place on 26 March 2009. 
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7.2.4.2 Dedicated Areas in Bank A2’s Branches 
In the case of Bank A2, there were four branches selected for observation, two in the city 
centre624 and two in the suburbs.625 
The branches in the city centre had information stands dedicated to the DIS which 
displayed the Federal Law, the certificate of membership in the DIS, the contact and 
other information relating to the DIA. Whilst, in the first branch in the city centre, it was 
not possible to find the cashier’s window, the sticker of the DIS sign was attached to the 
cashier’s window in the second branch. Such stickers were also placed on the glass 
windows of the clerks’ windows. 
The area with information about current and savings accounts in the second branch in the 
city centre was very untidy and missing some flyers, which had not been restocked. In 
addition, there were no DIS brochures issued by the DIA available to retail depositors on 
the day of the observation. At the same time, the information about the purchase of the 
98% of the shares of Bank A2 by a governmental corporation was placed on the 
information stand, assuring depositors that there was no need to worry about 
unavailability of funds. 
7.2.4.3 Dedicated Areas in Bank B1’s Branches 
The two selected branches of Bank B1 (one in the city centre626 and one in the 
suburbs627) had a similar presentation of the information about the DIS. 
Whilst the branch in the city centre had a corridor leading to the operations hall (where 
all clerks are based), the information about the DIS was placed on information stands in 
both the corridor (in the form of the certificate of membership in the DIS and a list of all 
available current and savings accounts featuring the DIS sign) and in the operations hall 
(in the form of the certificate of membership in the DIS). 
                                               
624 Observations took place on 19 March 2009 and on 24 March 2009. 
625 Observations took place on 25 March 2009 and on 2 April 2009. 
626 Observation took place on 24 March 2009. 
627 Observation took place on 26 March 2009. 
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The text of the Federal Law, the contact and other information relating to the DIA were 
stored in a folder, which was clearly marked as referring to the DIS, and was placed on a 
low table for retail depositors to consult whilst sitting on a sofa. 
Bank B1 provided the text of Recommendations issued by the DIA among other 
documents related to the DIS.  
The branch in the suburbs did not have a corridor and the retail depositors entered the 
branch straight into the operations hall. The content and presentation of information 
about the DIS in the dedicated area was similar to the branch in the city centre. The 
branch in the suburbs had only one DIS brochure issued by the DIA, and it was an out-
dated edition (the edition from August 2007). 
7.2.4.4 Dedicated Areas in Bank C1’s Branches 
Since there are only two branches of Bank C1 in Saint-Petersburg, observations took 
place in both branches (one in the city centre628 and one in the suburbs629). 
The branch in the suburbs was located in the Head Office of Bank C1 in Saint-
Petersburg, and therefore the access to the operations hall was not straightforward, and 
the information on the DIS was not easily available to the potential retail depositors, who 
might want to consult such information before making a decision as to whether to open a 
current or savings account with this bank. There was a special folder with the relevant 
information on the DIS, the most recent audited financial reports, as well as the 
information stand, which featured the certificate of membership in the DIS among other 
certificates, and notices for retail and/or business depositors. 
Compared to the branch in the suburbs, the branch in the city centre had a much better 
layout, and the information about the DIS was easily available to potential depositors. 
This branch had an information stand which featured the certificate of membership in the 
DIS among other notices, as well as the same special folder with relevant information 
about the DIS as the branch in the suburbs. 
                                               
628 Observation took place on 27 March 2009. 
629 Observation took place on 30 March 2009. 
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7.2.4.5 Dedicated Areas in Bank D1’s Branches 
Since there were only two branches of Bank D1 in Saint-Petersburg at the time, 
observations took place in both branches (one in the city centre630 and one in the 
suburbs631). 
The branches did not have any area dedicated to the DIS as such. The branch in the 
suburbs had a separate folder with all relevant information available to retail depositors, 
which was placed onto the counter where retail depositors are supposed to fill in the 
application form for the package of banking services. The folder contained the DIS sign, 
the Federal Law, the certificate of membership in the DIS, the contact and other 
information relating to the DIA. 
The branch in the city centre also had a separate folder with information about the DIS, 
and included the same documents as the folder in the branch in the suburbs, apart from 
the Federal Law. There was also a separate notice informing the retail depositors that 
information on the DIS was available on Bank D1’s website. 
Both branches had the latest DIS brochures issued by the DIA available on clerk’s desks, 
and also had flyers with information on current and savings accounts. 
7.2.4.6 Dedicated Areas in Bank D2’s Branches 
All three selected branches of Bank D2 (two in the city centre632 and one in the 
suburbs633) had a very well-presented reference rack with the information about the DIS. 
However, the reference rack was not easily accessible to retail depositors, as it was 
mounted on the wall next to the cashier’s window, which was in a different room from 
the operations hall where clerks consulted the retail depositors about the issues related to 
the opening of savings and current accounts. 
Bank D2 provided the text of Recommendations issued by the DIA among other 
documents related to the DIS.  
                                               
630 Observation took place on 24 March 2009. 
631 Observation took place on 25 March 2009. 
632 Observations took place on 26 March 2009 and on 27 March 2009. 
633 Observation took place on 26 March 2009. 
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None of the three branches had the DIS brochure issued by the DIA. 
7.2.5 Banks Inform Depositors about the DIS (Impact Indicator 
1.3.6) 
Compliance with the Recommendations issued by the DIA was verified through the 
interviews with banks’ employees, and observations in selected branches. 
Table 7.2 presents the summary of the observations, followed by comments for each 
bank. 
Table 7.2 
Summary of compliance with the Recommendations by six participating banks 
Bank Bank A1 Bank A2 Bank B1 Bank C1 Bank D1 Bank D2 
Display of documents 
Full copy of the 
Federal Law  
No Yes Yes634 Yes Yes/No635 Yes 
Colour copy of the 
Certificate 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Announcement 
(booklet, pamphlet) 
about the procedure 
for and the amount of 
deposit insurance 
coverage 
     Yes 
Notification to the 
depositors about 
necessity to timely 
inform the bank about 














Depiction of registered 
sign “Deposits insured. 
Deposit Insurance 
System” 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Requisites of the DIA No Yes Yes636 Yes Yes Yes 
Display of the DIS sign 
Unaltered sign No637 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Glass Yes Yes Yes Yes Not 
known 
Yes 
Information stands No Yes Yes Yes Yes No638 
                                               
634 In a special folder. 
635 Displayed only in one branch out of two. 
636 In a special folder. 
637 The DIS sign was altered as described in Section 7.2.4 above. 
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Bank Bank A1 Bank A2 Bank B1 Bank C1 Bank D1 Bank D2 

































Letterheads Yes Not 
known 




Advertising Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 





No Yes No Yes Not 
known641 
No 
Website –Deposit page 
(details) 
No642 Yes643 Yes Yes644 Not 
known 
Yes  
Source: In-branch observations and review of banks’ websites. 
7.2.5.1 Provision of Information about the DIS on Flyers and Other 
Marketing Materials 
Paragraph 11 of the Recommendations issued by the DIA allows banks to use the DIS 
sign and the fact of their membership in the DIS on marketing materials. Different 
marketing materials were collected at all six banks participating in this research, as well 
as from other banks in Russia. The analysis of the presentation of the information on the 
DIS is presented below. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
638 Neither of Bank D2’s branches had an information stand, they only had a reference rack, see 
Section 7.2.4 above. 
639 Only in the Annual Report for 2007. 
640 There is a partial DIS sign (featuring the logo and the words “Deposit Insurance Scheme”) 
placed on the unmovable footer of the website. When the cursor is placed on this partial DIS sign, 
more information on the DIS appears along the full DIS sign. 
641 The page was not accessible at the time of checking. 
642 On the webpage of each individual savings account, there is a link to the website with 
information on the DIS, which features the DIS sign and provides relevant information. 
643 Bank A2 placed the DIS sign at the bottom right corner of every page of its website. 
644 Bank C1 placed the DIS sign at the left-hand side of every page of its website. 
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Bank A1 
Eight different flyers were collected at Bank A1 for further analysis. Six flyers contained 
information about existing savings accounts, whilst the other two flyers provided 
additional information. 
Of those flyers with information on existing savings account, one had an overview of all 
existing savings accounts at the time and was A4 size, folded in three. It contained 
detailed information on the DIS (including an explanation of how the compensation 
amount is calculated if the retail depositors have loans or accounts in more than one 
branch) with the following title “Deposits up to RUB 700,000 are 100% insured”. 
Moreover, the flyer contained the DIS sign, positioned next to the text. 
The other five flyers with information on existing savings accounts were 1/3 of A4 size 
each, and featured the DIS sign only, either on the front or the back. 
The first flyer with additional information was 1/3 of A4 size, and was fully dedicated to 
the DIS. The front of the flyer featured the logo of Bank A1, the DIS sign as well as the 
following wording: “Find out everything about the Deposit Insurance Scheme!” and 
“Deposits up to RUB 700,000 are 100% insured”. The back of the flyer contained the 
same detailed information about the DIS as the flyers with the overview of the existing 
savings accounts (described above), with an additional reference to the Federal Law. At 
the bottom of the back of the flyer there was a free phone number for Bank A1 where the 
retail depositors were directed to find more detailed information. 
The last flyer collected at Bank A1 was A4 size, was entitled “How your money works. 
Information for depositors”, and contained information explaining clearly how the money 
of retail depositors works (including graphs with information on the loan portfolio of 
Bank A1, the growth of the number of branches and the information on profits of the 
bank). The flyer also featured information on savings accounts as a good and flexible way 
to receive guaranteed income. This flyer also featured the DIS sign and stated that, as a 
100% guarantee of the return of retail depositors’ savings, the DIA provides 
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governmental support and that all retail deposits up to the amount of RUB 700,000 are 
subject to the most secure protection645. 
Bank A2 
10 different flyers were collected at Bank A2 for further analysis. Of these flyers, six 
were promoting different savings accounts, and four informed retail depositors about 
different services. The six flyers promoting the savings accounts featured the DIS sign 
only, and did not provide any further information. The DIS sign was placed inside the 
flyer (A1 page folded into three parts). 
The other four flyers differed in the way the information about the DIS was presented. 
The booklet providing information about the bank cards and the addresses and access 
hours of the ATMs features the DIS sign on the front cover. 
The two flyers with information on mini-offices646 provided information on the DIS in a 
different way. Whilst one of the flyers features the DIS sign only (on the reverse side of 
the 1/3 of A1 size flyer), the other flyer features a paragraph providing extensive 
information about Bank A2’s membership in the DIS on the front and the DIS sign on 
the back. The information on the front of these flyers explained that Bank A2 is a 
member of the DIS, which means that deposits in this bank are insured by the state. 
Moreover, it provided the number of the certificate of membership in the DIS, and the 
date Bank A2 was admitted to the scheme. 





                                               
645 “В качестве 100% гарантии возврата Ваших сбережений, Агентство по страхованию 
вкладов обеспечивает государственную поддержку. Все вклады в сумме до 700 000 рублей 
находятся под самой надежной защитой.” 
646 See explanation about mini-offices of Bank A2 in Chapter 4. 
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Bank B1 
Four flyers were collected at Bank B1 for further analysis.647 Three flyers contained 
information on the existing savings accounts, including one flyer with an overview of all 
existing savings account, whilst the last flyer contained general information about the 
bank and its savings accounts. 
The front of all three flyers with information on the existing savings accounts features 
the DIS sign only. The flyer with general information about Bank B1 and its savings 
accounts (in general terms)featured both the DIS sign (on the back) and a sentence 
stating that Bank B1 is a member of the compulsory DIS and that this is an additional 
guarantee of return of the retail depositors’ savings.648 
Bank C1 
Seven flyers were collected at Bank C1. Four contained an overview of the existing 
savings account in RUB and the foreign currency, whilst three other flyers contained 
information on individual savings accounts. 
The flyers with the overview of the existing savings accounts had a slight difference in 
the way the information about the DIS was presented. The two older flyers contained the 
DIS sign only on the inside, whilst the more recent flyers with the same information 
contained a visibly bigger DIS sign inside the flyer as well as the DIS sign on the front. 
The three flyers with information on individual savings accounts featured the DIS sign 
only on the front. 
Bank D1 
Bank D1 yielded four different flyers, two with information about existing savings 
accounts, and two with information on other banking services.  
                                               
647 There was another flyer on the business package, which is assumed was for business 
depositors. This flyer did not contain the DIS sign, nor did it provide any other information on the 
DIS. 
648 “[Bank B1] является участником обязательной системы страхования вкладов, что является 
дополнительной гарантией возвратности вкладов наших клиентов.” 
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The two flyers with information on existing savings accounts, the flyer with details of 
internet banking and the flyer with details of individual safe deposit boxes do not feature 
any information on the DIS. None of the flyers featured the DIS sign. 
Each flyer featured the information about Bank D1’s association with one of the biggest 
financial groups, the parent group’s financial standing and the year Bank D1 entered the 
Russian market. 
Bank D2 
Five flyers were collected at Bank D2. Three contained information on the different 
packages of banking services and the relevant tariffs, one contained information on one 
specific branch and the last flyer contained information on the DIS. 
The flyers with information on packages of banking services and with information about 
one specific branch did not feature any information on the DIS at all. The flyer with 
information on the DIS entitled ‘Procedure for and the amount of compensation of 
savings accounts in accordance with the Federal Law “On the Insurance of Household 
Deposits in Banks of the Russian Federation”’649 provided a detailed outline of the 
amount of the DI coverage as well as the compensation procedure in accordance with the 
Federal Law, and featured the DIS sign. The back of the flyer featured details of the DIA 
and its free phone hotline, as well as the logo of Bank D2. The flyer did not explicitly 
state that Bank D2 is a member of the DIS.650 
Other Banks in Russia 
From the overview of marketing materials of different banks in Russia promoting savings 
accounts, it is clear that there is no one way in which banks present information about 
their membership in the DIS. Whilst all banks provide information about the licence for 
banking operations, not all of them fully inform potential and existing retail depositors 
about their membership in the DIS. 
                                               
649 “Порядок и размер возмещения по вкладам в соответствии с федеральным законом «О 
страховании вкладов физических лиц в банках Российской Федерации»”. 
650 The newer version of the flyer has a different layout but contains the same information with no 
explicit statement that Bank D2 is a member of the DIS. 
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The presentation of information about the DIS ranges from no information at all to 
extensive information with the registration number in the DIS, the date the bank was 
admitted to the DIS, the DIS sign and other details. 
For example, Sberbank of Russia has no reference to the DIS on its marketing materials 
promoting the savings accounts at all. Some banks place the DIS sign only, in the hope 
that no other information (such as, for example, the registration number in and the date 
the bank was admitted to the DIS) on the matter will be required by the retail depositors. 
Other banks place the DIS sign and the wording from the Recommendations issued by 
the DIA, such as for example, ‘Savings accounts at [name of the bank651] are insured 
within the limits and on the terms and conditions set by the Federal Law “On the 
Insurance of Household Deposits in Banks of the Russian Federation”’. UniCredit Bank 
also displays the DIS sign and uses a similar wording in its marketing materials, but adds 
that accrued interest is also insured. 
Another group of banks provide considerable amount of information about the DIS. For 
example, Credit Moscow Bank652 not only places the DIS sign on the flyer, but also the 
information about the date on which the bank was admitted to the DIS, the registration 
number in the DIS, which savings/current accounts are insured, which financial means 
deposited or placed at the bank are not insured, from which point in time the savings 
account is considered to be insured, and the link to the frequently asked questions placed 
on the DIA’s website. This information takes up one side of the 1/3 of an A4 page. 
There were also banks which differed in the presentation of information about the DIS 
across marketing materials promoting different savings accounts in each bank. For 
example, the two different flyers from MDM Bank653 (the first, with an overview of 
different savings accounts and the second, with information on one specific savings 
account) contained information on the DIS, but it was presented in a different way. Both 
flyers featured the DIS sign, though the first flyer had it on the front side, whilst the 
second flyer had it on the reverse. In terms of the written information about the DIS, 
                                               
651 For example, such banks as: Bank VTB 24 and MDM Bank (not on all of the marketing 
materials). 
652 Equivalent of Bank C1. 
653 Equivalent of Bank A1 and Bank A2. 
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whereas the first flyer contained the standard wording with reference to the Federal 
Law, as described in the paragraph above, the second flyer did not contain any written 
information at all. 
Alfa-Bank654 did not place the DIS sign on any of its flyers (out of the three flyers 
analysed). Whereas the two flyers with information on specific savings accounts did not 
contain any information about the DI at all, the third flyer with detailed information 
about the range of available savings accounts had a section consisting of the standard 
wording with reference to the Federal Law, as in the case of Bank VTB 24, and of the 
reference to the registration number in and the date the bank was admitted to the DIS. 
Likewise, OTP Bank655 did not place the DIS sign on either of the two flyers which were 
analysed. The first flyer contained information about a specific savings account, and did 
not have any reference to the DIS at all. The second flyer, with the overview of all 
available savings accounts at the time, contained only one sentence ‘OJSC “OTP Bank” is 
a member of the Deposit Insurance System’, which was placed in the list of facts about 
the bank, such as, for example, the bank’s owned capital, the fact that the bank is a 
member of the OTP Group and so on. 
National Bank TRUST provided information which was somewhat confusing in that it 
presented their membership in the DIS as one of five advantages of their savings account 
over other banks’ offers (together with high profitability, multi-currency, option of 
withdrawal and top-up, and increased interest rates for loyal customers).  
7.2.5.2 Text of Current/Savings Account Contracts 
One of the recommended ways to inform retail depositors about the DIS, according to 
paragraphs 5(5), 5(6) and 5(7) of the Recommendations of the DIA from 30 June 2005 
as amended, is to include such information in the text of the current/savings account 
contract. 
In view of the fact that there is no legislative obligation upon the banks to include such 
provisions into the contract, it is interesting to examine whether any of the six 
                                               
654 Equivalent of Bank A1 and Bank A2. 
655 Equivalent of Bank D1. 
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participating banks include the information about the DIS and other related information 
in the text of their contracts with retail depositors, and, if so, in what form. 
Bank A1656 
The savings account contract of Bank A1 is printed on both sides of one A4 sheet, and 
features the DIS sign on both sides. The contract contains 10 sections where the last 
section lists the details of the retail depositor and the bank and the signatures.  
Section 8, ‘Security for the Deposit’, has two paragraphs. Paragraph 8(a) states that the 
bank secures the return of the amount of the deposit and interest with all of its property 
and by allocating/deducting obligatory reserves in accordance with the legislation. 
Paragraph 8(b) states that the financial means, placed by the retail depositor in this bank 
under the contract of savings account or current account, are insured in the form, extent 
and on conditions set by the legislation of the Russian Federation in force. It further lists 
the financial means that are not insured. 
At the bottom of the second side of the contract, there is a bigger depiction of the DIS 
sign and a bullet-point list of the main provisions of the Federal Law, including the 
compensation amount, the fact that the interest on the savings accounts is also insured, 
that, if each member of the family has separate savings account, then each member of the 
family would receive separate compensation for each account. It also reminds the 
depositors that, if they have a loan from this bank, the amount of compensation is 
calculated based on the difference between the sum of all accounts and the amount of the 
liability which arose before the insured event. 
Moreover, the contract does not stipulate the obligation on the side of the retail depositors 
to inform their bank about any changes to the retail depositors’ personal details included 
in the contract. 
 
 
                                               
656 The information is based on one template contract, provided by Bank A1 in March 2009. 
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Bank A2657 
The contract is printed on several pages, depending on the type of the contract, and does 
not feature the DIS sign. The contract contains 7 sections where the last section lists the 
details of the retail depositor and the bank and the signatures. Additionally, the bottom of 
each page is supposed to be signed by both the retail depositor and the bank’s clerk. 
Section 5, ‘Bank Guarantees’, has two paragraphs. Paragraph 5.1 states that the bank 
guarantees the secrecy of the savings account and all related transactions, and declares 
the personal details of the retail depositor as confidential information. Paragraphs 5.2 
states that the account is insured in the form, extent and on conditions set by the Federal 
Law. 
Moreover, paragraph 2.1.2 stipulates the obligation on the side of the retail depositors to 
inform their bank in a timely fashion about any changes to the retail depositors’ personal 
details included in the contract. 
Bank B1658 
The contract is printed on two pages and features the DIS sign at the top left corner of 
the front page. The contract contains 6 sections, and the last section lists the details of 
the retail depositor and the bank and the signatures. The bottom of the second page 
features the statement that the retail depositors do not object to the SMS-notification 
about new banking services, and should be signed by the retail depositors, if they are in 
agreement. 
Paragraph 5.1 in Section 5, ‘Other Terms and Conditions’ states that the savings account 
is insured in the form, extent and on conditions set by the Federal Law. 
Moreover, paragraph 3.2.4 of the contract stipulates the obligation on the retail 
depositor’s side to inform their bank about any changes to the retail depositors’ personal 
details included in the contract in writing, within five days from the moment such 
changes occur, as well as at the bank’s request. It also states that retail depositors are 
responsible for any consequences of not-compliance with this obligation. 
                                               
657 The information is based on three template contracts, provided by Bank A2 in March 2009. 
658 The information is based on three template contracts, provided by Bank B1 in March 2009. 
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Bank C1659 
The contract is printed on several pages, depending on the type of the contract, and does 
not feature the DIS sign. The contract contains 6 or 7 sections, depending on whether 
the savings account has an option of a top-up throughout the term of the contract. The 
last section of the contract lists the details of the retail depositor and the bank and the 
signatures. 
Paragraph 1.4660 in Section ‘Subject of the Contract’ stipulates that Bank C1 is a member 
of the DIS, and provides the certificate number and the date of issue. This paragraph also 
states that deposits are insured in the form, extent and on conditions set by the Federal 
Law. Paragraph 5.3661 in Section ‘Concluding Provisions’ states that bank guarantees 
the return of the amount of the savings account and the payment of interest with all of its 
property and financial means/funds, including those located in bank’s reserve fund. 
Moreover, paragraph 3.2.3662 of the contract stipulates the obligation on the retail 
depositor’s part to inform the bank about any changes to the retail depositors’ personal 
details included in the contract not later than five days from the moment such changes 
occur. 
Bank D1663 
The contract is printed on one page (excluding the annexes), and does not feature the 
DIS sign. The contract is written in two languages, Russian and English (side by side), 
and contains an introductory paragraph (with details of the parties), eight sections and 
the closing unnumbered section which lists the details of the retail depositor and the bank 
and the signatures.  
                                               
659 The information is based on two template contracts, provided by Bank C1 in March 2009. 
660 Referring to the first template contract; the same information appears in paragraph 1.5 of the 
second template contract. 
661 Referring to the first template contract; the same information appears in paragraph 6.3 of the 
template contract. 
662 Referring to the first template contract; the same information appears in paragraph 4.2.3 of the 
second template contract. 
663 The information is based on standard template current account contract, provided by Bank D1 
in March 2009. The template current account contract is called ‘Current Account Agreement’ in 
the text and referred to as ‘Agreement’ throughout. Agreement will be referred to as ‘Contract’ 
for the purposes of this thesis. 
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The contract template of Bank D1 does not contain any reference to the DIS. However, 
Section 5 stipulates that the contract is governed by the law of Russian Federation and 
that parties will be guided by the legislation of Russian Federation in all other matters 
which are not provided for in the contract. 
Bank D2 
The clients of Bank D2 do not sign a contract when opening a current or savings account. 
They complete an application for a package of banking services, which include the 
opening of a current account and a savings account among other products. Once clients 
sign up for the package of banking services, they can choose savings accounts from those 
offered by Bank D2. Neither the application for a package of banking services, nor the 
application to open a savings account (after becoming a client) contains any information 
related to the bank’s participation in the DIS, or to the functioning of the DIS in general. 
The leaflet containing the information on savings accounts available to the retail 
depositors of Bank D2 (which can be obtained by the retail depositors from Bank D2’s 
branch) does not mention anything about the DIS either, apart from the statement that 
investment products, offered to the retail depositors of Bank D2, are not insured by the 
state, do not constitute a savings account and are not guaranteed by the bank. Moreover, 
the leaflet refers retail depositors to the website of Bank D2 where all conditions of the 
savings account are published on a special page entitled ‘Contract of a savings account’. 
The page of Bank D2’s website entitled ‘Contract for [Opening and Maintaining] a 
Savings Account’ contains terms and conditions of such a contract which form a 
constitutive part of the savings account contract between Bank D2 and the retail 
depositors. The other two parts are the application for a savings account (submitted by 
the retail depositors to Bank D2), and the confirmation of a savings account (given by 
Bank D2 to the retail depositors). 
The terms and conditions contain 6 sections, and are not supposed to be signed by the 
retail depositors and the bank. 
Section 1 ‘Terms and Conditions of a Savings Account’ stipulates that Bank D2 
guarantees to retail depositors the safety and the return of the amount of the savings 
 307 
account in the form, extent and on conditions set by the current legislation. Moreover, the 
final provisions of these terms and conditions stipulate that the contract of the savings 
account is regulated and construed in accordance with the legislation of the Russian 
Federation. 
No document provided by Bank D2 for analysis stipulated the obligation on the retail 
depositor’s side to inform their bank about any changes to the retail depositors’ personal 
detail included in the contract. 
7.3 Findings from In-Branch Observations and from Document 
Analysis in Relation to Objective 2 “To Strengthen Public 
Confidence in the Banking System” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are four main indicators related to Objective 
2. The impact indicator to be evaluated with the data gathered through observations and 
document review is impact indicator 2.1.4. The remaining indicators are examined in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and Sections 7.2 and 7.4 of this chapter. 
7.3.1 Depositors Keep Their Savings Accounts in Times of 
Economic Uncertainty in the Country (Impact Indicator 2.1.4) 
Figure 7.22 depicts data on the value of current/savings accounts by retail depositors in 
Russia in million RUB as recorded by the CBR for the period from January 1998 up to 
February 2010.664 
Three curves represent the total value of current/savings accounts in RUB in red, and 
the total value of current/savings accounts in foreign currencies in green; the summative 
curve in blue represents the combined total value across all currencies in RUB value. 
It can be seen from Figure 7.22 that starting from 01 October 2008, the dynamic of all 
three curves changes. 
                                               
664 The financial reports use the first date of the month/year as the reporting date for the previous 
month/year, for example, date 01 September 2009 refers to the data for the month of August 
2009, etc.; http://cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=pdko (last accessed on 06 February 2010). 
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The curve representing the total value of current/savings accounts in RUB goes down 
from RUB 5,169,069 million on 01 September 2008 to RUB 4,042,168 million on 01 
February 2009, which can be possibly interpreted as a loss of confidence in the banking 
system due to the world financial crisis. This fall in the value of current/savings accounts 
in RUB was happening despite the attempts of the Government to reinforce the 
confidence in the national banking system by raising the limit of the deposit insurance 
compensation and abolishing the co-insurance, which were introduced on 13 October 
2008 and came into force on 14 October 2008, with retrospective effect for all insured 
events starting from 01 October 2008. 
In contrast, the curve representing the total value of current/savings accounts in foreign 
currency surges from RUB 923,581 million on 01 November 2008 to RUB 2,112,341 
million on 01 March 2009. This can be possibly interpreted as an increase in confidence 
in foreign currencies by retail depositors in Russia. 
The curve representing the combined total value of current/savings accounts across all 
currencies goes down from RUB 5,978,008 million on 01 September 2008 to RUB 
5,523,844 million on 01 December 2008, after which it recovers and starts to grow 
again. 
The dynamics of all three curves between 01 September 2008 and 01 February 2009 
can be possibly interpreted in two time periods. The first time period, between 01 
September 2008 and 01 November 2008, sees a rapid withdrawal from the 
current/savings accounts in RUB and more or less stable values of current/savings 
accounts in foreign currencies, whilst the second time period, between 01 November 
2008 and 01 February 2009, sees an increase in the value of current/savings bank 
accounts in foreign currencies, with a continued withdrawal by retail depositors holding 
accounts in RUB. 
This can be possibly explained not only as a loss of confidence in national banking system 
at the early stages of the world financial crisis, but also as a loss of confidence in the 
national currency as the financial crisis progressed. 
By 01 March 2009, retail depositors who were more confident in foreign currencies 
would have transferred the value of their current/savings accounts from RUB into 
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foreign currencies and, as can be seen from the dynamic of the curve representing total 
value of current/savings accounts in foreign currencies, the value of such accounts 
stabilised and floated on and around the RUB 2,000,000 million mark until 01 December 
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7.4 Findings from In-Branch Observations and from Document 
Analysis in Relation to Objective 3 “To Encourage Household 
Savings in the Banking System of the Russian Federation” 
As shown in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4, there are five main indicators related to Objective 3. 
The impact indicator to be evaluated with the data gathered through observations and 
document review is impact indicator 3.1.1. The remaining indicators are examined in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and Sections 7.2 and 7.3 of this chapter. 
7.4.1 The Public Opens More Savings Accounts and/or Increases 
the Value of Existing Savings Accounts (Impact Indicator 
3.1.1) 
In order to assess the relevance of statistical data on the amounts held by retail 
depositors on current and savings accounts in Russia to evaluate the success of the DIS, 
Figure 7.23 depicts the changes in the amounts of retail deposits in the six participating 
banks in RUB (total across all currencies) for the period of 1998-2010 (data reported on 
01 January 1999 and 01 January 2011 respectively). 
Whilst the six participating banks entered the DIS at different times, it is clear that there 
was no immediate substantial increase in the amounts of retail deposits held at these 
banks as a consequence of the introduction of the DIS. 
Looking further at the data presented in Figure 7.23, it is possible to note that Bank A1 
and Bank D2 have the most significant increase in the amount of retail deposits as of 01 
January 2010, but that the development started at different times. Whilst the amount of 
retail deposits in Bank D2 started growing in 2003 (reported on 01 January 2004), well 
before the introduction of the DIS, in the case of Bank A1, the same growth took place in 
a much shorter time frame – between 2006 (reported on 01 January 2007) and 2009 
(reported on 01 January 2010). 
Figure 7.23 also clearly shows that Bank A2 and Bank D2 are the only two banks from 
the six participating banks which reported a fall in the amounts of retail deposits 2008 
(reported on 01 January 2009). Whilst in the case of Bank A2, there was a situation of 
governmental buy-out which may explain the uncertainty among retail depositors, there 
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is no clear evidence that may suggest the reasons for the same behaviour of retail 
depositors in relation to Bank D2. 
Figure 7.23 
Total volume of retail deposits in six participating banks in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 
 
Source: Financial reporting information from the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru). 
It should also be noted that both banks, Bank A2 and Bank D2, showed an increase in 
2009 (reported on 01 January 2010), but as against Bank D2, Bank A2 has not reached 
the pre-crisis level of retail deposits yet (as of reporting date). 
It is clear that, whilst the increase in the total amount of all depositors in Bank A1 
slowed down in 2008 (reported on 01 January 2009), Bank A2 showed steady growth in 
the amount of retail depositors in 2006-2008, irrespective of the financial crisis. The 
growth in 2009 (reported on 01 January 2010) was more rapid than in previous years. 
By looking at the same data for each bank separately, it is possible to look in detail at the 
changes in the amounts held by retail depositors in each of the six participating banks, 
compared to the total amounts of depositors held in each bank by retail and business 

















Figure 7.24 depicts the amount of deposits held by retail depositors compared to the total 
amount of deposits by all non-credit organisations and retail depositors taken together in 
Bank A1. 
Figure 7.24 
Total volume of retail and total deposits in Bank A1 in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 
Source: Bank A1’s financial reporting information from the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru). 
From Figure 7.24, it is clear that Bank A1 is more oriented towards retail depositors 
than towards business depositors. 
Figure 7.25 depicts the amount of deposits held in Bank A2 by both retail depositors and 
business depositors (non-credit organisations) in total, and by retail depositors 
separately. As can be seen from Figure 7.25, up to 2008 both curves show growth, 
through the growth of the curve representing the total amount of depositors (in red) 
showed more dynamic growth, which points to the fact that Bank A2’s strategy was 
directed towards the business depositors at the time. 
The financial crisis in 2008 hit Bank A2 more than any other of the six participating 
banks. As can be seen from Figure 7.25, the withdrawals by business depositors (the 
difference between the amount of total depositors and the amount of retail depositors) 
were higher than withdrawals by retail depositors and, whilst the dynamic of the retail 















depositors, the decrease continued until 2010, when it grew to the pre-crisis level 
(reported on 01 January 2011). 
Figure 7.25 
Total volume of retail and total deposits in Bank A2 in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 
Source: Bank A2’s financial reporting information from the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru). 
Figure 7.26 
Total volume of retail and total deposits in Bank B1 in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 























Bank B1 started working with retail depositors only in 2006 (reported on 1 January 
2007). As can be seen from Figure 7.26, there was a steady increase in the amount of 
retail deposits from 2006, and Bank B1 has not been affected by the financial crisis in 
this respect. It is clear that the situation with business depositors (non-credit 
organisations) is different. 
In 2008, the amount of total deposits held by both the retail depositors and the business 
depositors (non-credit organisations) sharply decreased, almost to the levels of 2006 
(reported on 1 January 2007). However, it picked up and started to grow in 2009 
(reported on 1 January 2010). Considering the amount of retail deposits continued to 
grow throughout the period, it is possible to attribute the decrease in the total amount of 
deposits in 2008 to the withdrawals by the business depositors (non-credit 
organisations). 
Figure 7.27 
Total volume of retail and total deposits in Bank C1 in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 
Source: Bank C1’s financial reporting information from the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru). 
As can be seen form Figure 7.27, Bank C1 was not affected by the financial crisis in 
terms of the growth of retail deposits. 
The growth in the total amount of deposits held in Bank C1 by both the retail depositors 
















in 2007 (reported on 1 January 2008), a year before the financial crisis in Russia. 
However, the pace of growth picked up in 2008 (reported on 1 January 2009). It can 
also be said that, considering the growth of retail deposits continued through the period, 
the decrease of the total amount of deposits held in Bank C1 can be attributed to 
withdrawals by business depositors (non-credit organisations). 
Figure 7.28 
Total volume of retail and total deposits in Bank D1 in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 
Source: Bank D1’s financial reporting information from the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru). 
With regard to Bank D1, Figure 7.28 shows that the amount of total deposits held by 
both the retail depositors and the business depositors (non-credit organisations) grew 
significantly, showing over a sevenfold increase between 2007 (reported on 1 January 
2008) and 2009 (reported on 1 January 2010). 
Considering the growth of the retail deposits was less dramatic, Figure 7.28 confirms the 
strategy of the bank to service mainly the business depositors, which has been officially 
confirmed by the decision of the parent banking group of Bank D1 in October 2010 to 
phase out retail banking operations in the territory of Russia, and to concentrate on 
















Bank D2 is one of only two of the six participating banks which had withdrawals by 
retail depositors in 2008 (reported on 1 January 2009), the year when the financial crisis 
hit Russia. 
However, compared to Bank A2 (see Figure 7.25 above), Bank D2 saw a decrease in the 
amount of retail deposits only, whilst the amount of deposits held by business depositors 
(non-credit organisations) continued to grow throughout the financial crisis. 
As can be seen from Figure 7.29, the pace of the growth of the total amount of deposits 
held in Bank D2 by both the retail depositors and the business depositors (non-credit 
organisations) slowed down in 2008 (reported on 1 January 2009), which can be 
explained by the balancing of the decreasing amount of retail deposits by the increasing 
amount of business deposits.  
Figure 7.29 
Total volume of retail and total deposits in Bank D2 in 1999-2010, in RUB billion 
Source: Bank D2’s financial reporting information from the CBR’s website (http://www.cbr.ru). 
7.5 Summary 
The results of the document and observational data analysis carried out in this chapter 
show that, whilst there is a legal duty on the part of a bank to inform retail depositors 

















about the DIS to retail depositors. 
Attempts by the DIA to provide guidance to the banks on the best ways to inform 
depositors (in the form of Recommendations), are undermined by the fact that these 
Recommendation have no enforcement mechanism. As a result, there are confusing 
messages about the DIS coming from some banks and no information about the DIS from 
others. 
The financial data presented in this chapter shows that there was an outflow of deposits 
from the Russian banks during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Depositors 
withdrew their savings, despite government attempts to maintain the public’s confidence 
in the banking system by increasing the maximum compensation amount under the DIS 
and abolishing the co-insurance. 
The link between the results of the document and observational data analysis in this 







“One of the great mistakes is to judge policies and 
programs by their intentions rather than their results.” 
–Milton Friedman (1912-2006) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of, and discusses, the main findings from the 
quantitative, qualitative, and document and observational data analysis, as well as 
comparing these to the literature on the subject. Section 8.1 summarises the research 
purpose and the research question. Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 provide a discussion of the 
main findings against each of the stated objectives of the Russian DIS reform. Finally, 
Section 8.5 places the main findings of this research into a broader context of previous 
studies into the Russian DIS, presented in Chapter 3, and the academic literature, 
reviewed in Chapter 2. 
8.1 Research Purpose and Research Question 
As set out in Chapter 1, the research purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the Russian 
DIS against its stated objectives, and to identify possible problems with the 
implementation of the 2003 reform, and the research question is ‘Has the Russian DIS 
achieved its stated objectives?’ 
Chapter 2 examined the importance of the DIS for depositor protection and for 
maintaining public confidence in the banking system. The review of theories of public 
policy implementation and evaluation has shown that, when implementing a 
governmental programme across a vast number of units (in this instance, banks), there 
will always be a human factor that affects the quality of implementation, and leads to 
variations from the original stated objectives.  
 320 
The Russian DIS has three stated objectives, namely (i) to protect the rights and legal 
interests of depositors, (ii) to strengthen public confidence in the banking system, and (iii) 
to encourage household savings in the banking system. 
As shown in Chapter 3, previous attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS failed to 
provide a clear overview of the multiple viewpoints across the spectrum of stakeholders. 
Using a critical realist perspective, the present investigation looked at the DIS in the 
context of multiple realities and multiple stakeholders, who were influenced and affected 
by the introduction of the DIS in Russia. Since banks are obliged to disseminate 
information about the DIS to retail depositors, six banks agreed to participate in the 
present investigation and this provided a platform for data collection.  
8.2 Main Findings in Relation to Objective 1 “To Protect the 
Rights and Legal Interests of Household Depositors” 
From the data analysed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the following main findings have 
emerged. 
8.2.1 Main Findings from the Quantitative Data Analysis 
With regard to the retail depositors’ perceptions of their knowledge about the DIS, and 
the information provision from the banks they patronise, the main findings are as follows. 
First, over a half of all respondents thought that their rights and legal interests were 
more protected after the introduction of the DIS in 2003. It appears that the 
respondents’ belief in a better protection of their rights as depositors depends on which 
bank they patronise. Bank A1 has the highest proportion of retail depositors who believe 
that their rights are better protected now than before the introduction of the DIS, whilst 
Bank C1 has the lowest proportion of such retail depositors. 
Second, whilst just under half of the respondents rated their perceived knowledge about 
the DIS as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’, a third of respondents stated the deposit insurance 
coverage limit wrongly or did not state amount at all. Almost half of the respondents 
were confused about the organisation responsible for the payout in case of an insured 
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event, with every fifth respondent being unaware of which organisation was responsible 
for the compensation process. 
It is essential to note that all of the above results depend on the bank the respondents 
patronised. It is clear from the additional analysis presented in Chapter 5 that retail 
depositors at Banks B1 and A1 have the highest perceived knowledge of the DIS, whilst 
Bank B1 has a significantly higher proportion of retail depositors who know the correct 
maximum compensation amount, and Banks D2 and A2 have the lowest proportion. 
Furthermore, it appears that Bank D1 has the highest proportion of retail depositors who 
are aware that the DIA is responsible for the payout in case of an insured event. 
Knowledge about the DIS amongst retail depositors also differed according to which 
banking products and services they used. For example, the practice of opening a bank 
account with a debit or credit card through the ‘salary project’ might have a negative 
impact on the knowledge of those retail depositors. Only one in four respondents who 
claimed to have a card through the ‘salary project’ acknowledged the existence of a 
current account with their respective bank, thus the majority of those who had a card 
through the ‘salary project’ did not know that they were, in fact, depositors within the 
meaning of the Federal Law. As the ‘salary projects’ spread across Russia, more and 
more retail depositors might be confused as to whether or not they are protected under 
the Federal Law, unless it is made clear to them that the debit or credit card on which 
they receive their monthly salary is attached to a current bank account. 
Furthermore, whilst the vast majority of respondents knew that their bank was a 
member of the DIS, Bank D2 had by far the highest proportion of retail depositors who 
thought that their bank was not a member of the DIS. 
Third, whilst the vast majority of respondents received information about the DIS from 
their bank in one way or another, only one in every seven respondents actually read about 
it in their bank account contracts. Other respondents received the information either from 
the clerk or from the information stand in the bank’s branch. The highest proportion of 
these patronised Bank A1, whilst Bank B1 had a significantly higher number of those 
respondents who found the information by reading their bank account contracts. In 
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addition, Banks D2 and A2 had the highest proportions of those who stated that they did 
not receive any information about the DIS from their bank at all. 
Fewer than one in four respondents were given details of the changes in the parameters 
of the DIS in October 2008 by the bank they patronised, with the highest proportion of 
these respondents coming from Bank A1, and the lowest from Bank D1. 
Fourth, the vast majority of respondents agreed that they were confident about finding 
additional information about the DIS, with Banks B1 and D1 having the highest 
proportion of such retail depositors. 
8.2.2 Main Findings from the Qualitative Data Analysis 
As for bank staff’s understanding of how the DIS operates, and the bank staff’s and 
representatives of the judiciary’s perception of the retail depositors’ knowledge about the 
DIS, the main findings are as follows. 
First, all senior bank staff believed that the rights and legal interests of retail depositors 
had greater protection since the introduction of the DIS in 2003. Furthermore, most of 
them also noted that the retail depositors’ knowledge about their rights as depositors had 
increased. 
Second, when examining the perceptions of retail depositors’ knowledge in more detail, 
less than one in five bank clerks thought that retail depositors knew about both the 
parameters of the DIS and the compensation process. More than a third of bank clerks 
thought that there was a clear difference between depositors’ knowledge of the 
parameters of the DIS and their understanding of the compensation process. This 
perception was echoed by the senior bank staff, all of whom thought that retail depositors 
knew the maximum compensation amount. However, not all senior bank staff believed 
that the same could be said about retail depositors’ knowledge of the compensation 
process and the timings involved. 
Senior bank staff gave varied explanations of this phenomenon. Some said that 
knowledge depended on the level of depositors’ economic and financial literacy, and that 
those less economically and financially literate would only know the basic details, like the 
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maximum compensation amount. Others suggested that most people would know the 
deposit insurance coverage limit, and that the information gap in the retail depositors’ 
knowledge was within the area of the compensation process. They explained this by 
reference to Russian mentality, whereby Russians learnt how to deal with a problem (in 
this case, an insured event) only when such a problem occurred. 
Third, further to the statements above, it appears that retail depositors had difficulty 
with understanding the basic features of the DIS in Russia. Thus, more than a half of 
bank clerks recalled retail depositors asking questions about the bank’s membership of the 
DIS when, in fact, membership is compulsory for all retail deposit-taking institutions. 
Most senior bank staff supported this view, stating that the question about the bank’s 
membership in the DIS was by far the most common, if not the only, question that retail 
depositors asked. In addition, the retail depositors might have been confused about the 
maximum compensation amount and the compensation process. Half of bank clerks 
recalled a question about the deposit insurance coverage limit, and only one in five clerks 
recalled a question about the compensation process in general. Only one in seven clerks 
could recall retail depositors asking more focused, situation-specific questions about the 
compensation process.  
The age of the depositor and the amount deposited were the most significant features of 
retail depositors who chose to ask questions. It was thought that pensioners asked 
questions not only as a result of their negative experiences during the 1998 financial 
default when their savings were frozen, but also because they were unlikely to have 
internet access and did not use ratings, popularity or other information to assess banks. 
In terms of the deposited amount, the views of bank clerks and senior bank staff differed. 
Whilst the former believed that retail depositors with large deposits asked more 
questions, the latter believed that those with smaller deposits tended to ask more 
questions. 
From further probing, it appeared that some bank clerks noted that pensioners tended to 
ask questions about the bank’s membership of the DIS more often than others, and that 
this was their only question. Some clerks noted that questions about, and requests to 
calculate, the maximum compensation amount were asked more frequently when changes 
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in the coverage limit occurred, because depositors were unsure of the actual compensation 
amount in their case, especially when co-insurance was involved. Some bank clerks noted 
that questions about the compensation process were specifically asked by depositors with 
deposits higher than the deposit insurance coverage limit. 
Other questions included requests to show a DIS membership certificate, requests to 
show a copy of the Federal Law and questions as to where in the bank information about 
the DIS could be found. It is important to note that all of these requests were recalled by 
clerks from Bank D2. 
Fourth, it appears that bank staff’s knowledge of the DIS was not uniform, and that 
some were clearly confused about the basic parameters of the DIS. For example, only 
three clerks and only one head of branch could name all three objectives of the DIS. 
Objective 3 about the encouragement of household savings among the population was 
recalled least often by all bank staff. 
The vast majority of bank clerks read the Federal Law, but less than a quarter of them 
read the Recommendations issued by the DIA. Not all senior bank staff read both the 
Federal Law and the Recommendations issued by the DIA. The three senior staff who 
did not read the Federal Law fully admitted that they only browsed through it, or read 
the parts relevant to their immediate work. 
Furthermore, it was clear that three clerks (one from Bank D1 and two from Bank D2) 
and the head of branch at Bank A2 were confused about the compulsory nature of the 
DIS in Russia, and gave incorrect statements. 
When asked to describe in their own words how the DIS worked, most of the bank clerks 
mentioned the maximum compensation amount, the existence of the DIA and the fact that 
compensation takes place when some insured event occurs. Four clerks attempted to state 
the timings involved in the payout process, but only one managed to state them correctly. 
Fifth, in comparison to the finding immediately above, when asked to state what 
information they would provide orally about the DIS to retail depositors, the majority of 
bank clerks mentioned the maximum compensation amount, and the fact that their bank 
was a member of the DIS, with less than a quarter of all clerks mentioning that they 
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would state that there would be compensation should something happen to the bank. Only 
two bank clerks explicitly said that they would convey information on the compensation 
process, whilst a further three clerks stated that they would provide such information 
only if retail depositors asked specifically about it. 
It appears that, when it comes to information provision, bank clerks prefer to be reactive 
rather than proactive. Clerks from Banks A1 and D1 only agreed that they would all 
inform retail depositors about the DIS at the initial consultation stage. Many clerks from 
other banks admitted that they would not normally tell depositors about the DIS if they 
did not ask questions about it. Some bank clerks further stated that they would not advise 
depositors about the DIS at all, in case they were dissuaded from opening an account. 
Bank clerks were equally divided between informing depositors by means of both oral and 
written information, or merely the provision of oral information about the DIS. This 
divide was confirmed by the senior bank staff. Senior bank staff from Banks A1 and C1 
stated that they provided mostly oral information to retail depositors, and supplemented it 
with some written information. On the contrary, senior staff from Banks D1 and D2 
stated that, whilst they provided information orally, they put emphasis on the provision 
of written information, as the written form was important to retail depositors.665 
When changes in the DIS occurred, banks would update the information stands in the 
branches and would inform retail depositors orally. However, this would be done only 
when retail depositors visited the branch, which may suggest that depositors who did not 
visit the branch regularly might not receive such information.  
Information provision regarding changes in the DIS was disseminated within banks by 
email to clerks and, in a third of cases, a dedicated person was responsible for this task. 
In relation to the first point of contact for bank clerks with regard to questions about the 
DIS, there was no consistency in answers neither within each bank nor across all banks. 
                                               
665 The head of branch from Bank A2 was not sure whether the standard (green) brochure 
produced by the DIA was a standard one used by all banks or used only by their bank. The heads 
of branch from Bank D2 confirmed that they provide all the necessary information in the branch 
and that it is usually located next to the cashier’s office and not in the main area where the 
consultations with depositors take place. However, it was clear from their responses that 
depositors are not automatically directed to this information. 
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This suggests that there was no clearly identifiable procedure for dealing with queries 
about the DIS which were outside the clerks’ immediate knowledge. 
This was confirmed by the responses of senior bank staff. Not all of the senior bank staff 
could clearly articulate whether there was a dedicated person in the bank in charge of 
information provision about the DIS. Even the senior staff from the same bank were 
confused, and named different persons or departments as their point of contact. 
Furthermore, more than half of staff stated that they would consult additional external 
resources when changes in the DIS occur, which may suggest that the quality of the 
information on the DIS provided within the banks was not sufficient, and there was no 
straightforward way to obtain such information internally. 
Sixth, only Banks B1 and C1 admitted to using their membership of the DIS as a 
marketing tool. Both banks were relatively unknown to the population and placed an 
important role to their membership in the DIS in their advertising. 
On the contrary, it appears that banks with 100% foreign capital used reference to the 
DIS for information purposes only (to comply with the regulation), and not as an 
instrument to attract new depositors. 
Seventh, it emerged that the process of compensation of any amount beyond the 
maximum coverage limit was somewhat complicated, and might not be understood by the 
average retail depositor. Whilst the DIA is responsible for the liquidation process and the 
compensation of amounts above RUB 700,000, representatives of the judiciary were 
sceptical about the level of financial and legal literacy among the population and their 
knowledge of the procedures required to be followed in claiming outstanding amounts. 
Considering there were only a few retail depositors with deposits above the maximum 
compensation amount, this lack of knowledge might have also have created a 
psychological barrier that contributed to the reluctance to deposit higher amounts. 
8.2.3 Main Findings from the Document and Observational Data 
Analysis 
The main findings arising from analysis of documents collected and observations made at 
the participating banks which are related to the protection of depositors’ rights and legal 
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interests, their knowledge of the DIS and the provision of information by the banks are as 
follows. 
First, the compensation process in all but four insured events commenced within the time 
stated in the Federal Law.666 The four insured events in which the payout did not 
commence within 14 days as stipulated by the Federal Law occurred late in the year (two 
in late December 2008 and two in late December 2009), so the scheduled payouts fell 
due on the long holiday period in January and, thus, were postponed until the end of the 
public holidays. 
The compensation process observed on two occasions appears to have been within the 
provisions stipulated by the Federal Law. However, it should be noted that not all bank-
agents accept the completed claim form, and fill in the claim form on their computer and 
asked depositors to sign it. This creates additional work on both sides. Moreover, it 
appears that communications from the DIA regarding amounts above the DI coverage 
limit through the liquidation process of the failed bank might not be clear enough for 
some retail depositors to understand. 
Second, not all of the six banks in this investigation had a dedicated area with 
information on the DIS, with some opting for providing such information in a folder 
which was made available in the area where the consultation with depositors took place. 
There were significant differences in the presentation of information on the DIS among 
different branches of some banks. 
The best folder with the most information was provided by Bank D2, but it was placed 
next to the cashier’s office, on the wall, and was not easily available for browsing. Bank 
D1 also opted for providing a folder. Banks B1 and C1 had both a folder and a separate 
information stand, though these stands differed from branch to branch within each bank. 
Bank A1 did not have a separate dedicated area. The information presented in the 
branches of Bank A2 differed from one branch to another. 
                                               
666 This number does not include three insured events where retail depositors did not receive any 
compensation at all because the obligations were taken over by other banks. For more information 
see Chapter 7. 
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Third, in terms of marketing materials, there was no consistency in presenting 
information about the DIS. Some banks chose to include only the DIS sign and no further 
information, whilst others opted for a written reference to their membership of the DIS. 
In addition, some included their number in the register of the banks participating in the 
DIS, whilst other did not. It was also clear that, whilst some banks put information about 
the DIS on all marketing materials, irrespective of the target audience, some banks put 
such information only on the marketing materials related to retail deposits. 
Fourth, considering there is no legal obligation for banks to include any reference to the 
DIS in the text of a bank account contract, but only a recommendation by the DIA, it was 
not surprising that all six banks differed in the way they presented information on the 
DIS in the text of their contracts. Only two banks’ contracts featured the DIS sign 
(Banks A1 and B1). Whilst the wording used by all banks is somewhat uniform, 
generally following the Recommendations of the DIS, there was no consistency in terms 
of placement of such a wording in the contract. 
Bank C1 is the only bank which included in the first section of the contract reference to 
the DIS, and the fact that all depositors were insured. Other banks placed such 
information in the last sections of the bank account contract and sometimes among other 
provisions. 
8.2.4 Summary 
The above findings suggest that depositors felt more protected following the introduction 
of the DIS in 2003, which was also confirmed by bank staff. However, when questioned, 
retail depositors appeared to be confused as to their understanding of the main 
parameters of, and the compensation process under, the DIS. It appears that retail 
depositors’ knowledge depends not only on the bank they patronised, but also on the 
banking products and services used. Those served by Banks B1, A1 and D1 appear to be 
significantly more knowledgeable than retail depositors from other banks. 
There may be several possible explanations to this. Both Banks A1 and D1 inform retail 
depositors about the DIS at the initial consultation stage, whilst Banks A1 and B1 place 
the DIS sign on their bank account contracts, all of which may lead to a greater public 
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awareness of the DIS. Moreover, retail depositors from Banks B1 and D1 appear to 
know where to find additional information about the DIS, which may suggest that they 
are confident in their knowledge about the DIS. 
The understanding of the DIS by bank staff was limited and only a few bank clerks and 
senior bank staff appeared to have an in-depth and accurate knowledge. Several bank 
staff were confused about the compulsory nature of the DIS in Russia. Most clerks had 
not read the Recommendations, issued by the DIA, whilst a third of senior staff had not 
read the Federal Law. As a result, clerks did not understanding how to inform retail 
depositors about the DIS, and stated that they would normally limit their information 
provision to the fact that the bank is a member of the DIS and/or the compensation 
amount. 
From the document analysis, it emerged that the payout process commenced within the 
time prescribed by the Federal Law in almost all of the insured events. Additionally, 
what transpired was that the average retail depositor might not have a full understanding 
about how to claim an amount beyond the maximum coverage limit. The representatives 
of the judiciary questioned the extent to which the Russian population was able to 
understand the compensation process. 
The provision of information about the DIS varied, not only amongst the banks, but also 
across the branches of individual banks. This may explain why retail depositors were so 
confused in their understanding of the DIS. Additionally, the lack of a clearly identifiable 
procedure for dealing with queries regarding the DIS created a further barrier to 
information provision.  
8.3 Main Findings in Relation to Objective 2 “To Strengthen 
Public Confidence in the Banking System” 
From the data analysed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the following main findings have 
emerged. 
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8.3.1 Main Findings from the Quantitative Data Analysis 
With regard to the perceptions of retail depositors concerning their level of confidence in 
the banking system, the main findings are as follows. 
First, almost all respondents were confident in the safety of their money in the bank they 
patronised, irrespective of the bank. This may be explained by the fact that the retail 
depositors have been with their bank for a certain time, or took time to choose the bank 
carefully. Another explanation may be the amount deposited in the bank, as the majority 
of respondents’ deposits were within the DI coverage limit. 
Second, in comparison to almost all respondents feeling confident in the bank they 
patronised, a little over 50% of all respondents felt more confident in the banking system 
as a whole following the introduction of the DIS in 2003. In addition, almost three 
quarters of all respondents agreed that the DIS had a major impact on the change in their 
level of confidence. In terms of changes in confidence levels among the respondents 
during the global financial crisis, half of the respondents reported no change, despite the 
increase in the maximum compensation amount in October 2008. 
It is vital to note that respondents’ confidence levels and their perception of the DIS’s 
impact on it depended on the bank they patronised. Not only was there a proven 
significant difference between the six banks which participated in this research, it was 
clear from the additional analysis presented in Chapter 5 that retail depositors at Banks 
A1 and B1 were significantly more confident in the banking system than the respondents 
from the other four banks. One possible explanation of this might be the strong focus on 
retail operations within these two banks, as well as a better organised process of 
information provision. 
Third, whilst less than a third of all respondents chose their bank on the recommendation 
of a family member, a friend or other person, two-thirds of all respondents agreed that 
they tend to recommend keeping money in a bank to members of their family and friends, 
irrespective of the bank they patronise. 
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8.3.2 Main Findings from the Qualitative Data Analysis 
With regard to the perception of bank staff about retail depositors’ levels of confidence in 
the banking system, the main findings are as follows. 
First, all senior bank staff stated that, in their opinion, the level of depositors’ confidence 
in the banking system increased following the introduction of the DIS. Some of them 
compared the 1998 financial default to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and stated 
that depositors became less anxious. However, some respondents found it difficult to 
separate depositors’ confidence in the banking system from depositors’ saving behaviour, 
stating that one may infer confidence by looking at saving behaviour. This confusion 
among the interviewees posed difficulties in analysing the data. 
Interviewees did not attribute the increase in confidence solely to the introduction of the 
DIS, and suggested that increased choice in the banking market and increased levels of 
financial literacy generally were relevant.  
Second, despite general agreement that confidence in the banking system amongst 
depositors had increased since 2003, all banks experienced an outflow of savings in 
autumn 2008 when the global financial crisis reached Russia. That outflow took two 
forms, namely a shifting of savings from bank accounts in domestic currency to bank 
accounts in a foreign currency and, secondly, a shifting of savings from privately-owned 
banks to state-owned banks. Most of the interviewees commented that, if it were not for 
the DIS and the increase in the maximum compensation amount in October 2008, the 
consequences of the global financial crisis might have been much worse. 
8.3.3 Main Findings from the Document and Observational Data 
Analysis 
With regard to the document analysis, evidence suggests that, during the global financial 
crisis, there was a run on the banks, despite the introduction of a higher DI coverage 
limit and the abolition of co-insurance. Data presented in Chapter 7, shows that retail 
depositors lost their confidence in the national currency, which resulted in the shift of 
some savings in domestic currency into savings in foreign currencies. This appears to 
confirm the perceptions of bank staff on this issue. 
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8.3.4 Summary 
The above findings suggest that there was an evident increase in the level of public 
confidence in the banking system. However, the recent test of confidence levels during 
the global financial crisis shows that, in time of crisis, retail depositors are not confident 
enough in the banking system to keep their savings in the bank, despite governmental 
attempts to calm retail depositors by introducing a higher DI coverage limit. 
Furthermore, there will need to be more evidence to confirm the exact impact of the 
introduction and proper functioning of the DIS on the public confidence in the banking 
system. At present, it is not possible to differentiate between the impact of the DIS made 
and the many other possible reasons for such an increase in public confidence in the 
banking system. 
8.4 Main Findings in Relation to Objective 3 “To Encourage 
Household Savings in the Banking System of the Russian 
Federation” 
From the data analysed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the following main findings have 
emerged. 
8.4.1 Main Findings from the Quantitative Data Analysis 
With regard to the perceptions of retail depositors about the change in their saving 
behaviour, the main findings are as follows. 
First, only a quarter of respondents increased the value of their savings because of the 
DIS, whilst the saving behaviour of more than half of all respondents remained 
unchanged, despite the introduction of the DIS in 2003. Paradoxically, more than half of 
respondents agreed that the DIS had a major impact on the changes in their saving 
behaviour. Thus, it appears that retail depositors attributed no change in their saving 
behaviour during the global financial crisis to the existence of the DIS, as there were low 
levels of withdrawals by depositors in the six participating banks in the third quarter of 
2008. 
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It is vital to note that the changes in saving behaviour and the perception of the DIS’s 
impact on it amongst the respondents depended on the bank they patronised. Not only is 
there a proven significant difference between the six banks which participated in this 
research, it is also clear from the additional analysis presented in Chapter 5, that retail 
depositors at Banks A1 and B1 changed their saving behaviour significantly more than 
respondents from the other four banks. On the contrary, the significantly higher number 
of respondents from Banks D1 and D2 reported no change in their saving behaviour. 
Second, in terms of changes in saving behaviour amongst the respondents following the 
increase in the DI coverage limit to RUB 700,000 in October 2008, only one in four 
respondents increased, or was planning to increase, the value of their savings in the bank 
they patronised, whilst one in ten opened, or was planning to open, a new savings 
account in another bank. The majority of respondents were not planning to increase the 
amount in their bank account, nor did they plan to open a new bank account, despite the 
increase in the DI coverage limit. 
These results, as in the first main finding above, depended on the bank the respondents 
patronised at the time of the survey. The respondents from Banks A1 andB1 were 
significantly more inclined to increase the amount in their bank account following the 
increase in the maximum compensation amount. The respondents from Banks B1 and C1 
were significantly more inclined to open a new bank account in another bank. 
Significantly more respondents who planned no changes were from Banks D1 and D2. 
8.4.2 Main Findings from the Qualitative Data Analysis 
With regard to the perception of bank staff about the change in retail depositors’ saving 
behaviour, the main findings are as follows. 
First, almost all senior bank staff stated that, in their opinion, depositors’ saving 
behaviour increased. Two of the interviewees from Bank B1 stated that there was a 
temporary decrease in the level of saving behaviour during the global financial crisis. 
However, this was not confirmed by the document analysis, which showed that the retail 
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business of Bank B1 did not suffer as a result of the global financial crisis at all.667 Some 
interviewees emphasised that retail depositors were spending more time gathering 
information about the bank they wanted to patronise, and also that more of such 
information was available on the market. 
On the whole, interviewees did not attribute the increase in retail depositors’ saving 
behaviour only to the introduction of the DIS, and named several other possible reasons 
for such an increase. These included higher quality of customer service, an increase in the 
level of financial literacy among retail depositors, and the introduction of new banking 
products and services on the market. 
Second, the interviewees confirmed the following tendency in the saving market. At the 
outset of the DIS, retail depositors were dividing their resources between different banks 
so that their deposits were covered by the maximum compensation amount. As the 
maximum coverage limit increased, retail depositors accumulated their deposits in fewer 
accounts.  
Third, most of the senior bank staff pointed out that there was no major shift in the 
perception of the DIS among retail depositors following the increase in the maximum 
compensation amount. 
Whilst, in the opinion of senior bank staff, many retail depositors actively increased their 
deposits to the new coverage limit introduced in October 2008, interviewees stressed that 
the DI coverage limit is a psychological barrier for many retail depositors preventing 
them from depositing higher amounts. This psychological barrier was used by some 
banks in the market by introducing so-called ‘fully guaranteed deposits’, whereby the 
amount of deposit was limited to RUB 700,000.668 
                                               
667These interviewees might have referred to a ‘temporary’ outflow, which has not materialised in 
the annual financial statements. The inflow of retail deposits in November-December 2008 might 
have returned the value of retail deposits to the pre-October 2008 level. 
668 None of the six banks participating in the research introduced such bank accounts following the 
increase in the DI coverage limit in October 2008. 
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8.4.3 Main Findings from the Document and Observational Data 
Analysis 
With regard to the document analysis, evidence suggests that there was no immediate 
substantial increase in the amount of retail deposits held at the six participating banks. 
Banks A1 and D2 have a similar amount of retail deposits and show the most significant 
increase in the amount of retail deposits. However, the growth rate for these two banks is 
different with Bank D2 showing growth from 2003, whilst Bank A1 shows growth from 
2006. 
When looking at the six participating banks separately, it is clear that not all of them are 
focused on retail deposits. For example, Bank A1 is clearly mostly retail-orientated, as 
the majority of its deposits are by retail depositors. Bank D1 has always been orientated 
towards business depositors, which was also confirmed by the bank’s decision to cease 
retail operations and only provide retail services to the employees of the bank’s corporate 
clients. In case of Bank B1, it only started working with retail depositors in 2006, and 
has been steadily growing. The retail business of Bank C1 was also not affected by the 
financial crisis, and the amount of retail deposits continued to grow at an accelerated rate 
over the last two years of the investigation. 
Moreover, in terms of the response to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, not all of the 
six banks were affected in the same way. Banks A2 and D2 were the only two banks of 
those participating in the research to suffer an outflow of retail deposits. Bank A2 saw an 
outflow of both retail and business deposits, and Bank D2 saw an outflow of retail 
deposits only. Whilst the outflow of retail deposits in Bank A2 can be explained by the 
uncertainty among retail depositors following the governmental buy-out of the bank, 
there is no immediately apparent reason for the same behaviour of retail depositors 
patronising Bank D2. 
8.4.4 Summary 
The above findings suggest that the deposit insurance coverage limit is a determinant of 
the upper level of savings for most of retail depositors, and that the increase in the value 
of bank accounts will follow the increase in the coverage limit and not the other way 
around. 
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Furthermore, unfortunately, it is not possible to attribute the increase in the number and 
volume of retail deposits to the introduction of the DIS. On the one hand, the statistics 
show a steady increase in the value of retail deposits, with senior bank staff perceiving 
this as an outcome of increased saving behaviour among retail depositors. On the other 
hand, the majority of retail depositors believe that their saving behaviour remained 
unchanged, despite the introduction of the DIS in 2003 and the increase in the coverage 
limit in October 2008. 
As a result, owing to the difficulty to measure the impact of the introduction of the DIS 
on saving behaviour of the retail depositors, and complexity of other plausible reasons for 
the increase in household savings, there will need to be more evidence to confirm the 
exact impact of the introduction and proper functioning of the DIS on the changes in the 
saving behaviour of the population. 
8.5 Summary of the Main Findings in Relation to the Stated 
Objectives of the DIS 
The findings in relation to Objective 1 “To Protect the Rights and Legal Interests of 
Household Depositors” presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and discussed in Section 8.2 of 
this chapter, suggest that the system which was put in place by the DIA provides 
adequate DI coverage in a timely manner. The evidence suggests that retail depositors 
felt more protected following the introduction of the DIS in 2003 and, thus, it could be 
concluded that Objective 1 has been met. 
However, based on the additional evidence and further data analysis, it can be said that 
the way the Objective 1 was met differs between the banks. Banks have an obligation to 
provide the information on the DIS to the retail depositors. However, the provision of 
information about the DIS varied, not only amongst the banks, but also across the 
branches of individual banks. Considering the depositors from certain banks participating 
in the research appeared to know significantly more about the main parameters of, and 
the compensation process under, the DIS than depositors from other banks, it is clear 
that the DIS has been implemented unevenly across different banks. The same can be 
said about the understanding of the DIS by bank staff, which was not only limited, but 
also differed amongst the banks and across the branches of individual banks. 
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The findings in relation to Objective 2 “To Strengthen Public Confidence in the Banking 
System” presented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, and discussed in Section 8.3 of this chapter, 
suggest that there was an evident increase in the level of public confidence in the banking 
system. The retail depositors appeared more confident in the banking system than before 
the DIS was introduces, and this increased confidence was also confirmed by the 
perceptions of the bank staff: Thus, it could be concluded that Objective 2 has been met. 
However, the additional evidence suggests that, in time of crisis, retail depositors are not 
confident enough in the banking system to keep their savings in the bank, despite 
governmental attempts to calm retail depositors by introducing a higher DI coverage 
limit. Furthermore, more evidence will be required to confirm the exact impact of the 
introduction and proper functioning of the DIS on the public confidence in the banking 
system. 
The findings in relation to Objective 3 “To Encourage Household Savings in the Banking 
System of the Russian Federation” presented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, and discussed in 
Section 8.4 of this chapter suggest that there was not enough evidence to conclude that 
the Objective 3 has been met. It was not possible to attribute the increase in the number 
and volume of retail deposits to the introduction of the DIS. Whilst official statistics 
showed a steady increase in the value of retail deposits, with senior bank staff perceiving 
this as an outcome of increased saving behaviour among retail depositors, the majority of 
retail depositors believed that their saving behaviour remained unchanged, despite the 
introduction of the DIS in 2003 and the increase in the coverage limit in October 2008. 
The results of qualitative data analysis presented in Section 8.4.2 suggest that the 
apparent changes in retail depositors’ saving behaviour could have been affected by a 
range of factors including, but not limited to, higher quality of customer service, an 
increase in the level of financial literacy among retail depositors, the introduction of new 
banking products and services on the market. Further reasons for such a change could 
have also been of a non-banking nature, for example, changes in retail depositors’ 
employment status and salary levels, changes in family circumstances and the state of the 
economy on the whole, may also have contributed to the increase in the value of retail 
deposits. It is argued that it would have been nearly impossible to successfully take 
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account of the myriad of such variables when assessing the impact the introduction of the 
DIS has had on the increase in the level of household savings. 
Owing to the difficulty to measure the impact of the introduction of the DIS on saving 
behaviour of the retail depositors in general, and complexity of other plausible reasons for 
the increase in household savings, more evidence will be required to confirm the exact 
impact of the introduction and proper functioning of the DIS on the changes in the saving 
behaviour of the population. However, based on the additional evidence it is clear that the 
DI coverage limit remains as a determinant of the upper level of savings for most of retail 
depositors, and that the increase in the value of bank accounts will follow the increase in 
the coverage limit and not the other way around. 
8.6 Discussion of the Main Findings against the Literature 
The Russian DIS, introduced in 2003, was devised by the Russian Government to mirror 
the explicit DISs introduced in other countries. The main objectives of the DIS included 
depositor protection, increase of public confidence in the banking system, and the 
encouragement of household savings. Depositor protection was high on the agenda of the 
Russian Government, owing to the collapse of the banking system and the loss of savings 
by the population during the 1998 financial default. 
The main test for the Russian DIS took place in autumn 2008, when the global financial 
crisis reached Russia. The attempt of the Russian Government to prevent bank runs by 
introducing a higher coverage limit and abolishing co-insurance failed to impress retail 
depositors, who continued withdrawing their savings from the banks they patronised. 
The data collected through the retail depositor survey, interviews with bank staff and 
representatives of the judiciary, in-branch observations, and numerous documents 
allowed the evaluation of the impact of the Russian DIS. However, any of the findings 
and analytical propositions should be viewed in the context of academic literature, as well 
as the past evaluations of the DIS, commissioned by the DIA. 
The following sections will discuss the main findings of the present investigation against 
the literature on the features of a DIS, on depositor protection, on challenges in 
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implementation of governmental programmes, and on the past attempts at evaluating the 
Russian DIS. 
8.6.1 Features of a DIS 
Depositor protection and financial stability are the most recognised public policy 
objectives of the DIS. These can be achieved through a combination of features, which 
include essential issues which have to be addressed when establishing a DIS (see, for 
example, Bernet and Walter, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2008c; Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001; Garcia, 1996, 1999, 2000; Hoelscher et 
al., 2006; Kyei, 1995; MacDonald, 1996; Mas and Talley, 1990). The most common 
features were discussed in Chapter 2. 
Whilst all of these are important and have been implemented in the Russian DIS to a 
certain degree, the co-insurance and information provision regulation resonated with the 
findings of the present investigation. 
8.6.1.1 Co-insurance 
Some countries decide to introduce a co-insurance element into their DISs so that only a 
certain percentage of the maximum coverage limit is fully guaranteed, whilst the loss of 
the remainder is shared with the depositor. The proponents of co-insurance believe that it 
reduces moral hazard by encouraging depositors to monitor bank performance and risk-
taking (see, for example, Ellinger et al., 2005). However, critics suggest that co-
insurance undermines depositor confidence and, for instance, all EU Member States were 
obliged to abolish co-insurance in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the arguments by the critics of the co-insurance relate to theory on 
information asymmetry in the financial markets, whereby depositors have access only to 
a fraction of the information on bank performance, out of which even smaller portion is 
read and understood (Balling, 2011). 
The Russian DIS had a co-insurance element introduced in 2006, which was 
subsequently removed in October 2008 to prevent bank runs by the population. 
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The findings of the present investigation confirm that co-insurance caused problems for 
retail depositors. Bank staff stated that, at the time when co-insurance was part of the 
Russian DIS, retail depositors were confused as to how much compensation they would 
be given in case of an insured event. This was illustrated by reference to a number of 
requests by retail depositors to calculate the compensation amount based on the amount 
deposited in their bank accounts. Since the abolition of the co-insurance element as part 
of the Russian DIS, it became easier for retail depositors to understand the compensation 
amount and, thus, such requests diminished. 
The data reconfirms the concerns of the critics of co-insurance. Whilst the moral hazard 
argument can be substantiated in theory, the use of co-insurance as part of the DISs 
should be selective and dependent on the levels of financial literacy of the population. 
Furthermore, the introduction of such a feature may undermine the public confidence in 
the banking system. 
8.6.1.2 Payout Process 
When it comes to the payout process in the case of an insured event, the compensation 
may be arranged by the organisation or governmental body which runs the DIS, by bank-
agents chosen and nominated by this body, or, in some countries, through the postal 
system. 
In the past, the Russian DIA chose to organise the payout through all three methods. 
Bank-agents were mostly used in the case of insured events involving banks with a 
widespread network of regional offices and/or branches. Whilst this certainly helped to 
speed up the compensation process and simplified it for a retail depositor, it is not clear 
what the long-term consequences of this practice will mean for the banking system in 
Russia. 
One of the public policy objectives of the DIS stated in the academic literature (Tompson, 
2004), and advocated by several proponents as one of the underlying objectives of the 
Russian DIS, is the creation of a level playing field for small banks, that would not 
otherwise be able to attract retail depositors and compete with larger banks. 
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Bank-agents in Russia are allowed to keep the compensation amounts by offering a bank 
account to the retail depositor of a failed bank. As evidenced in Chapters 6 and 7, some of 
the Russian banks, acting as a bank-agent (including Bank A2 of this investigation), have 
been seen to create special bank accounts for such situations. Whilst there is no evidence 
to suggest a possible negative impact of these practices on the concentration of the 
banking sector in Russia, such practices may lead to an artificial consolidation of the 
client base and creation of a bigger gap between larger and smaller banks in terms of the 
number of retail depositors and the volume of retail deposits. 
The limited data suggests that, when one of the objectives of a DIS is the creation of a 
level playing field for small and large banks, consideration should be given to the impact 
of all components of the DIS in terms of competition as an objective, as the introduction 
of the DIS as such may not be enough to create a foundation for perfect competition in 
the banking sector. 
When it comes to the payout process, all banks should have the right to become the bank-
agent or the compensation should be carried out by the organisation or governmental 
body which runs the DIS directly. This would not create any preferential treatment of 
larger banks with a widespread network of regional offices and/or branches. 
8.6.1.3 Public Awareness 
Whilst the public awareness as a feature of a DIS was not widely discussed in academic 
literature, in 2009 it was introduced as one of the Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems (BCBS and IADI, 2009). 
Public awareness is understood as an ongoing process of dissemination of information 
about the benefits and limitations of the DIS. Many countries place the responsibility for 
dissemination of DIS-related information on the banks participating in the DIS. This is 
also the case with the Russian DIS, where banks are obliged to provide certain 
information about the DIS to retail depositors. 
However, the Russian DIS does not have any enforcement mechanism to ensure the 
uniformity of such information provision. The Recommendations, issued by the DIA, 
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whilst being a good example of the information provision practices, have no legal 
obligation and, thus, cannot be enforced.  
Such practice with limited provisions on information dissemination in the Federal Law 
and non-enforceable Recommendations, issued by the DIA, has an impact on the public 
awareness of the DIS, and, as a result, on the level of depositors’ understanding of how 
their savings are protected under the Russian DIS. 
As evidenced by the data, the lack of uniformity in information provision among the 
banks, caused by such practice, resulted in the varied levels of knowledge about the DIS 
among retail depositors which, in turn, affects levels of confidence in the banking system 
and the extent to which retail depositors are prepared to part with their savings. 
The data reaffirms the importance of public awareness campaigns carried out by the 
organisation or governmental body which runs the DIS, and by the banks participating in 
the DIS. Such campaigns have to be uniform and consistent, so that retail depositors at 
any bank receive the same information in terms of content and amount which, in turn, can 
lead to higher extent of achievement of the public policy objectives. 
8.6.2 Depositor Protection 
Depositor protection is one of the key public policy objectives of a DIS. The financial 
markets, and banking services in particular, being the place characterised by imperfect 
information, necessitate the creation of provisions for consumer protection. The three 
main instances of information failure in the market include material non-disclosure (and 
related issues of information asymmetry),669 information processing deficiencies and 
standard form contracts (Trebilcock, 1997). 
Some of the findings of the present investigation have raised important questions in 
relation to savings by retired depositors and standard form contracts used in depositor-
bank relationships. 
                                               
669 The findings of the present investigation in relation to information asymmetry have been 
discussed in Section 8.5.1.1 above. 
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8.6.2.1 Savings by Retired Depositors 
Several authors have identified characteristics of, and difficulties experienced by, 
vulnerable consumers (see, for example, Burden, 1998; Scott and Black, 2000). One such 
group is that of elderly consumers, who are characterised as vulnerable, because of their 
deficiencies in processing and remembering information (John and Cole, 1986). 
On the other hand, elderly consumers typify an average retail depositor, as a result of the 
high accumulation of liquidity through their lifetime (Cunha et al., 2011). The 2007 and 
2010 surveys commissioned by the DIA identified pensioners as the second most common 
category of typical saver. 
As evidenced by the findings of the present investigation, retired retail depositors or 
pensioners were among the top two categories of those who asked questions about the 
DIS.  
This could be supported by the academic literature on deficiencies in processing the 
information by different age groups and, in particular, elderly consumers, whereby 
additional recommendations have been developed on the amount of information required, 
and response formats, in order to ensure that the effects of deficiencies in information 
processing among the elderly are minimised.  
As the elderly represent, and will continue to represent, one of the most common 
categories of a typical saver in Russia, more effort should be put into devising 
information in the quantity and format suitable for the pensioners. Such information 
should be concise, visual and recognisable across different banks. 
8.6.2.2 Standard Form Contracts 
Retail depositors enter a variety of contracts with banks on a daily basis. By the nature of 
retail banking, these contracts are standard form contracts, whereby depositors join them 
if they wish to open a bank account, and have no power to change the terms and 
conditions. Whilst there are pros and cons of using standard form contracts, most of the 
time there is a lack of transparency with such contracts, as they are usually expressed in 
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a text which is difficult to read and understand for an average depositor (Wilhelmsson 
and Willett, 2010). 
As a result, consumers in general choose not to read standard form contracts (Gillette, 
2006), thus remaining unaware of the terms which may be favourable to them. 
This is confirmed by the findings of the present investigation, which shows that retail 
depositors tend not to read bank account contracts.670 There are many ways in which 
banks present information on the DIS in their bank account contracts (if they do so at 
all). This may be confusing for some retail depositors who became familiar with certain 
terms in the contract with the bank they patronise, when they decide to open an account 
in another bank and fail to find similar provisions in the proposed contract. 
Unification of the approach to provision of information on the DIS in the texts of bank 
account contracts may help to increase awareness of the DIS among retail depositors. 
8.6.3 Implementation of the DIS 
The theory of implementation suggests that the best way to implement a public policy is 
for the organisation or governmental body in charge of the programme to implement it 
directly or, if this is not possible, to have the least number of parties involved in the 
implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). 
Further, the theory of street-level bureaucracy suggests that front office staff tend to 
inject their own understanding of a governmental programme, as well as the perceptions 
of their organisation, into the implementation and, thus, may skew the planned outcome 
(Lipsky, 1971, 1980).  
Both of these theories can explain the findings of the present investigation in relation to 
the implementation of the DIS in Russia. Firstly, the three degrees of separation between 
the DIA, in charge of the functioning of the DIS, and bank clerks, ultimately in charge of 
the provision of information about the DIS, construct the skewed reality in the mind of 
retail depositors. Bank clerks bring in not only their own (mis)understanding of the DIS, 
                                               
670 Please see Chapter 6 for more details. 
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but also the (mis)understanding of their heads of branch, as well as the instructions for 
implementation devised by the management of the bank, which can also be flawed. 
As evidenced from the findings, there are varying degrees of implementation of 
information dissemination between banks, which affects retail depositors’ knowledge 
about the DIS, their levels of confidence in the banking system, and the likelihood that 
they will save. A connection could be drawn with the US provisions, discussed in Chapter 
2. These establish a fine for non-compliance in relation to the information provision by 
banks. 
The data substantiates the lack of uniformity and consistency in presenting information 
about the DIS to retail depositors, which creates uneven implementation of the DIS not 
only between the banks, but also between the branches of the same bank, and even 
between clerks within individual branches. For the successful implementation of the DIS, 
banks have to be monitored on a regular basis on the quality of the information provided 
to retail depositors, so as to ensure consistency in information provision, for lack of which 
a fine can be imposed.   
8.6.4 Past Attempts at Evaluating the Russian DIS 
There were two attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS commissioned by the DIA, one 
in 2007 and one in 2010. Whilst not all of the findings of the present investigation have 
a point of reference in the results of the 2007 and 2010 surveys, the following main 
findings can help establish comparisons or lack thereof. 
Both surveys were designed to investigate the impact of the DIS on the public saving 
behaviour. They included multiple questions regarding the saving behaviour of the 
respondents, but had a rather limited focus on the DIS and its impact. 
In terms of protection of depositors’ rights and legal interests, the findings of the present 
investigation are largely in line with those of the 2010 survey. Both sets of data confirm 
that around half of the retail depositors are not well informed about the DIS in Russia. 
The present investigation, however, adds a further dimension to this, by posing a series 
of questions probing the knowledge of retail depositors on the subject, unlike the 2007 
and 2010 surveys, thus offering possible explanations to the confirmed lack of awareness. 
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The 2010 survey confirms the finding of the present investigation that those with large 
amounts in the bank accounts know more about the DIS than those with smaller amounts 
and, thus, do not ask a lot of questions about the DIS. 
In terms of the increase in public confidence in the banking system, the findings of the 
present investigation differ significantly from those in the 2007 and 2010 surveys. 
Unlike these results, which show that public confidence in the banking system remained 
unchanged over time (46% in 2007 compared to 54% in 2010), the present investigation 
showed that just over half of all respondents felt more confident in the banking system as 
a whole since the introduction of the DIS in 2003. Whilst the latter may be explained by 
the quality of the sample, all being users of some banking products or services, these 
findings cannot be really compared to the ones of the 2007 and 2010 surveys, because of 
the differences in sampling techniques. Similarly, in terms of the increase in the saving 
behaviour among the population, the results of the present investigation contradict those 
of the 2007 and 2010 surveys.  
The theoretical framework devised for the present investigation is much more rigorous 
and systematic than any of the past attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS. Hence, it is 
recommended that the DIA adopts this bespoke theoretical framework with its success 
criteria and impact indicators for future evaluations of the DIS in Russia. With 
modifications to accommodate the country-specific parameters of the DIS and regulatory 
and institutional environment, this theoretical framework can be used to evaluate a DIS 
in any country. 
8.7 Summary 
Whilst the findings suggest that depositors felt more protected following the introduction 
of the DIS in 2003, these findings should be looked at in conjunction with the evidence of 
limited and, sometimes, confused knowledge about the DIS among both retail depositors 
and bank staff, and evidence of varying levels of information provision amongst the 
banks.  
The findings of the present investigation also show that there was an evident increase in 
the level of public confidence in the banking system, however further evidence will be 
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required to confirm the exact impact of the DIS. Furthermore, the events in autumn 
2008 confirmed that, in time of crisis, retail depositors are not confident in the banking 
system enough to keep their savings in the bank, despite the introduction of a higher 
deposit insurance coverage limit. 
Whilst the saving behaviour of retail depositors has remained unchanged as a whole since 
2004, the findings confirm that the amounts deposited into bank accounts increased 
following the changes in the coverage limit. However, further evidence will be required to 
identify the exact impact of the DIS on the changes in the saving behaviour of the 
population. 
The present investigation provides a number of contributions in relation to the existing 
academic literature on (i) the consequences of co-insurance, (ii) competition as an 
objective of the DIS, (iii) public awareness about the DIS, (iv) deficiencies in information 
processing by the elderly, (v) standard form bank account contracts, and (vi) the 
implementation of the DIS reforms. Furthermore, this investigation calls for better 
impact evaluations of the DIS in Russia and elsewhere, for instance, by adopting the 
bespoke theoretical framework devised in the present research with modifications to 
accommodate country-specific parameters of the DIS and country-specific features of the 





“The only possible conclusion the social sciences can draw 
is: some do, some don’t.” 
–Ernest Rutherford (1871-1937) 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis, summarises the main findings and 
indicates areas of further research. 
Having set out to evaluate the Russian DIS, this thesis looked into its objectives and the 
extent to which these have been achieved thus far. 
The research purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the Russian DIS against its stated 
objectives, and to identify possible problems with its implementation. The research 
question posed for this investigation was ‘Has the Russian DIS achieved its stated 
objectives?’ The Russian DIS has three stated objectives, namely (i) to protect the rights 
and legal interests of depositors, (ii) to strengthen public confidence in the banking 
system, and (iii) to encourage household savings in the banking system. 
Looking at the DIS as a public policy, different methodological approaches have been 
considered, with a mixed method, non-experimental approach being the most appropriate 
for this type of impact evaluation. Using a critical realist perspective, a theoretical 
framework was devised to guide the research design, data collection and data analysis. 
Six banks in Saint-Petersburg (North-Western Federal District of Russia) were selected 
for data collection. The data collection methods included a retail depositor survey, a series 
of interviews with bank staff and representatives of the judiciary, in-branch observation, 
as well as the analysis of primary and secondary documents. 
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As part of the retail depositor survey conducted between March and May 2009, 942 
questionnaires were collected and analysed using SPSS. 30 interviews and 17 in-branch 
observations were conducted in Saint-Petersburg in different branches of the six selected 
banks. These were supplemented by 2 interviews with representatives of the judiciary. 
Quantitative data was analysed using statistical tests, including the Chi-squared and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests. Bespoke formulae were devised to help with the analysis. 
Qualitative data was analysed using content analysis and document analysis techniques. 
A more detailed summary of the thesis is presented in Section 9.1. Section 9.2 highlights 
the key findings and original contributions of the present research. This is followed by 
the limitations of this investigation, presented in Section 9.3, and suggestions for further 
research, presented in Section 9.4. 
9.1 Summary of the Thesis 
The present investigation is placed within the wider academic literature on banking law 
and regulation and public policy evaluation, with specific foci on DI, consumer protection, 
programme implementation and impact evaluation. Chapter 2 discusses these areas of 
literature and presents an overview of current debates. It looks at the DIS as a 
governmental programme, and provides a historical account of DISs in different 
countries. Chapter 2 also identifies the typology of commonly recognised features of DIS 
design, including legal form, mandate and public policy objectives; membership; coverage 
and pay-out mechanism; and administration and funding. 
Furthermore, Chapter 2 looks at depositor protection in financial markets and identifies 
the main issues in relation to depositor-bank relationship, namely information asymmetry, 
standard form contracts, and deficiencies in information processing.  
Finally, it considers general theories of public policy implementation and evaluation, 
identifies possible challenges with the implementation of a governmental programme, and 
explains the different approaches to its evaluation. Theory suggests that matching the 
stated objectives of a public policy with its outcomes is best achieved through an 
objectives-based impact evaluation.  
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The present investigation was informed by these theoretical foundations and the findings, 
discussed in Chapter 8, have been related back to these theories. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, being a country-specific overview, introduced the Russian 
context within which the current investigation was carried out. The literature on the 
Russian DIS suggests that all attempts to establish such a scheme at federal level failed 
until 2003, when the current scheme was institutionalised. However, most of Russian 
literature on the DIS is of a doctrinal nature, and makes little reference to empirical data. 
All authors who have attempted to assess the effectiveness of the DIS have invariably 
used statistics from the DIA and CBR, rather than gathering their own data. 
Consequently, there has been no systematic evaluation of the Russian DIS, nor any 
impartial assessment of the extent to which its stated objectives have been achieved. The 
two known surveys from 2007 and 2010, commissioned by the DIA, though not 
complete and systematic, were used as a reference point against which the findings of the 
present investigation were compared. 
To evaluate the Russian DIS, the present investigation adopts a cross-sectional, mixed 
method research design under a critical realist perspective. Chapter 4 presents a bespoke 
theoretical framework for impact evaluation of a DIS, which was devised to facilitate the 
analysis and interpretation of the data. Four methods of data collection were used in the 
present investigation, namely a retail depositor survey, semi-structured interviews with 
bank staff and representatives of the judiciary, in-branch observations, and primary and 
secondary documents related to the DIS. 
The findings of the present investigation are presented in three chapters. Chapter 5 looks 
at the results of the quantitative data analysis using statistical tests, Chapter 6 describes 
the results of the qualitative data analysis using a content analysis technique, and 
Chapter 7 depicts the results of document and observational data analysis using a 
document analysis technique. 
The results of the quantitative data analysis presented in Chapter 5 suggest that, on the 
whole, the DIS has been successful in meeting two of its stated objectives, Objectives 1 
and 2. The majority of retail depositors appear to be more confident in the banking 
system, and the DIS put in place provides for more 
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and legal interests. As for Objective 3, there is not enough evidence to confirm that this 
objective of the DIS has been met. The majority of retail depositors report no change in 
their saving behaviour since 2004, and there appears to be no direct link between the 
introduction of the DIS and the changes in the saving behaviour. 
The same data analysed in disaggregate form, based on the bank as an independent 
variable, reveals a statistically significant difference in survey responses by retail 
depositors. Moreover, retail depositors appear to be confused in terms of their knowledge 
of the DIS, in particular with regard to its compulsory nature and the institution 
responsible for DI compensation. Retail depositors at some banks appear to be more 
knowledgeable about the DIS than in other banks. 
The results of the qualitative data analysis presented in Chapter 6 show that knowledge 
of the Russian DIS amongst the bank staff is not uniform across the participating banks. 
Some clerks are confused over how the DIS works, including its compulsory nature. It 
appears there is no specific system in place to provide support to front office staff when it 
comes to questions about the DIS which are outside of their immediate knowledge. 
Moreover, in relation to retail depositors, the evidence suggests that the most frequently 
asked question by retail depositors is still whether the bank is a member of the DIS. This 
clearly indicates a lack of basic knowledge about the principles of the Russian DIS 
amongst retail depositors. 
The amount and the content of information about the DIS provided by banks to retail 
depositors varies from bank to bank, and even from branch to branch within a single 
bank. Some clerks admitted to not providing any information about the DI compensation 
mechanism at all, whilst others stated that they would provide such information, but only 
if asked by retail depositors directly. 
The results of the document and observational data analysis presented in Chapter 7 
illustrate that, whilst there is a legal duty on the part of a bank to inform retail depositors 
of the DIS in Russia, there are substantial differences in the way banks present such 
information. 
Recommendations by the DIA providing guidance to banks on the best ways to inform 
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depositors are undermined by the fact that these recommendations have no enforcement 
mechanism. As a result there are confusing messages about the DIS coming from some 
banks and no information about the DIS from others. 
9.2 Contributions 
By adopting an impact evaluation approach to assessment of the DIS in Russia, this 
thesis makes an original contribution to legal policy making and implementation. 
Being the first systematic impact evaluation of the Russian DIS, this research provides a 
number of original theoretical, empirical, analytical and methodological contributions. 
9.2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 
In terms of theoretical and empirical contributions, this research adds to the current 
debate on DI, consumer protection, and programme implementation. 
9.2.1.1 Contributions to the Literature on Deposit Insurance 
There are three main contributions in relation to academic literature on DI.  
Firstly, the present thesis reaffirms the concerns of the critics of co-insurance. Whilst the 
moral hazard argument can be substantiated in theory, the use of co-insurance as part of 
a DIS should be selective, and dependent on levels of financial literacy of the population. 
Furthermore, the introduction of such a feature may undermine public confidence in the 
banking system. 
Secondly, the present thesis suggests that, when one of the objectives of a DIS is the 
creation of a level playing field for small and large banks, consideration should be given 
to the organisation of a compensation mechanism. When it comes to the pay-out process 
and the use of bank-agents, either every bank should have the right to become a bank-
agent, or the compensation should be carried out by the organisation or governmental 
body which runs the DIS directly. This would discourage the creation of preferential 
treatment of larger banks with a widespread network of regional offices and branches. 
 353 
Thirdly, this thesis reaffirms the importance of public awareness campaigns carried out 
by the organisation or governmental body which runs the DIS, and by the banks 
participating in the DIS. Such campaigns have to be uniform and consistent so that retail 
depositors at any bank receive the same information in terms of the content and amount, 
which in turn can lead to a higher extent of achievement of the public policy objectives. 
9.2.1.2 Contributions to the Literature on Consumer Protection 
There are two main contributions in relation to academic literature on consumer 
protection.  
Firstly, as the elderly represent, and will continue to represent, one of the most common 
categories of saver in Russia, this thesis suggests that more effort should be put into 
devising information in a quantity and format suitable for the retired. Such information 
should be concise, visual and recognisable across different banks. 
Secondly, whilst this thesis confirms that retail depositors tend not to read standard form 
contracts, the unification of the approach to the provision of information on the DIS in 
contracts of bank accounts may help increase the awareness of the DIS amongst retail 
depositors. 
9.2.1.3 Contributions to the Literature on Public Policy 
Implementation 
There is one main contribution in relation to the academic literature on public policy 
implementation.  
This thesis substantiates the lack of uniformity and consistency in presenting information 
about the DIS to retail depositors. This creates an uneven implementation of the DIS, not 
only between banks, but also between the branches of the same bank, and even between 
the clerks within individual branches. For the successful implementation of the DIS, 
banks have to be monitored on a regular basis on the quality of the information provided 
to retail depositors, so as to ensure consistency in the information provided. Moreover, 
this thesis suggests that the Recommendations issued by the DIA should be introduced 
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into the existing body of legislation on the Russian DIS, thus creating an enforcement 
mechanism to support uniform dissemination of information on the DIS across all banks 
in Russia. 
9.2.2 Analytical and Methodological Contributions 
In terms of analytical and methodological contributions, this research adds to the current 
practices of the evaluation of DISs and further develops the methodology of impact 
evaluation. There are three main contributions in this regard. 
Firstly, this thesis calls for better impact evaluations of the DIS in Russia, and 
recommends that the DIA adopts the bespoke theoretical framework devised for the 
present investigation with its success criteria and impact indicators for future evaluations 
of the DIS in Russia. This theoretical framework is much more rigorous and systematic 
than any of the past attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS. This thesis also tests this 
theoretical framework through several data collection and data analysis techniques. 
With modifications to accommodate country-specific parameters of the DIS and country-
specific features of the regulatory and institutional environment, this theoretical 
framework can be used to evaluate a DIS in any country. 
Secondly, by using a critical realist paradigm to guide the research process, and by 
viewing the DIS as a stratified three-level reality, this thesis contributes to the use of a 
mixed method approach with a multiplicity of data collected from a wider range of 
stakeholders. This thesis argues that this approach is better suited for impact evaluation 
of a DIS than any of the previous attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS. 
Thirdly, to deepen the statistical analysis, two bespoke formulae were designed within 
this thesis to enhance the output from the Chi-squared test, thus making a contribution to 
statistical data analysis techniques. The application of these two formulae makes it 
possible to see whether there is an association between two categorical variables and 
which category of an independent variable performed better than the other another 
category. This, in turn, allows the researchers to rank the categories (similarly to the 
output of the Kuskal-Wallis test). 
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To conclude, the present thesis, using an evaluation of the Russian DIS as an example 
makes nine original contributions to existing knowledge about legal policy making and 
implementation, as well as methodologies used for impact evaluation of governmental 
programmes. 
9.3 Limitations 
Every study has its limitations. The following limitations of a theoretical and 
methodological nature have been identified.  
From a theoretical point of view, this research was positioned within three branches of 
literature related to DI, consumer protection and implementation and evaluation of public 
policy, and was based on the stated objectives of the Russian DIS. Whilst some authors 
have considered financial stability as an implied objective of the Russian DIS, the present 
investigation did not aim to assess the impact of the DIS on the financial stability of the 
Russian banking system. If financial stability were to be considered as part of the present 
thesis, different data could have been collected and analysed, and hence further points for 
discussion could have been identified.   
From a methodological point of view, there are number of limitations. Whilst these 
limitations have been discussed at length in Chapter 4, it is important to stress the main 
limitations in this area. 
The attempt at undertaking research into the Russian DIS under a critical realist 
paradigm at PhD level provided a snapshot of the implementation of the Federal Law and 
the establishment of the institutional and regulatory environment, and the perceptions of 
the multiple stakeholder of the success of this public policy at one point in time. 
Therefore, the present investigation is more exploratory in its nature. 
Furthermore, there are limitations in relation to the sample, location and timing of data 
collection. The choice of the extreme cases of six banks in Saint-Petersburg and their 
client base of retail depositors has influenced the results of the present investigation. 
With regard to the timing and location of data collection, this research was devised as a 
cross-sectional investigation, with the data collected at one point in time, in one country 
and in one region of the country. The place of data collection might have had an impact 
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on the results, because of the prior history of the DI in Saint-Petersburg. Furthermore, 
considering the data was collected in spring 2009, just after the global financial crisis had 
had its deepest effect in Russia, in October 2008, the timing of data collection might also 
have impacted on the results of this research.  
9.4 Further Research 
This thesis, being the result of research at PhD level, is time-bound and resource-
constrained. There are a number of potential avenues for further research that could be 
explored with the data collected within the present investigation. 
Firstly, it is possible to test the retail depositor survey results against the age, gender, 
deposited amount and the location of the bank’s branch to identify further inter-group 
differences (if any). This additional analysis may provide insights into the difference in 
confidence levels, saving behaviour and feelings of being protected as depositors across 
different age groups, genders and the range of deposited amounts. Furthermore, this 
additional analysis may deepen the understanding of inconsistencies in information 
provision by individual branches within each of the six participating banks. 
Secondly, a thematic analysis of the qualitative data could be performed to provide a more 
nuanced interpretation of the data collected through interviews. This would help to attain 
much more in-depth understanding of bank staff perceptions and insights in relation to 
the objectives of the DIS. 
To supplement the findings of the present investigation, new data could be collected and 
analysed to relate the findings of the present investigation to other banks in Russia, to 
banks in other post-communist states, and finally to the same sample at a different point 
in time. 
To enhance the findings, research could be carried out across a larger number of banks in 
Russia. This would illustrate whether or not the regularities observed in the six banks in 
Saint-Petersburg are mirrored elsewhere in Russia. 
Another option would be to embark on a longitudinal study and survey the retail 
depositors and interview staff at the same six banks at several points in time in the 
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future, including a different phase of the economy (e.g., growth phase). This would help 
to identify whether the retail depositors’ and staff’s knowledge about the DIS and the 
changes in the level of confidence in the banking system and in saving behaviour depend 
on the whether the phase of economy. 
Finally, data could also be drawn from the post-communist states, including those 
currently in the EU. This would permit the determination of whether there are any 
cultural differences of DIS’s perceptions amongst retail depositors in these countries. 
Moreover, since all EU Member States provide deposit protection to business depositors, 
such depositors could also be included in the sample for data collection. This could shed 
light on the peculiarities of information provision to business depositors, should Russia 
decide to extend the DI coverage to business depositors in the future. 
From a theoretical perspective, future research could look at financial stability as an 
objective of the DIS, and the impact of the DIS on the regulatory and institutional 
environment of the Russian banking sector. However, this would require an adaptation of 
the theoretical framework, presented and tested in this study, by including a new set of 
success criteria and impact indicator.
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Appendix 1 
Russian Federal Law on the DIS671 
23 December 2003             #177-FZ
 











on 28 November 2003
Approved by
the Federation Council
on 10 December 2003
 
(including Federal Laws incorporating amendments 
dated 20.08.2004 #106-FZ, dated 29.12.2004 #197-FZ, 
dated 20.10.2005 #132-FZ, dated 27.07.2006 #150-FZ, 
dated 13.03.2007 #34-FZ, dated 13.10.2008 #174-FZ, 
dated 22.12.2008 # 270-FZ)672 
 
This Federal Law sets forth legal, financial and organizational basis for operations 
of a mandatory deposit insurance system for deposits of households in banks of the 
Russian Federation (hereinafter – deposit insurance system or DIS), competences, 
procedures of establishment and functioning of an organization authorized to fulfil the 
functions of mandatory deposit insurance (Deposit Insurance Agency, hereinafter 
referred to also as the Agency), as well as rules regulating payouts to insured depositors. 
This law regulates relationship between banks of the Russian Federation, the Agency, 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (the Bank of Russia) and executive bodies of 
the Russian Federation in the area of mandatory households’ deposit insurance.  
                                               
© DIA. Reprinted with permission of the DIA. 
671 Translated to English by the DIA, available at http://asv.org.ru/en/legislation/law_1/ (last 
accessed on 04 December 2011). Formatting added, spelling, grammar and punctuation are as in 
the original. 
672 There have been several further amendments to this Federal Law since 2008, which are not 
included in this English version. 
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Chapter I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 1. Purposes of this Federal Law and Relations Regulated by it  
 
1. The purposes of this Federal Law are to protect rights and legitimate interests of 
household depositors with banks of the Russian Federation, to strengthen public 
confidence in the banking system of the Russian Federation and to encourage acception of 
households’ savings to the banking system of the Russian Federation.  
2. This Federal Law regulates relations arising in connection with establishment 
and functioning of the mandatory deposit insurance system for households’ deposits, 
formation and use of its pecuniary fund, payouts to insured depositors upon occurrence of 
an insured event, as well as relations arising in connection with control by the state over 
the deposit insurance system operations and any other relations arising thereof.  
3. This Federal Law shall not apply to other methods of insurance of households’ 
deposits for securing their repayment and payment of interest on them.  
4. In accordance with the purposes of this Federal Law, legal status specifics shall 
be set forth for the DIS participants, as well as material conditions of the mandatory 
insurance of deposits of households, insured event occurrence, payment of insurance 
premiums and reimbursement of insured depositors.  
5. Relations arising in connection with the establishment and functioning of the 
deposit insurance system shall be governed by this Federal Law, and other Federal 
Laws, and in cases envisaged by this Federal Law by regulations issued by the Russian 
Federation Government and the Bank of Russia in accordance with thereof. 
 
Article 2. Basic Definitions Used in This Federal Law  
 
For the purposes of this Federal Law, the following basic definitions are used:  
1) bank – a credit institution licensed by the Bank of Russia to accept deposits from 
households and open and operate bank accounts in accordance with the procedure set 
forth in the Federal Law «On Banks and Banking» (version dated 3 February 1996 #17-
FZ) (hereinafter – the Federal Law «On Banks and Banking»);  
2) deposit – cash resources denominated in the currency of the Russian Federation 
or foreign currency placed by individuals or to their benefit in a bank on the territory of 
the Russian Federation in accordance with a deposit or an account agreement, including 
capitalized (accrued) interest on the deposit amount;  
3) register of banks - list of banks compiled in accordance with this Federal Law 
that includes banks registered as members of the deposit insurance system;  
4) depositor – a citizen of the Russian Federation, a foreign citizen or an individual 
without citizenship that concluded a bank account or a deposit agreement, or any 
individual in whose favor a deposit is made;  
5) deposit reimbursement (deposit insurance payout) – an amount of money to be 
repaid to a depositor in accordance with this Federal Law when an insured event occurs;  
6) the Bank of Russia’s authorization – a license to accept individuals’ cash 
resources into deposits and open and operate individuals’ bank accounts granted by the 
Bank of Russia in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Federal Law «On Banks 
and Banking»;  
7) deficit of the mandatory deposit insurance fund – shortage of funds in the 
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mandatory deposit insurance fund to reimburse insured depositors within the time limit 
set forth by this Federal Law;  
8) counterclaim – a debt owed to a bank by its depositor resulting from civil law 
relations (transactions) and/or from other arrangements envisaged by the legislation of 
the Russian Federation that make the depositor a debtor of the bank. 
 
Article 3. Basic Principles of the Deposit Insurance System  
 
The following shall be the basic principles of the deposit insurance system:  
1) mandatory membership of banks in the deposit insurance system;  
2) mitigation of risks of occurrence of unfavorable consequences for depositors in 
case banks fail to meet their obligations;  
3) transparency of the deposit insurance system operations;  
4) cumulative nature of formation of the deposit insurance fund at the expense of 
regular insurance premiums from the DIS member banks.  
Article 4. Participants of the Deposit Insurance System  
The following parties shall be the participants of the deposit insurance system:  
1) depositors that are recognized «the beneficiaries» for the purposes of this Federal 
Law;  
2) banks that are included into the register of banks in accordance with established 
rules and procedure and considered «the insured» for the purposes of this Federal Law;  
3) the Agency that is considered «the insurer» for the purposes of this Federal Law; 
4) the Bank of Russia when fulfilling functions arising from this Federal Law.  
 
Article 5. Deposits that are Insured In Accordance with This Federal Law  
 
1. In accordance with this Federal Law, deposits are covered by the insurance in 
amounts, on conditions and according to the procedure set forth in Chapter 2 of this 
Federal Law, except the funds mentioned in part 2 of this article.  
2. Under this Federal Law, the following types of funds shall not be covered by the 
insurance:  
1) placed on bank accounts (deposits) of non-incorporated individuals engaged in 
entrepreneurial activities, if such accounts (deposits) have been opened for conducting 
legitimate entrepreneurial activities as well as those placed on bank accounts (deposits) of 
attorneys, notaries and other persons, if such accounts (deposits) have been opened for 
conducting professional activities as specified by Federal Law;  
2) placed by individuals in bearer’s bank deposits, including those certified by a 
bearer’s savings certificate and/or savings book;  
3) placed by individuals in trust with banks;  
4) placed in bank deposits with branches of Russian banks outside the territory of 
the Russian Federation.  
3. Insurance of deposits shall be conducted in accordance with this Federal Law 
without concluding a special insurance agreement.  
 
Article 6. Membership of Banks in the Deposit Insurance System  
 
1. Under this Federal Law participation of banks in the deposit insurance system 
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shall be mandatory for all banks.  
2. A bank shall be considered a member of the deposit insurance system as of its 
registration date until the date of its removal from the register of banks as prescribed in 
Article 28 of this Federal Law.  
3. Banks shall be obligated:  
1) to pay insurance premiums to the mandatory deposit insurance fund;  
2) to disclose information to depositors on their membership in the deposit 
insurance system, and on the procedure and the amount of deposit insurance coverage;  
3) to place information about the deposit insurance system in premises of a bank 
where depositors have a free access and are serviced;  
4) to keep records of a bank’s liabilities to depositors and the bank’s counterclaims 
against depositors enabling the bank to prepare on insured event occurrence as well as at 
any other day upon the Bank of Russia request (within seven calendar days upon delivery 
to the bank of the request) a register of liabilities to depositors in accordance with rules 
and in form set out by the Bank of Russia upon the Agency’s proposal;  
5) To fulfill other duties as set forth by this Federal Law.  
 
Chapter II. PROCEDURE AND TERMS OF REIMBURSEMENT OF 
INSURED DEPOSITORS 
 
Article 7. Depositors’ Rights  
 
1. Depositors have the following rights:  
1) to receive reimbursement of their deposits in accordance with rules set forth by 
this Federal Law;  
2) to inform the Agency about delays in settling by a bank of its liabilities due to 
depositors;  
3) to receive information from a bank with which they place a deposit, as well as 
from the Agency about this bank’s membership in the deposit insurance system.  
2. A depositor who has received reimbursement of his/her deposits placed with a 
bank in which the insured event occurred, preserves the right to claim from the bank an 
amount that is determined as a difference between amount of his/her claim to the bank 
and amount paid to him/her as reimbursement of deposits with this bank. Reimbursement 
of such claims shall be carried out in accordance with civil legislation of the Russian 
Federation.  
3. In case of executing bank deposit (bank account) agreement for the benefit of a 
third person an individual who is the beneficiary of this deposit (bank account) should 
gain the rights of a depositor established by this Federal Law.  
 
Article 8. Insured Event  
 
1. For the purposes of this Federal Law one of the following circumstances shall be 
considered as the insured event:  
1) revocation (annulment) of a bank’s license to conduct banking business granted 
by the Bank of Russia (hereinafter referred to as the license of the Bank of Russia) in 
accordance with the Federal Law «On Banks and Banking»;  
2) imposition of a moratorium by the Bank of Russia on settling claims of a bank’s 
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creditors in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.  
2. Insured event shall be deemed to arise as of the date of revocation (annulment) 
by the Bank of Russia of a bank’s license or imposition of a moratorium on settlement of 
claims of the bank’s creditors.  
 
Article 9. Emergence of a Depositor’s Right for Reimbursement of Deposits  
 
1. The right of a depositor for reimbursement of his/her deposits emerges as of the 
insured event date.  
2. An individual who acquired from a depositor claims based on deposit (deposits) 
after occurrence of an insured event shall not be entitled for compensation on such deposit 
(deposits) except an individual who acquired by inheritance the right of claim arising 
from a deposit which has not been reimbursed (hereinafter referred to as inheritor). The 
inheritor can use the rights of a decedent depositor that are established by this Federal 
Law starting from the moment when the inheritor receives the relevant certificate of his 
right to inheritance or other document confirming his right to inheritance or the right to 
use money of the decedent.  
3. In case rights of claim arising from a deposit (deposits) of a depositor after the 
insured event occurrence are transferred to several inheritors, each of them obtains the 
right for a part of non paid to the insurance compensation that is proportionate to the size 
of his/her acquired right of claim to this deposit (deposits). In this case insurance 
compensation paid to an inheritor in connection with this deposit (deposits) does not 
depend on insurance compensation paid or due to this inheritor in connection with other 
deposits. 
 
Article 10. Procedure to Apply for Reimbursement of Deposits  
 
1. A depositor (his/her representative or inheritor (inheritor’s representative)) shall 
be entitled to request the Agency to reimburse his/her insured deposits starting the day 
of insured event occurrence through the date of completion of bankruptcy proceedings. If 
the Bank of Russia imposed a moratorium on settling creditors’ claims – through the date 
of the moratorium termination.  
2. If a depositor (his inheritor) missed timing for filing a claim for reimbursement 
stipulated in part 1 of this article, such period can be restored upon request of the 
depositor (his inheritor) by the Agency’s management board under one of the following 
circumstances:  
1) If force majeure event precluded filing a claim for deposit insurance;  
2) If the depositor (inheritor) was (is) conscripted into military service or was (is) 
in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (other troops, military units 
and bodies) put under the conditions of martial law – for the period of doing such service 
(of martial law);  
3) if the term for filing a claim for deposit insurance was missed as a result of 
serious illness of the depositor (his inheritor), helpless condition of the depositor (his 
inheritor), timing of obtaining inheritance rights by an inheritor as well as other reasons 
that are connected with the depositor’s (his inheritor’s) personality.  
3. The Agency’s management board decision not to restore the missed timing for 
filing a claim for deposit insurance can be appealed by depositor (his inheritor) in courts.  
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4. When filing a claim for deposit insurance to the Agency, a depositor (inheritor) 
shall submit the following documents:  
1) an application filled out according to Agency format;  
2) the depositor identity documents or, in case when the inheritor files a claim, also 
documents that confirm his right to inheritance or to use money of the testator.  
5. If a depositor (inheritor) files a claim through a trustee, a notarized power of 
attorney shall be submitted in addition to the documents indicated in point 1 and 2 of part 
4 of this article.  
 
Article 11. Amount of Insurance Coverage  
 
1. Amount of insurance coverage for every depositor is calculated based on the 
aggregate amount of liabilities to a depositor of a bank in which the insured event 
occurred. When calculating the aggregate amount of liabilities to a depositor, only 
deposits insured in accordance with article 5 of this Federal Law are taken into account.  
2. Depositors shall get a 100% reimbursement of their aggregate deposits in a bank 
in which the insured occurred but not more than 700,000 rubles.  
3. If a depositor has several deposits in one bank with aggregate liabilities thereof 
in excess of 700,000 rubles the deposit insurance reimbursement shall be effected with 
regard to each deposit on a pro rata basis.  
4. If the insured events occurred in several banks where a depositor has deposits, 
the amount of insurance coverage shall be calculated in relation to each such bank 
separately.  
5. An amount of deposit insurance due to a depositor is calculated based on account 
balances at a bank as at the end of the business day when the insured event occurred.  
6. If liability to a depositor of a bank’s in which the insured event occurred is 
denominated in foreign currency, the amount of deposit insurance due to the depositor 
shall be calculated in the Russian Federation currency at the exchange rate set by the 
Bank of Russia as at the date of insured event.  
7. If a bank in which an insured event occurred was also a creditor of an insured 
depositor, the amount of deposit insurance due to the depositor shall be determined based 
on the difference between the aggregate liabilities of the bank to this depositor and the 
bank’s counter claims to the depositor that emerged before the insured event.  
 
Article 12. Deposit Insurance Payout Procedure  
 
1. The Agency shall, within seven days from receipt of a register of liabilities from 
a bank in which the insured event occurred, forward to this bank as well as to «The Bank 
of Russia Bulletin» for publication, information specifying location, time, format and 
procedure for claiming deposit insurance. Within a month from receipt of a register a 
bank’s liabilities to depositors, the Agency shall send respective information to depositors 
of the bank in which the insured event occurred.  
2. A depositor shall be entitled to receive information mentioned in part 1 of this 
article directly at the Agency, as well as at the bank in which the insured event occurred.  
3. Upon submission by a depositor (his representative) to the Agency of documents 
listed in parts 4 and 5 of article 10 of this Federal Law, the Agency shall provide to 
depositor an abstract from the bank’s register of liabilities to depositors indicating an 
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amount due to the depositor.  
4. Deposit reimbursement shall be effected by the Agency in accordance with the 
register liabilities to depositors formed by a bank in which the insured event occurred, 
within 3 business days from the day of submission by a depositor of respective documents 
listed in parts 4 and 5 of article 10 of this Federal Law, but no sooner than 14 days after 
the insured event date.  
5. When effecting deposit reimbursement the Agency shall provide reference 
information to a depositor on amounts paid out and deposits that were reimbursed and 
sends a copy of this information to the bank.  
6. If the Agency failed to reimburse an agreed amount within the time frame set 
forth in this article, the Agency shall be obligated to pay interest to the depositor 
calculated based on the Bank of Russia’s refinancing rate as at the date of actual 
reimbursement.  
7. If a depositor does not agree with the amount due to him/her, the Agency shall 
request that depositor to submit additional documents to justify the validity of his/her 
claims and send them to the bank for review. Within 10 days from receipt of the above 
documents the bank shall be obligated to consider them and, if the depositor’s claims were 
recognized valid, make relevant amendments to the register of the bank’s liabilities to 
depositors and send information to the Agency on the results of claims review and, if 
needed, on changes in the register of the bank’s liabilities to depositors.  
8. Upon agreement with the bank and the depositor on the bank’s liabilities amount 
based on the additionally submitted documents, the Agency shall reimburse the agreed 
amount according to the established procedure.  
9. If a depositor missed the timing for filing a claim for deposit reimbursement that 
was restored in accordance with parts 2 and 3 of article 10 of this Federal Law, the 
depositor shall be entitled for deposit reimbursement in the amount of aggregate liabilities 
to him as stated in the bank’s register of liabilities to depositors.  
10. If a depositor disagrees with the reimbursement amount due to him/her, the 
depositor shall be entitled to apply to the court in accordance with legislation of the 
Russian Federation.  
11. Deposit reimbursement can be effected upon a depositor’s request either in cash 
or by transfer of funds to the bank account specified by a depositor.  
12. Acceptance of claims for reimbursement along with other documents including 
those listed in parts 4 and 5 of article 10 of this Federal Law and part 7 of this article, 
can be done by Agency through authorized agent banks acting in the Agency’s name, on 
its behalf and at its expense. The procedure for interaction between agent banks and the 
Agency, including compensation of agent banks’ incurred costs, shall be set by the 
Agency’s Board of Directors. A procedure for selection of agent banks on competitive 
basis shall be established by the Agency’s Board of Directors upon agreement with the 
federal anti-monopoly body.  
13. Deposit reimbursement shall be effected in the Russian Federation currency.  
 
Article 13. Subrogation of Claim after Deposit Reimbursement  
 
1. The Agency, that reimbursed insured depositors, shall subrogate the depositor’s 
claims against the bank in which the insured event occurred, up to the amount actually 
reimbursed.  
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2. In the course of bankruptcy (liquidation) proceedings the claims acquired by the 
Agency as a result of reimbursement of insured depositors, shall be treated as claims of 
first priority creditors.  
3. In bankruptcy (forced liquidation) actions and proceedings claims to the bank, 
acquired by the Agency as a result of its reimbursement of insured depositors, shall be 
presented by a federal agency, authorized by the Government of Russia (hereinafter – the 
authorized agency).  
4. After the Agency reimburses insured depositors, the authorized agency shall take 
steps to recover from the bank its debt to the Agency acquired by the Agency as a result 
of reimbursement of insured depositors pursuant to parts 1 and 2 of this article, 
according to procedures, set forth by the legislation of the Russian Federation. The 
recovered funds shall be credited to the mandatory deposit insurance fund.  
5. Upon expiration of the term of a moratorium on settlement of creditors’ claims, 
established by the Bank of Russia, the Agency may give the bank, whose depositors it 
has reimbursed a deferment for repayment of its debt or for its payment by installments.  
6. The repayment may be deferred for the period up to six months for the 
repayment to be made in a lump sum.  
7. There can be provided for payment by installments for a period up to a year.  
8. The debt shall accrue interest at the rate, which equals half the refinancing rate 
of the Bank of Russia, effective during the period of deferment or payments in 
installments.  
 
Chapter III. LEGAL STATUS, PURPOSE OF ACTIVITIES AND 
AUTHORITY OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE AGENCY 
 
Article 14. The Deposit Insurance Agency  
 
1. The Deposit insurance agency shall be established with the purpose to fulfill 
functions of the mandatory deposit insurance.  
2. The Agency shall be the State Corporation established by the Russian 
Federation. The legal status, purposes of activities, functions and authority of the newly 
established agency shall be set forth in this Federal Law, the Federal Law # 7-FZ «On 
Non-commercial Organizations» dated January 12, 1996, the Federal Law «On Banks 
and Banking», the Federal Law # 40-FZ «On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit 
Institutions» dated February 25, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Law «On 
Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit Institutions».  
3. The Agency shall have its seal with the Russian Federation State Emblem and 
its name. 
4. The Agency shall have an account with the Bank of Russia.  
5. Location of the Agency’s headquarters shall be the city of Moscow.  
 
Article 15. The Agency’s Purpose of Activities and Authority  
 
1. The purpose of the Agency activities in accordance with this Federal Law shall 
be to ensure operations of the mandatory deposit insurance system.  
2. When executing the mandatory deposit insurance functions, the Agency shall:  
1) keep the register of member banks;  
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2) collect insurance premiums from banks and monitor their timely and full receipt 
by the deposit insurance fund;  
3) take measures to record depositors’ claims and reimburse insured depositors;  
4) request the Bank of Russia to impose sanctions against banks that violate 
provisions of this Federal Law as set forth in article 74 of the Federal Law «On the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (The Bank of Russia)» and in the Bank of Russia 
regulations;  
5) place and (or) invest temporarily idle funds of the deposit insurance fund in 
accordance with the procedure set forth in this Federal Law;  
6) require that banks place information on the deposit insurance system and bank 
membership in it in premises where banks provide services to depositors;  
7) determine the procedure for insurance premium calculation in accordance with 
article 36 of this Federal Law;  
8) exercise other powers aimed at accomplishing goals and objectives set forth for 
the Agency by this Federal Law.  
3. Fulfillment by the Agency of the mandatory deposit insurance functions in 
accordance with this Federal Law shall not require the Agency to obtain a license to 
conduct insurance business. 
4. The Agency in accordance with the Federal Law «On Banks and Banking» and 
the Federal Law «On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit Institutions» fulfills functions of 
a bankruptcy trustee (liquidator) in bankruptcy proceedings in credit institutions. 
5. The Agency is authorized to make transactions relating to realization of property 
(collateral) that is pledged as security against liabilities of credit institutions arising from 
the Bank of Russia loans to them. 
 
Article 16. Property of the Agency 
 
1. The property of the Agency shall be formed at the expense of initial property 
contribution made in accordance with article 50 of this Federal Law, insurance 
premiums, as well as income derived by the Agency from investments, issuance of 
securities and other legitimate earnings.  
2. The Agency shall not be liable for obligations of the Russian Federation. The 
Russian Federation shall not be liable for the Agency’s obligations, unless otherwise is 
prescribed in Federal Laws.  
3. The Agency shall use its property to fulfill functions set forth in this Federal 
Law, the Federal Law «On Banks and Banking» and the Federal Law «On Insolvency 
(Bankruptcy) of Credit Institutions».  
 
Article 17. Governing Bodies of the Agency  
 
The Board of Directors, the Board of Managements and General Director shall be 
governing bodies of the Agency.  
 
Article 18. The Board of Directors of the Agency 
 
1. The Board of Directors shall be highest governing body of the Agency. It shall 
be comprised of 13 members: seven representatives of the Russian Federation 
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Government, five representatives of the Bank of Russia, and the Agency’s General 
Director. The General Director shall be an ex officio member of the Agency’s Board of 
Directors.  
2. Chairman of the Board of Directors shall be elected by the Board of Directors 
upon proposal of the Russian Federation Government.  
3. Meetings of the Board of Directors shall be called by its Chairman or by no less 
than one third of its members, as needed, but no less frequent than once every quarter.  
4. The Board of Directors is authorised to make decisions if no less than half of its 
members are present. Decisions shall be made by simple majority. If equal votes, the 
Chairman’s vote shall be decisive.  
5. The Chairman shall conduct meeting of the Agency’s Board of Directors, and in 
his absence a person authorized by him shall do this.  
6. The chairman of the meeting shall sign minutes of the Agency’s Board of 
Directors meeting. Minority opinion shall be included in the minutes upon request.  
 
Article 19. Authority of the Board of Directors  
 
The Agency’s Board of Directors shall:  
1) approve the Agency’s Board of Management’s proposals on projected amount of 
federal budget expense that may incur in connection with the deficit of the mandatory 
deposit insurance fund’s resources and submit them to the Government of the Russian 
Federation for incorporating in the draft federal budget law for the forthcoming year;  
2) set the insurance premium rate;  
3) determine types, conditions and procedure for placement and/or investment of 
temporarily idle funds of the Agency, as well as upper limits for such 
placements/investments;  
4) make a decision on existence of a deficit of the mandatory deposit insurance fund 
and submit proposals to the government on forms and terms of covering the deficit in 
case of insured event occurrence no later than within 5 days from receipt of notification 
from the Agency’s Board of Management;  
5) make decisions of Decide on remittance of budget funds received from the federal 
budget in accordance with this Federal Law upon restoration of financial sustainability of 
the deposit insurance fund;  
6) approve a procedure for calculating insurance premiums;  
7) approve the Agency’s annual report;  
8) approve a procedure for deferment and repayment in installments for banks in 
cases set forth in this Federal Law;  
9) approve the Agency’s estimate of expenses and rules for allocation of the 
Agency’s profit;  
10) approve the Agency’s organizational structure;  
11) make decisions on establishing branches and representative offices of the 
Agency;  
12) appoint and dismiss the Agency’s General Director;  
13) appoint and dismiss members of the Agency’s Board of Management;  
14) appoint an auditor of the Agency;  
15) consider the General Director’s reports on operations of the Agency;  
16) approve terms of reference of the Board of Management;  
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17) govern operation of the Agency’s Internal audit department;  
17¹) establish rules for the bidding process for selection of audit firms for auditing 
the use by the Agency of the mandatory deposit insurance fund resources.  
18) make decisions on issuance by the Agency of bonds and other securities;  
19) execute other powers set forth in this Federal Law, the Federal Law «On 
Banks and Banking» and the Federal Law «On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit 
Institutions».  
 
Article 20. The Board of Management of the Agency  
 
1. The Board of Directors shall determine the size of the Agency’s Board of 
Management. The General Director of the Agency shall be a member of the Board of 
Management and run its operation.  
2. Members of the Board of Management, except its General Director, shall be 
appointed by the Board of Directors for a five year period upon proposal of the General 
Director.  
3. Members of the Board of Management shall be full time employees of the 
Agency.  
4. Members of the Board of Management may be dismissed from their positions in 
the following cases:  
1) upon expiration of their five year term in office – by the General Director;  
2) before expiration of the term set by this article – by the Board of Directors of the 
Agency on proposal by the General Director.  
5. The Board of Management of the Agency shall act on the basis of the terms of 
reference approved by the Board of Directors. These terms of reference shall set out 
frequency and procedure for calling the Board of Management’s meetings and decision 
making.  
6. During the Board meetings minutes of the meeting should be recorded. The 
minutes shall be submitted to the Agency Board of Directors’ members, as well as to the 
internal and external auditors at their request.  
7. Meetings of the Board of Management of the Agency shall be arranged by the 
General Director or a person authorized by him. Minutes of a meeting shall be signed by 
chairman of the meeting and one of members of the Board of Management present at the 
meeting.  
 
Article 21. Authority of the Board of Management of the Agency  
 
When exercising mandatory deposit insurance functions, the Board of Management 
of the Agency shall:  
1) make decisions on reimbursement of depositors;  
2) make decisions on inclusion of banks into the register of DIS member banks and 
exclusion of banks from the register in accordance with procedure set forth in this 
Federal Law;  
3) propose to the Bank of Russia to impose liability measures against banks in 
accordance with article 74 of the Federal Law «On the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation (The Bank of Russia)»;  
4) submit proposals for approval by the Board of Directors of the Agency on the 
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development of the deposit insurance system, as well as on types, conditions and 
procedure for placement and/or investment of temporarily idle funds of the mandatory 
deposit insurance fund;  
5) submit proposals for approval by the Board of Directors of the Agency on the 
size of the mandatory deposit insurance fund which is deemed sufficient for predicted 
deposit reimbursements during a forthcoming year, and on projected amount of 
borrowings from the federal budget needed to cover the mandatory deposit insurance 
fund’s deficit during a forthcoming year;  
6) notify the Board of Directors of the Agency about the mandatory deposit 
insurance fund’s deficit based on information derived from registers of liabilities to 
depositors formed in accordance with point 4 of part 3 of article 6 of this Federal Law, 
within no later than 3 days from receipt of a register of liabilities to depositors from a 
bank in accordance with part 1 of article 30 of this Federal Law;  
7) consider the Agency’s annual report and submit it for approval to its Board of 
Directors;  
8) submit proposals to the Board of Directors of the Agency on allocation of the 
agency’s profit;  
9) approve the Agency’s staff schedule, determine terms of personnel hiring and 
firing, office duties and rights, the system of disciplinary measures, forms and amounts of 
compensation for the Agency’s employees;  
10) Execute other powers set forth in this Federal Law, the Federal Law «On 
Banks and Banking» and the Federal Law «On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit 
Institutions» that is not within competence of the Board of Directors of the Agency.  
 
Article 22. The General Director of the Agency 
 
1. The Board of Directors shall appoint the General Director upon proposal of its 
Chairman for the term of five years. A nominee for the position of the General Director 
shall be presented to the Board one month prior to the expiration of the General 
Director’s authority.  
2. The General Director can be dismissed from his position by the Board of 
Directors upon submission of its Chairman in the following cases:  
1) expiration of his authority;  
2) his personal resignation request submitted to the Board of Directors’ Chairman;  
3) criminal offence acknowledged by the court sentence in legal force;  
4) violation of Federal Laws that govern relations connected with the Agency’s 
activities.  
 
Article 23. Authority of the General Director  
 
The General Director shall:  
1) act on behalf of the Agency and represent its interests without any power of 
attorney in relationships with state bodies, foreign entities and international 
organizations, as well as other institutions;  
2) head the Board of Management of the Agency and arrange for implementation of 
its decisions;  
3) issue orders and regulations related to the Agency activities;  
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4) distribute duties and responsibilities between his deputies;  
5) appoint and dismiss employees of the Agency;  
6) make decisions on other issues referred to the competence of the Agency, except 
those referred to the competence of the Board of Directors and the Board of Management. 
 
Article 24. Accountability and reporting of the Agency  
 
1. The reporting period for the Agency shall be set from January 1 to December 31 
inclusive.  
2. The annual report shall be prepared on annual basis no later than by February 
15 of the year following the reported one. The Agency’s Board of Directors shall approve 
the annual report by March 15.  
3. The Agency’s annual report shall be submitted to the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Bank of Russia.  
4. Summarized data of the Agency’s annual report and balance sheet shall be 
published in the «The Bank of Russia Bulletin» and «Rossiyskaya Gazeta».  
5. The Agency’s annual report shall include:  
1) report of the Agency operations for the passed reported period with the analysis 
of the DIS condition and use of the mandatory deposit insurance fund’s resources;  
2) annual balance sheet of the Agency;  
3) cash flow statement of the mandatory deposit insurance fund;  
4) report on income (loss) gained from placement and/or investment of temporary 
idle funds of the Agency;  
5) the register of member banks.  
6. The Agency’s balance sheet, cash flow statement of the mandatory deposit 
insurance fund and report on income (loss) gained from placement and/or investment of 
temporary idle funds of the Agency shall be certified by an independent audit company.  
 
Article 25. Audit of the Agency  
 
1. The Board of Directors of the Agency shall annually select an audit company to 
review financial statements of the Agency.  
2. The Agency’s internal audit shall be carried out by its Internal Audit 
Department accountable to the Board of Directors of the Agency. Procedure for 
establishment and operations of the Internal Audit Department shall be set by the Board 
of Directors of the Agency.  
3. The Board of Directors of the Agency shall be entitled to make decisions on 
conducting extraordinary audits of the Agency.  
 
Article 26. Reorganization and Liquidation of the Agency  
 
The Agency can be re-organized or liquidated in accordance with a Federal Law 
prescribing re-organization or liquidation procedure and use of the Agency’s property.  
 
Chapter IV. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
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Article 27. Interaction between the Agency and the Bank of Russia  
 
1. Federal executive bodies, as well as regional entities of the Russian Federation, 
municipal governments and the Bank of Russia shall not be entitled to interfere with the 
Agency operations aimed at implementing its legally set functions and authority.  
2. The Agency and the Bank of Russia shall coordinate their activities and inform 
each other on issues related to execution of deposit insurance actions.  
3. With the purpose to ensure informational support of DIS operations, the Bank of 
Russia shall send to the Agency banks’ statements and other information.  
4. The Bank of Russia no later than on a business day following the respective 
decision date shall inform the Agency about:  
1) granting by the Bank of Russia of an authorisation to a bank;  
2) making a decision to conduct inspection of a bank based on the Agency’s 
proposal;  
3) appointment of a provisional administration to manage a bank’s affairs; 
4) revocation (annulment) of the a bank’s license by the Bank of Russia; 
5) imposing a moratorium on meeting creditors’ claims.  
6) substitution of a bank’s license by the Bank of Russia; 
7) imposing a ban on accepting household deposits and opening bank accounts for 
individuals as set forth in article 48 of this Federal Law; 
4¹. Not later than within seven business days after the Bank of Russia made a 
relevant decision or received relevant information from its regional branch or an 
authorized body the Bank of Russia shall inform the Agency: 
1) on invalidation of the bank’s license to accept household deposits and open bank 
accounts for individuals; 
2) on measures taken by the Bank of Russia against the bank which impose a ban 
(limitation) on accepting household deposits and opening bank accounts for individuals in 
accordance with article 74 of the Federal Law «On the Central bank of the Russian 
Federation (the Bank of Russia)»; 
3) on reorganization of the bank. 
5. The Agency no later than on a business day following the respective decision 
date shall inform the Bank of Russia about the following:  
1) inclusion of a bank in the register of member banks in accordance with this 
Federal Law, as well as exclusion of a bank from the register;  
2) changes in the insurance premium rates.  
6. The Agency shall be entitled to submit proposals to the Bank of Russia about the 
following:  
1) conducting an inspection of a bank by the Bank of Russia. The procedure of the 
Agency’s employees participation in the above inspections, their rights and duties shall be 
set by regulations of the Bank of Russia upon agreement with the Agency;  
2) imposing by the Bank of Russia of liability measures against a bank as set forth 
in Federal Laws. The Agency shall enclose documents containing justifications and 
grounds for imposing the above measures.  
7. The Bank of Russia shall inform the Agency about its decision to conduct 
inspection and impose liability measures against the bank within 15 days from receipt of 
respective Agency proposal.  
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Article 28. Procedure for Registering and Terminating Registration in the Deposit 
Insurance System. The Register of member Banks.  
 
1. Registration of a bank in the DIS shall be done by the Agency by making 
respective record in the register of member banks on the basis of the Bank of Russia’s 
notification about licensing this bank  
2. The Agency shall make a respective record into the register of member banks on 
the date of receipt of the Bank of Russia’s notice as stated in part 1 of this article.  
3. The Agency shall terminate registration of a bank in the following cases:  
1) revocation (annulment) of a banking license by the Bank of Russia and 
completion by the Agency of deposit reimbursement as set forth in this Federal Law;  
2) upon termination of the bank’s right to accept household deposits and open bank 
accounts for individuals in connection with substitution of the bank’s license by the Bank 
of Russia or invalidation by the Bank of Russia in accordance with its regulation of the 
bank’s license to accept household deposits and open bank accounts for individuals and 
fulfillment by the bank of its obligations to depositors. Simultaneously the bank shall be 
obligated to notify all depositors about its exit from the deposit insurance system;  
3) termination of a bank’s operations resulting from its re-organization (excluding 
reorganization in the form of transformation).  
4. Information about registration and termination of a banks’ registration shall be 
published by the Agency in the «The Bank of Russia Bulletin» and «Rossiyskaya Gazeta». 
The procedure for keeping the register of member banks shall be set by the Agency.  
5. The Agency shall send information to a bank about its registration in the register 
of member banks or termination of registration, as well as insurance premium calculation 
and payment procedure no later than one day after the Agency made respective decision. 
The Agency shall regularly forward to banks needed information about the deposit 
insurance system.  
6. Registration, inclusion and exclusion of banks from the register of member banks 
shall be free of charge.  
 
Article 29. Receiving by the Agency of Banks’ Reports and Other Information  
 
1. Contents of reports and other information to be forwarded to the Agency by the 
Bank of Russia, as well as timing for sending this information shall be set by the Bank of 
Russia upon agreement with the Agency.  
2. On issues related to banks’ membership in the deposit insurance system, the 
Agency shall be entitled to request clarifications from banks related to information on 
payment of insurance premiums, accounting, formation of the register of liabilities to 
depositors, obligations of depositors to the bank, as well as executing by banks of other 
obligations set forth in this Federal Law. Above clarifications shall be submitted by banks 
to the Agency within 15 days from receipt of respective Agency’s request, unless the 
Agency requested different timing.  
 
Article 30. Interaction between the Agency and a Bank in which the Insured Event 
Occurred 
 
1. A bank in which the insured event occurred within 7 days from the insured event 
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date shall submit to the Agency the register of the bank’s liabilities to depositors in 
confirmation of accepting household deposits insured in accordance with this Federal 
Law.  
2. After the day of receipt by the Agency of a bank’s register of liabilities to 
depositors and up to the day of an arbitration court decision on completion of the 
bankruptcy proceedings or forced liquidation of the credit institution, and in case of 
moratorium imposed by the Bank of Russia on meeting the bank creditors’ claims up to 
the day of completion of the moratorium, the bank is obliged to make changes to the 
register of liabilities to depositors in following cases: 
1) identification of mismatch between data in the register and actual mutual 
obligations of the bank and a depositor as at the date of insured event subject to reflection 
in the bank’s register of liabilities to depositors; 
2) termination (in full or in part), after the insured event occurrence, of liabilities 
included in the bank’s register of liabilities to depositors. 
2¹. Information on changes made in the bank’s register of liabilities to depositors 
should be forwarded to the Agency at the day of making such changes in accordance with 
procedure established by the Agency, and it should be taken into account when amounts 
to be paid to depositors is determined. 
 3. The Agency shall be entitled to request from a bank in which the insured event 
occurred, any further information, including copies of documents, if information 
submitted in accordance with parts 1 and 2 of this article is insufficient to execute 
measures aimed at reimbursement of depositors. The bank in which the insured event 
occurred shall be obligated to submit the requested information within three business 
days from receipt of the Agency’s request.  
4. The Agency shall weekly advise the bank in which the insured event occurred 
about depositors who received reimbursement, amounts paid by the Agency and deposits 
which were reimbursed.  
 
Article 31. Business, Commercial and Banking Secret  
 
1. The Agency shall be entitled to receive information related to banks in which the 
insured event occurred, constituting commercial, business or banking secret, to the extent 
it is needed to fulfill functions set forth by this Federal Law.  
2. The Agency shall be obligated to submit information that became available about 
bank’s operations, deposits, accounts, financial condition, as well as any other data 
constituting commercial or banking secret to the court or the Bank of Russia upon 
request.  
3. If the Agency or its employees disclosed information constituting commercial, 
business and banking secret, a person whose rights were infringed, shall be entitled to 
request that Agency compensate for the losses in accordance with the legislation of the 
Russian Federation.  
 
Article 32. Participation of Agency Employees in Bank Inspections  
 
The Bank of Russia shall request the Agency employees to participate in 
inspections on issues related to bank deposit liabilities’ size and structure, payment of 
insurance premiums, as well as executing by banks other obligations set forth in this 
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Federal Law.  
 
Chapter V. FINANCIAL FOUDATION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
 
Article 33. The Mandatory Deposit Insurance Fund  
 
1. The mandatory deposit insurance fund is the combination of funds and other 
property formed and used in accordance with this Federal Law.  
2. The mandatory deposit insurance fund is owned by the Agency by title and 
designated to fund deposit reimbursements according to the procedure and on conditions 
set forth in this Federal Law.  
3. The mandatory deposit insurance fund shall be separated from any other Agency 
property. The fund shall be accounted by the Agency on a separate balance sheet using 
separate bookkeeping procedure.  
4. The mandatory deposit insurance fund’s reserves shall be kept on a specially 
opened Agency account with the Bank of Russia. The Bank of Russia shall not pay 
interest on funds balances left on the above account.  
5. The mandatory deposit insurance fund shall not be liable for obligations of the 
Russian Federation, regional and municipal entities, banks and third parties, as well as 
the Agency’s obligations, except cases when such obligations arose in connection with 
non-fulfillment by the Agency of its obligations on reimbursement of insured depositors. 
Such recovery shall be executed only based on court decision.  
 
Article 34. Sources of Formation of the Mandatory Deposit Insurance Fund  
 
1. The mandatory deposit insurance fund shall be formed out of:  
1) insurance premiums paid in accordance with this Federal Law;  
2) penalties imposed for partial and/or untimely payment of premiums to the 
mandatory deposit insurance fund;  
3) funds and other property received as a result of satisfaction of claims acquired by 
the Agency as a result of deposit reimbursement;  
4) funds from the federal budget in cases as set forth in this Federal Law;  
5) income derived from placement (investment) of temporarily idle funds of the 
mandatory deposit insurance fund;  
6) initial property contribution in accordance with article 50 of this Federal Law;  
7) other earnings not prohibited by the legislation of the Russian Federation.  
 
Article 35. Insurance Premiums  
 
1. Insurance premiums shall be uniform for all banks and to be paid by every bank 
starting the date of inclusion of the bank in the register of member banks and through the 
date of revocation (annulment) of the bank’s license by the Bank of Russia, or exclusion 
of the bank from the register of member banks in accordance with points 2, 3 of part 3 of 
article 28 of this Federal Law.  
2. The first calculation period for payment of insurance premiums shall be the 
period from the day of a bank’s inclusion in the register of member banks through the last 
day of the calendar quarter during which the bank was included in the register of member 
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banks.  
3. Imposition by the Bank of Russia of a moratorium on meeting claims of creditors 
of a credit institution shall suspend payment of insurance premium during the 
moratorium. In this case a bank shall be obligated to pay insurance premium for the 
calculation period up to the day preceding the moratorium imposition date.  
 
Article 36. Procedure for Calculation and Payment of Insurance Premiums  
 
1. The calculation period for banks to pay insurance premiums shall be a calendar 
quarter.  
2. The calculation base for calculation of insurance premiums (hereinafter referred 
to as «the calculation base») shall be determined as the average chronological daily 
balance of household deposits except deposits that are not covered by insurance in 
accordance with this Federal Law.  
3. With regard to deposits denominated in foreign currency, the average daily 
balance shall be included in calculation in ruble equivalent based on the official exchange 
rate set by the Bank of Russia.  
4. The rate of insurance premium shall not exceed 0.15% of the calculation base for 
the latest calculation period.  
5. In cases as set forth by this Federal Law, the rate of insurance premiums can be 
increased to 0.3% of the calculation base, but no longer than for two calculation periods 
during 18 months.  
6. Insurance premium rate cannot exceed 0.05% of the calculation base from the 
calculation period following the one when the total funds of the mandatory deposit 
insurance fund, including funds invested by the Agency according to the procedure set 
forth in this Federal Law, exceeded 5% of the aggregate amount of banks’ deposits.  
7. The Board of Directors of the Agency shall set insurance premium rate for 
banks. If the insurance premium rate is changed, the new rate shall be introduced no 
sooner than 45 days after respective decision is made.  
8. The decision on setting the insurance premium rate shall be published in the 
«The Bank of Russia Bulletin» and «Rossiyskaya Gazeta» no later than 5 days after the 
decision is made.  
9. The Agency shall establish a procedure for determining the calculation base. If 
the procedure is changed, the new procedure shall be applied as of the next calculation 
period. Banks shall be informed about a new calculation procedure no later than 30 days 
before it starts being applicable.  
10. Banks shall conduct the insurance premium calculation themselves.  
11. Payment of insurance premium shall be effected within 25 days from the end of 
a calculation period by remittance to the Agency account opened with the Bank of Russia 
where the mandatory deposit insurance fund’s resources are placed.  
12. Obligation of a bank to pay insurance premium shall be considered executed as 
of the date when funds are written off from the bank’s correspondent account with the 
Bank of Russia.  
13. Insurance premium (fines) amount paid for the calculation period in excess of 
the set level shall be taken into account as part of payments due for other calculation 
periods or future payments, or shall be returned if the bank’s obligation to pay insurance 
premium is terminated in accordance with article 35 of this Federal Law.  
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14. Payment of insurance premiums shall be effected in the currency of the Russian 
Federation.  
15. Payment of insurance premiums shall be automatically suspended by banks 
starting the calculation period following the one when the total funds of the mandatory 
deposit insurance fund, including funds invested by the Agency according to the 
procedure set forth in this Federal Law exceeded 10% of the aggregate amount of banks’ 
deposits.  
16. Payment of insurance premiums shall automatically recommence starting the 
calculation period following the one when the total funds of the mandatory deposit 
insurance fund, including funds invested by the Agency according to the procedure set 
forth in this Federal Law fall below 10% of the aggregate amount of banks’ deposits.  
 
Article 37. Execution by Banks of their Obligation to Pay Insurance Premiums  
 
1. Fines shall be imposed on banks for untimely or incomplete payment of the 
insurance premium to the mandatory deposit insurance fund.  
2. A fine is understood as set by this Article amount of money that a bank will be 
obligated to pay in addition to insurance premium for delayed payment of the insurance 
premium.  
3. The Agency shall be entitled to request that banks transfer delayed insurance 
premium with accrued fine and inform the Bank of Russia thereof.  
4. The fine shall accrue for each calendar day of the delay starting the date 
following the set payment date.  
5. The fine per each day of the delay shall accrue in percentage of non-paid 
insurance premium amount. The fine per one day of the delay shall be equal to the Bank 
of Russia refinancing rate valid during the respective period and divided to 360 calendar 
days.  
6. The Agency shall be entitled to enforce non-paid premium with the fines through 
courts. The recovered amounts shall be transferred to the Agency’s account with the 
Bank of Russia where the mandatory deposit insurance fund’s resources are placed.  
 
Article 38. Placement and/or Investment of Temporarily Idle Mandatory Deposit 
Insurance Fund’s Resources  
 
1. Placement and/or investment of temporarily idle funds of the mandatory deposit 
insurance fund shall be effected with the purpose to develop the deposit insurance system. 
The above investment shall be effected based on principles of recoverability, profitability 
and liquidity of purchased financial instruments.  
2. The Board of Directors of the Agency shall annually set types, procedures and 
terms for placement and/or investment of temporary idle resources of the mandatory 
deposit insurance fund, as well as the upper limit for the volume of investments.  
3. Temporarily idle resources of the mandatory deposit insurance fund can be 
placed and/or invested in the following instruments:  
1) government bonds of the Russian Federation;  
2) government bonds of regional entities of the Russian Federation;  
3) securities of Russian issuers in addition to those stated in points 1 and 2;  
4) shares of Russian issuers incorporated as open joint stock companies;  
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5) shares of index investment funds investing in foreign government bonds and 
securities of foreign issuers;  
6) mortgage securities issued in accordance with the Federal Law «On Mortgage 
Securities»;  
7) securities issued by countries that are members of the OECD;  
8) deposits and securities of the Bank of Russia;  
4. Temporarily idle resources of the mandatory deposit insurance fund shall not be 
invested in instruments that are not directly prescribed in this Federal Law.  
5. Temporarily idle resources of the mandatory deposit insurance fund cannot be 
invested in securities of issuers subject to pre-trial rehabilitation or bankruptcy 
(observation, provisional (external) administration, bankruptcy proceedings) in 
accordance with the bankruptcy legislation of the Russian Federation, or if the above 
procedures were applicable during the preceding two years.  
6. Investment in securities of temporary idle resources of the mandatory deposit 
insurance fund shall be permitted only if:  
1) they are in circulation on the securities market, or issued by the Russian 
Government specifically for institutional investors – for those mentioned in point 1 of 
part 3 of this article;  
2) they are in circulation on the organized securities market and comply with 
criteria set forth by federal executive body authorized by the Russian Government – for 
those mentioned in points 2 to 4 and 6 of part 3 of this article;  
7. Time transactions (securities options, futures and forwards) shall be permitted 
only for hedging purposes in accordance with federal legislation.  
8. Financial instruments purchased at the expense of deposit insurance Fund’s 
resources shall be the Fund’s integral part and should be reflected on its balance sheet.  
 
Article 39. Designation of Deposit Insurance Fund’s Resources  
 
Deposit insurance Fund’s resources shall be designated by Agency to fund deposit 
repayment process, as well as for expenses incurred in connection with execution of 
deposit insurance functions and other purposes in accordance with this Federal Law.  
 
Article 40. Funding the Agency’s Expenses  
 
1. The Agency’s expenses on implementation of measures relating to its operations 
on the mandatory deposit insurance and fulfillment of other functions envisaged by the 
Federal Law «On Banks and Banking» and the Federal Law «On Insolvency 
(Bankruptcy) of Credit Institutions» shall be funded at the expense of the Agency’s 
property.  
2. If the above property is insufficient for funding the Agency’s deposit insurance 
activities, upon the Board of Directors of the Agency proposal funding of these operations 
can be effected at the expense of the Reserve (Stabilization) Fund of the Russian 
Federation Government.  
 
Article 41. Securing Deposit Insurance System Financial Sustainability  
 
1. Financial sustainability of the deposit insurance system shall be secured by the 
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Agency’s property, as well as by the federal budget funds according to the procedure and 
on conditions set forth in this Federal Law and the budget legislation of the Russian 
Federation.  
2. To secure sustainability of the deposit insurance system the Federal Law on the 
federal budget for a respective year shall stipulate the right of the Russian Federation 
Government to provide loans from the state budget and effect borrowings, the limit of 
above borrowings as well as limitations of respective expenses from federal budget.  
3. If the Board of Directors of the Agency approves a decision of the Board of 
Management about the deficit of the mandatory deposit insurance fund and impossibility 
to effect deposit reimbursements within time limits set by this Federal Law, without 
replenishing the fund with additional resources (except insurance premiums and other 
planned earnings), the Board of Directors within no more than 7 days from the insured 
event date shall make one of the following decisions:  
1) to request the Russian Federation Government to designate respective funds to 
the Agency as non-interest budget loan, if according to the Agency’s calculation the 
deficit of the mandatory deposit insurance fund does not exceed 1 billion rubles. The 
Government of the Russian Federation shall make respective decision within no longer 
than 7 calendar days;  
2) to request the Russian Federation Government to allocate additional funds from 
the federal budget to the Agency, if according to Agency’s calculation the deficit of the 
mandatory deposit insurance fund exceeds 1 billion rubles. If the Government of the 
Russian Federation is unable to allocate the requested funds, it shall within its 
competence submit to the State Duma a draft Federal Law on making respective 
amendments to the Federal Law on the federal budget for a respective year. The above 
presentation to the State Duma shall take place within 7 calendar days from the day of 
receipt of the Agency Board of Directors’ request.  
4. With the purpose of restoration of the mandatory deposit insurance fund the 
Board of Directors of the Agency shall be entitled to set increased insurance premiums in 
accordance with this Federal Law.  
 
Article 42. Control of the Deposit Insurance System Operations  
 
1. The Bank of Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation shall control 
the deposit insurance system operations through their designated representatives in 
governing bodies of the Agency.  
2. The Board of Directors of the Agency shall annually select by tender an audit 
company to audit the use by the Agency of funds of the deposit insurance fund.  
3. Control of the use of federal budget funds allocated to the deposit insurance fund 
shall be conducted according to the procedure set for the use of federal budget funds.  
 
Chapter VI. PARTICIPATION OF BANKS IN THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
SYSTEM: FINAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 43. Specifics of Registration in the Deposit Insurance System of Banks that 
have the Authorization of the Bank of Russia as at the Date of Enactment of This 
Federal Law  
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1. A bank that has the authorization of the Bank of Russia as at the date of 
enactment of this Federal Law shall be registered with the deposit insurance system by 
the Agency by means of its inclusion in the register of member banks based on the Bank 
of Russia’s notification about the bank’s compliance with requirements stated in article 
44 of this Federal Law.  
2. The Agency shall include a bank in the register of member banks no later than on 
the business day following the receipt of the Bank of Russia’s notification stated in part 1 
of this article.  
3. Deposits in a bank that has the authorization of the Bank of Russia as at the date 
of enactment of this Federal Law shall be insured according to procedures set forth in 
this Federal Law as of the day of the bank’s registration in the register of member banks. 
 
Article 44. Requirements to Membership of Banks in the Deposit Insurance System 
 
1. A bank that has the authorization of the Bank of Russia as at the date of 
enactment of this Federal Law or applying for the Bank of Russia’s authorization shall be 
considered as complying with requirements to membership in the deposit insurance 
system, if it simultaneously meets the following conditions:  
1) if the bank’s accounting and reporting are acknowledged by the Bank of Russia 
as reliable;  
2) if the bank fulfills mandatory regulatory ratios set by the Bank of Russia;  
3) if the bank’s financial sustainability is recognized by the Bank of Russia as 
adequate;  
4) if measures stipulated by article 74 of the Federal Law «On the Central Bank of 
the Russian Federation (The Bank of Russia), as well as by article 20 of the Federal Law 
«On Banks and Banking», and article 3 of the Federal Law «On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) 
of Credit Institutions» have not been imposed against the bank and there are no grounds 
for their imposition based on the results of examination conducted by the Bank of Russia 
in accordance with part 4 of article 45 of this Federal Law.  
2. Accounting and reporting of a bank shall be considered reliable by the Bank of 
Russia, if simultaneously:  
1) accounting and reporting practices comply with Federal Laws, regulations and 
rules set by the Bank of Russia as well as internal accounting policy of the bank;  
2) possible weaknesses and errors in accounting/reporting do not have a significant 
effect on bank’s financial sustainability.  
3. Financial sustainability of a bank shall be assessed by the Bank of Russia by 
groups of indicators listed in part 4 of this article arriving at summary «satisfactory» or 
«unsatisfactory» result with respect to each group. The Bank of Russia shall acknowledge 
financial sustainability as adequate if a bank has «satisfactory» for all groups of 
indicators.  
4. To assess financial sustainability of a bank, the following groups of criteria shall 
be used:  
1) a group of indicators characterizing a bank’s capital that includes capital 
adequacy and quality indicators;  
2) a group of indicators characterizing a bank’s assets that includes indicators of 
quality of loans and other assets, loan loss provisions, risk concentration , including credit 
risk exposure to shareholders and insiders;  
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3) a group of indicators characterizing a bank’s a bank’s management, operations 
and risk management, including property structure transparency, operation of risk 
management system, including control of currency position, as well as internal controls 
including the system for combating money laundering and financing terrorism;  
4) a group of indicators characterizing a bank’s earnings, including asset and capital 
profitability indicators, structure of income and expense, profitability of specific 
operations and a bank as a whole;  
5) a group of indicators characterizing a bank’s liquidity, including indicators of 
asset liquidity, liquidity and the structure of liabilities, overall liquidity, risk exposure to 
large creditors and depositors; 
6) a bank’s compliance with rules established by the Bank of Russia in respect to 
unrestricted public disclosure of information on persons that have substantial influence 
(direct or indirect) on decisions taken by its governing bodies.  
5. The composition of indicators named in this article, their calculation methodology 
and procedure of arriving at summary results shall be set forth in a regulation of the 
Bank of Russia and published in «The Bank of Russia Bulletin» no later than a month 
after enactment of this Federal Law.  
 
Article 45. The Procedure for the Bank of Russia to Make Judgment Banks’ 
Compliance with Requirements to Membership in the Deposit Insurance System (for 
Banks that have the Bank of Russia Authorization at the Date of Enactment of This 
Federal Law)  
 
1. A bank that has the Bank of Russia’s authorization at the day of enactment of 
this Federal Law that made a decision to join the deposit insurance system shall be 
entitled within no longer than 6 months from the enactment of this Federal Law to 
submit their application to the Bank of Russia to make a judgment on its compliance with 
requirements to membership in the deposit insurance system (hereinafter also referred to 
as the judgment).  
2. The Bank of Russia shall make the judgment within a period not exceeding nine 
months from the day of receipt of a bank’s application (hereinafter referred to as the 
application).  
3. Review by the Bank of Russia of banks’ applications and making judgments on 
them shall be completed within a period not exceeding 15 months from the day of 
enactment of this Federal Law.  
4. Review of banks applications by the Bank of Russia shall consist of the following 
stages:  
1) preliminary analysis of a bank’s compliance with requirements to membership in 
the deposit insurance system;  
2) a special inspection of a bank with the purpose to assess reliability of its 
accounting and reporting practices, as well as to identify issues related to assessment of 
the bank’s compliance with requirements to membership in the deposit insurance system 
that cannot be identified by off-site supervision techniques;  
3) final analysis of results including calculation of all criteria;  
4) making a positive or negative judgment.  
5. Parts 5 and 6 of article 73 of the Federal Law «On the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation (The Bank of Russia)» shall not be applicable to inspections 
 402 
conducted in banks in accordance with this Federal Law.  
6. If the Bank of Russia makes a negative judgment, a bank after eliminating 
detected discrepancies shall be entitled to submit a follow-up application to the Bank of 
Russia, except cases when there are grounds to revoke its banking license in accordance 
with Federal Laws.  
7. The follow-up application shall be submitted by banks within the time period not 
exceeding 16 months from the day of enactment of this Federal Law.  
8. Consideration by the Bank of Russia of a follow-up application and making a 
judgment on it shall be completed within the time period not exceeding 21 months from 
the day of enactment of this Federal Law.  
9. It is not allowed for a bank to submit the application to the Bank of Russia more 
than twice.  
10. The judgment shall be made by the Bank of Russia’s Banking supervision 
Committee.  
11. The Bank of Russia shall send its positive or negative judgment to a bank no 
later than one business day after the decision is made.  
12. A bank within one month after the Bank of Russia made a negative judgment 
on its follow-up application shall be entitled to appeal the above judgment in the Bank of 
Russia’s Banking supervision Committee. If a negative judgment is confirmed by the 
above committee, a bank shall be entitled to appeal with the Chairman of the Bank of 
Russia within a month from receipt of the confirmed negative judgment.  
13. The Bank of Russia’s Banking supervision Committee and the Chairman of the 
Bank of Russia shall be obligated to review the appeal of the bank within one month from 
its receipt.  
14. Procedure for review by the Bank of Russia of applications and appeals from 
banks shall be set by a regulation of the Bank of Russia and published in «The Bank of 
Russia Bulletin» no later than a month after enactment of this Federal Law.  
15. The Bank of Russia shall send notification to the Agency about its positive 
judgment no later than on the following business day after the decision was made.  
 
Article 46. Consequences Arising in Connection with Refusal of a Bank that has the 
Bank of Russia Authorization at the day of Enactment of This Federal Law to Join the 
Deposit Insurance System  
 
1. For the purposes of this Federal Law, refusal from membership in the deposit 
insurance system shall be considered as follows:  
1) failure by a bank to submit an application to the Bank of Russia within 6 months 
from the enactment of this Federal Law;  
2) submission by a bank to the Bank of Russia of a notification on refusal to work in 
the area of accepting household deposits, as well as opening and keeping bank accounts 
for individuals.  
2. The Bank of Russia with regard to banks that refused to join the deposit 
insurance system in accordance with part 1 of this article, shall be obligated:  
1) Upon expiration of 21 months from the day of enactment of this Federal Law, to 
impose a prohibition for such banks to accept household deposits and open bank accounts. 
The above prohibition shall be in force until the right of a bank to accept household 
deposits is terminated, or its banking license is revoked in accordance with the procedure 
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set forth in this Federal Law and regulations of the Bank of Russia adopted in connection 
therewith;  
2) As of the date when a bank refused to join the deposit insurance system, but no 
later than 21 months from the day of enactment of this Federal Law, the Bank of Russia 
shall require such a bank to submit a request about termination of its right to work with 
individuals.  
3. Banks that are requested by the Bank of Russia in accordance with part 2 of this 
article, shall be obligated within 30 days to request that the Bank of Russia terminate 
their right to accept household deposits according to the procedure set forth in 
regulations of the Bank of Russia.  
4 Banks that submitted requests to the Bank of Russia about terminating their right 
to accept household deposits shall not be entitled to accept from individuals deposits and 
additional funds on bank accounts as of the above request date. Information thereof shall 
be put in the bank’s premises where it is provides services to its household customers.  
5. Bank account and/or deposit agreements with individuals concluded by a bank 
before the Bank of Russia prohibition was imposed shall not be cancelled, except when 
account/deposit owner requested cancellation of the above agreements. Additional funds 
that arrived in a deposit (account) starting the day when the Bank of Russia imposed the 
above ban, except interest accrued in accordance with terms of a bank deposit (bank 
account) agreement, shall not be entered into the deposit (account) and shall be returned 
to persons that ordered the transfer of funds to the deposit (account) or, based on a 
request of the individual, shall be transferred to an account of this particular individual in 
another insured bank in accordance with procedure established by the Bank of Russia.  
6. Banks on a day of the Bank of Russia imposition of a prohibition according to 
part 2 of this article, shall be obligated to place information about termination of its right 
to accept individuals’ money into deposits and/or open bank accounts, as well as about 
absence of right to conclude new bank account and/or deposit agreements with 
individuals. The above information should be placed in bank’s premises where it provides 
services to its household customers.  
7. If a bank fails to fulfill obligations set forth by parts 4 to 6 of this article, the 
Bank of Russia shall be obligated to impose liability measures against the bank set forth 
in the Federal Law «On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (The Bank of 
Russia), in Federal Law «On Banks and Banking», and other Federal Laws.  
 
Article 47. Consequences of the Bank of Russia Negative Judgment  
 
1. For the purposes of this Federal Law a bank shall be acknowledged as non-
complying with requirements to membership in the deposit insurance system, if:  
1) the bank failed to submit a follow-up application within the time period set forth 
in parts 6 to 8 of article 45 of this Federal Law;  
2) The Bank of Russia has made a negative judgment on the bank’s follow-up 
application and after the review of the appeal.  
2. The Bank of Russia within a month from the day of making the negative 
judgment on a bank’s follow-up application, or within a month after expiration of time 
period given to submit the follow-up application, but no later than 21 months from the 
day of enactment of this Federal Law, shall be obligated:  
1) to require such a bank to submit a request about terminating its right to accept 
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household deposits;  
2) impose prohibition to accept household deposits and open bank accounts for 
individuals that will be in force until the right to accept deposits is terminated, or banking 
license is revoked in accordance with the procedure set forth by this Federal Law and 
regulations of the Bank of Russia adopted in connection therewith.  
3. A bank that was acknowledged by the Bank of Russia as non-complying with 
requirements to membership in the deposit insurance system according to part 1 of this 
article, shall be obligated within a month from the day of imposition by the Bank of 
Russia of prohibition to accept household deposits and open bank accounts for individuals 
to submit request to the Bank of Russia about termination of its right to work with 
individuals.  
4. Bank account and/or deposit agreements concluded by a bank with individuals 
prior to the above imposition shall not be cancelled, except when a deposit (account) 
owner requested the above cancellation. Additional funds shall not be accepted from 
individuals except interest accrued in accordance with account or deposit agreements and 
shall be returned to persons that authorized such placement of funds into bank 
deposit/account or based on a request of the individual shall be transferred to an account 
of this particular individual in another insured bank in accordance with procedure 
established by the Bank of Russia.  
5. Banks on a day of the Bank of Russia imposition of a prohibition according to 
part 2 of this article, shall be obligated to place information about termination of their 
right to accept individuals’ resources into deposits and/or open bank accounts, as well as 
about absence of right to conclude new bank account and/or deposit agreements with 
individuals. The above information should be placed in bank’s premises where they 
provide services to household customers.  
6. If a bank failed to fulfill obligations set by parts 3 to 5 of this article, the Bank of 
Russia shall be obligated to impose liability measures against the bank set forth in the 
Federal Law «On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (The Bank of Russia), in 
Federal Law «On Banks and Banking», and other Federal Laws.  
 
Article 48. Consequences of Non-compliance of Banks Included in the Register of 
Member Banks with Requirements to Membership in the Deposit Insurance System  
 
1. Banks that are included in the register of member banks shall be obligated to 
comply with requirements to membership in the DIS set forth in article 44 of this Federal 
Law subject to provisions established in this article.  
2. In accordance with the Russian Federation legislation the Bank of Russia shall 
exercise supervision over banks’ compliance with requirements stated in part 1 of this 
article.  
3. A bank is perceived as not complying with requirements to membership in the 
DIS in cases when: 
1) the bank’s accounting records and reports are recognized by the Bank of Russia 
not trustworthy for three consequent months; 
2) the bank for six subsequent months does not comply with a certain particular 
mandatory ratio or requirement established by the Bank of Russia. Non-compliance of a 
mandatory ratio or requirement at least for six business days within a reporting month 
shall be considered as non-compliance for the whole reporting month; 
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3) financial sustainability of the bank is recognized by the Bank of Russia 
insufficient; 
4) for three subsequent months one of the measures set forth in point 4 of second 
part of article 74 of the Federal Law «On the Central bank of the Russian Federation 
(the Bank of Russia)» is applied to the bank.  
3¹. For the purposes of this article a bank’s financial sustainability is recognized by 
the Bank of Russia insufficient in cases when: 
1) for six subsequent reporting months or two subsequent quarter reporting dates 
the bank is categorized as «deficient » on a certain particular group of indicators set forth 
in points 1, 2 and 5 of part 4 of article 44 of this Federal Law;  
2) for three subsequent months the bank is categorized as «deficient» on a group of 
indicators set forth in points 3 and 6 of part 4 of article 44 of this Federal Law; 
3) for two subsequent quarter reporting dates the bank is categorized as «deficient»  
on a group of indicators set forth in point 4 of part 4 of article 44 of this Federal Law. 
3². Compliance of a bank included in the register of member banks with 
requirements to membership in the DIS is determined on the basis of results of 
inspections or documentary examination of the banks reports as well as documented 
evidences received from the bank. In case the identified in the course of an inspection or 
documentary examination deficiencies that cause violation of requirements set forth in 
points 1, 2 or 3 of part 1 of article 44 of this Federal Law have been corrected before the 
date of their identification or in the course of inspection which identified them, or 
corrected before the date when the Bank of Russia considered a question of imposing a 
bank on accepting of household deposits and opening of bank accounts for individuals, the 
bank is recognized as complying with requirements set forth in points 1, 2 and 3 of part 1 
of article 44 of this Federal Law.  
3³. In case a bank’s non-compliance with requirements to membership in the DIS on 
grounds set forth in parts 3 and 3¹ of this article, the Bank of Russia in accordance with 
decision taken by its Banking supervision Committee shall: 
1) send to the bank a request to submit an application to terminate its right to work 
with household deposits; 
2) impose a ban on accepting by the bank of household deposits and opening of bank 
accounts for individuals, which will be effective through the day of termination of this 
bank’s right to work with household deposits in accordance with provisions set forth in 
this Federal Law and the Bank of Russia regulations issued in accordance with it, or 
through the day of revocation of the bank’s license by the Bank of Russia for accepting 
household deposits and opening bank accounts for individuals. 
34. The Bank of Russia in case of identification of threat to interests of creditors 
and depositors resulting from a bank’s operations can, in accordance with decision taken 
by its Banking supervision Committee, make decisions envisaged by part 3³ of this article 
in cases when: 
1) accounting records and reports of the bank are recognized not trustworthy; 
2) the bank for two subsequent months does not comply with a certain particular 
mandatory ratio or requirement established by the Bank of Russia; 
3) the bank for two subsequent months is categorized as «deficient» on a certain 
particular group of indicators set forth in points 1, 2 and 5 of part 4 of article 44 of this 
Federal Law. 
4. A bank in relation to which in accordance with parts 3³ and 34 of this article the 
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Bank of Russia imposed a ban on accepting household deposits and opening bank 
accounts for individuals shall, within thirty days after this ban was imposed, submit to 
the Bank of Russia in accordance with the procedure established by the Bank of Russia’s 
regulations a request about termination of the bank’s right to work with individuals.  
5. Bank account and/or deposit agreements concluded by a bank with individuals 
prior to the above imposition shall not be cancelled, except when a deposit (account) 
owner requested the above cancellation. Additional funds that arrived in a deposit 
(account) day starting the day when the Bank of Russia imposed the above ban, except 
interest accrued in accordance with terms of a bank deposit (bank account) agreement, 
shall not be entered into the deposit (account) and shall be returned to persons that 
ordered the transfer of funds to the deposit (account) or, based on a request of the 
individual, shall be transferred to an account of this particular individual in another 
insured bank in accordance with procedure established by the Bank of Russia.  
6. Banks after the Bank of Russia imposition of a prohibition according to parts 3³ 
and 34 of this article, shall be obligated to place information no later than the next 
business day about termination of their right to accept individuals’ resources into deposits 
and/or open bank accounts, as well as about absence of right to conclude new bank 
account and/or deposit agreements with individuals. Above information should be placed 
in bank’s premises where they provide services to their household customers.  
7. If a bank failed to fulfill obligations set by part 3 of this article, the Bank of 
Russia shall be obligated to impose liability measures against the bank set forth in the 
Federal Law «On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (The Bank of Russia), in 
Federal Law «On Banks and Banking», and other Federal Laws.  
8. If a bank refused to join the deposit insurance system in accordance with article 
46 of this Federal Law, it shall be entitled to request that the Bank of Russia granted an 
authorization or cancelled the prohibition on accepting household deposits and opening 
bank accounts for individuals no sooner than 2 years after the day of enactment of this 
Federal Law.  
9. A bank that received negative judgment in accordance with article 47 of this 
Federal Law or recognized as non-complying with requirements to membership in the 
DIS shall be entitled to request the Bank of Russia to grant an authorization or cancelling 
the prohibition on accepting household deposits and opening bank accounts to individuals 
no sooner than 2 years after the day of enactment of this Federal Law. The day of 
termination of a bank’s right to work with household deposits means the day when the 
bank’s license on accepting of household deposits and opening of bank accounts for 
individuals was recognized invalid in accordance with a regulation by the Bank of Russia. 
 
Article 49. Specifics of Reimbursement of Deposits placed with the DIS Member 
Banks in which the Bank of Russia has Equity Interest  
 
1. Reimbursement of household depositors in excess of the coverage limit set forth 
in this Federal Law placed under banking deposit agreement or bank account agreements 
executed before October 1, 2004 in credit institutions with the Bank of Russia 
participating in their capital, if such agreements have not been changed or amended after 
September 30, 2004, shall be guaranteed by vicarious liability of the Russian Federation 
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in article 399 of the Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation until January 1, 2007.  
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Article 50. Property Contribution of the Russian Federation  
 
1. Property contribution of the Russian Federation to the Agency’s property shall 
be effected by transfer of 3 billion rubles from the State Corporation «Agency for 
Restructuring of Credit Organizations». Out of this amount 2 billion rubles shall be 
allocated to the mandatory deposit insurance fund and 1 billion rubles – to establish the 
Agency’s resources for implementing actions set forth in this Federal Law, the Federal 
Law «On Banks and Banking» and the Federal Law «On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of 
Credit Institutions».  
2. Property contribution stated in part 1 of this article shall be effected in cash 
and/or government securities with their market value estimation within 6 months from 
the day of enactment of this Federal Law.  
3. Funds received by the State Corporation «Agency for Restructuring of Credit 
Organizations» upon completion of its restructuring projects and based on its Board of 
Directors’ decisions shall be contributed to Agency as property contributions of the 
Russian Federation.  
 
Article 51. Enactment of This Federal Law  
 
1. This Federal Law shall be enacted as of its official publication date.  
2. The Government of the Russian Federation and the Bank of Russia within ten 
days from the day of enactment of this Federal Law shall designate their respective 
candidates to represent them in the Board of Directors of the Agency.  
 
President
of the Russian Federation
V. PUTIN
Moscow, Kremlin 
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Summary of the Results of 2007 Study674 
 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR IN 2007 AND DIS 
IMPACT ON IT (SHORT VERSION) 
To assess the current public investment behavior and its changes under the influence of 
the Federal Law “On Insurance of Households’ Deposits in Banks of the Russian 
Federation” Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) organized sociological survey in December 
2007 incorporating quantitative and qualitative components. Quantitative research was 
conducted by OAO “All Russia Centre for Public Opinion Review” (VTZIOM). The 
analysis of obtained data was carried out jointly by experts of VTZIOM and DIA. 
 
1600 people from 18 years of age and above participated in the survey. It was based on 
representative all-Russia sampling taking into account age and sex quotas (according to 
State Statistics Committee data). The survey took place in 153 settlements located in 4 
regions, areas and republics of the Russian Federation. The research techniques consisted 
in individual interviews. Sampling statistical error did not exceed 2.34%. The results of 
the above quantitative research are presented in the first part of this review. 
 
Also, within the framework of the present review in-depth interviews with 
representatives of groups with high personal income were conducted in 6 cities (where 
income was in excess of RUR 50,000 per person). Summarized results of qualitative 
research are presented in the second part of this review. 
 
I. BASIC RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH (ALL-RUSSIA 
SURVEY) 
 
During 2007 possibilities for public savings increased. Compared to the results of 2006 
survey the number of people in a position to save part of their resources went up from 
40% to 47%. However the increase of ‘potential’ households’ savings ‘energy’ was not 
transformed into ‘kinetic’ one. This is also verified by State Statistics Committee data, 
according to which savings ratio (ratio of savings to pure income) during the last five 
years went down one and half times. 
 
To analyze the survey results all respondents were divided into typological groups based 
on available to them resources and those classified depending on the use of banking 
services. 
                                               
© DIA. Reprinted with permission of the DIA. 
674 Translated to English by the DIA, available at http://asv.org.ru/en/analit/analit_5.doc (last 
accessed on 04 December 2011). Formatting added, spelling, grammar, punctuation and 
underlines are as in the original. 
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Groups that do not have available resources represent 50%. People whose monthly 
income is spent on basic current needs referred themselves to this group. The share of 
this group compared to the previous year went down by 9% (in 2006 it was 59%). 
 
Groups who only sometimes have available resources make up 32%. People who 
regularly have part of their monthly income left after covering all basic needs referred 
themselves to this group, and sometimes they have opportunity to make savings in 
various modes. Last year the share of this group was 26%. 
 
Groups with available resources (‘systemic savers’) constitute 15%. People who regularly 
have part of their monthly earnings left as free resources after covering all basic needs 
referred themselves to this group, and they are in a position to save the resources in 
different modes. Last year the share of this typological group was 14%. 
 
The portrait of ‘systemic saver’ looks as follows: it is a specialist with higher education 
and income of RUR 5,000 per each family member. He lives in Moscow or St. Petersburg 
and would characterize his financial condition as good or very good. His age would be 
from 45 to 59 years. The second most spread ‘typical saver’ is a pensioner. The most 
significant changes compared to 2006 are connected with financial condition 
improvements, which can be accounted for general well-being growth throughout the 
country. 
 
Approximately one fourth of the Russian population (26%) are still keeping their 
resources at home in cash rubles, but this is almost twice less compared to the results of 
2006 (50%). 
 
The number of people who place their resources into bank deposits went down (11% 
compared to 16% in 2006). The reasons for the above reduction were – consumption 
growth, reduction of deposit interest rates to the inflation level, and changes in 
population age structure giving preference to bank deposits. 
 
Based on the results of 2007 survey – 33% of those interviewed were included in the 
group of depositors675 as interpreted by deposit insurance law, out of which – 11% are 
using their deposits as an investment instrument, while others using them to receive 
salaries, pensions and students’ scholarship. Another 21% of the population is using 
other types of banking services. 46% respondents can be referred to the group that does 
not use banking services at all. The above testifies to the fact that the share of depositors 
is preserved, but the share of general public using banking services declined (from 63% to 
54%). The present research has once again reaffirmed an obvious fact: banking services’ 
attractiveness and demand depend, above all, on income level. 
 
                                               
675 The term ‘deposit’ for the purposes of the present research is used in the same meaning as in 
the Federal Law “On Insurance of Households’ Deposits in Banks of the Russian Federation”. 
Citizens are referred to the group of depositors if they opened time deposit and/or have balances 
on their current bank accounts, including plastic card debit account and/or plastic card salary 
(pension, scholarship) account. 
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Random ‘depositor portrait’ looks as follows: it is an employed urban citizen, aged above 
40 years with higher education; or it is a rural citizen with college level education of same 
age group. Another socially typical depositor is a pensioner. Characteristic features of a 
typical depositor have not undergone significant changes compared to 2006. 
 
Public group using alternative banking services constitutes 21%. Respondents of this 
group do not have bank deposits or accounts, but they use other banking services 
(consumer or auto loans, utilities payments, money transfers, investment services). 
Compared to the results of 2006 survey this group’s share went down by 12%. The 
above reduction took place because the number of consumer credit users decreased. 
 
Public group that does not use banking services at all constitutes 46%. This group’s 
share went up compared to 2006 results – then it was 37%. 
 
The following have been basic 2007 trends in investing and saving public behavior: (1) 
significant reduction in the share of those keeping their savings in cash at home (both in 
rubles and foreign currencies); (2) decline of bank deposits’ attractiveness as an 
investment instrument, which is accounted by higher inflation rate compared to average-
weighted deposit interest rate; (3) formation of numerous group of those who see no 
rationale for making savings in any mode – for example, every fifth Muscovite and citizen 
of St. Petersburg see no motivation for saving as they try to spend all their earnings. 
 
Bank deposits more and more have to compete not with cash hidden at home, but with 
the desire of the public to spend all earnings in order to meet their ever increasing 
demands. The result of such competition will determine savings’ dynamics on a mid-term 
perspective. 
 
Based on the results of 2007 survey, one fourth of the interviewed respondents (25%) 
mentioned amounts within the range from RUR 50,000 to 100,000 as resources that 
could be referred to savings. 59% respondents consider amounts less than RUR 100,000 
as savings (in 2006 this size amounts were pointed out by 77%). Only 5% of the Russian 
citizens look upon amounts from RUR 100,000 to 400,000 as savings and practically the 
same number (4%) named amounts in excess of RUR 400,000 as their savings. Every 
seventh respondent (15%) pointed out that any amount could be considered as savings. In 
other words, only 9% respondents consider resources in amount exceeding RUR 100,000 
as savings. The above testifies that DIS potential impact on investment and saving public 
behavior within the framework of existing insurance coverage is far from being 
exhausted. 
 
If we compare the share of those who have saving opportunities by age groups, then 
within 25-34 age group – we can observe the maximum number of those who are able to 
make planned savings (19%). Last year this share was 16%, which also constituted the 
maximum. 
 
Among respondents above 60 years of age the above share is minimal (12% in 2007, and 
13% – in 2006). Most likely, the above is caused by the fact that 25-34 is the most 
‘favorable’ age group: people already have an opportunity to make good earnings, while 
many of them would not yet have to incur significant outlays connected with upbringing 
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and educating kids, but have the need to resolve the issue of housing property. Also, 
some growth was discernable in the share of ‘systemic savers’ within 45-59 age group – 
most likely people have been more actively saving part of their resources “for the old age” 
(15% in 2007 compared to 10% in 2006). The growth of savings share in the group 
preceding retirement age testifies to the public longing to add up to insufficient earnings 
ratio on individual basis (income before retirement age to pension amount ratio). In 2006 
distribution of ‘systemic savers’ share was more uniform, which can characterize 
ownership differentiation growth depending on age group. 
 
“Criteria rating” for selecting banks by depositor looks as follows. The first and second 
ratings belong to responds “bank is owned by government” and “bank’s office is located 
close to the residence place” (26%); the third place (18%) is taken up by interest rates’ 
level – which, in our opinion, shows not only “more homogeneous” proposals on deposit 
market, but recognition of this phenomenon by the public as well. While attractiveness of 
state-owned bank status has started to decay – this trend is more discernable with the 
respondents’ age decrease. 
 
16% respondents began to feel more confidence in banks, while twice as less – 8%, 
demonstrate less confidence in financial institutions. About half of the Russian citizens 
(46%) pointed out that their attitude towards banks during the last three years has not 
changed at all. 
 
Thus, positive dynamics in the change of public attitude to banks can be testified. 
However, it would be premature to speak about final eradiation of public scepsis – 
positive changes can be of unstable character. 
 
Taking into consideration the current public confidence level to the banking system, 
introduction of irrevocable deposits is viewed as extremely undesirable. Establishment of 
this normative is rather negatively perceived by Russians. 42% depositors pointed out 
that they would say “no” to time deposits at all. 
 
The results of the present research showed that 38% of the public are more or less 
acquainted with deposit insurance system – this confirms that more than one third of 
Russians demonstrate positive awareness of the DIS. 
 
In 2007 DIS had an impact on investment behavior of 15% Russians (in 2006 – also 
15%). The review of responds’ distribution regarding DIS impact on relationship with 
banks among depositors has shown its positive influence on actions of 45% 
representatives of this group. 12% depositors began paying attention on interest rate 
levels in banks that are not the largest and well-known. 
 
For the first time 14% depositors opened accounts in banks; while another 7% depositors 
increased deposit amounts or terms of deposits respectively. Other depositors – based on 
DIS influence – began to split their total deposits (3%) and turn down keeping their 
funds at home in cash (2%). 
 
37% Russians are aware of insurance coverage increase that took place in 2007, which 
exceeds the number of persons who have a bank deposit. 
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Coverage increase influenced actions or intentions of 15% of those who are aware of this 
event. 7% have increased their deposit amounts (or are planning such an increase). 4% 
opened bank accounts for the first time (or expressed their intention to do it in the nearest 
time). Another 4% extended their deposit terms (or are prepared to do so in the nearest 
time). 
 
The results of the survey have shown that if we review our capital cities as ‘beacons’ 
laying the basis for ‘itinerary’ of the Russian public investing and saving behavior as a 
whole, we can distinguish two opposite further developments’ options. These options 
correspond to multi-direction trends established in Moscow and St. Petersburg. On the 
one hand, the share of those who are guided by principle ‘live today’ in the area of 
savings policy is unprecedented high in these cities. On the other hand, the share of 
‘savers’ is also higher in Moscow and St. Petersburg: here only one third of the 
population (33%) is spending all income without saving any resources. In all other cities 
and towns almost half population (46%-52%) spends all monetary resources to cover 
basic necessities. 23% population are making planned savings in both capitals, while in 
other cities this share does not exceed 14%-16%. 
 
Resolving the above dilemma in the interests of the Russian economy will in many 
respects depend on the total growth and homogeneous distribution of public earnings. 
 
II. BASIC RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEWS) 
 
Representatives of high-income group believe that savings amount may vary depending 
on the situation (resources availability and planned expenditure) – i.e. they were unable 
to formalize their understanding of the margin separating ‘pocket money’ from ‘savings’. 
Majority mentioned amounts within the range from RUR 100,000 to 500,000 as the 
minimum. 
 
Respondents from this group try to select investment mode that would be reliable and 
profitable at the same time. Most frequently this group’s respondents mentioned investing 
in real estate. The next most popular investment area is private (with relatives or 
partners) business. This type of investments is particularly widespread in non-capital 
cities. 
 
Bank deposits are viewed by respondents as a saving instrument enabling to keep funds 
“for the future”. Almost all respondents pointed out that bank deposits are unattractive 
method of investing funds because of low interest rates. 
 
Basic saving objectives for this group’s respondents are purchasing real estate and 
accumulating funds for further investments in their private business with the purpose of 




Among priority banking services the respondents named loans (mortgage, auto, credits 
for business development or for consumer purpose), plastic cards (both debit and credit), 
utilities payments, time or demand deposits, bank safes, money transfers. 
 
Majority respondents do not have time deposits in banks (while almost all have current 
accounts). Those who have deposits, are using them as a means of ensuring funds’ 
security, preferring safety and partial compensation for inflationary losses. 
Term of deposit is the key criterion for selecting a bank deposit. For high-income 
depositors it is of primary importance to have an opportunity to withdraw funds at any 
convenient for them time, while interest rate turns out to be less meaningful (partially it 
can be explained by uniformity of banks’ proposals). Therefore, majority representative 
of high-income groups of respondents having time deposits prefer to have short-term 
deposits. 
 
To open up a time deposit a reliable bank should be selected. In the opinion of many 
respondents, such banks are more likely to be state-owned institutions. The second 
important selection criterion is proposal’s profitability, while the third – convenient 
location of the bank’s branch (availability of parking or driveway are often understood as 
convenience). In addition to being a state-owned bank, in the opinion of many 
respondents, large charter capital may serve as indicator of bank’s reliability. Besides, a 
number of respondents believe that foreign capital involvement can be viewed as another 
testimony of bank’s reliability. In capital cities the importance of foreign shareholders 
presence in a bank turned out to be significantly higher. 
 
According to many respondents, a recently established private bank annoyingly 
advertising its services with a long and sophisticated name should be viewed as unreliable 
bank. Also, many respondents look upon small banks with a great degree of vigilance. 
 
The following are voiced as basic weaknesses of banks’ operations are: long lines of 
customers, no flexibility in selecting insurance company when obtaining a credit, as well 
as low efficiency and inconvenient work hours. 
 
If we characterize general attitude of high-income group’s representatives – it can be 
stated that on the whole confidence in the Russian banking system has strengthened 
during the latest years. 
 
The reason for the above could be a number of circumstances. The respondents pointed to 
stabilization, and expanding the spectrum of provided services. Some respondents 
mentioned DIS introduction as a stabilization factor. One of the meaningful factors of 
Russian banking system stabilization, according to many high-income group 
representatives, has been the presence of foreign banks on the market. 
 
Respondents have rather general knowledge about deposit insurance system – which can 
be accounted by absence of their interest to time deposits because of their low yield, 
inconvenient service or lack of confidence in the banking system as a whole. Some 
respondents expressed their negative attitude to insurance coverage limit. In their 
opinion, deposits should be covered in full – no matter how big the deposit amount, while 
the current coverage is too low for them. 
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Opinions about DIS reliability and usefulness differ among those who are aware of 
system operations. For example, some respondents believe that DIS introduction was a 
very important innovation bringing domestic banking system closer to international 
standards. Other respondents do not have trust in DIS, thinking that one should not rely 
on government guarantees, whose actions not once caused bankruptcy for depositors. 
Still others who were interviewed pointed out that introduction of DIS and coverage 
increase enhanced their confidence in banks and has been indication of banking system 
stability for them. 
 
Absolute majority of high-income group’s respondents express negative attitude towards 
the idea of irrevocable deposits. The basic reason for such negative approach – it is 
impossible to anticipate beforehand the need to withdraw funds for more profitable 
investments, which could arise on a situational basis. 
 
The results of in-depth interviews for high-income groups’ representatives have shown 
principal differences in their investment behavior from other Russian citizens with lower 
earnings. The above, first of all, is explained by weak motivation to make long-term 
investments on organized markets, including into bank deposits. Taking into account the 
fact that this group’s representatives shape up considerable part of retail deposit base, 
changes or fluctuations in their preferences have a serious impact on the banking system 
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Results of the Pilot Retail Depositor Survey 
 
The pilot retail depositor survey took place at one of the branches of Bank Saint-
Petersburg on 17 October 2007. The pilot survey was conducted face-to-face. 
The questionnaire (including the distribution of responses) is presented below, followed 
by the overview of the results. 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used for the pilot retail depositor survey consisted of 15 questions (11 
closed questions and 4 open questions). 
Question 1: Do you have a bank deposit or cash card account, including through the 
‘salary project’, in this bank? 
Yes, I have a bank deposit 4 
Yes, I have a cash card account 2 
Yes, I have a cash card account through the ‘salary project’ 5 
No 0 
 
Question 1а: (If the cash card account is through the ‘salary project’) Who opened this 
account for you? 
Myself 0 
My employer 5 
 
Question 2: What is the value of your bank deposit/cash card account in this bank? 
Less than RUB 100,000 0 
RUB 100,001-200,000 3 
RUB 200,001-300,000 0 
RUB 300,001-400,000678 0 
More than RUB 400,001 1 
                                               
678 RUB 400,000 was the maximum compensation amount at the time. 
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Question 3: Was your bank deposit/cash card account opened before or after 25 
November 2004679 
Before 25 November 2004 0 
After 25 November 2004 10 
 
Question 4a: (If before 25 November 2004) Were you informed by the bank about its 
inclusion in the DIS? 
Yes, I received information by post N/A 
Yes, I received information over the phone N/A 
Yes, I received information in the bank branch N/A 
No, I was not informed N/A  
 
Question 4b.1: (If after 25 November 2004) What was your reason to open a bank 
deposit/cash card account in this bank? 
High level of customer service 1 
Bank’s reputation 1 
Better conditions of the contract (compared to other banks)   
Interest rates 3 
Term of contract 0 
Both interest rates and term of contract 1 
Recommendation by family member, friend, other person 0 
Other  5 
 
Question 4b.2: (If after 25 November 2004) Were you informed by the bank about the 
DIS when the bank deposit/cash card account was opened? 
Yes, I read about it at the information stand at the bank branch before opening 
the account 
0 
Yes, I received information from the clerk at the time of opening the account 1 
Yes, I saw it in the text of the contract at the  time of opening the account 2 
No, I have received no such information 8 
 
 
                                               
679 Date of inclusion of Bank Saint-Petersburg to the DI
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Question 5: Is your bank a member of the DIS? 
Yes 6 
No 0 
Do not know 4 
 
Question 6: How do you rate your knowledge about the DIS on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 












Question 8: Who are the main parties of the DIS (who participates in the deposit 
insurance relationship)? 
Central Bank of Russia 3 
Government of Russia 1 
Depositor 4 
Bank 5 
Deposit Insurance Agency 5 
 
Question 9: What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount? 
RUB 100,000 1 
RUB 190,000 0 
RUB 370,000 0 
RUB 400,000 5 
More than RUB 500,000 0 
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Question 10: From which funds is the deposit insurance compensation paid? 
Government of Russia 1 
Deposit Insurance Agency 0 
Central Bank of Russia 6 
Bank where the account was opened 3 
 
Question 11: How do you receive information about changes in the DIS? 
TV 4 
Printed press 3 
From family members, friends, other people 2 
Radio 1 
Internet 4 
Bank branch 0 
Other 3 
 










Question 14: How did your confidence in the banking system change following the 
introduction of the DIS? 
Confidence increased 3 
Confidence decreased 0 
Confidence did not change 6 
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Question 15: Did your saving behaviour change following the introduction of the DIS? 




Overview of the Results 
10 depositors participated in the pilot retail depositor survey: 5 males and 5 females. The 
age groups were as follows: <25 years – 2 people, 25-34 years – 4people, 55-64 years 
– 2people, >=65 years – 2 people. 
The main results included the following: 
Comment on Question 1:  Of the10 respondents, only 5 opened their bank account (either 
current or savings account) themselves. The current accounts of the other 5 were opened 
by their employer, and they only had a debit card (usually Visa Electron) through the 
‘salary project’. 
Comment on Questions 1a, 6 and 9: 3 out of the 5 respondents on the ‘salary project’ did 
not know anything about the DI compensation amount, and 1 thought it was RUB 
100,000. However, 2 of these respondents ranked their knowledge of DIS as 4 and 5 
accordingly (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is the highest). 
Comment on Question 2: The greatest knowledge of the DIS (most correct answers 
compared to other respondents) was shown by a respondent with a savings account of 
more than RUB 400,001. 
Comment on Questions 3 and 4b.2: All respondents opened their bank account after 25 
November 2004 (which was the date of acceptance of this bank into the DIS); however, 
8 out of 10 respondents said they did not receive any information from the bank on this 
matter (neither at the time of opening of the account, nor at a later stage). 
Comment on Question 5: 4 respondents did not know whether their bank was a member 
of the DIS. 
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Comment on Question 10: None of the respondents said that the DI compensation comes 
from the DIA, while 6 respondents thought the coverage is provided by the CBR. 
Comment on Question 11: None of the respondents said that they received information 
on changes in the DIS from the bank branch. 
Comment on Question 14: 6 out of 10 respondents said their confidence in the banking 







































Translation of Questions in the Questionnaire for Banks A1, 
B1, C1 and D1 
 
Sex: 
□ Male □ Female 
 
Age: 
□ < 25 □ 26-35 □ 36-45 
□ 46-55 □ 56-65 □ > 66 
 
QUESTION 1: What banking products (services) do you use in this bank? (Please tick 
all that apply) 
□ Savings account □ Current account 
□ Card through the ‘salary project’ □ Card without the ‘salary project’ 
□ None (Please go directly to QUESTION 7) 
 
QUESTION 2: How much of your money is deposited in this bank (in total across all 
current/savings accounts)? (If your accounts are in foreign currency, please use the 
equivalent in RUB) 
□ RUB < 100,000 □ RUB 700,001-1,000,000 
□ RUB 100,001-400,000 □ RUB > 1,000,001 
□ RUB 400,001-700,000   
 
QUESTION 3: Why did you choose this bank to service your current/savings account? 
(Please tick all that apply) 
□ High level of customer service □ Recommendation of a member of family, a friend, other person 
□ Bank’s reputation □ 
Participation of this bank in the 
deposit insurance scheme 
□ Better savings accounts’ interest rates(compared to other banks) □ 
Participation of my employer in the 
‘salary project’ 
□ Better savings accounts’ term of contract (compared to other banks) □ 
Other (Please give details 
______________________________) 
 
QUESTION 4: Is this bank a member of the deposit insurance scheme? 
□ Yes □ No □ Do not know 
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QUESTION 5: How confident are you in the safety of your money in this bank? 
□ Completely confident □ Somewhat lack confidence 
□ Somewhat confident □ Completely lack confidence 
 
QUESTION 6: Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance scheme 
when opening the savings/current account? 
□ 
Yes, I read about it on the 
information stand in the bank’s 
branch before opening the 
savings/current account 
□ 
Yes, I saw information in the text of 
contract at the time of opening the 
savings/current account 
□ 
Yes, I received information from the 
bank clerk at the time of opening the 
savings/current account 
□ No, I have received  no such information from this bank 
 
QUESTION 7: How do you evaluate your knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme 
(where 1 – “have no knowledge” and 5 – “know everything or almost everything”)? 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
QUESTION 8: What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount? 
□ RUB 100,000 □ RUB 400,000 
□ RUB 700,000 □ RUB 1,000,000 
□ There is no maximum deposit insurance compensation amount □ Do not know 
 
QUESTION 9: Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit insurance 
compensation? 
□ Government □ Central Bank 
□ Deposit Insurance Agency □ Bank serving the bank account 
□ Do not know   
 
QUESTION 10: How would you prefer to receive information about the deposit 
insurance scheme? 
□ TV □ Radio 
□ Printed press □ Internet 
□ 
From a member of family, a friend, 
other person □ In the bank’s branch 





QUESTION 11: Do you feel your rights as depositor are more protected following the 
introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004? 
□ Yes □ No □ Do not know 
 
QUESTION 12: How did your level of confidence in banking system change following 
the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004? 
□ Level of confidence increased □ 
Level of confidence 
decreased □ 
Level of confidence 
remained unchanged 
 
QUESTION 13: How did your saving behaviour change following the introduction of 
the deposit insurance scheme in 2004? 
□ 
I increased the value of savings 
account in connection with the 
introduction of the deposit insurance 
scheme 
□ 
I did not increase the value of savings 
account despite the introduction of 
the deposit insurance scheme 
□ 
I increased the value of savings 
account irrespective of the 
introduction of the deposit insurance 
scheme 
□ My saving behaviour remained unchanged 
 
QUESTION 14: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following 









14a: I receive sufficient information 
about the deposit insurance scheme 
from this bank 
□ □ □ □ 
14b: I know where to find further 
information about the deposit 
insurance scheme 
□ □ □ □ 
14c: The introduction of the deposit 
insurance scheme to a large extent 
influenced a change in my saving 
behaviour 
□ □ □ □ 
14d: The introduction of the deposit 
insurance scheme to a large extent 
influenced a change in my 
confidence in the banking system 
□ □ □ □ 
14e: I would  recommend  that 
family members and friends  place 
their money in savings accounts 





QUESTION 15: Have you heard anything about changes to the main parameters of the 
deposit insurance scheme in October 2008? 
□ Yes, I am well aware of these changes □ 
Yes, I heard something, but do not 
know the details 
□ No,  this is the first I have heard of it (Please go directly to QUESTION 17) 
 
QUESTION 16: How did you hear about the changes? 
□ TV □ Radio 
□ Printed press □ Internet 
□ From a member of family, a friend, other person □ In the bank’s branch 
□ Other (Please give details_______________________________________________) 
 
QUESTION 17: How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes? (More 
than one response possible) 
□ I increased/plan to increase the value of my savings account in this bank □ 
I opened/plan to open  a new savings 
account in another bank 
□ I do not plan to do anything   
 
QUESTION 18: Has your level of confidence in the banking system changed since 
October 2008? 
□ 
Level of confidence has increased 
(compared to the level of confidence 
in September 2008) 
□ 
Level of confidence has decreased 
(compared to the level of confidence 
in September 2008) 
□ 
Level of confidence has remained 
unchanged (compared to the level of 






Description of Methods Used To Capture, Verify and 
Validate the Quantitative Data 
 
When data is transferred from one medium to another, there will always be a danger that 
errors are introduced, and there will be a need to verify the data. This is especially true 
when the input is done manually. 
The data collected from 942 questionnaires were transferred from paper to digital format 
using a bespoke software called qAssistant developed for this investigation. The software 
algorithms performed the following steps to capture, validate and verify the data: 
1. All questionnaires from each participating bank were scanned and saved as picture 
files with the name identifying the questionnaire. 
2. All the picture files related to each questionnaire page were grouped together. 
3. Required information was extracted from each of the picture files using the following 
steps: 
• each picture was rotated, scaled and centred according to defined fix points (top 
left and bottom left corners of each page); 
• a template was used to identify areas on the picture which show checkboxes; and 
• software determined whether each of the checkboxes on the page was ticked by 
counting black pixels (if the number of black pixels was larger than a certain pre-
determined threshold count, the checkbox was considered ticked). 
In order to validate the data compiled from the ticked checkboxes, a series of checks have 
been performed which helped to identify invalid responses: 
• a respondent could be either male or female; if both checkboxes were ticked, 
neither response  was recorded; 
 440 
• a respondent could only be in one age group; if more than one checkbox were 
ticked,  none of the responses were recorded; 
• if a respondent indicated in Question 1 that they did not patronise the bank where 
they were surveyed, they were not supposed to tick any of the checkboxes in 
Questions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (on the questionnaire for Banks A1, B1, C1, D1 and 
D2) and in Questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 (on the questionnaire for Bank A2), if any of 
the checkboxes from these questions were ticked,  none of the responses were 
recorded; 
• a respondent could only choose one response in relation to the total amount of 
money deposited in the bank; if more than one checkbox were ticked,  none of the 
responses were recorded; 
• if a respondent stated in Question 6 (on the questionnaire for Banks A1, B1, C1, 
D1 and D2) and in Question 5 (on the questionnaire for Bank A2) that they did 
not receive any information about the DIS from the bank, no other checkbox in 
this question could be ticked; if any of the other checkboxes from this question 
were ticked, none of the responses were recorded; 
• a respondent could only tick one checkbox  on the level of their knowledge of the 
DIS; if more than one checkbox were ticked, none of the responses were recorded; 
• a respondent could only tick one checkbox regarding the maximum compensation 
amount; if more than one checkbox were ticked, r none of the  responses were 
recorded; 
• a respondent could only tick one checkbox in Questions 11, 12 and 13 (on the 
questionnaire for Banks A1, B1, C1, D1 and D2) and in Questions 10,11 and 12 
(on the questionnaire for Bank A2), if more than one checkbox were ticked,  none 
of  the responses were recorded; 
• a respondent could only tick one checkbox in relation to statements in Question 14 
(on the questionnaire for Banks A1, B1, C1, D1 and D2) and in Question 13 (on 
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the questionnaire for Bank A2), if more than one checkbox were ticked,  none of 
the  responses were recorded; 
• a respondent could only tick one checkbox in Question 15 (on the questionnaire 
for Banks A1, B1, C1, D1 and D2) and in Question 14 (on the questionnaire for 
Bank A2),  if more than one checkbox were ticked,  none of the responses were 
recorded; 
• if a respondent stated  in Question 15 (on the questionnaire for Banks A1, B1, 
C1, D1 and D2) and in Question 14 (on the questionnaire for Bank A2) that they 
heard about the October 2008 changes in the DIS for the first time, they were not 
supposed to tick any of the checkboxes in Question16 (on the questionnaire for 
Banks A1, B1, C1, D1 and D2) and in Question 15 (on the questionnaire for 
Bank A2), if any of the checkboxes from this question were ticked,  none of the 
responses were recorded; and 
• a respondent could only tick one checkbox in Questions 17 and 18 (on the 
questionnaire for Banks A1, B1, C1, D1 and D2) and in Questions 16 and 17 (on 
the questionnaire for Bank A2); if more than one checkbox were ticked,  none of 
the responses were recorded. 
After the data from all valid questionnaires were identified, software combined the 
validated data from different versions of the questionnaire into one big dataset suitable 
for statistical analysis using SPSS. 
Since the data was inputted into an electronic file using bespoke software, it is believed 




Detailed Analysis of Retail Depositors’ Survey Data in 
Disaggregate Form 
 
Findings from Retail Depositors’ Survey in Relation to Objective 1 “To Protect the 
Rights and Legal Interests of Household Depositors” 
Depositors Know About the Parameters of, and the Process of Compensation Under, the 
DIS (Impact Indicator 1.2.1) 
To determine whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the level of 
perceived knowledge about the DIS among retail depositors, and given that the data in 
Question 7 ‘How do you evaluate your knowledge about the deposit insurance scheme?’ is 
ordinal, it is appropriate to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of 
perceived knowledge about the DIS among retail depositors. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is a statistical difference 
between the banks in respect of the level of perceived knowledge about the DIS among 
the retail depositors. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 7 
 How do you evaluate your knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme? 
Chi-Square 21.101 
df 5 
Asymp. Sig. .001 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Bank 
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to the Question 7 (see below), it is possible to rank the banks in the order of a 
number of respondents giving the marks to themselves (from the highest mark to the 
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lowest): 1st – Bank B1, 2nd – Bank A1, 3rd – Bank D1, 4th – Bank A2, 5th – Bank 
D2, 6th – Bank C1. 
Output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 7 
How do you evaluate your 
knowledge of the deposit 
insurance scheme? 
Bank N Mean Rank 
B1 57 574.07 
A1 146 514.95 
D1 68 476.38 
A2 248 450.88 
D2 267 439.86 
C1 142 433.08 
Total 928  
The next question to be tested against the bank as an independent variable is Question 8 
‘What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount?’ To determine whether 
there is a statistical difference between the banks with regards to whether the retail 
depositors know the correct deposit insurance compensation amount or not, the Chi-
squared tests were carried out in relation to the correct response option ‘RUB 700,000’. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the retail 
depositors’ knowledge of the correct amount of the deposit insurance compensation. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and the retail depositors’ knowledge of the correct amount of 
the deposit insurance compensation. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to the retail depositors’ knowledge of the 
correct amount of the deposit insurance compensation 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.402a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 28.108 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.211 1 .137 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.29. 
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To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 8 ‘What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount?’ 
has six response options, including the response option ‘700,000 RUB’, which is the only 
correct answer, and is being tested against the bank as an independent variable in this 
instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: 
‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those 
respondents who did not choose it). Since the amount of deposit insurance compensation 
is one of the parameters of the DIS, it was hoped that respondents would choose the 
original response option in Question 8 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question), 
meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the positive response option for the purposes of 
calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not choosing the original response option in 
Question 8 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question) was not anticipated and, 
therefore, will be considered as a negative response option for the purposes of calculating 
ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 8 ‘What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation 
amount?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 116 
14.62 2 Expected Count 101.2 
A2 Count 153 
-10.26 6 Expected Count 170.5 
B1 Count 49 
26.61 1 Expected Count 38.7 
C1 Count 96 
-0.41 4 Expected Count 96.4 
D1 Count 53 
13.01 3 Expected Count 46.9 
D2 Count 170 
-7.31 5 
Expected Count 183.4 




With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 8 
‘What is the maximum deposit insurance compensation amount?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
45.59 2 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-32.00 6 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
82.90 1 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
-1.29 4 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
40.61 3 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
-22.78 5 Expected Count 270 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank B1 is ranked first and Bank A1 is ranked second, whilst Banks D2 and A2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
 
Considering Question 9 ‘Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit 
insurance compensation?’ contains nominal data, a separate Chi-squared test was carried 
out in relation to the correct response option ‘Deposit Insurance Agency’ to determine 
whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences retail depositors’ knowledge on 
this matter. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way. 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the retail 
depositors’ knowledge of who is responsible for the organisation of deposit insurance 
compensation. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value 0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a relationship 
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between a bank and the retail depositors’ knowledge of who is responsible for the 
organisation of the deposit insurance compensation. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to the retail depositors’ knowledge of who is 
responsible for the organisation of deposit insurance compensation 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.481a 5 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 21.929 5 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association .091 1 .763 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.74. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 9 ‘Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit 
insurance compensation?’ has five response options, including the response option 
‘Deposit Insurance Agency’, which is the only correct answer and is being tested against 
the bank as an independent variable in this instance.680 
The rephrased question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for 
those respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those 
respondents who did not choose it). Since it is important for retail depositors to know 
that the Deposit Insurance Agency is the one responsible for arranging the deposit 
insurance compensation in case of a triggering event, it was hoped that respondents 
would choose the original response option in Question 9 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the 
rephrased question), meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the positive response option for 
the purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not choosing the original response 
option in Question 8 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question) was not anticipated 
and, therefore, will be considered as a negative response option for the purposes of 
calculating ψ values. 
                                               
680 As noted in Section 5.2.1.1 in Chapter 5, some respondents treated this question as a multiple-
response question and 4.6% chose response option ‘Deposit Insurance Agency’ together with 
other response options. This percentage is not considered significant for the purposes of the Chi-
squared test. 
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With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 9 ‘Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit 
insurance compensation?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 87 9.99 3 
Expected Count 79.1 
A2 Count 114 -14.48 6 
Expected Count 133.3 
B1 Count 38 25.41 2 
Expected Count 30.3 
C1 Count 72 -4.51 5 
Expected Count 75.4 
D1 Count 49 33.88 1 
Expected Count 36.6 
D2 Count 138 -3.70 4 
Expected Count 143.3 
Total Count 498   
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 9 
‘Who bears the responsibility for the organisation of deposit insurance compensation?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
21.29 3 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-30.88 6 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
54.25 2 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
-9.61 5 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
72.15 1 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
-7.88 4 Expected Count 270 




From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking Bank D1 is ranked first and Bank B1 is ranked second, whilst Banks C1 and A2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
Depositors Consult the Printed/Online Materials about the DIS (Impact Indicator 1.2.2) 
To understand whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the perception of 
retail depositors with respect to their understanding of where to find additional 
information about the DIS (outside of the bank branch), and considering the data in 
Question 14b ‘I know where to find further information about the deposit insurance 
scheme’ is ordinal, it is necessary to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of retail 
depositors’ agreement with the statement ‘I know where to find further information 
about the deposit insurance scheme’. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.033, which means the result is significant, and there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘I know where to find further information about the deposit insurance scheme’. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 14b 




Asymp. Sig. .033 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test   
b. Grouping Variable: Bank   
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to the Question 14b (see below), it is possible to rank the banks in order 
according to the number of respondents providing positive answers (from the highest to 
the lowest): 1st – Bank B1; 2nd – Bank D1; 3rd – Bank D2; 4th – Bank A1; 5th – Bank 
A2; 6th – Bank C1. 
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Output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 14b 
I know where to find 
further information about 
the deposit insurance 
scheme 
Bank N Mean Rank 
B1 53 376.29 
D1 68 394.36 
D2 253 430.57 
A1 131 435.34 
A2 226 441.36 
C1 142 486.13 
Total 873  
Depositors Have Been Made Aware of the Protection of their rights and Legal Interests 
(Impact Indicator 1.2.4) 
The following test seeks to demonstrate the extent to which the banks influence the 
perception of retail depositors about the protection of their rights and legal interests 
under the DIS. Considering the data in Question 11 ‘Do you feel your rights as depositor 
are more protected following the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ 
is nominal, the Chi-squared test will be used. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the way retail 
depositors feel about the protection of their rights and legal interests. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS shows (see below) the Sig. 
value of 0.003, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and the way retail depositors feel about the protection of their rights and 
legal interests. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to the way retail depositors feel about the 
protection of their rights and legal interests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.446a 10 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 26.425 10 .003 
Linear-by-Linear Association .001 1 .969 
N of Valid Cases 931   
a. 1 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.78. 
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However, the output from the test also mentions that the assumptions of the Chi-squared 
test concerning ‘minimum expected cell frequency’ has been violated, as one cell (5.6%) 
have an expected count of less than five, with the minimum expected count of 4.78. Some 
authors believe it is still possible to use the result of the Chi-squared test if not more than 
20% of cells have an expected count of less than five, and no cell has an expected count of 
less than one (see Chapter 4 for more details). 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The question has three response options: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’. Since one of the 
objectives of the establishing the DIS in Russia was to protect the rights and legal 
interests of depositors, it was hoped that the respondents would answer ‘Yes’ to this 
question, meaning ‘Yes’ is the positive response options for the purposes of calculating 
the ψ value. Reciprocally, ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’ were not anticipated to be chosen by 
respondents and, therefore, will be considered as negative response options for the 
purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks is presented 
below. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in Question 11 ‘Do you feel your rights as depositor are more protected following the 
introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 104 
19.5 1 
Expected Count 87.0 
A2 Count 131 
-10.8 5 
Expected Count 146.8 
B1 Count 37 
9.8 2 
Expected Count 33.7 
C1 Count 74 
-11.9 6 
Expected Count 84.0 
D1 Count 43 
5.4 3 
Expected Count 40.8 
D2 Count 162 
2.1 4 
Expected Count 158.6 




With respect to the overall performance of retail depositors in this question, if the three ψ 
values (one per each response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to 
compile an overall ranking of banks with respect to the performance of retail depositors in 
this question (see below). 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to Question 11 ‘Do you feel 
your rights as depositor are more protected following the introduction of the deposit 
insurance scheme in 2004? 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 147 
93.2 1 
Expected Count 147.0 
A2 Count 248 
-13.3 5 
Expected Count 248.0 
B1 Count 57 
-6.3 4 
Expected Count 57.0 
C1 Count 142 
-77.9 6 
Expected Count 142.0 
D1 Count 69 
12.7 2 
Expected Count 69.0 
D2 Count 268 
1.1 3 
Expected Count 268.0 
Total Count 931   
From these results, it is clear that Bank A1 is ranked first in the positive response option 
as well as overall, with Bank B1 coming in second place for the positive response options 
and Bank D1 coming in second place in the overall ranking for this question. It is 
interesting to note that Banks A2 and C1 are placed fifth and sixth respectively in both 
rankings. 
Bank Informs Depositors About the DIS (Impact Indicator 1.3.6) 
To ascertain whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the retail 
depositors’ knowledge about whether the bank they patronise is a member of the DIS or 
not, and considering the data in the Question 4 ‘Is this bank a member of the deposit 
insurance scheme?’ is nominal, it is appropriate to use the Chi-squared test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to retail depositors’ 
knowledge of whether their bank is a member of the DIS. 
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The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and retail depositors’ knowledge of whether their bank is a 
member of the DIS. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to retail depositors’ knowledge of whether 
their bank is a member of the DIS 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 38.562a 10 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 49.358 10 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.038 1 .025 
N of Valid Cases 760   
a. 4 cells (22.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.56. 
However, the output from the test also mentions that the assumptions of the Chi-squared 
test concerning ‘minimum expected cell frequency’ has been violated, as four cells 
(22.2%) have an expected count of less than five, with the minimum expected count of 
1.56. Some authors believe it is still possible to use the result of the Chi-squared test if 
not more than 20% of cells have an expected count of less than five, and no cell has an 
expected count of less than one (see Chapter 4 for further details). In this situation 
22.2% of cells have an expected count of less than five, but considering the Sig. value is 
<0.001, this can be described as a borderline case, and the result will be taken into 
account in this instance. 
To rank the banks according to their performance in this question, it is necessary to 
calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this question (as 
described in Chapter 4). 
The question has three response options: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’. Since the DIS in 
Russia is compulsory in nature and all banks dealing with the general public, are 
members of the DIS, it was hoped that respondents would answer ‘Yes’ to this question, 
meaning ‘Yes’ is the positive response options for the purposes of calculating the ψ value. 
Reciprocally, ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’ were not anticipated to be chosen by respondents 
and, therefore, will be considered as negative response options for the purposes of 
calculating ψ values. 
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With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks is presented 
below. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in Question 4 ‘Is this bank a member of the deposit insurance scheme?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 115 
15.0 2 
Expected Count 100.0 
A2 Count 154 
-5.5 4 
Expected Count 162.9 
B1 Count 53 
21.6 1 
Expected Count 43.6 
C1 Count 57 
-8.2 6 
Expected Count 62.1 
D1 Count 51 
2.0 3 
Expected Count 50.0 
D2 Count 183 
-5.9 5 
Expected Count 194.4 
Total Count 613 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance of retail depositors in this question, if the three ψ 
values (one per each response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to 
compile an overall ranking of banks. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to Question 4 ‘Is this bank a 
member of the deposit insurance scheme?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 124 
170.9 2 
Expected Count 124.0 
A2 Count 202 
-21.2 4 
Expected Count 202.0 
B1 Count 54 
210.3 1 
Expected Count 54.0 
C1 Count 77 
-78.4 5 
Expected Count 77.0 
D1 Count 62 
94.2 3 
Expected Count 62.0 
D2 Count 241 
-117.0 6 
Expected Count 241.0 
Total Count 760 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that Bank B1 is ranked first in the positive response option 
as well as overall, with Bank A1 coming in second place. It is interesting to see that, 
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whilst Bank C1 was ranked sixth in the positive response option, it improved its overall 
ranking by performing better than Bank D2 in two negative response options, placing 
Bank D2 at the bottom of the list. 
Considering Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ is a multiple-response question and 
contains nominal data, separate Chi-squared tests were carried out in relation to four 
response options: ‘Yes, I read about it on the information stand in the bank's branch 
before opening the savings/current account’, ‘Yes, I received information from the bank 
clerk at the time of opening the savings/current account’ and ‘Yes, I saw information in 
the text of contract at the time of opening the savings/current account’ to determine 
whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences retail depositors’ answers to this 
question. Each of the tests is considered separately below. 
In relation to the first response option ‘Yes, I read about it on the information stand in 
the bank's branch before opening the savings/current account’, the null hypothesis will be 
worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to whether the retail 
depositors read about the DIS on the information stand in the bank’s branch before 
opening the savings/current account. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and the fact that retail depositors read the DIS on the 
information stand in the bank’s branch before opening the savings/current account. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to whether the retail depositors read about 
the DIS on the information stand in the bank’s branch before opening the savings/current 
account 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.718a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 31.968 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.362 1 .067 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.24. 
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To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the DIS when opening 
the savings/current account?’ has four response options, including the response option 
‘Yes, I read about it on the information stand in the bank's branch before opening the 
savings/current account’, which is being tested against the bank as an independent 
variable in this instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of this test) has two 
response options: ‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original response option) 
and ‘No’ (for those respondents who did not choose it). Since banks are responsible for 
the provision of information about the DIS to retail depositors, it was hoped that 
respondents would choose the original response option in a multiple-response Question 6 
(indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question), meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the 
positive response option for the purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not 
choosing the original response option in a multiple-response Question 6 (indicated as ‘No’ 
in the rephrased question) was not anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as a 
negative response option for the purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 77 
45.56 1 Expected Count 52.9 
A2 Count 72 
-19.19 6 Expected Count 89.1 
B1 Count 23 
13.86 3 Expected Count 20.2 
C1 Count 41 
-18.65 5 Expected Count 50.4 
D1 Count 34 
38.78 2 Expected Count 24.5 
D2 Count 86 
-10.32 4 Expected Count 95.9 




With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 6 
‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance scheme when opening the 
savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
70.64 1 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-29.75 6 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
21.47 3 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
-28.91 5 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
60.12 2 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
-16.01 4 Expected Count 270 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank D1 is ranked second, whilst Banks C1 and A2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
 
In relation to the second response option ‘Yes, I received information from the bank clerk 
at the time of opening the savings/current account’, the null hypothesis will be worded in 
the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to whether the retail 
depositors received information about the DIS from the bank clerks at the time of 
opening the savings/current account. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.005, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and the fact that the retail depositors received information about the DIS 
from the bank clerks at the time of opening the savings/current account. 
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Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to whether the retail depositors received 
information about the DIS from the bank clerks at the time of opening the savings/current 
account 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.798a 5 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 16.866 5 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association .217 1 .642 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.61. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ has four response options, including 
the response option ‘Yes, I received information from the bank clerk at the time of 
opening the savings/current account’, which is being tested against the bank as an 
independent variable in this instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of this 
test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original 
response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who did not choose it). Since banks are 
responsible for the provision of information about the DIS to retail depositors, it was 
hoped that respondents would choose the original response option in a multiple-response 
Question 6 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question), meaning the response option 
‘Yes’ is the positive response option for the purposes of calculating the ψ value. 
Reciprocally, not choosing the original response option in a multiple-response Question 6 
(indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question) was not anticipated and, therefore, will be 
considered as a negative response option for the purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 




Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 79 
22.86 1 Expected Count 64.3 
A2 Count 90 
-16.97 6 Expected Count 108.4 
B1 Count 27 
9.76 3 Expected Count 24.6 
C1 Count 51 
-16.80 5 Expected Count 61.3 
D1 Count 30 
0.67 4 Expected Count 29.8 
D2 Count 128 
9.78 2 Expected Count 116.6 
Total Count 405 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 6 
‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance scheme when opening the 
savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
40.22 1 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-29.88 6 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
17.16 3 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
-29.57 5 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
1.18 4 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
17.21 2 Expected Count 270 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank D2 is ranked second, whilst Banks C1 and A2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
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In relation to the third response option ‘Yes, I saw information in the text of contract at 
the time of opening the savings/current account’, the null hypothesis will be worded in 
the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to whether the retail 
depositors saw the information about the DIS in the text of contract at the time of 
opening the savings/current account. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.002, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and the fact that the retail depositors saw the information about the DIS 
in the text of contract at the time of opening the savings/current account. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to whether the retail depositors saw the 
information about the DIS in the text of contract at the time of opening the 
savings/current account 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.548a 5 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 20.913 5 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.162 1 .281 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.44. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the DIS when opening 
the savings/current account?’ has four response options, including the response option 
‘Yes, I saw information in the text of contract at the time of opening the savings/current 
account’, which is being tested against the bank as an independent variable in this 
instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: 
‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those 
respondents who did not choose it). Since banks are responsible for the provision of 
information about the DIS to retail depositors, it was hoped that respondents would 
choose the original response option in a multiple-response Question 6 (indicated as ‘Yes’ 
in the rephrased question), meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the positive response 
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option for the purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not choosing the original 
response option in a multiple-response Question 6 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased 
question) was not anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as a negative response 
option for the purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 22 
30.95 3 Expected Count 16.8 
A2 Count 12 
-57.75 6 Expected Count 28.4 
B1 Count 12 
87.50 1 Expected Count 6.4 
C1 Count 16 
0.00 5 Expected Count 16 
D1 Count 11 
41.03 2 Expected Count 7.8 
D2 Count 33 
8.20 4 Expected Count 30.5 
Total Count 106 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank B1 is ranked first and Bank D1 is ranked second, whilst Banks C1 and A2 




Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 6 
‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance scheme when opening the 
savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
34.89 3 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-65.11 6 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
98.57 1 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
0.00 5 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
46.25 2 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
9.24 4 Expected Count 270 
Total Count 938 
 
 
In relation to the fourth response option ‘No, I have not received such information from 
this bank’, the null hypothesis will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to whether the retail 
depositors did not receive information about the DIS from the bank. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and the fact whether the retail depositors did not receive the 
information about the DIS from the bank they patronise. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to whether the retail depositors did not 
receive information about the DIS from the bank 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 27.081a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 30.664 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.900 1 .048 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.92. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
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The original Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ has four response options, including 
the response option ‘No, I have not received such information from this bank’, which is 
being tested against the bank as an independent variable in this instance. The rephrased 
question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those 
respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who 
did not choose it). Since banks are responsible for the provision of information about the 
DIS to retail depositors, it was hoped that respondents would not choose the original 
response option in a multiple-response Question 6 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased 
question), meaning the response option ‘No’ is the positive response option for the 
purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, choosing the original response option in 
a multiple-response Question 6 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question) was not 
anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as a negative response option for the 
purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘No’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘No’ 
in rephrased Question 6 ‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance 
scheme when opening the savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 146 
7.27 1 Expected Count 136.1 
A2 Count 219 
-4.49 5 Expected Count 229.3 
B1 Count 55 
5.57 2 Expected Count 52.1 
C1 Count 136 
4.86 3 Expected Count 129.7 
D1 Count 66 
4.76 4 Expected Count 63 
D2 Count 235 
-4.74 6 Expected Count 246.7 




With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 6 
‘Were you informed by this bank about the deposit insurance scheme when opening the 
savings/current account?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
84.02 1 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-51.96 5 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
64.75 2 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
56.08 3 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
54.76 4 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
-54.96 6 Expected Count 270 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank B1 is ranked second, whilst Banks A2 and D2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
 
In order to ascertain whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the 
perception of retail depositors with respect to receiving sufficient information about the 
DIS from the bank they patronise, and considering the data in Question 14a ‘I receive 
sufficient information about the deposit insurance scheme from this bank’ is ordinal, it is 
appropriate to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of 
agreement with the statement ‘I receive sufficient information about the deposit 
insurance scheme from this bank’. 
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The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.521, which means the result is not significant, and there is, indeed, no 
statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of agreement with the 
statement ‘I receive sufficient information about the deposit insurance scheme from this 
bank’. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 14a 




Asymp. Sig. .521 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test   
b. Grouping Variable: Bank   
In relation to Question 16 ‘How did you hear about the changes?’ which was aimed at 
gathering data as to the sources of information about the changes in the parameters of 
the DIS, which took place in October 2008, the response option ‘In the bank’s branch’ 
presents the most interest, considering that banks are obliged to provide information 
about the DIS to retail depositors. 
In order to establish whether there is a statistical difference between banks with respect 
to retail depositors’ answers in this instance, and considering the data in this question is 
nominal, it is necessary to use the Chi-squared. 
In relation to response option ‘In the bank’s branch’, the null hypothesis will be worded in 
the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the retail 
depositors’ being informed by the bank they patronise about the changes in the 
parameters of the DIS, which were introduced in October 2008. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value 0.013, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and whether the retail depositors were informed by the bank they 
patronise about the changes in the parameters of the DIS, which were introduced in 
October 2008. 
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Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to the retail depositors’ being informed by 
the bank they patronise about the changes in the parameters of the DIS, which were 
introduced in October 2008 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.402a 5 .013 
Likelihood Ratio 14.335 5 .014 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.318 1 .251 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.57. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original multiple-response Question 16 ‘How did you hear about the changes?’ has 
seven response options, including the response option ‘In the bank’s branch’, which is 
being tested against the bank as an independent variable in this instance. The rephrased 
question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those 
respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who 
did not choose it). Since there is an obligation on banks’ side to inform retail depositors 
about the DIS and the changes thereof, it was hoped that respondents would choose the 
original response option in a multiple-response Question 16 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the 
rephrased question), meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the positive response option for 
the purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not choosing the original response 
option in a multiple response Question 16 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question) 
was not anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as negative response options for the 








With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in Question 16 ‘How did you hear about the changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 66 
29.03 1 Expected Count 51.1 
A2 Count 75 
-12.96 4 Expected Count 86.2 
B1 Count 17 
-13.12 5 Expected Count 19.6 
C1 Count 57 
16.93 2 Expected Count 48.7 
D1 Count 17 
-28.23 6 Expected Count 23.7 
D2 Count 90 
-2.90 3 Expected Count 92.7 
Total Count 322 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to Question 16 ‘How did you 
hear about the changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
44.21 1 Expected Count 149.0 
A2 Count 251 
-19.73 4 Expected Count 251.0 
B1 Count 57 
-19.98 5 Expected Count 57.0 
C1 Count 142 
25.78 2 Expected Count 142.0 
D1 Count 69 
-42.99 6 Expected Count 69.0 
D2 Count 270 
-4.41 3 Expected Count 270.0 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank C1 is ranked second, whilst Banks B1 and D1 
are ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
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Findings from Retail Depositors’ Survey in Relation to Objective 2 “To Strengthen 
Public Confidence in the Banking System” 
Depositors Believe Their Money Is Safe With the Bank Where their Account is Held 
(Impact Indicator 2.1.1) 
To identify whether the level of perceived confidence of retail depositors in the safety of 
their money is influenced by the bank they deposit their money with, and considering the 
data in Question 5 ‘How confident are you in the safety of your money in this bank?’ is 
ordinal, it is appropriate to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of retail 
depositors’ confidence in the safety of their money in the bank. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.195, which means the result is not significant, and there is, indeed, no 
statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ 
confidence in the safety of their money in the bank. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 5 
 How confident are you in the safety of your money in this bank? 
Chi-Square 6.049 
df 4 
Asymp. Sig. .195 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Bank 
Depositors Are Confident in the Banking System (Impact Indicator 2.1.2) 
The next question to be tested against the bank as an independent variable is Question 12 
‘How did your level of confidence in banking system change following the introduction of 
the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ To determine whether there is a statistical 
difference between the banks with regard to their retail depositors’ level of confidence in 
the banking system following the introduction of the DIS in 2004, and considering the 
data in this question is ordinal, it is appropriate to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
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There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the change in the 
level of confidence following the introduction of the DIS in 2004. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.004, which means the result is significant, and there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the change in the level of confidence following the 
introduction of the DIS in 2004. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 12 
 How did your level of confidence in banking system change following the 
introduction of the deposit insurance scheme? 
Chi-Square 17.278 
df 5 
Asymp. Sig. .004 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Bank 
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to Question 12 (see below), it is possible to rank the banks in the order of the 
change in level of confidence in banking system (from ‘increased’ to ‘decreased’): 1st – 
Bank A1; 2nd – Bank B1; 3rd – Bank D1; 4th – Bank D2; 5th – Bank A2; 6th – Bank 
C1. 
Output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 12 
How did your level of 
confidence in banking 
system change following 
the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme? 
Bank N Mean Rank 
A1 146 402.20 
B1 56 436.28 
D1 69 443.04 
D2 267 465.51 
A2 244 485.78 
C1 142 498.63 
Total 924  
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the retail 
depositors’ perception of the influence the introduction of the deposit insurance had on the 
change in the level of their confidence in the banking system, and considering the data in 
Question 14d ‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent 
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influenced a change in my confidence in the banking system’ is ordinal, it is appropriate to 
use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of 
agreement with the statement ‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a 
large extent influenced a change in my confidence in the banking system’. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is a statistical 
difference between the banks with respect to the level of agreement with the statement 
‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent influenced a change in 
my confidence in the banking system’. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 14d 
 The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent 
influenced a change in my confidence in the banking system 
Chi-Square 24.566 
df 5 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test   
b. Grouping Variable: Bank   
Output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 14d 
The introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme 
to a large extent 
influenced a change in my 
confidence in the banking 
system 
Bank N Mean Rank 
A1 135 376.26 
B1 53 379.60 
A2 224 424.18 
D1 68 429.25 
D2 247 446.93 
C1 139 502.88 
Total 866  
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to Question 14d (see above), it is possible to rank the banks in order of the 
number of respondents providing positive answers (from the highest to the lowest): 1st – 
 470 
Bank A1; 2nd – Bank B1; 3rd – Bank A2; 4th – Bank D1; 5th – Bank D2; 6th – Bank 
C1. 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the perception of 
retail depositors with respect to their perceived change in the level of confidence in the 
banking system since the latest changes in the parameters of the DIS took place in 
October 2008, and considering the data in Question 18 ‘Has your level of confidence in 
the banking system changed since October 2008?’ is ordinal, it is appropriate to use the 
Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the change in the 
level of retail depositors’ confidence since October 2008. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is a statistical 
difference between the banks with respect to the change in the level of retail depositors’ 
confidence since October 2008. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 18 




Asymp. Sig. .000 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test   
b. Grouping Variable: Bank   
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to Question 18 (see below), it is possible to rank the banks in order of the change 
of level of confidence in banking system (from ‘increased’ to ‘decreased’): 1st – Bank A1; 




Output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 18 
Has your level of 
confidence in the banking 
system changed since 
October 2008? 
Bank N Mean Rank 
A1 139 370.55 
B1 57 443.94 
A2 243 456.03 
D1 68 457.94 
C1 141 465.39 
D2 265 501.34 
Total 913  
Depositors Recommend Savings Accounts to Their Family and Friends (Impact Indicator 
2.1.3) 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the perception of 
retail depositors with respect to whether they recommend to their families and friends to 
keep money in savings account or not, and considering the data in Question 14e ‘I 
recommend to family and friends to place their money in savings accounts’ is ordinal, it is 
appropriate to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of retail 
depositors’ agreement with the statement ‘I recommend to family and friends to place 
their money in savings accounts’. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.244, which means the result is not significant, and there is, indeed, no 
statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ 
agreement with the statement ‘I recommend to family and friends to place their money in 
savings accounts’. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 14e 
 I recommend to family and friends to place their money in savings accounts 
Chi-Square 6.693 
df 5 
Asymp. Sig. .244 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test   
b. Grouping Variable: Bank   
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Findings from Retail Depositors’ Survey in Relation To Objective 3 “To Encourage 
Household Savings in the Banking System of the Russian Federation” 
Public Opens More Saving Accounts as the Changes in the Parameters of the DIS Are 
Implemented (Impact Indicator 3.1.2) 
Considering Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
is a multiple-response question and contains nominal data, separate Chi-squared tests 
were carried out in relation to the response option ‘I have increased/plan to increase the 
value of my savings account in this bank’, the response option ‘I have opened/plan to 
open a new savings account in another bank’ and the response option ‘I do not plan to do 
either of the above’ to determine whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences 
retail depositors’ willingness to act in the face of changing the parameters of the DIS. 
Each of the tests is considered separately below. 
In relation to the first response option ‘I have increased/plan to increase the value of my 
savings account in this bank’, the null hypothesis will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to retail depositors’ 
willingness to increase the value of the savings accounts in the bank they patronise. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and a retail depositors’ willingness to increase the value of 
their savings accounts in the bank they patronise. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to retail depositors’ willingness to increase 
the value of the savings accounts in the bank they patronise 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 40.003a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 38.029 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.275 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.86. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
 473 
The original Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
has three response options, including the response option ‘I have increased/plan to 
increase the value of my savings account in this bank’, which is being tested against the 
bank as an independent variable in this instance. The rephrased question (for the 
purposes of this test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose 
the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who did not choose it). 
Since one of the objectives of the establishing the DIS in Russia was to encourage 
household savings, it was hoped that respondents would choose the original response 
option in a multiple-response Question 17 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question), 
meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the positive response option for the purposes of 
calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not choosing the original response option in a 
multiple-response Question 17 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question) was not 
anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as a negative response option for the 
purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 67 
61.45 1 Expected Count 41.5 
A2 Count 56 
-19.77 5 Expected Count 69.8 
B1 Count 25 
57.23 2 Expected Count 15.9 
C1 Count 40 
1.27 3 Expected Count 39.5 
D1 Count 17 
-11.46 4 Expected Count 19.2 
D2 Count 56 
-25.43 6 Count 261 
Total Expected Count 261.0 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
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Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 17 
‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
85.17 1 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-27.39 5 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
79.37 2 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
1.75 3 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
-15.88 4 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
-35.23 6 Expected Count 270 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank B1 is ranked second, whilst Banks A2 and D2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
 
In relation to the second response option ‘I have opened/plan to open a new savings 
account in another bank’, the null hypothesis will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to retail depositors’ 
willingness to open a new savings accounts in another bank. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.009, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a relationship 
between a bank and a retail depositors’ willingness to open a new savings account in 
another bank. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to retail depositors’ willingness to open new 
savings accounts in another bank 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.236a 5 .009 
Likelihood Ratio 14.266 5 .014 
Linear-by-Linear Association .705 1 .401 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.29. 
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To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes’ 
has three response options, including the response option ‘I have opened/plan to open a 
new savings account in another bank’, which is being tested against the bank as an 
independent variable in this instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of this 
test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original 
response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who did not choose it). Since one of the 
objectives of the establishing the DIS in Russia was to encourage household savings, it 
was hoped that respondents would choose the original response option in a multiple-
response Question 17 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question), meaning the 
response option ‘Yes’ is the positive response option for the purposes of calculating the ψ 
value. Reciprocally, not choosing the original response option in a multiple-response 
Question 17 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question) was not anticipated and, 
therefore, will be considered as a negative response option for the purposes of calculating 
ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in rephrased Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 17 
23.19 3 Expected Count 13.8 
A2 Count 16 
-31.33 6 Expected Count 23.3 
B1 Count 9 
69.81 1 Expected Count 5.3 
C1 Count 22 
66.67 2 Expected Count 13.2 
D1 Count 5 
-21.88 4 Expected Count 6.4 
D2 Count 18 
-28.00 5 Expected Count 25 




With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 17 
‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 17 
25.56 3 Expected Count 13.8 
A2 Count 16 
-34.54 6 Expected Count 23.3 
B1 Count 9 
76.97 1 Expected Count 5.3 
C1 Count 22 
73.50 2 Expected Count 13.2 
D1 Count 5 
-24.11 4 Expected Count 6.4 
D2 Count 18 
-30.86 5 Expected Count 25 
Total Count 87 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank B1 is ranked first and Bank C1 is ranked second, whilst Banks D2 and A2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
 
In relation to the third response option ‘I do not plan to do anything from the above’, the 
null hypothesis will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to retail depositors’ 
not willing to either increase the value of their savings accounts or to open a new 
savings accounts in another bank. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and the fact that the retail depositors did not plan either to 
increase the value of their savings accounts, or to open a new savings accounts in another 
bank. 
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Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to retail depositors’ not willing to either 
increase the value of their savings accounts or to open a new savings accounts in another 
bank 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 55.669a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 54.726 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.793 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.69. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
has three response options, including the response option ‘I do not plan to do anything 
from the above’, which is being tested against the bank as an independent variable in this 
instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: 
‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those 
respondents who did not choose it). Since one of the objectives of the establishing the 
DIS in Russia was to encourage household savings, it was hoped that respondents would 
not choose the original response option in a multiple-response Question 17 (indicated as 
‘No’ in the rephrased question), meaning the response option ‘No’ is the positive response 
option for the purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, choosing the original 
response option in a multiple-response Question 17 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased 
question) was not anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as a negative response 







With respect to the positive response option ‘No’, the ranking of banks (from the best 
performing to the worst performing) is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘No’ 
in rephrased Question 17 ‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 90 
58.73 1 Expected Count 56.7 
A2 Count 79 
-17.28 4 Expected Count 95.5 
B1 Count 32 
47.47 2 Expected Count 21.7 
C1 Count 57 
5.56 3 Expected Count 54 
D1 Count 21 
-20.15 5 Expected Count 26.3 
D2 Count 78 
-24.12 6 Expected Count 102.8 
Total Count 357 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the rephrased Question 17 
‘How have you reacted/do you plan to react to these changes?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
94.81 1 Expected Count 149 
A2 Count 251 
-27.89 4 Expected Count 251 
B1 Count 57 
76.64 2 Expected Count 57 
C1 Count 142 
8.96 3 Expected Count 142 
D1 Count 69 
-32.56 5 Expected Count 69 
D2 Count 270 
-38.96 6 Expected Count 270 




From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank B1 is ranked second, whilst Banks A2 and D2 
ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
Depositors Save More Through Bank Deposits (Impact Indicator 3.1.3) 
The following question (Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour change following 
the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’) has the nominal data, so in 
order to determine whether the retail depositors’ change in saving behaviour was 
influenced by the bank they patronise, it is appropriate to use the Chi-squared test. 
As only two response options are of interest in this instance, two separate Chi-squared 
tests were carried out in relation to the response option ‘I increased the value of savings 
account in connection with the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme’ and the 
response option ‘My saving behaviour remained unchanged’. Each of the tests is 
considered separately below. 
In relation to the response option ‘I increased the value of savings account in connection 
with the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme’, the null hypothesis will be worded 
in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the increase of the 
value of savings accounts by retail depositors in connection with the introduction of the 
DIS. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 
relationship between a bank and an increased value of savings accounts by retail 
depositors in connection with the introduction of the DIS. 
Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to the increase of the value of savings 
accounts by retail depositors in connection with the introduction of the DIS 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 43.729a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 41.774 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.368 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.13. 
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To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour change following the 
introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ has four response options, 
including the response option ‘I increased the value of savings account in connection with 
the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme’, which is being tested against the bank 
as an independent variable in this instance. The rephrased question (for the purposes of 
this test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those respondents who chose the original 
response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who did not choose it). Since one of the 
objectives of the establishing the DIS in Russia was to encourage household savings, it 
was hoped that respondents would choose the original response option in Question 13 
(indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question), meaning the response option ‘Yes’ is the 
positive response option for the purposes of calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, not 
choosing the original response options in Question 13 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased 
question) was not anticipated and, therefore, will be considered as a negative response 
options for the purposes of calculating ψ values. 
With respect to the positive response option ‘Yes’, the ranking of banks is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘Yes’ 
in Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour change following the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 60 
74.87 1 Expected Count 34.3 
A2 Count 43 
-25.60 5 Expected Count 57.8 
B1 Count 19 
44.75 2 Expected Count 13.1 
C1 Count 38 
16.21 3 Expected Count 32.7 
D1 Count 8 
-49.65 6 Expected Count 15.9 
D2 Count 48 
-22.80 4 Expected Count 62.2 




With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each banks are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall 
ranking of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to Question 13 ‘How did 
your saving behaviour change following the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme 
in 2004?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
97.27 1 Expected Count 149.0 
A2 Count 251 
-33.27 5 Expected Count 251.0 
B1 Count 57 
58.14 2 Expected Count 57.0 
C1 Count 142 
21.06 3 Expected Count 142.0 
D1 Count 69 
-64.51 6 Expected Count 69.0 
D2 Count 270 
-29.62 4 Expected Count 270.0 
Total Count 938 
 
 
From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank B1 is ranked second, whilst Banks A2 and D1 
are ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
 
In relation to the response option ‘My saving behaviour remained unchanged’, the null 
hypothesis will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the saving 
behaviour of retail depositors remaining unchanged. 
The output from the Chi-squared test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of <0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is, indeed, a 




Output from the Chi-squared test with respect to the saving behaviour of retail depositors 
remaining unchanged 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 42.786a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 42.641 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 18.914 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 938   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.25. 
To rank the banks according to the performance of their retail depositors in this question, 
it is necessary to calculate ψ values for each bank for each of the response options in this 
question (as described in Chapter 4). 
The original Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour change following the 
introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ has four response options, 
including the response option ‘My saving behaviour remained unchanged’, which is being 
tested against the bank as an independent variable in this instance. The rephrased 
question (for the purposes of this test) has two response options: ‘Yes’ (for those 
respondents who chose the original response option) and ‘No’ (for those respondents who 
did not choose it). Since one of the objectives of the establishing the DIS in Russia was to 
encourage household savings, it was hoped that respondents would not choose the 
original response option in Question 13 (indicated as ‘No’ in the rephrased question), 
meaning the response option ‘No’ is the positive response option for the purposes of 
calculating the ψ value. Reciprocally, choosing the original response options in Question 
13 (indicated as ‘Yes’ in the rephrased question) was not anticipated and, therefore, will 








With respect to the positive response option ‘No’, the ranking of banks is as follows. 
Ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to the positive response option ‘No’ 
in Question 13 ‘How did your saving behaviour change following the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme in 2004?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Ranking 
A1 Count 95 
49.89 1 Expected Count 63.4 
A2 Count 96 
-10.09 4 Expected Count 106.8 
B1 Count 32 
31.98 2 Expected Count 24.2 
C1 Count 58 
-3.98 3 Expected Count 60.4 
D1 Count 21 
-28.45 6 Expected Count 29.4 
D2 Count 97 
-15.54 5 Expected Count 114.9 
Total Count 399 
 
 
With respect to the overall performance in this question, if the two ψ values (one per each 
response option) for each bank are summed up, it is possible to compile an overall ranking 
of banks in this question. 
Overall ranking of banks based on their ψ values in relation to Question 13 ‘How did 
your saving behaviour change following the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme 
in 2004?’ 
Bank Count N ψ value Overall Ranking 
A1 Count 149 
86.82 1 Expected Count 149.0 
A2 Count 251 
-17.55 4 Expected Count 251.0 
B1 Count 57 
55.65 2 Expected Count 57.0 
C1 Count 142 
-6.92 3 Expected Count 142.0 
D1 Count 69 
-49.51 6 Expected Count 69.0 
D2 Count 270 
-27.05 5 Expected Count 270.0 




From these results, it is clear that in both the positive response option and in the overall 
ranking, Bank A1 is ranked first and Bank B1 is ranked second, whilst Banks D2 and D1 
are ranked fifth and sixth respectively. 
To establish whether the bank, as an independent variable, influences the retail 
depositors’ perception of the influence the introduction of the deposit insurance had on the 
change in the saving behaviour, and considering the data in Question 14c ‘The 
introduction of the DIS to a large extent influenced a change in my saving behaviour’ is 
ordinal, it is appropriate to use the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The null hypothesis in this instance will be worded in the following way: 
There is no statistical difference between the banks with respect to the level of retail 
depositors’ agreement with the statement ‘The introduction of the deposit insurance 
scheme to a large extent influenced a change in my saving behaviour’. 
The output from the Kruskal-Wallis test computed in SPSS (see below) shows the Sig. 
value of 0.001, which means the result is significant, and there is a statistical difference 
between the banks with respect to the level of retail depositors’ agreement with the 
statement ‘The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent influenced a 
change in my saving behaviour’. 
Test Statisticsa,b with respect to the Question 14c 
 The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme to a large extent 
influenced a change in my saving behaviour 
Chi-Square 21.943 
df 5 
Asymp. Sig. .001 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test   
b. Grouping Variable: Bank   
According to the ranks provided as part of the output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with 
respect to Question 14c (see below), it is possible to rank the banks in the order of a 
number of respondents providing positive answers (from the highest to the lowest): 1st – 
Bank A1; 2nd – Bank B1; 3rd – Bank D1; 4th – Bank D2; 5th – Bank A2; 6th – Bank 
C1. 
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Output from the Kruskal-Wallis test with respect to the Question 14c 
The introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme 
to a large extent 
influenced a change in my 
saving behaviour 
Bank N Mean Rank 
A1 134 367.46 
B1 53 373.52 
D1 68 426.88 
D2 245 435.53 
A2 223 442.93 
C1 138 489.49 




Interview Schedule (List of Questions) for Bank Clerks 
 
1. Как долго Вы работаете на этой должности? 
2. Какие должности и где Вы занимали до того, как перешли на эту работу? 
3. Что входит в Ваши обязанности на работе? 
4. Пожалуйста, объясните в нескольких предложениях, как работает система 
страхования вкладов? 
5. Каковы цели системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Читали ли Вы федеральный закон о системе страхования вкладов? 
6. Пожалуйста, опишите процесс (стадии) открытия банковского вклада/счета?  
7. Говорите ли Вы клиентам о системе страхования вкладов при открытии 
банковского вклада/счета? 
a. На какой стадии? 
b. Почему? 
c. Какой должна быть сумма вклада/счета, чтобы Вы решили рассказать о 
системе страхования вкладов поподробнее? 
8. Подумайте о 10 обычных клиентах – сколько из них действительно читают текст 
договора об открытии вклада/счета перед подписанием? 
a. Какими должны быть условия, чтобы клиенты все-таки прочитали текст 
договора? 
9. Из этих же 10 обычных клиентов, сколько из них попросят дать более подробную 
информацию о системе страхования вкладов? 
a. Что их больше всего интересует (какие аспекты системы страхования 
вкладов)? 
b. Наблюдаете ли Вы какие-либо особенности (с точки зрения возраста, 
социального положения и др.) тех, кто спрашивает? 
10. Какую информацию о системе страхования вкладов Вы предоставляете клиентам? 
a. Каким образом Вы информируете клиентов об изменениях в системе 
страхования вкладов? 
b. Вы лично знакомы с рекомендациями Агентства по страхованию вкладов 
«О порядке информирования банками вкладчиков по вопросам страхования 
вкладов»? 
11. В какой форме Вы доводите эту информацию до сведения клиентов 
(устно/письменно)? 
12. Вы лично, каким образом получаете информацию об изменениях в системе 
страхования вкладов? 
13. По Вашему мнению, вкладчики (клиенты) хорошо ознакомлены с параметрами и 
порядком работы системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Почему Вы так считаете? 
b. Можете ли Вы привести какие-либо примеры? 
14. Клиенты спрашивают Вас о системе страхования вкладов? 
15. Что Вы сделаете, если клиент спросит вопрос о системе страхования вкладов, 
ответ на который Вы не знаете? 
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16. Изменились ли восприятие системы страхования вкладов среди Ваших клиентов в 
связи с финансовым кризисом? 
a. Да – в каком плане? 
b. Почему Вы так считаете? 
17. Каким образом Вы бы изменили распространение информации о системе 
страхования вкладов? 
18. Каким образом повлияло на Ваших клиентов введение системы страхования 
вкладов? 
a. На их поведение по отношению к сбережениям? 
b. Почему Вы так думаете? 
c. Можете ли Вы привести какие-либо примеры? 
19. Если бы Вы могли одним словом выразить ту пользу, которую принесла система 
страхования вкладов вкладчикам в целом (не только в вашем банке), – какое это 





Interview Schedule (List of Questions) for Heads of Branch 
 
1. Как долго Вы работаете на этой должности? 
2. Какие должности и где Вы занимали до того, как перешли на эту работу? 
3. Что входит в Ваши обязанности на работе? 
4. Каковы цели системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Читали ли Вы федеральный закон о системе страхования вкладов? 
5. Какие методы Вы используете для привлечения новых клиентов? 
a. Вы используете факт своего членства в системе страхования вкладов? 
6. Какие методы Вы используете с целью увеличения сумм вкладов уже имеющихся 
клиентов? 
a. Вы используете факт своего членства в системе страхования вкладов? 
7. Пожалуйста, расскажите каким образом Ваш банк использует факт своего 
членства в системе страхования вкладов? 
8. Были ли какие-либо изменения в структуре вкладов с момента вступления в 
систему страхования вкладов? (Например, увеличение количества открытых 
банковских вкладов, увеличение сумм вкладов и др.) 
9. Какую информацию о системе страхования вкладов Вы предоставляете клиентам? 
a. Каким образом Ваш банк проинформировал своих клиентов о вступлении в 
систему страхования вкладов? 
b. Вы лично знакомы с рекомендациями Агентства по страхованию вкладов 
«О порядке информирования банками вкладчиков по вопросам страхования 
вкладов»? 
10. В какой форме Вы доводите эту информацию до сведения клиентов 
(устно/письменно)? 
a. Можно мне будет получить копию (если «письменно»)? 
11. По Вашему мнению, что является для клиентов решающим фактором при выборе 
именно Вашего банка для открытия банковского вклада/счета? 
a. По Вашему мнению, членство Вашего банка в системе страхования вкладов 
сыграло какую-либо роль в решении клиентов открыть банковский 
вклад/счет именно в Вашем банке? 
i. Какую роль? 
12. Кто является ответственным за предоставление/распространение информации о 
системе страхования вкладов в Вашем банке? 
13. Вы лично, каким образом получаете информацию об изменениях в системе 
страхования вкладов? 
14. Когда вносятся изменения в систему страхования вкладов, каким образом Вы 
информируете клиентов об этом? 
15. По Вашему мнению, вкладчики (клиенты) хорошо ознакомлены с параметрами и 
порядком работы системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Почему Вы так считаете? 
b. Можете ли Вы привести какие-либо примеры? 
16. Клиенты спрашивают Вас о системе страхования вкладов? 
17. В обычном календарном месяце, сколько вкладчиков попросят дать более 
подробную информацию о системе страхования вкладов? 
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a. Что их больше всего интересует (какие аспекты системы страхования 
вкладов)? 
b. Наблюдаете ли Вы какие-либо особенности (с точки зрения возраста, 
социального положения и др.) тех, кто спрашивает? 
18. Считаете ли Вы, что система страхования вкладов защищает права и интересы 
вкладчиков? 
a. Какие подтверждения есть у вас в поддержку Вашего мнения? Вы можете 
привести какие-либо примеры? 
b. По Вашему мнению, вкладчики знают больше о своих правах сейчас, чем до 
введения системы страхования вкладов? 
19. Что Вы можете сказать об уровне финансовой грамотности россиян в целом и 
клиентов Вашего банка в частности? 
a. Есть ли какие-либо различия и почему? 
20. Какую бы оценку Вы поставили вкладчикам  за знание о системе страхования 
вкладов (от 1 «единица» до 5 «отлично»)? 
a. Не могли бы Вы объяснить, почему Вы так думаете? У Вас есть какое-либо 
подтверждение этого? 
21. В Вашем банке существуют специальные правила по обслуживанию VIP-
клиентов? 
a. В чем существенное отличие в обслуживании таких клиентов – можно ли 
просмотреть внутренние инструкции? 
b. Есть ли какое-либо отличие в предоставлении информации о системе 
страхования вкладов VIP-клиентам, по сравнению с обычными клиентами? 
22. Каким образом, по Вашему мнению, изменилось поведение населения по 
отношению к сбережениям после введения системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Считаете ли Вы, что есть какая-либо взаимозависимость между 
изменениями поведения вкладчиков по отношению к сбережениям и 
введением системы страхования вкладов?  
i. Да – Есть ли у Вас какие-либо подтверждения в поддержку этого? 
ii. По Вашему мнению, это произошло только из-за работы системы 
страхования вкладов, или по какой-либо другой причине? 
23. Каким образом, по Вашему мнению, изменилось доверие населения к банковской 
системе в целом после введения системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Считаете ли Вы, что есть какая-либо взаимозависимость между 
изменениями доверия вкладчиков к банковской системе и введением 
системы страхования вкладов? 
i. Есть ли у Вас какие-либо подтверждения в поддержку этого? 
ii. Нет – почему? 
24. Изменились ли восприятие системы страхования вкладов среди Ваших клиентов в 
связи с финансовым кризисом? 
a. Да – в каком плане? 
b. Почему Вы так считаете? 
25. Считаете ли Вы, что система страхования вкладов уже достигла или достигнет 
целей, для которых она была создана? 
a. На основании чего Вы так считаете? 
b. Приведите примеры, пожалуйста? 
26. По Вашему мнению, каковы пути изменения (улучшения) системы страхования 
вкладов? 
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a. Каким образом Вы бы изменили распространение информации о системе 
страхования вкладов? 
27. По Вашему мнению, размер страхового возмещения в 700 000 рублей является 
обоснованным? Эта сумма соответствует потребностям Ваших клиентов? 
28. В общем и целом, какую пользу принесла система страхования вкладов Вашему 




Interview Schedule (List of Questions) for Marketing Staff 
 
1. Как долго Вы работаете на этой должности? 
2. Какие должности и где Вы занимали до того, как перешли на эту работу? 
3. Что входит в Ваши обязанности на работе? 
4. Каковы цели системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Читали ли Вы федеральный закон о системе страхования вкладов? 
5. Какие методы Вы используете для привлечения новых клиентов? 
a. Вы используете факт своего членства в системе страхования вкладов? 
6. Какие методы Вы используете с целью увеличения сумм вкладов уже имеющихся 
клиентов? 
a. Вы используете факт своего членства в системе страхования вкладов? 
7. Пожалуйста, расскажите, каким образом Ваш банк использует факт своего 
членства в системе страхования вкладов? 
8. Были ли какие-либо изменения в структуре вкладов с момента вступления в 
систему страхования вкладов? (Например, увеличение количества открытых 
банковских вкладов, увеличение сумм вкладов и др.) 
9. Какую информацию о системе страхования вкладов Вы предоставляете клиентам? 
a. Каким образом Ваш банк проинформировал своих клиентов о вступлении в 
систему страхования вкладов? 
b. Вы лично знакомы с рекомендациями Агентства по страхованию вкладов 
«О порядке информирования банками вкладчиков по вопросам страхования 
вкладов»? 
10. В какой форме Вы доводите эту информацию до сведения клиентов 
(устно/письменно)? 
a. Можно мне будет получить копию (если «письменно»)? 
11. По Вашему мнению, что является для клиентов решающим фактором при выборе 
именно Вашего банка для открытия банковского вклада/счета? 
a. По Вашему мнению, членство Вашего банка в системе страхования вкладов 
сыграло какую-либо роль в решении клиентов открыть банковский 
вклад/счет именно в Вашем банке? 
i. Какую роль? 
12. Кто является ответственным за предоставление/распространение информации о 
системе страхования вкладов в Вашем банке? 
13. Вы лично, каким образом получаете информацию об изменениях в системе 
страхования вкладов? 
14. Когда вносятся изменения в систему страхования вкладов, каким образом Вы 
информируете клиентов об этом? 
15. По Вашему мнению, вкладчики (клиенты) хорошо ознакомлены с параметрами и 
порядком работы системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Почему Вы так считаете? 
b. Можете ли Вы привести какие-либо примеры? 
16. Клиенты спрашивают Вас о системе страхования вкладов? 
a. Что их больше всего интересует (какие аспекты системы страхования 
вкладов)? 
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b. Наблюдаете ли Вы какие-либо особенности (с точки зрения возраста, 
социального положения и др.) тех, кто спрашивает? 
17. Считаете ли Вы, что система страхования вкладов защищает права и интересы 
вкладчиков? 
a. Какие подтверждения есть у вас в поддержку Вашего мнения? Вы можете 
привести какие-либо примеры? 
b. По Вашему мнению, вкладчики знают больше о своих правах сейчас, чем до 
введения системы страхования вкладов? 
18. Что Вы можете сказать об уровне финансовой грамотности россиян в целом и 
клиентов Вашего банка в частности? 
a. Есть ли какие-либо различия и почему? 
19. Какую бы оценку Вы поставили вкладчикам за знание о системе страхования 
вкладов (от 1 «единица» до 5 «отлично»)? 
a. Не могли бы Вы объяснить, почему Вы так думаете? У Вас есть какое-либо 
подтверждение этого? 
20. В Вашем банке существуют специальные правила по обслуживанию VIP-
клиентов? 
a. В чем существенное отличие в обслуживании таких клиентов – можно ли 
просмотреть внутренние инструкции? 
b. Есть ли какое-либо отличие в предоставлении информации о системе 
страхования вкладов VIP-клиентам, по сравнению с обычными клиентами? 
21. Каким образом, по Вашему мнению, изменилось поведение населения по 
отношению к сбережениям после введения системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Считаете ли Вы, что есть какая-либо взаимозависимость между 
изменениями поведения вкладчиков по отношению к сбережениям и 
введением системы страхования вкладов?  
i. Да – Есть ли у Вас какие-либо подтверждения в поддержку этого? 
ii. По Вашему мнению, это произошло только из-за работы системы 
страхования вкладов, или по какой-либо другой причине? 
22. Каким образом, по Вашему мнению, изменилось доверие населения к банковской 
системе в целом после введения системы страхования вкладов? 
a. Считаете ли Вы, что есть какая-либо взаимозависимость между 
изменениями доверия вкладчиков к банковской системе и введением 
системы страхования вкладов? 
i. Есть ли у Вас какие-либо подтверждения в поддержку этого? 
ii. Нет – почему? 
23. Изменились ли восприятие системы страхования вкладов среди Ваших клиентов в 
связи с финансовым кризисом? 
a. Да – в каком плане? 
b. Почему Вы так считаете? 
24. Считаете ли Вы, что система страхования вкладов уже достигла или достигнет 
целей, для которых она была создана? 
a. На основании чего Вы так считаете? 
b. Приведите примеры, пожалуйста? 
25. По Вашему мнению, каковы пути изменения (улучшения) системы страхования 
вкладов? 
a. Каким образом Вы бы изменили распространение информации о системе 
страхования вкладов? 
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26. По Вашему мнению, размер страхового возмещения в 700 000 рублей является 
обоснованным? Эта сумма соответствует потребностям Ваших клиентов? 
27. В общем и целом, какую пользу принесла система страхования вкладов Вашему 




Translation of Questions in Interview Schedule (List of 
Questions) for Bank Clerks 
 
1. How long have you been working in this bank? 
2. What positions have you occupied since the start of your employment in this bank? 
3. What are your main duties? 
4. Please explain, in a few sentences, how the DIS works? 
5. What are the objectives of the DIS? 
a. Have you read the Federal Law? 
6. Please describe the process of opening of a bank account.  
7. Do you tell the clients about the DIS when they open an account?   
a. If so, at what stage of the process? 
b. Why? 
c.  Does the amount of the deposit influence your decision as to whether or not 
to explain the DIS in detail? 
8. Looking at 10 average depositors, how many of them actually read the contract when 
opening a bank account, in your opinion? 
a. What are the possible conditions prompting clients to read it? 
9.  Of the same 10 average depositors, how many of them asked for additional 
information about the DIS? 
a. Which aspects of the DIS interested them most? 
b. Have you noticed any pattern (with regard to the age, social group etc.)? 
10. What information on DIS do you provide to clients? 
a. How did you notify the clients of this bank of its membership in the DIS? 
b. Are you personally aware of the recommendations on how best to inform your 
clients about the DIS issued by the Central Bank? 
11. What is the format of such information (verbal/printed)? 
12. How do you, personally, get information on the changes in the DIS? 
13. In your opinion, are depositors well informed about the parameters of and the 
compensation process under the DIS? 
a. How did you come to this conclusion? 
b. Can you give me any examples? 
14. Do customers ask about the DIS? 
15. What do you do if the client asks you a question about DIS and you do not know the 
answer? 
16. Do you think the perceptions of DIS among depositors changed due to the financial 
crisis? 
a. If so, in what ways? 
b. How did you come to this conclusion? 
17. How would you improve the dissemination of information on the DIS? 
18. Was there any influence on depositors from the DIS? 
a. On their saving behaviour? 
b. Why do you say this? Can you give me any examples? 
19. Overall, in your opinion, how did the DIS benefit your bank’s depositors? 
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Appendix 17 
Translation of Questions in Interview Schedule (List of 
Questions) for Heads of Branch 
 
1. How long have you been working in this bank? 
2. What positions have you occupied since the start of your employment in this bank? 
3. What are your main duties? 
4. What are the objectives of the DIS? 
a. Have you read the Federal Law? 
5. What methods do you use in order to attract new depositors? 
a. Do you use your membership in the DIS? 
6. What methods do you use in order to increase the sums of deposits by existing 
depositors? 
a. Do you use your membership in the DIS? 
7. Please explain how you use the fact of your bank’s membership in the DIS? 
8. Were there any changes in the structure of deposits since your bank entered the DIS?  
9. What information on the DIS do you provide to your clients? 
a. How did you notify the clients of the bank’s membership in the DIS? (active 
notification (telephone calls, letters by post, bringing their attention to the 
changes in the text of  the account contract etc.) or passive notification 
(display of information on the DIS in the branch, display of marketing 
materials with information on the DIS etc.). 
b. Are you personally aware of the recommendations on how best to inform your 
clients about the DIS issued by the Central Bank and Deposit Insurance 
Agency? 
10. What is the format of such information (verbal/printed)? 
a. Is it possible for me to have a copy of it (if printed)? 
11. What, in your opinion, is the most significant factor for your clients when they open 
an account in your bank? (e.g. high level of customer service, reputation of this bank, 
better condition of contract etc. compared to other banks). 
a. Do you think your membership in the DIS played any role in their decision to 
open bank account in this bank? 
b. If so, what role did it play? 
12. Who is responsible for providing information on the DIS to clients in your bank? 
13. How do you, personally, get information on the changes in the DIS? 
14. When changes occur, how do you communicate them to the clients? 
15. In your opinion, are depositors well informed about the DIS? 
a. Why do you say this? 
b. Can you give me any examples? 
16. Do customers ask about the DIS? 
17. In an ordinary month, how many times will depositors ask you to give more 
information on DIS? 
a. Which aspects of deposit protection are of particular interest to them? 
b. Did you observe any difference in age, wealth or social groups when it comes 
to asking about the DIS? 
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18. Do you think the DIS protects the rights and legal interests of depositors? 
a. Was it beneficial and, if so, how? 
b. Do they know more about their rights than before the introduction of the 
DIS? 
19. What can you say about the financial knowledge of the Russian population in general 
and of clients of this bank in particular? 
a. Are there any differences and why? 
20. How would you rate the depositors’ knowledge of DIS on a scale from 1 to 5? 
a. Why do you say this? Can you give me any examples? 
21. Are there special rules for VIP clients in this bank? 
a. What are the main differences in customer care? 
b. Are there any differences in relation to the way the information on the DIS is 
provided to VIP clients and to ordinary clients? 
22. How, in your opinion, did the saving behaviour of the Russian population change 
after the introduction of the DIS? 
a. Do you think there is any correlation between changes in the saving 
behaviour of depositors and the introduction of the DIS in 2004? 
i. If   so, do you have any evidence to support this? 
ii. Do you think it is only because of the DIS or is there any other 
reason? 
23. How, in your opinion, did public confidence in the banking system change after the 
introduction of the DIS? 
a. Do you think there is any correlation between changes in the confidence of 
depositors and the introduction of the DIS in 2004? 
i. Do you have any evidence to support this? 
ii. If not, why do you think it is the case? 
24. Do you think the perceptions of the DIS among depositors changed due to the 
financial crisis? 
a. If so, in what ways? 
b. How did you come to this conclusion? 
25. Do you think the DIS has achieved/will achieve its objectives? 
a. Why do you say this? 
b. Can you give me any examples? 
26. Are there any ways, in your opinion, that the DIS could be improved? 
a. How would you improve the dissemination of information on the DIS? 
27. Do you think that the maximum insurance compensation of 700 000 roubles is 
reasonable? Does it satisfy the demands of the clients of your bank? 




Translation of Questions in Interview Schedule (List of 
Questions) for Marketing Staff 
 
1. How long have you been working in this bank? 
2. What positions have you occupied since the start of your employment in this bank? 
3. What are your main duties? 
4. What are the objectives of the DIS? 
a. Have you read the Federal Law? 
5. What methods do you use in order to attract new depositors? 
a. Do you use your membership in the DIS? 
6. What methods do you use in order to increase the sums of deposits by existing 
depositors? 
a. Do you use your membership in the DIS? 
7. Please explain how you use the fact of your bank’s membership in the DIS? 
8. Were there any changes in the structure of deposits since your bank entered the DIS? 
(e.g. an increase in the number of deposits, an increase in the sums of deposits etc.). 
9. What information on DIS do you provide to your clients? 
a. How did you notify the clients of the bank’s membership in the DIS? (active 
notification (telephone calls, letters by post, bringing their attention to the 
changes in the text of  the account contract etc.) or passive notification 
(display of information on the DIS in the branch, display of marketing 
materials with information on the DIS etc.). 
b. Are you personally aware of the recommendations on how best to inform your 
clients about the DIS issued by the Central Bank and Deposit Insurance 
Agency? 
10. What is the format of such information (verbal/printed)? 
a. Is it possible for me to have a copy of it (if printed)? 
11. What, in your opinion, is the most significant factor for your clients when they open 
an account in your bank? (e.g. high level of customer service, reputation of this bank, 
better condition of contract etc. compared to other banks). 
a. Do you think your membership in the DIS played any role in their decision to 
open bank account in this bank? 
i. What role? 
12. Who is responsible for providing information on the DIS to clients in your bank? 
13. How do you, personally, get information on the changes in the DIS? 
14. When changes occur, how do you communicate them to the clients? 
15. In your opinion, are depositors well informed about the DIS? 
a. Why do you say this? 
b. Can you give me any examples? 
16. Do customers ask about the DIS? 
a. Which aspects of deposit protection are of particular interest to them? 
b. Did you observe any difference in age, wealth or social groups when it comes 
to asking about the DIS? 
17. Do you think the DIS protects the rights and legal interests of depositors? 
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a. Was it beneficial and, if so, how? 
b. Do they know more about their rights than before the introduction of the 
DIS? 
18. What can you say about the financial knowledge of Russian the population in general 
and of clients of this bank in particular? 
a. Are there any differences and why? 
19. How would you rate the depositors’ knowledge of DIS on a scale from 1 to 5? 
a. Why do you say this? Can you give me any examples? 
20. Do you have special rules for VIP clients in this bank? 
a. What are the main differences in the customer care? 
b. Are there any differences in relation to the way the information on the DIS is 
provided to VIP clients and ordinary clients? 
21. How, in your opinion, did the saving behaviour of the Russian population change 
after the introduction of the DIS? 
a. Do you think there is any correlation between changes in the saving 
behaviour of depositors and the introduction of the DIS in 2004? 
i. If so, do you have any evidence to support this? 
ii. Do you think it is only because of the DIS or is there any other 
reason? 
22. How, in your opinion, did public confidence in the banking system change after the 
introduction of the DIS? 
a. Do you think there is any correlation between changes in the confidence of 
depositors and the introduction of the DIS in 2004? 
i. Do you have any evidence to support this? 
ii. If not, why do you think it is the case? 
23. Do you think the perceptions of the DIS among depositors changed due to the 
financial crisis? 
a. If so, in what ways? 
b. How did you come to this conclusion? 
24. Do you think the DIS achieved/will achieve its objectives? 
a. Why do you say this? 
b. Can you give me any examples? 
25. Are there any ways, in your opinion, that the DIS could be improved? 
a. How would you improve the dissemination of information on the DIS? 
26. Do you think that the maximum insurance compensation of 700 000 roubles is 
reasonable? Does it satisfy the demands of the clients of your bank? 
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681 Number of branches as at the time of data collection, March-May 2009. Branches marked with 
a push-pin are those where interviews took place. Bank A1 (blue colour) – 11 branches; Bank A2 
(red colour) – 15 branches; Bank B1 (green colour) – 5 branches; Bank C1 (turquoise colour) – 2 
branches; Bank D1 (yellow colour) – 2 branches; Bank D2 (purple colour) – 12 branches. 
